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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
Table 16. Major Factions/Leaders in Afghanistan
Party/ |
|
Ideology/ |
|
Leader |
Leader |
Ethnicity |
Regional Base |
|
|
|
|
Taliban |
Mullah (Islamic cleric) Muhammad Umar (still at large |
Ultra- |
Throughout |
|
possibly in Afghanistan). Umar, born in Tarin Kowt, Uruzgan |
orthodox |
south and east. |
|
province, is about 65 years old. |
Islamic, |
Small numbers |
|
|
Pashtun |
elsewhere. |
Haqqani |
Jalaludin Haqqani. Allied with Taliban and Al Qaeda. Said to |
Same as |
Paktia, Paktika, |
Network |
be supported, or at least tolerated, by Pakistani ISI. |
above |
Khost, Kabul |
Islamic Society |
Yunus Qanooni (speaker of lower house)/Muhammad |
Moderate |
Much of |
(leader of |
Fahim/Dr. Abdullah Abdullah (Foreign Minister 2001-2006). |
Islamic, |
northern and |
“Northern |
Ismail Khan, a so-called “warlord,” heads faction of the |
mostly Tajik |
western |
Alliance”) |
grouping in Herat area. Former party head, Burhanuddi |
|
Afghanistan, |
|
Rabbani, assassinated by Taliban in September 2011. |
|
including Kabul |
National |
Abdul Rashid Dostam. Was Karzai rival in October 2004 |
Secular, left- |
Jowzjan, Balkh, |
Islamic |
presidential election, then his top “security adviser.” As of |
leaning, |
Faryab, Sar-i-Pol, |
Movement of |
October 2011, reportedly has joined new opposition |
Uzbek |
and Samangan |
Afghanistan |
movement called “Truth and Justice Party.” |
|
provinces. |
Hizb-e- |
Composed of Shiite Hazara tribes from central Afghanistan. |
Shiite, |
Bamiyan, Ghazni, |
Wahdat |
Former members Karim Khalili is vice president, but |
Hazara |
Dai Kundi |
|
Mohammad Mohaqiq is Karzai rival. Generally pro-Iranian. |
tribes |
province |
|
Was part of Rabbani 1992-1996 government, and fought |
|
|
|
unsuccessfully with Taliban over Bamiyan. Still revered by |
|
|
|
Hazaras is the former leader of the group, Abdul Ali Mazari, |
|
|
|
who was captured and killed by the Taliban in March 1995. |
|
|
Pashtun |
Various regional governors and local leaders in the east and |
Moderate |
Dominant in the |
tribal/regional |
south; central government led by Hamid Karzai. |
Islamic, |
south and east |
leaders |
|
Pashtun |
|
Hizb-e-Islam |
Mujahedin party leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar. Was part of |
Orthodox |
Small groups in |
Gulbuddin |
Soviet-era U.S.-backed “Afghan Interim Government” based |
Islamic, |
Nangarhar, |
(HIG) |
in Peshawar, Pakistan. Was nominal “prime minister” in |
Pashtun |
Nuristan, and |
|
1992-1996 mujahedin government but never actually took |
|
Kunar provinces |
|
office. Lost power base around Jalalabad to the Taliban in |
|
|
|
1994, and fled to Iran before being expelled in 2002. Still |
|
|
|
active in operations east of Kabul, but open to ending |
|
|
|
militant activity. Leader of a rival Hizb-e-Islam faction, Yunus |
|
|
|
Khalis, the mentor of Mullah Umar, died July 2006. |
|
|
Islamic Union |
Abd-I-Rab Rasul Sayyaf. Islamic conservative, leads a pro- |
orthodox |
Paghman |
|
Karzai faction in parliament. Lived many years in and |
Islamic, |
(west of Kabul) |
|
politically close to Saudi Arabia, which shares his “Wahhabi” |
Pashtun |
|
|
ideology. During anti-Soviet war, Sayyaf’s faction, with |
|
|
|
Hikmatyar, was a principal recipient of U.S. weaponry. |
|
|
|
Criticized the U.S.-led war against Saddam Hussein after |
|
|
|
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. |
|
|
Source: CRS.
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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
Residual Issues from Past Conflicts
A few issues remain unresolved from Afghanistan’s many years of conflict, such as Stinger retrieval and mine eradication.
Stinger Retrieval
Beginning in late 1985 following internal debate, the Reagan Administration provided about 2,000 man-portable “Stinger” anti-aircraft missiles to the mujahedin for use against Soviet aircraft. Prior to the ouster of the Taliban, common estimates suggested that 200-300 Stingers remained at large, although more recent estimates put the number below 100.92 The Stinger issue resurfaced in conjunction with 2001 U.S. war effort, when U.S. pilots reported that the Taliban fired some Stingers at U.S. aircraft. No hits were reported. The danger of these weapons has become apparent on several past occasions. Iran bought 16 of the missiles in 1987 and fired one against U.S. helicopters in the Persian Gulf. India claimed that it was a Stinger supplied to Islamic rebels in Kashmir by sympathizers in Afghanistan, that shot down an Indian helicopter over Kashmir in May 1999.93 Soviet-made SA-7 “Strella” man-portable launchers, which allegedly have been used in the past by Al Qaeda, including against an Israeli passenger jet in Kenya on November 30, 2002, were discovered in Afghanistan by U.S. forces in December 2002.
In 1992, after the fall of the Russian-backed government of Najibullah, the United States reportedly spent about $10 million to buy the Stingers back, at a premium, from individual mujahedin commanders. The New York Times reported on July 24, 1993, that the buyback effort failed because the United States was competing with other buyers, including Iran and North Korea, and that the CIA would spend about $55 million in FY1994 in a renewed effort. On March 7, 1994, The Washington Post reported that the CIA had recovered only about 50 or 100 at-large Stingers. In February 2002, the Afghan government found and turned over to the United States “dozens” of Stingers.94 In January 2005, Afghan intelligence began buying Stingers back, at a reported cost of $150,000 each.95 Any Stingers that remain in Afghanistan likely pose little threat, in part because of deteriorating components. No recent uses are reported.
Mine Eradication
Land mines laid during the Soviet occupation constitute one of the principal dangers to the Afghan people. The United Nations estimates that 5 million to 7 million mines remain scattered throughout the country, although some estimates are lower. U.N. teams have destroyed 1 million mines and are now focusing on de-mining priority-use, residential and commercial property, including lands around Kabul. Amounts contributed by the United States to the de-mining effort are shown in the tables above. Most of the funds have gone to HALO Trust, a British organization, and the U.N. Mine Action Program for Afghanistan. The Afghanistan Compact adopted in London in February 2006 states that by 2010, the goal should be to reduce the land area of Afghanistan contaminated by mines by 70%.
92Saleem, Farrukh. “Where Are the Missing Stinger Missiles? Pakistan,” Friday Times. August 17-23, 2001.
93“U.S.-Made Stinger Missiles—Mobile and Lethal.” Reuters, May 28, 1999.
94Fullerton, John. “Afghan Authorities Hand in Stinger Missiles to U.S.” Reuters, February 4, 2002.
95“Afghanistan Report,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. February 4, 2005.
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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
Appendix. U.S. and International Sanctions Lifted
Virtually all U.S. and international sanctions on Afghanistan, some imposed during the Soviet occupation era and others on the Taliban regime, have now been lifted.
•P.L. 108-458 (December 17, 2004, referencing the 9/11 Commission recommendations) repealed bans on aid to Afghanistan outright. On October 7, 1992, President George H. W. Bush had issued Presidential Determination 93-3 that Afghanistan is no longer a Marxist-Leninist country, but the determination was not implemented before he left office. Had it been implemented, the prohibition on Afghanistan’s receiving Export-Import Bank guarantees, insurance, or credits for purchases under Section 8 of the 1986 Export-Import Bank Act, would have been lifted. In addition, Afghanistan would have been able to receive U.S. assistance because the requirement would have been waived that Afghanistan apologize for the 1979 killing in Kabul of U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Adolph “Spike” Dubs. (Dubs was kidnapped in Kabul in 1979 and killed when Afghan police stormed the hideout where he was held.)
•U.N. sanctions on the Taliban imposed by Resolution 1267 (October 15, 1999), Resolution 1333 (December 19, 2000), and Resolution 1363 (July 30, 2001) have now been narrowed to penalize only Al Qaeda (by Resolution 1390, January 17, 2002). Resolution 1267 banned flights outside Afghanistan by Ariana, and directed U.N. member states to freeze Taliban assets. Resolution 1333 prohibited the provision of arms or military advice to the Taliban (directed against Pakistan); ordered a reduction of Taliban diplomatic representation abroad; and banned foreign travel by senior Taliban officials. Resolution 1363 provided for monitors in Pakistan to ensure that no weapons or military advice was provided to the Taliban.
•On January 10, 2003, President Bush signed a proclamation making Afghanistan a beneficiary of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), eliminating U.S. tariffs on 5,700 Afghan products. Afghanistan had been denied GSP on May 2, 1980, under Executive Order 12204 (45 F.R. 20740).
•On April 24, 1981, controls on U.S. exports to Afghanistan of agricultural products and phosphates were terminated. Such controls were imposed on June 3, 1980, as part of the sanctions against the Soviet Union for the invasion of Afghanistan, under the authority of Sections 5 and 6 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 [P.L. 96-72; 50 U.S.C. app. 2404, app. 2405].
•In mid-1992, the George H. W. Bush Administration determined that Afghanistan no longer had a “Soviet-controlled government.” This opened Afghanistan to the use of U.S. funds made available for the U.S. share of U.N. organizations that provide assistance to Afghanistan.
•On March 31, 1993, after the fall of Najibullah in 1992, President Clinton, on national interest grounds, waived restrictions provided for in Section 481 (h) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 mandating sanctions on Afghanistan, including bilateral aid cuts and suspensions, including denial of Ex-Im Bank credits; the casting of negative U.S. votes for multilateral development bank loans; and a non-allocation of a U.S. sugar quota. Discretionary sanctions included denial of GSP; additional duties on exports to the United States; and
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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
curtailment of air transportation with the United States. Waivers were also granted in 1994 and, after the fall of the Taliban, by President Bush.
•On May 3, 2002, President Bush restored normal trade treatment to the products of Afghanistan, reversing the February 18, 1986, proclamation by President Reagan (Presidential Proclamation 5437) that suspended most-favored nation (MFN) tariff status for Afghanistan (51 F.R. 4287). The Foreign Assistance Appropriations for FY1986 [Section 552, P.L. 99-190] had authorized the denial of U.S. credits or most-favored-nation (MFN) status for Afghanistan.
•On July 2, 2002, the State Department amended U.S. regulations (22 C.F.R. Part 126) to allow arms sales to the new Afghan government, reversing the June 14, 1996, addition of Afghanistan to the list of countries prohibited from importing U.S. defense articles and services. Arms sales to Afghanistan had also been prohibited during 1997-2002 because Afghanistan had been designated under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132) as a state that is not cooperating with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts.
•On July 2, 2002, President Bush formally revoked the July 4, 1999, declaration by President Clinton of a national emergency with respect to Taliban because of its hosting of Bin Laden. The Clinton determination and related Executive Order 13129 had blocked Taliban assets and property in the United States, banned U.S. trade with Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan, and applied these sanctions to Ariana Afghan Airlines, triggering a blocking of Ariana assets (about $500,000) in the United States and a ban on U.S. citizens’ flying on the airline. (The ban on trade with Taliban-controlled territory had essentially ended on January 29, 2002, when the State Department determination that the Taliban controls no territory within Afghanistan.)
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Figure A-1. Map of Afghanistan
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.
CRS-80
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
Figure A-2. Map of Afghan Ethnicities
Source: 2003 National Geographic Society. http://www.afghan-network.net/maps/Afghanistan-Map.pdf. Adapted by Amber Wilhelm, CRS Graphics.
Notes: This map is intended to be illustrative of the approximate demographic distribution by region of Afghanistan. CRS has no way to confirm exact population distributions.
Author Contact Information
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612
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