Bordens Social Psychology (3rd ed)
.pdf408 Social Psychology
arousing empathic concern about a person in distress, helping situations also arouse a greater sense of self-other overlap. Specifically, the helper sees more of himself or herself in the person in need (Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 1997). When this occurs, the helper may engage in helping because of a greater sense of closeness with the victim than with the arousal of empathic concern alone.
Cialdini and colleagues (1997) conducted three experiments to test the self-other oneness hypothesis. They found that when the self-other-oneness dimension was considered along with empathy arousal, the relationship between empathy and altruism was weakened substantially. Furthermore, they found that empathy increases altruism only if it results in an increase in self-other oneness. According to Cialdini and colleagues, empathic concern for a victim serves as an emotional cue for the increase in self-other oneness. Additionally, as suggested by Neuberg and colleagues, because empathy is an emotion, it may only be important in deciding between not helping or providing minimal or superficial help (Newberg, Cialdini, Brown, Luce, & Sagarin, 1997).
However, the matter was not resolved, because Batson (1997) pointed out that the methods used by Cialdini and colleagues were questionable. In fact, Batson and colleagues (1997) found that when more careful procedures were used, there was little evidence that self-other oneness was critical in mediating the empathy-altruism link. As to whether empathy arousal leads only to superficial helping, Batson pointed out that the empathy-altruism hypothesis only states that empathy arousal is often associated with an altruistic act and does not specify the depth of the act. Batson, however, does acknowledge that there may be limits to the empathy-altruism relationship.
Where do we stand currently on these hypotheses about helping? Although the research of Batson and others supports the empathy-altruism hypothesis (Batson et al., 1988; Dovidio et al., 1990), other research does not. For example, a strong relationship has been found between feeling and giving help, a finding that does not support the empathy-altruism hypothesis (Cialdini & Fultz, 1990). If we give help when we feel sad, it seems more likely that we are helping to relieve personal distress than out of pure altruism.
It is apparent that the empathy-altruism hypothesis remains a point of controversy in social psychology. Batson (1997) suggested that the controversy exists mainly over whether there is enough clear evidence to justify acceptance of the empathy-altruism hypothesis. There is agreement, according to Batson, that empathy can be a factor in altruistic behavior. At this point, it is probably best to adopt a position between the competing hypotheses. People may be motivated by empathic altruism, but they seem to need to know that the victim benefited from their help (Smith, Keating, & Stotland, 1989). This allows them to experience empathic joy for helping the victim. Empathic joy simply means that helpers feel good about the fact that their efforts helped someone and that there was a positive outcome for that person. Helpers get a reward: the knowledge that someone they helped benefited. Additionally, helping situations may arouse a greater sense of closeness or oneness with the helper and the victim. In any event, empathy does appear to be an important emotion involved in altruism.
Biological Explanations: Helping in Order to Preserve Our Own Genes
As mentioned earlier, some psychologists have been skeptical about the existence of purely altruistic behavior, because they believe behavior is shaped and regulated by rewards and punishments. But there is another reason psychologists have been skeptical about the existence of pure altruism, and that reason is biological: People or animals
Chapter 11 Prosocial Behavior and Altruism |
409 |
that carry altruism involving personal danger to its logical conclusion will sometimes die. Because self-preservation, or at least the preservation of oneʼs genes (i.e., oneʼs children or relatives), is a fundamental rule of evolutionary biology, pure altruism stands on some shaky grounds (Wilson, 1978). Self-sacrificing behavior is very rare. When it occurs, we reward it extravagantly. The Medal of Honor, for example, is given for extraordinary bravery, behavior that goes beyond the call of duty.
Evolutionary biologists find altruistic behavior fascinating, because it presents a biological paradox: In light of the principle of survival of the fittest, how can a behavior have evolved that puts the individual at risk and makes survival less likely (Wilson, 1975)? The principle of natural selection favors selfish behavior. Those animals that take care of themselves and do not expend energy on helping others are more likely to survive and reproduce their genes. The basic measure of biological fitness is the relative number of an individualʼs offspring that survive and reproduce (Wilson, 1975).
The evolutionary biologistʼs answer to the paradox is to suggest that there are no examples of purely altruistic, totally selfless behavior in nature. Instead, there is behavior that may have the effect of helping others but also serves some selfish purpose. For example, consider the white-fronted bee eater, a bird living in eastern and southernAfrica (Goleman, 1991b). These birds live in complex colonies consisting of 15 to 25 extended families. Family units consist of about four overlapping generations. When breeding time arrives, some family members do not breed. Instead, they serve as helpers who devote themselves to constructing nests, feeding females, and defending the young. This helping is called alloparenting, or cooperative breeding.
How could such behavior have evolved? The bee eaters who do not breed lose the opportunity to pass on their genes to offspring. However, their behavior does help to ensure the survival of the whole colony and, specifically, the family members with whom they share genes. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the bee eater helpers provide cooperative help only to their closest relatives. Birds that could have provided help but do not turn out to be “in-laws”—birds that have no genetic connection with the mating pairs. Although the helping behavior does not further the survival of the individualʼs genes, it serves to preserve the individualʼs gene pool.
Do humans differ significantly from animals when it comes to altruism? According to sociobiologists, human social behavior is governed by the same rules that order all animal behavior. A central problem of sociobiology is to explain how altruism can exist even though such behavior endangers individual fitness and survival (Wilson, 1975, 1978). However, there is ample evidence that altruism among humans flourishes and endures.
One possible resolution to this apparent paradox lies in the idea that human survival, dating to the beginnings of human society, depends on cooperation. Human beings, smaller, slower, and weaker than many other animal species, needed to form cooperative groups to survive. In such groups reciprocal altruism may be more important than kin altruism. In reciprocal altruism, the costs of behaving altruistically are weighed against the benefits. If there is greater benefit than cost, an altruistic response will occur. Also, reciprocal altruism involves a kind of tit-for-tat mentality: You help me, and Iʼll help you.
Cooperation and reciprocal altruism (helping one another) would have been selected for, genetically, because they increase the survival of human beings (Hoffman, 1981). Unlike animals, humans do not restrict their helping to close genetic relatives. Instead, humans can maintain the gene pool by helping those who share common characteristics, even if they are not close kin (Glassman, Packel, & Brown, 1986). Helping nonkin may help one preserve oneʼs distinguishing characteristics in the gene pool in a manner analogous to helping kin.
410 |
Social Psychology |
|
Social psychologists acknowledge that biology plays a role in altruistic behavior. |
|
Altruism does not occur as often or as naturally as aggression, but it does occur. However, |
|
social psychology also points out that altruistic behavior in humans is determined by |
|
more than the biological dimension of our nature. |
Helping in Emergencies: A Five-Stage
Decision Model
Irene Opdykeʼs decision to help the Jews in Ternopol is an example of helping involving a long-term commitment to a course of action. We refer to this as long-term helping. Opdykeʼs help involved a commitment that was extended over a period of months and required a great investment of effort and resources. However, there are many other situations that require quick action involving a short-term commitment to helping. For example, if you saw a child fall into a pond, you probably would rescue that child. We refer to this type of helping as situation-specific helping. This helping, most likely in response to an emergency, does not require a long-term investment of effort and resources.
Emergency situations in which bystanders give help occur quite often. But there are also many instances in which bystanders remain passive and do not intervene. This is true even when a victim is in clear need of help. One such incident captured the attention not only of the public but also of social psychologists: the tragic death of Kitty Genovese on March 13, 1964.
Genovese, a 24-year-old waitress, was coming home from work in Queens, New York, late one night. As she walked to her apartment building, a man wielding a knife attacked her. She screamed for help; 38 of her neighbors took notice from their apartments. One yelled for the man to stop. The attacker ran off, only to return when it was obvious that nobody was coming to her aid. He stabbed Genovese repeatedly, eventually killing her. The attack lasted 40 minutes. When the police were called, they responded within 2 minutes. More than 40 years later, this tragedy continues to raise questions about why her neighbors did not respond to her cries for help.
The Genovese tragedy and similar incidents that occur all too frequently have raised many questions among the public and among social scientists. Dissatisfied with explanations that blamed life in the big city (“urban apathy”), social psychologists Darley and Latané began to devise some explanations about why the witnesses to Genoveseʼs murder did nothing to intervene. Darley and Latané sketched out a social psychological model to explain the bystandersʼbehavior.
The model proposed that there are five stages a bystander must pass through, each representing an important decision, before he or she will help a person in need (Latané, & Darley, 1968). In their original formulation of the model, Latané and Darley (1968) suggested that a bystander must notice the situation, label the situation correctly as an emergency, and assume responsibility for helping. Darley and Latané proposed that there is a factor even beyond assuming responsibility: The individual must decide how to help. Help, according to these researchers, could take the form of direct intervention (Irene Opdykeʼs behavior) or indirect intervention (calling the police). The general model proposed by Latané and Darley (1968; Darley & Latané, 1968), along with an additional stage, is shown in Figure 11.3.
At each stage of the model, the individual must assess the situation and make a “yes” or “no” decision. At any point in the decision process, a “no” decision will lead to failure
Chapter 11 Prosocial Behavior and Altruism |
411 |
Help provided |
No |
|
|
Yes |
|
Implement |
No |
|
|
decision |
|
Yes |
|
Decide how |
No |
|
|
to help |
|
Yes |
|
Assume |
No |
responsibility |
|
Yes |
|
Label correctly |
No |
|
|
Yes |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Notice |
|
|
|
No help provided |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Figure 11.3 The fivestage model of helping. The path to helping begins with noticing an emergency situation. Next, a potential helper must label the situation correctly as an emergency and then assume responsibility for helping. A negative decision at any point will lead to nonhelping.
Based on Darley and Latané (1968) and Latané and Darley (1968).
to help.A“yes” decision itself does not guarantee intervention; it simply allows the person to move to the next stage of the model. According to the model, help will be given only if a “yes” decision is made at each stage. Letʼs consider each of the five stages.
Stage 1: Noticing the Situation
Before we can expect a person to intervene in a situation, that person must have noticed that an emergency exists. If, for example, an accident occurred 10 miles from where you are presently sitting, you would not be expected to help because you are unaware of the accident. Before you can act, you must be aware that something has occurred. For example, Kitty Genoveseʼs neighbors were aware of what was happening to Kitty. Noticing was not a problem for the witnesses.
Noticing is purely a sensory/perceptual phenomenon. If the emergency situation catches our attention, we will notice the situation. As such, noticing involves the basic laws of perception, such as the figure-ground relationship. This fundamental relationship is manifested when a stimulus stands out against a background. For example, when you go to a museum and look at a painting hanging on the gallery wall, the painting is the figure and the gallery wall is the background. We pay most attention to the figure (so when you tell a friend about your trip to the museum, you will describe the painting and not the gallery wall). In general, we are particularly likely to notice a stimulus that is brightly colored, noisy, or somehow stands out against a background. This is also true when noticing an emergency. Our chances of noticing an emergency increase if it stands out against the background of everyday life. For example, we are more likely to notice an automobile accident if there is a loud crash than if there is little or no sound. Anything that makes the emergency more conspicuous will increase the probability that we will attend to it.
412 |
Social Psychology |
Stage 2: Labeling the Situation as an Emergency
If a person notices the situation, the next step is to correctly label it as one that requires intervention. One very important factor at this stage is whether there is ambiguity or uncertainty about what has happened. For example, imagine that you look out the window of your second-floor apartment one day and notice immediately below the window a car with its driverʼs side door open and a person laying half in and half out of the car. Has the person collapsed, perhaps of a heart attack or a stroke? Or is the person changing a fuse under the dashboard or fixing the radio? If you decide on the latter explanation, you will turn away and not give it another thought. You have made a “no” decision in the labeling stage of the model.
Recognizing an emergency situation can be highly ambiguous because there is often more than one interpretation for a situation. Is the woman upstairs beating her child or merely disciplining her? Is the man staggering down the street sick or drunk? Is that person slumped in the doorway injured or a drunken derelict? These questions must be resolved if we are to correctly label a situation as an emergency requiring our intervention.
When two 10-year-old boys abducted a 2-year-old from a shopping center in Liverpool, England, in 1993 and subsequently killed him, they walked together for 2 miles along a busy road congested with traffic. Thirty-eight people remembered seeing the three children, and some said later that the toddler was being dragged or appeared to be crying. Apparently, the situation was ambiguous enough—were they his older brothers, trying to get him home for dinner?—that no one stopped. A driver of a dry-cleaning van said he saw one of the older boys aim a kick at the toddler, but it looked like a “persuading” kind of kick such as one might use on a 2-year-old (Morrison, 1994). The driver failed to label the situation correctly.
The Ambiguity of the Situation
Research confirms that situational ambiguity is an important factor in whether people help. In one study, subjects were seated in a room and asked to fill out a questionnaire (Yakimovich & Salz, 1971). Outside the room, a confederate of the experimenter was washing windows. When the experimenter signaled, the confederate knocked over his ladder and pail, fell to the pavement, and grabbed his ankle. In one condition (the verbalization condition), the confederate screamed and cried for help. In the other condition (the no-verbalization condition), the confederate moaned but didnʼt cry for help.
In both conditions, subjects jumped up and went to the window when they heard the sound of the crash. Therefore, all subjects noticed the emergency. In the verbalization condition, 81% (13 of 16) tried to help the victim. In the no-verbalization condition, however, only 29% (5 of 17) tried to help. The clear cry for help, then, increased the probability that people would help. Without it, it wasnʼt clear that the man needed help.
Note also that the potential helpers had all seen the victim before his accident. He was a real person to them. Recall in the Genovese case that the witnesses had not seen her before she was stabbed. Given this fact and that the murder took place in the fog of the early morning hours, ambiguity must have existed, at least for some witnesses.
The Presence of Others
The presence of other bystanders also may affect the labeling process. Reactions of other bystanders often determine the response to the situation. If bystanders show little concern over the emergency, individuals will be less likely to help. When we are placed in a social situation (especially an ambiguous one), we look around us to
Chapter 11 Prosocial Behavior and Altruism |
413 |
see what others are doing (the process of social comparison). If others are not concerned, we may not define the situation as an emergency, and we probably will not offer to help.
In one study, increasing or decreasing the availability of cues from another bystander affected helping (Darley, Teger, & Lewis, 1973). Subjects were tested either alone or in groups of two. Those participating in groups were either facing each other across a table (face-to-face condition) or seated back-to-back (not-facing condition). An emergency was staged (a fall) while the subjects worked on their tasks. More subjects who were alone helped (90%) than subjects who were in groups. However, whether subjects were facing each other made a big difference. Subjects who were facing each other were significantly more likely to help (80%) than subjects not facing each other (20%). Consider what happens when you sit across from someone and you both hear a cry for help. You look at her, she looks at you. If she then goes back to her work, you probably will not define the situation as an emergency. If she says, “Did you hear that?” you are more likely to go investigate.
Generally, we rely on cues from other bystanders more and more as the ambiguity of the situation increases. Thus, in highly ambiguous emergency situations, we might expect the presence of others who are passive to suppress helping. The fact that the witnesses to Genoveseʼs murder were in their separate apartments and did not know what others were doing and thinking operated to suppress intervention.
Stage 3: Assuming Responsibility to Help: The Bystander Effect
Noticing and correctly labeling a situation as an emergency are not enough to guarantee that a bystander will intervene. It is certain that the 38 witnesses to Genoveseʼs murder noticed, to one degree or another, the incident and probably labeled it as an emergency. What they did not do is conclude that they had a responsibility to help. Darley and Latané (1968), puzzled by the lack of intervention on the part of the witnesses, thought that the presence of others might inhibit rather than increase helping. They designed a simple yet elegant experiment to test for the effects of multiple bystanders on helping. Their experiment demonstrated the power of the bystander effect, in which a person in need of help is less likely to receive help as the number of bystanders increases.
Subjects in this experiment were told it was a study of interpersonal communication. They were asked to participate in a group discussion of their current problems. To ensure anonymity, the discussion took place over intercoms. In reality, there was no group. The experimenter played a tape of a discussion to lead the subject to believe that other group members existed.
Darley and Latané (1968) varied the size of the group. In one condition, the subject was told that there was one other person in the group (so the group consisted of the subject and the victim); in a second condition, there were two other people (subject, victim, and four others). The discussion went along uneventfully until it was the victimʼs turn to speak. The actor who played the role of the victim on the tape simulated a seizure. Darley and Latané noted the number of subjects who tried to help and how long it took them to try to help.
The study produced two major findings. First, the size of the group had an effect on the percentage of subjects helping. When the subject believed that he or she was alone in the experiment with the victim, 85% of the subjects helped. The percentage of subjects offering help declined when the subject believed there was one other bystander (62%) or four other bystanders (31%). In other words, as the number of bystanders increased, the likelihood of the subject helping the victim decreased.
bystander effect The social phenomenon that helping behavior is less likely to occur as the number of witnesses to an emergency increases.
414 |
Social Psychology |
diffusion of responsibility
An explanation suggesting that each bystander assumes another person will take responsibility to help.
The second major finding was that the size of the group had an effect on time between the onset of the seizure and the offering of help. When the subject believed he or she was alone, help occurred more quickly than when the subject believed other bystanders were present. In essence, the subjects who believed they were members of a larger group became “frozen in time” by the presence of others. They had not decided to help or not to help. They were distressed but could not act.
Interestingly, the “other bystanders” need not be physically present in order for the bystander effect to occur. In one experiment conducted by Garcia, Weaver, Moskowitz, and Darley (2002), participants were asked to imagine that they had won a dinner for either themselves and 30 friends, 10 friends, or just for themselves (alone condition). Later participants were asked to indicate how much money they would be willing to donate to charity after they graduated college. Garcia et al. found that participants indicated the lowest level of donations in the 30 friends condition, and the most in the alone condition (the 10-friends condition fell between these two groups). This effect extends to computer chat rooms (Markey, 2000). Markey found that as the number of participants in a chat room increased, the time it took to receive requested help also increased. Interestingly, the chat room bystander effect was eliminated when the person making the request personalized the request by singling someone out by name.
Why Does the Bystander Effect Occur?
The best explanation offered for the bystander effect is diffusion of responsibility (Darley & Latané, 1968). According to this explanation, each bystander assumes that another bystander will take action. If all the bystanders think that way, no help will be offered. This explanation fits quite well with Darley and Latanéʼs findings in which the bystanders could not see each other, as was the case in the Genovese killing. Under these conditions, it is easy to see how a bystander (unaware of how other bystanders are acting) might assume that someone else has already taken or will take action.
What about emergency situations in which bystanders can see one another? In this case, the bystanders could actually see that others were not helping. Diffusion of responsibility under these conditions may not explain bystander inaction (Latané & Darley, 1968). Another explanation has been offered for the bystander effect that centers on pluralistic ignorance, which occurs when a group of individuals acts in the same manner despite the fact that each person has different perceptions of an event (Miller & McFarland, 1987). In the bystander effect, pluralistic ignorance operates when the bystanders in an ambiguous emergency situation look around and see each other doing nothing; they assume that the others are thinking that the situation is not an emergency (Miller & McFarland, 1987). In essence, the collective inaction of the bystanders leads to a redefinition of the situation as a nonemergency.
Latané and Darley (1968) provided evidence for this explanation. Subjects filled out a questionnaire alone in a room, with two passive bystanders (confederates of the experimenter) or with two other actual subjects. While the subjects were filling out the questionnaire, smoke was introduced into the room through a vent. The results showed that when subjects were alone in the room, 75% of the subjects reported the smoke, many within 2 minutes of first noticing it. In the condition in which the subject was in the room with two passive bystanders, only 10% reported the smoke. In the last condition, in which the subject was with two other subjects, 38% reported the smoke. Thus, the presence of bystanders once again suppressed helping. This occurred despite the fact that subjects in the bystander conditions denied that the other people in the room had any effect on them.
Chapter 11 Prosocial Behavior and Altruism |
415 |
In post-experimental interviews, Latané and Darley (1968) searched for the underlying cause for the observed results. They found that subjects who reported the smoke felt that the smoke was unusual enough to report, although they didnʼt feel that the smoke was dangerous. Subjects who failed to report the smoke, which was most likely to occur in the two-bystander condition, developed a set of creative reasons why the smoke should not be reported. For example, some subjects believed that the smoke was smog piped into the room to simulate an urban environment, or that the smoke was truth gas designed to make them answer the questionnaire truthfully. Whatever reasons these subjects came up with, the situation was redefined as a nonemergency.
Is diffusion of responsibility, dependent on the number of bystanders present, always the underlying cause for the bystander effect? Although diffusion of responsibility is the most widely accepted explanation, it is not the only explanation. Levine (1999) suggests that there are situations in which diffusion of responsibility based on the presence of bystanders cannot explain nonintervention. Instead, Levine suggests that if a bystander assumes that a social category relationship exists between parties in a potential helping situation, intervention is unlikely. A social category relationship is one in which bystanders assume that the parties involved belong together in some way. For example, a spousal relationship would fit this definition because the two individuals are seen as belonging together in the relationship. Levine argues that when we are confronted with a situation in which a social category relationship exists or is assumed, a social norm of nonintervention is activated. In short, we are socialized to keep our noses out of family matters. In fact, there is research that shows that bystanders are less willing to intervene in an emergency situation when a social category relationship exists (Shotland & Straw, 1976). Shotland and Straw, for example, found that 65% of participants were willing to intervene in an argument between a male and female who were strangers, but only 19% were willing to intervene when the male and female were said to be married.
Levine (1999) provides further evidence for this effect. He analyzed the trial transcript of the trial of two 10-year-old boys who murdered a 2-year-old child in London in 1993 (we briefly described this crime earlier in this chapter). The two older boys, Jon Thompson and Robert Venables, abducted James Bulger and walked Bulger around London for over 2 hours. During this time, the trio of boys encountered 38 witnesses. Some witnesses were alone, whereas others were with other bystanders. In a situation reminiscent of the Kitty Genovese murder, none of the 38 witnesses intervened. Based on his analysis of the trial transcript, Levine concluded that the nonintervention had little or nothing to do with the number of bystanders present, or diffusion of responsibility. Instead, statements of witnesses during trial testimony indicated that the witnesses assumed (or were told by the older boys) that the older boys were Bulgerʼs brothers taking him home. According to Levine, the assumption that a social category relationship existed among the boys was the best explanation for why the 38 witnesses did not intervene.
As a final note, we need to understand that category relationships can extend beyond social categories. We may assume that a relationship exists between people and objects. For example, imagine you are going to your car after work and see another car parked next to yours. You see that the hood is open and there is someone tinkering with something under the hood. What would you think is going on? Most likely you would assume that the person tinkering under the hood owns the car and is fixing something. You would then be surprised to learn the next day that the car was stolen and the man tinkering under the hood was a thief! Assuming that such relationships exist can be a powerful suppressant to intervention.
social category relationship A relationship in which bystanders assume that the parties involved belong together in some way.
416
Figure 11.4 Bystanders who are alone are likely
to help in high and low danger situations. The presence of another bystander increased helping in the high danger but not low danger situation; a clear reversal of the usual bystander effect.
Social Psychology
Limits to the Bystander Effect
Increasing the number of bystanders does not always suppress helping; there are exceptions to the bystander effect. The bystander effect does not hold when intervention is required in a potentially dangerous situation (Fischer, Greitemeir, Pollozek, & Frey, 2006). In this experiment participants watched what they believed was a live interaction between a male and female (actually the participants viewed a prerecorded videotape). In the high-potential-danger condition, the male was shown to be a large, “thug-like” individual who made progressively more aggressive sexual advances toward the female, culminating in sexually aggressive touching of the female and the female crying for help. At that point the tape went blank. In the low-potential-danger condition, the male was shown as a thin, short male who engaged in the same sexually aggressive behavior with the same victim reactions. Half of the participants watched the interaction alone (no bystander) and the other half watched it in the presence of a confederate of the experimenter (bystander). The experimenters measured whether the participant tried to help the female in distress. As shown in Figure 11.4, the bystander effect was replicated in the low-danger situation: Fewer participants attempt to help when a bystander is present than when the participant is alone. In the high-danger situation, however, the bystander effect was not evident.
In another experiment, a reversal of the typical bystander effect was shown with a potentially dangerous helping situation. One group of researchers staged a rape on a college campus and measured how many subjects intervened (Harari, Harari, & White, 1985). The subjects had three options in the experimental situation: fleeing without helping, giving indirect help (alerting a police officer who is out of view of the rape), or giving direct help (intervening directly in the rape).
Male subjects were tested as they walked either alone or in groups. (The groups in this experiment were simply subjects who happened to be walking together and not interacting with one another.) As the subjects approached a certain point, two actors staged the rape. The woman screamed, “Help! Help! Please help me! You bastard! Rape! Rape!” (Harari et al., 1985, p. 656). The results of this experiment did not support the
Bystander Condition
|
Alone |
Bystander |
|
60 |
|
Helping |
50 |
|
40 |
|
|
30 |
|
|
Percentage |
|
|
20 |
|
|
10 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
0 |
|
|
High |
Low |
Based on data from Fischer, et al. (2006). |
Situation Danger Level |
Chapter 11 Prosocial Behavior and Altruism |
417 |
bystander effect. Subjects walking in groups were more likely to help (85%) than subjects walking alone (65%). In this situation—a victim is clearly in need and the helping situation is dangerous—it seems that bystanders in groups are more likely to help than solitary bystanders (Clark & Word, 1974; Harari et al., 1985).
The bystander effect also seems to be influenced by the roles people take. In another study, some subjects were assigned to be the leaders of a group discussion and others to be assistants (Baumeister, Chesner, Senders, & Tice, 1988). When a seizure was staged, subjects assigned the role of leader were more likely to intervene (80%) than those assigned the role of assistant (35%). It appears that the responsibility inherent in the leadership role on a specific task generalizes to emergencies as well.
Finally, the bystander effect is less likely to occur when the helping situation confronting us involves a clear violation of a social norm that we personally care about. Imagine, for example, you see a person throw an empty bottle into the bushes at a public park. In such a situation you may engage in social control behaviors (e.g., confront the offender, complain to your partner). Contrast this with a situation where private property is involved (e.g., painting graffiti in an elevator in a building owned by a large corporation). You may be less likely to engage in social control behaviors. Chekroun and Brauer (2001) wondered if the bystander effect would operate differently in these two situations. They hypothesized that the bystander effect would hold for situations involving low personal implications (e.g., graffiti in the elevator), but not in situations involving high personal implications (e.g., littering in a public park). In the low-personal-implication condition a confederate of the experimenters entered an elevator in a shopping center parking lot. As soon as the door closed, the confederate began scrawling graffiti on the wall with a magic marker. This was done under two conditions: a participant alone in the elevator with the confederate (no bystanders) or two or three naïve individuals in the elevator with the confederate. In the high-personal-implications condition a confederate of the experimenters threw an empty plastic bottle into some bushes in a public park in front of one participant or a group of two or three participants. In both situations the reaction of the participant(s) was (were) recorded on a scale ranging from no social control to an audible negative comment. As you can see in Figure 11.5, social control was most
|
70 |
|
|
|
Control |
60 |
|
|
|
50 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Social |
40 |
|
Figure 11.5 |
Social |
|
|
control behaviors are more |
||
|
|
|
||
Percent |
30 |
|
likely if a behavior has |
|
20 |
|
high personal implications |
||
|
|
|||
|
|
(littering in a public park) |
||
|
|
|
||
|
10 |
|
than if the behavior has |
|
|
|
low personal implications |
||
|
|
|
||
|
0 |
|
(graffiti in a privately- |
|
|
Graffiti |
Littering |
owned elevator). |
|
|
|
|
||
Deviant Behavior
Based on data from Checkroun and Brauer (2002).
