Konrad Muzyka Russian Forces in the Western Military District

The 152nd Missile Brigade, based in Chernyakovsk (and shown in Figure 12), was the next to last brigade in the Russian ground forces to receive the Iskander complex, in 2018. In this case, delivering the complex to Kaliningrad it may have been an intentional move as the system became a part of the Russian propaganda toolkit used against NATO countries, Poland, and the Baltic States in particular. Any information about the possible deployment of the system (either permanently or for exercises) was met with an uproar, and the media in those countries gave increased attention to the militarization of the region. Unlike the missile brigade based in Luga, and because of its location (in the northeastern part of the city), the base does not seem to feature a weapon storage area where warheads for the Iskander complex can be stored; this presumably has a negative effect on the readiness of the brigade.

The army corps also has the 148th Repair and Recovery Battalion, which provides repair and recovery services to ground units in Kaliningrad.

The Baltic Sea Fleet commander also manages coastal defense forces, which are composed of the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade, the 25th Coastal Missile Regiment, the 561st Naval Reconnaissance Centre, the 69th Naval Engineering Regiment, and the 841st EW Centre.

Figure 12. The 152nd Missile Brigade based in Chernyakovsk, largely completed

Source: Includes material from © CNES 2020, Distribution Airbus DS, all rights reserved/PLEIADES satellite imagery/Acquired through ShadowBreak Intl. on Oct. 5, 2020.

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The army corps also has the 148th Repair and Recovery Battalion, which provides repair and recovery services to ground units in Kaliningrad.

The Baltic Sea Fleet commander also manages coastal defense forces, which are composed of the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade, the 25th Coastal Missile Regiment, the 561st Naval Reconnaissance Centre, the 69th Naval Engineering Regiment, and the 841st EW Centre.

The 336th Naval Infantry Brigade is the most combat-ready ground force/naval infantry unit in the oblast. Its personnel were deployed to operations in Eastern Ukraine in 2014 and Syria in 2016. This confirms that at least some of the personnel from the brigade have gained combat experience—some, possibly in two theaters—which has undeniably increased the overall professionalism levels within the unit.

Locally, personnel from the brigade train extensively, usually at the Khmelevka training range, although these exercises are rather limited in mission scope and size (company level). Within the first two months of service, enlisted servicemembers spend an average of three weeks at the range.

The brigade is a heavily mechanized force. It fields around 60-80 BTR-82s (two battalions). One battalion, the 879th, has jump status, which is confirmed by social media posts. The battalion could, therefore, be earmarked for airborne assault operations. Its personnel train with the VDV and are likely linked to them on an operational level. Interoperability between Western VDV forces (most likely the 76th Airborne Division) and the 336th Brigade, is also presumably higher than interoperability between other units stationed in the oblast.

This means that in times of crisis or war, personnel from the brigade could be employed with VDV servicemembers, using the latter’s transport aircraft in coastal areas to clear them from opposing forces and allow for amphibious landings. The brigade possesses organic artillery capability in the form of an artillery battalion.

The 25th Coastal Missile Regiment operates out of Donskoye. It is equipped with a battalion of one 3K60 Bal and, presumably, one K-300P Bastion-P coastal defense system.80 The unit is tasked with protecting sea approaches and conducting surface-to-water strikes against opposing naval forces at stand-off distances. In Syria, the K-300P Bastion-P has also been used in a land attack mode, thus expanding the mission envelope of the regiment.

At least one company—the 69th Naval Engineering Regiment—is at full readiness status to conduct demining tasks across the Kaliningrad Oblast. However, apart from such missions, the unit is also responsible for the provision of camouflage and deception capabilities for some of

80 Интерфакс АВН, Балтийский флот будет усилен еще одним противокорабельным ракетным дивизионом с комплексом "Бал" – источник, Интерфакс АВН, 02.03.2019, https://www.militarynews.ru/story.asp?rid=1&nid=503170&lang=RU.

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the forces stationed in the oblast. Also, it has a pontoon-bridging battalion that provides bridging capabilities for ground forces operating in and from the oblast.

Electronic warfare capability on a fleet level is provided by the 841st EW Centre, which may consist of two battalions and a company. The first battalion undertakes strategic EW tasks, and the second is responsible for the provision of EW capability on a tactical level.81

The Centre fields the “Samarkand” electronic warfare (EW) system,82 which has the stated role of monitoring and assessing the electromagnetic spectrum, instantly detecting, analyzing, and locating radio signals in conjunction with other mobile and static signals intelligence/electronic intelligence (SIGINT/ELINT) systems, as well as using software, electronics, and other decoys to divert and misdirect enemy platforms and systems away from intended targets. Krasuha EW and Murmansk-BM complexes are also understood to be deployed within the Centre.83

Naval forces

As of mid 2020, the Baltic Sea Fleet fielded 52 surface combatants and one subsurface combatant, with an average age of 24 years. These assets are grouped into two naval bases: Leningrad (Kronstadt) and Baltyisk. In Kronstadt, the fleet deploys the 3rd Submarine Brigade84 and the 105th Sea Protection Ships Brigade. In addition, two rescue detachments are subordinated to the base, one of which is earmarked for expeditionary (long-range) operations. Note that each naval base across Russia has one subunit—a detachment for counteraction underwater diversionary forces and facilities—which conducts underwater combat, mining, and demining operations, and protect fleets’ assets against the enemy’s naval special forces. In the case of the Baltic Sea Fleet, these are the 473rd and the 313th Detachments, located in Kronstadt and Baltyisk, respectively.

81Jonas Kjellèn, Russian Electronic Warfare. The role of Electronic Warfare in the Russian Armed Forces, FOI, Apr. 10, 2018, p. 37, https://www.foi.se/rapportsammanfattning?reportNo=FOI-R--4625--SE.

82Андрей Резчиков, «Самарканд» превратит армии НАТО в войско дикарей, Взгляд, Oct. 28, 2018, https://vz.ru/society/2018/10/28/674524.html.

83Лидия Мисник, Гроза Европы: в Калининграде развернули «Мурманск-БН», Газета.ру, Apr. 26, 2019, https://www.gazeta.ru/army/2019/04/26/12323509.shtml. This deployment is also confirmed by satellite imagery (54.831422, 19.957723).

84The brigade fields one Kilo-class patrol submarine – Project 877EKM (487 Dmitrov, commissioned in 1986). It was under repair between 2014 and March 2018, when it was transferred back to the Baltic Sea Fleet. In the meantime, the second submarine of the fleet, Project 877 (469 Vyborg, commissioned in 1983), is understood to have been decommissioned in November 2018.

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In the future, the fleet may obtain modern submarines in the form of the Project 636.3 Varshavyanka class (Improved-Kilo). There are several reasons why the Baltic Sea

Fleet’s submarine presence is mediocre. The first is that the Black Sea Fleet took modernization priority post-2014, which resulted in the delivery of six 636.3 Varshavyanka class submarines between 2014 and 2016. The second modernization priority pertained to the delivery of new submarines to the Pacific and Northern Fleets as an additional support to their SSBN forces. The third reason is the low priority of the Baltic Fleet as a training and sea trials fleet. Last but not least, the Russian military leadership had little incentive to allocate funds into the development of the Baltic Sea Fleet’s capabilities, in view of the inherent weakness of other regional navies. The Polish Navy’s submarine force is on the brink of collapse, and there are real concerns that Warsaw may soon lose this capability altogether. The surface fleet is also antiquated, obsolete, and unable to effectively address challenges posed by the fleet and its seaand land-based platforms.

Most naval forces are stationed in Baltyisk: the 36th Missile Boats Brigade, the 64th Sea Protection Ships Brigade, the 72nd ELINT Ships Squadron, the 71st Landing Ships Brigade, the 106th Small Missile Ships Squadron, and the 128th Surface Ships Brigade. Each fleet also has a detachment that is responsible for rescue and emergency operations as well as for undertaking such roles in expeditionary missions. Baltyisk also houses the 342nd Emergency Rescue Detachment, and the base in Kronstadt has both the 501st Emergency Rescue Detachment and the 328th Expeditionary Emergency Rescue Detachment.

Between 2007 and 2014, the fleet received four Steregushchy-class FFCs (Project 20380) and one Neustrashimy-class FFG (FFG Project 11540). In 2016, Russia redeployed two Project 21631 Buyan-M artillery ships from the Black Sea Fleet to the Baltic Sea. These vessels epitomize the “Kalibrization” of the Russian Navy, which seeks to provide the Russian Navy with as many cruise missiles as possible. Indeed, one of the most significant surface ship developments has been the fitting of the Kalibr capability to the Project 21631 Buyan-M corvettes. The ships’ eight-cell 3S-14 VLS launcher has been used to fire missiles on a number of occasions during combat operations in Syria. What is most striking in this development is the proven ability to fit a long-range land-attack punch to even relatively small surface platforms, and for these platforms to have a demonstrable impact on shaping events ashore. With a reported range of 1,500 km (932 miles), these missiles can effectively engage targets across Western and Northern Europe. However, the Buyan-M’s weakness is a lack of air defense, given that it comprises two Komar launchers with 9M39, 9M313, or 9M342 Igla missiles, which can only engage targets up to 6 km (3.7 miles). This means that Buyan-Ms also need to operate under a more robust air defense umbrella provided either by larger-class vessels, such as Steregushchiy-class, or by land-based systems.

Initially, the inclusion of Buyan-Ms in the Baltic Sea Fleet inventory served as a power projection tool, but its psychological effect on regional countries could not be

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Air and air defense forces

Russia has deployed and developed a robust network of strategicand tactical-level SAM capabilities that fall under the command of the 44th Air Defence Division. The division comprises the 183rd Air Defence Regiment, the 1545th Air Defence Regiment, and the 81st Radio-Technical Regiment.

In early 2019 the 1545th Air Defence Regiment was rearmed with a regimental set (two battalions) of the S-400s, which are stationed just north of Gvardeysk. The 183rd Regiment fields four S-400 battalions, which are deployed in the western parts of the oblast,85 and two S-300PS battalions just north and south of the Chernyakovsk Air Base.86 The conversion of the 1545th also indicates a definite removal of the S-300V SAM system, which the unit previously operated, from the oblast (or perhaps it is a confirmation of the system’s non-existence). It is unclear whether there are plans to redeploy it into Kaliningrad; however, from an operational perspective, such a system would undeniably improve the ground forces’ ability to operate in a contested environment.

In terms of aviation, in 2018 Russia opened the airbase in Chkalovsk, which was closed for modernization in 2013. The works involved extending the runway, replacing its surface, increasing the apron’s size, and installing new navigation and communication systems.

Surprisingly, imagery intelligence (IMINT) shows that the resurfacing concluded in 2016 and no construction works occurred at the base for two years. It is unclear what caused the delay, but one would expect an airbase modernization to take less than five years, especially given the deteriorating security environment after Russia’s seizure of Crimea and its operations in Eastern Ukraine. Currently, aircraft at Chkalovsk are parked in the open air, because no new shelters have been built.

It remains to be seen whether the Chernyakhovsk airbase will undergo a similar upgrade or whether it will be used as a reserve airbase. As of mid 2020, fixed-wing combat assets were stationed in Chkalovsk.

85One is near Mamonovo by the Polish border; one is south and one is north of Baltyisk; and one is near Yantarny.

86Центр АСТ, В Калининградской области развернуты уже шесть дивизионов зенитной ракетной системы С-400, Mar. 12, 2019, https://bmpd.livejournal.com/3566812.html.

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Russian aviation assets in the Kaliningrad Oblast are centered around the 132nd SAD87, which comprises the 4th Guards Naval Assault Air Regiment, the 689th Guards MshAP, a UAV company, and the 369th OSVP. 88

The naval attack aviation regiment was originally stationed in Chernyakovsk. Between 2016 and 2018 it received eight Su-30SMs, which partially replaced and augmented the squadron of Su-24M/MR aircraft.89

The 689th MshAP is equipped with about 20 Su-27P/UB fighters, some of which were diverted from the 790th IAP’s base as it was converting to Su-35s. Ultimately these Su-27s should also be replaced by modern platforms; however, this seems unlikely in the medium term. The combat structure of the division will rest on four squadrons equipped with a mix of Su-30SMs, Su-24s, and Su-27s.

Rotary-wing assets are subordinated to the 396th OSVP from Donskoye. It is composed of the 125th OVE (Mi-24s and Mi-8Ts), 396th OKPLVE (Ka-27(M)s, Ka-27Ps, and Ka-29s), and the 398th OVTE. The last subunit provides VIP airlift for Baltic Sea Fleet personnel as well as tactical airlift for ground forces.

87 A June 2020 Krasnaya Zvezda report stated that rotary-wing aviation assets operating in the Kaliningrad Oblast are subordinate to the 34th SAD. No mention of the 132nd SAD was made therein. It is possible that the 132nd SAD has indeed morphed into the 34th SAD. However, neither has this information been officially confirmed, nor has the author confirmed the veracity of this claim from other openly available sources.

Владислав Павлютки, Стражи неба и моря, Красная Звезда, June 8, 2020, http://redstar.ru/strazhi-neba-i- morya/.

88Regnum, В Крыму и в Калининграде формируют две новые авиационные дивизии, Regnum, Oct. 30, 2019, https://regnum.ru/news/polit/2763916.html.

89Piotr Butowski claims that all MR variants were withdrawn from service and replaced by a Forpost UAV detachment. Piotr Butowski, Flashpoint Russia: Russia’s Air Power: Capabilities and Structure (Vienna: Harpia Publishing, 2019), p. 111.

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Ongoing Modernization, Finished

Reform

The current composition of conventional components of the Russian armed forces deployed in the Western Military District presents a force that is capable of conducting operations across all domains and the entire spectrum of warfare. Table 4 shows a summary of Russian forces in the Western Military District.

Table 4. Summary of Russian forces in the Western Military District

Source: Author’s calculation.

Since 2014, the Russian armed forces have demonstrated the capability to undertake special forces-led irregular warfare missions, high-tempo maneuver warfare with armor, mechanized forces and artillery forces, effective air operations, and seaand air-led long-range conventional precision strikes. An indirect threat to use nuclear weapons was used to advance the state’s interests and deter potentially hostile actions against Russia in February and March

2014.

A decision to move away from the brigade concept towards heavier division-led ground operations highlights the difference in threat assessments between the current minister of defense, Sergei Shoigu, and those of his predecessor, Anatoly Serdyukov. The latter expected future wars to be limited to local conflicts akin to that in Georgia in 2008. The MoD view is that

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conflict with NATO is possible, although unlikely, and that, given the alliance’s expansion towards Russia, Moscow needs to be prepared for large-scale operations using regiments and divisions as its main maneuver forces.

The predominant developments focus on the creation of heavy forces that can engage a nearpeer adversary close to Russian borders and that can deliver a preponderance of power in the initial stages of conflict and thus bring it to a swift conclusion, or at least place Russia in a favorable position for negotiation. That said, lessons learned from the Syrian campaign also seem to be incorporated into the armed forces. The creation of light and ultra-light battalions seeks to further enhance mobility and maneuverability of land force sub-units, especially in areas where other formations seem to be too heavy or require significant logistics support.

NATO, however, is not the sole enemy “at the gates.” The push to establish new regiments, divisions, and armies around Ukraine since 2014 clearly indicates concerns about possible conflict escalation in this southwestern strategic direction. At the same time, these forces could be redeployed to Belarus or farther north near the Baltic States, if required, in order to create favorable correlations of force ratios in targeted battlespaces.

Expansion of divisions, within both the ground and airborne forces, is stymied by a lack of manpower, appropriate equipment, modernization priorities, and—perhaps the most important—financial considerations. The process of expanding VDV to a historic threeregiment configuration is slow. The 1st GTA has two maneuver divisions, whereas its Cold War predecessor had three. Similarly, each division was to have six regiments, but it only fields five.

It is Russian policy to build up and maintain forces to fight a conventional war in its neighborhood and sustain enough capability to achieve the immediate deterrent effect through the peacetime location of military units and capabilities that go with them. This pertains not only to strictly offensive operations but to defensive ones as well. A surge in air defense assets deployed in the Western MD in recent years will significantly hinder air operations of any conventional opponent. Long-range assets also ensure that Russia can deliver high-precision strikes on strategic assets to cripple an opposing force’s command and control.

To support such operations, in recent years Russia has grown its logistics and support capabilities to provide a constant flow of materiel into the battlefield, evacuate and repair equipment when necessary, and undertake deception operations in terms of movement and assembly of Russian units.

The reorganization of the units stationed in the Western Military District has largely concluded. Although some tactical-level innovations based on combat experiences could be implemented across ground forces, the main fighting and support components are established. There nevertheless are weak areas that will demand addressing. Restructuring of Russian assets in the Kaliningrad Oblast is ongoing, but the pace is sluggish.

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Although St. Petersburg is heavily defended with multiple SAM sites, ground force elements would need to be significantly reinforced even if they were to conduct effective defensive operations—and much more so if they were to undertake offensive missions in the Baltic States.

In August or September 2021 Russia and Belarus will conduct the quadrennial Zapad-21 strategic-operational exercise. This will provide insights into how Russia’s threat assessment has changed in the last four years and how it plans to fight a war with a near-peer adversary on its borders. The political crisis that erupted following the August 2020 presidential elections in Belarus and statements coming from the Belarusian president, Alexander Lukashenko, blaming NATO and the EU for political upheaval,90 again indicate that NATO will once more be the main target of the exercise. Numerous calls to Russia for military and political assistance have left Lukashenko weakened in relation to Russia and in the face of Moscow’s demands to expedite the merger of the two countries.91 Zapad-21 will present an ideal opportunity for the Russian troops to stay in Belarus. If this happens, NATO’s military posture in Poland and the

Baltic States will need to adapt to the challenge of a significantly expanded battlefield (from Belarus to Kaliningrad) and decreased deployment time for Russian forces.

90“Belarus: Rival rallies as Lukashenko claims NATO deployed to border,” Deutsche Welle, Aug. 16, 2020, https://www.dw.com/en/belarus-rival-rallies-as-lukashenko-claims-nato-deployed-to-border/a-54586752.

91Konrad Muzyka, Endgame? Russia to deepen military co-operation with Belarus, Rochan Consulting, Sept. 16, 2020, https://rochan-consulting.com/endgame-russia-to-deepen-military-co-operation-with-belarus/.

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