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1.3 The One Experience View

    1. Consider the following example (from Parsons 1972) as a way of beginning to get at what seems to me wrong.

Suppose that this statement is true:

(S) Jones writes illegibly and Jones writes painstakingly.

It does not follow that

(S*) Jones writes illegibly and painstakingly,

at least on one natural reading of (S*). For if Jones writes illeg­ibly but not painstakingly with his left hand and painstak­ingly but legibly with his right, then (S) is true but (S*) false. In this case, there is an event of Jones's writing illegibly and there is an event of Jones's writing painstakingly, but these are two distinct events. There is no event of Jones's writing both illegibly and painstakingly. So, (S) does not entail (S*), but (S*) clearly does entail (S). Given the event of Jones's writ­ing both illegibly and painstakingly, there is, of course, the event of Jones's writing illegibly. For the latter is the very same event as the former under a less broad description. Likewise for the event of Jones's writing painstakingly.

    1. In the case where (S*) is true, there is a kind of unity to Jones's writing. Illegibility and painstakingness are com­bined together in a single instance of writing. That unity is lacking in the case that (S) is true and (S*) is false. But where (S*) is true, there are not two different writings, one painstaking and the other illegible, which somehow are uni­fied together to produce a third, overarching writing that includes them. There is just one writing that may be described in more or less encompassing ways.6 To suppose otherwise is to create a new pseudo-problem: the problem of the unity of the event of Jones's writing illegibly and painstakingly.

    2. Here is another example. Suppose it is lunchtime and I have a sudden and strong desire for a pint of beer with a ham sandwich. In having this desire, of course, I have a desire for a pint of beer. It is also true that I have a desire for a ham sandwich. But patently I don't have three sudden desires here. Nor is it the case that having a desire for a beer together with a desire for a ham sandwich just is having a desire for a pint of beer with a ham sandwich. I might want a beer and also want a ham sandwich while finding the idea of having the two together repellent.

My sudden desire for a pint of beer with a ham sandwich is a single desire that can be described in multiple ways. The description 'desire for a pint of beer' is incomplete, but unlike the description 'desire for a pint of beer alone', it is not inaccurate.

(22) These remarks apply mutatis mutandis, I want to sug­gest, to the problem of the unity of conscious experience, as it is usually conceived. There are not five different or sepa­rate simultaneous experiences somehow combined together to produce a new unified experience. Nor are there are mul­tiple simultaneous unified experiences within each sense. To be sure, if I am the wine taster, the statement

(S!) I have an experience of a bright red shape and I have an experience of a fruity taste and I have an experience of a cassis odor . . .

is true. And, given that the case is one of phenomenal unity, the following is true too:

(S#) I have an experience of a bright red shape and a fruity taste and a cassis odor . . .

Moreover, (S#) entails (S!). But there is just one experience here, an experience that can be described less fully as my experience of a bright red shape or as my experience of a fruity taste, etc.

      1. On this view, there really are no such entities as purely visual experiences or purely auditory experiences or purely olfactory experiences in normal, everyday consciousness. Where there is phenomenological unity across sense modal­ities, sense-specific experiences do not exist. They are the figments of philosophers' and psychologists' imaginations. And there is no problem, thus, of unifying these experi­ences. There are no experiences to be unified. Likewise within each sense: there are not many simultaneous visual experiences, for example, combined together to form a com­plex visual experience. There is a single multimodal experi­ence, describable in more or less rich ways.

      2. "Stuff and nonsense," you may say. "The proposal is empirically false. Visual experiences are known to arise in the visual cortex, auditory experiences are known to arise in the auditory cortex, and so on. In the wine taster case, it is surely undeniable that visual experiences are tokened in the wine taster's visual cortex, as he views the wine he is tast­ing, experiences of just the same phenomenal type as those that would have been tokened in that cortex had the situa­tion been the same but his other senses blocked from any information. Of course, these experiences exist!"

      3. By way of reply, let us for a moment indulge in the fic­tion that there are purely visual experiences in everyday consciousness of the external world. In these experiences, shape and color are unified. If, for example, I view a green square, my visual system represents the greenness and the squareness in separate places in the brain; but these quali­ties aren't experienced as separate. They are experienced as qualities of a single thing. I have an experience that is object- unified, as we might say, even though its physical basis is disunified.7 What is the relationship between the experience and its physical basis? The answer I favor is that the experi­ence, assuming there is one, is constituted by a certain com­bination of separate and largely independent physical events in the visual cortex, but it is not token identical with that combination. This answer gives the experience a physi­cal nature; moreover, constitution is the relation that bonds macro-events and micro-events, macro-states and micro- states, macro-objects and micro-objects generally.

Consider, for example, a single cloud in the sky. The cloud is an aggregate of water droplets. The 'is' in the last sentence is not the 'is' of identity. The cloud in the sky could survive the loss of a few of its constituent water droplets (if, say, a highly localized strong gust of warm air were to cause them to evaporate). Not so any aggregate of water droplets that contains them. The loss of those droplets would destroy the original aggregate. So, the cloud has a modal property the aggregate of water droplets lacks, that of possibly surviving the loss of such-and-such droplets. It follows by Leibniz's Law that the cloud is not identical with any aggregate of droplets. In general, ordinary, everyday macro-objects are not identical with aggregates of their parts, since the former differ in their modal properties from the latter. My car, for example, might have had a different carburetor, but the aggregate of its actual parts could not have failed to contain the actual carbu­retor. The car, thus, is not identical with the sum of its parts. The relationship rather is one of constitution or composition.

One need not resort to modal properties to make the above points. Actual properties will do in some cases. The clay that constitutes a pot exists before the pot does. The lump of silver that is melted and formed into a coin exists before the melting process, but the coin does not. The clay is thus not identical with the pot; the lump of silver not identical with the coin.

Likewise for macro-events. Consider the eruption of Mount Vesuvius. Intuitively, that very eruption might have spewed forth an imperceptibly smaller amount of lava. Had it done so, the micro-events taking place in the spatial region of Vesuvius' eruption would have been minimally different, and thus the aggregate of those events in that counterfactual situation is not the same as the actual aggre­gate. The eruption, therefore, has a modal property that the underlying cluster of micro-events lacks, and the former is not identical with the latter.

Alternatively, consider all the microphysical events that compose the emergence of North America (Burge 1986). Imagine that these events are embedded within a much larger land mass, so that in the counterfactual situation there is no such thing as North America and its emergence. Then the aggregate of micro-events has the property of pos­sibly existing without North America; but the event of North America's emerging does not. That event is not iden­tical with the aggregate. The aggregate constitutes the emer­gence of North America in actual fact, but the relationship is not one of identity.

(26) Consider next the following example. A large chunk of clay is used to make a statue at time t. The clay constitutes the statue without being identical with it. Suppose counter- factually that at time t', where t' is later than t, an artist clev­erly removes much of the clay without remolding it so as to leave behind a small clay pot. In the counterfactual situa­tion, the clay that remains constitutes a pot at t'. But in the actual situation it does not. In actual fact, no clay is removed. There is, in actual fact, no tiny pot within the statue. There is only the statue.

Within the aggregate of lumps of clay composing the statue, there is a smaller aggregate of clay lumps that in a certain counterfactual situation composes a pot. In actual fact, the smaller aggregate does not compose a pot. Indeed, it does not by itself actually compose or constitute any ordi­nary thing. Rather, that aggregate and the remaining aggre­gate form a larger aggregate that composes the statue.

  1. I hope that the relevance of all of this is becoming clear. On my view, at the given time the wine taster is subject to a single experience that represents the color of the wine, the sound of the wineglass, as it is flicked, the smell of the wine, and so on. This experience is constituted by a combination of largely independent physical events going on in separate regions of the brain. Within that combination of events, there is a cluster of events (call it C) occurring in the wine taster's visual cortex. In the extraordinary counterfactual situation in which the wine taster's nonvisual senses are all blocked so that no nonvisual information gets in, the wine taster is left with a purely visual experience. And in that counterfactual situation, C, in the absence of the other perti­nent actual physical events, constitutes a visual experience. But it does not follow from this that in actual fact C consti­tutes a purely visual experience. In actual fact, C (wholly) constitutes no experience at all. There is just one unified experience the wine taster undergoes, and C, in conjunction with the relevant events in the auditory cortex, the olfactory cortex, and so on, constitutes that.

  2. Perhaps it will be replied that in the example of the statue and the pot, the aggregate of lumps of clay that coun- terfactually constitutes the pot is in the actual world a purely arbitrary part of the statue, with nothing to mark it out from any number of other arbitrary parts of the statue. However, the cluster of physical events I have labeled 'C is a nonarbitrary part of the relevant totality of physical events, a token of a physical type with a definite functional role, namely, to generate a conscious visual experience with a certain visual unity.

  3. This reply begs the question. I grant that C is a token of a physical type P whose role in a normally functioning brain is to endow the conscious experience of the subject with a visual phenomenology. But that is certainly compatible with denying that P's role is to generate in the brain a token expe­rience with an exclusively visual phenomenology. To sup­pose that P's role is the latter is to take for granted the truth of the view I am opposing.

  4. Furthermore, the fact that C is a nonarbitrary part of the whole combination of physical events constituting the experience is not to the point. Suppose events E1 and E2 together actually constitute event F. Suppose E1 could have occurred without E2 and further that had E1 done so, it would have (wholly) constituted event G. Still, this is no guarantee that E1 actually constitutes G. For example, my arm and hand movement relative to Smith and Smith's arm and hand movement relative to me constitute a certain fight. Smith's movement might have occurred without my move­ment. Had it done so, it would have constituted an act of aggression on the part of Smith. But in actual fact that act of aggression does not exist. In actual fact, Smith's arm and hand movement relative to me is a counterpunch; for I hit Smith first.

Thus, just as Smith's arm and hand movement might have constituted an act of aggression although in reality it does not, so too the cluster of events, C, might have constituted a purely visual experience although in reality it does not.

  1. Suppose now that the counterfactual situation I have envisaged for C becomes a reality. As the wine taster tastes the wine, some extraordinary neural malfunction causes the events other than C that constituted the wine taster's experi­ence prior to the malfunction to cease. Before the malfunc­tion, on the proposed view, C does not constitute a purely visual experience. After the malfunction, it does. This, it may be charged, is strange. Why the radical change in what C does?

  2. The answer, as earlier, is that there is no change. Before and after the malfunction, C does the same thing: It endows the conscious experience of the subject with a visual phe­nomenology. The difference is that before the malfunction, the experience of the wine taster does not have a purely visual phenomenology; after the malfunction, it does.

  3. Consider next the following example. Suppose I hear a conversation on my left, as I look at a bed of roses laid out in front of me. Intuitively, my auditory experience—that very experience—could have occurred without my visual experi­ence. On my account, however, that isn't possible. So much the worse, it may be said, for my account!

  4. Too fast, I reply. When I try to introspect my auditory experience, I fail. As noted earlier, what I actually come across are the sounds and the auditory qualities the experi­ence represents. By being aware of those sounds, I am aware that I am undergoing an auditory experience. But I am not aware of the token vehicle of that content. The sounds I experience could have existed without my visual experience of the roses. Moreover, I could certainly have undergone an experience that represented those sounds (or sounds just like them) without also representing the colors and shapes of roses. That, I suggest, is all that untutored intuition requires here, once we are clear on what introspection does and does not reveal. And it is perfectly compatible with these claims that I am the subject of just one experience, an experience that is audiovisual in character.

  5. But what if my auditory experience goes on longer than my visual experience? Then my auditory experience has a temporal property my visual experience lacks, and there cannot be a single experience after all.

  6. I grant that I can experience a sound that continues, in my experience, after I experience anything visually. But this is all in the content of the experience. Initially, what I experience is that a sound with a certain pitch and loud- ness is accompanied by a certain color and shape. As time goes on, the experienced content changes. No longer is any shape or color represented. The sound is represented on its own. This certainly shows that the represented sound is not the same as the represented shape or color. But it does not show that there is more than a single experience at a time.

I do not deny, of course, that difficult questions arise con­cerning the individuation of experiences through time. Is the experience I undergo initially—an experience with an audiovisual content—the same as the experience I undergo after the color and shape cease? Is there one experience here with a less rich content through time? Or is the audiovisual experience replaced by a second purely auditory experi­ence, phenomenally just like the first in its auditory dimension? Hard questions of individuation through time arise for everyone, however. They are discussed further in chapter 4.

  1. Here is a further worry. Seeing something entails the presence of a visual experience. I cannot see X unless X looks some way to me; and for X to look some way to me, it must cause in me a visual experience. So, to return to the example of the wine taster, since he is seeing the wine in the glass, he must be subject to a visual experience. However, on the account I am adopting, his experience isn't really properly classified as visual at all.

  2. It is indeed true that X cannot look some way to person P unless X produces in P an experience with a visual phe­nomenology. But the phenomenology of P's experience need not be purely or exclusively visual. It can be partly auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and tactual too. If a visual experience is understood to be an experience with a visual phenomenology, then the wine taster, as he sees the wine in the glass, is subject to a visual experience. It's just that that very experience has a phenomenology that is auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and tactual as well.

  3. Still, it may be complained, on the one experience view, no explanation is possible for why the beliefs formed directly on the basis of experience are about how things look, or how they taste or how they smell, rather than about some combination of these. My response is to deny the datum. We can know directly that the object looks red and is apparently emitting a loud sound, just as we can know directly that the object looks red and looks round. We have the ability to attend all at once to qualities, the experience of which (in some cases) requires the use of different senses. Indeed, it is the exercise of this ability that leads us to think that there is such a thing as synchronic unity in perceptual experience in the first place. In everyday life, we say things like "The drink looks creamy and it tastes sweet" and "The exhaust smells noxious and it sounds loud." The beliefs these remarks express are no less cautious or direct than the belief expressed by, for example, "The card looks square and silvery in color."

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