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This paper reflects more generally on the content and focus of International Studies as a global inter-discipline. Specifically, it does three things: First, it reviews the concept of world orders that the authors have found most appropriate for exploring their sense that the world is simultaneously being shaped by a multiplicity of world orders, some contradictory and some complimentary with each other. Secondly, it reports, for the first time, the 12 debates that for us have been the most significant, theoretically and practically, in the past century. Participation in these debates, or in the chains of argumentation that they have been part of or given rise to, has helped to constitute worlds within worlds, international studies as a professional subject of study in more and more parts of the globe. Thirdly, it illustrates how Inoguchi’s previous suggestions of current world order contenders – a renewed Westphalian world order, a global republican world order, and an anti-utopian, multi-cultural world order – can be seen as abstractions from the 12 previously identified world order debates.

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If Huntington talks more realistically in his Clash of Civilizations book about “Core states” within his frequently crashing civilizations than he did before, it is probably because he has been so roundly criticized for his imputing some kind of agency to his protagonists in world history, a kind of intentional direction that the empirically or historically minded have had a very hard time identifying. Significantly inspired by Galtung’s writings, our own earlier work on “The Decline of the Superstates” suggested phased rise and fall stories for China, Japan, the US, Britain and the Soviet Union, treated as “superstates” or distinctive, exclusive, autonomous, quasi-imperial orders within a highly competitive Westphalian power balancing system. We did develop a tentative framework for locating the possible causes of such rises and declines, and even suggested ways to judge such trajectories as “comic” or “tragic.” But these conceptions were too unidimensional or univocal.

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In the conferences of Teheran in the late autumn of 1943 and Yalta on the Crimean peninsula in February of 1945, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin prepared a blueprint on how to deal with Germany after the end of the war. The three leaders agreed that Germany would be divided into three occupation zones. Berlin would also be divided into three sectors. They agreed further that Germany would lose its eastern provinces to the Soviet Union and Poland. Poland in turn would lose part of its eastern territory to the USSR. After the war ended, the three Allies met again, this time in Potsdam. This conference, which took place in late July of 1945, had a different cast of participants. The Soviet Union was still represented by Stalin. Instead of Roosevelt, who had died on April 12, Harry S. Truman participated for the United States. Churchill led the British delegation, but he was replaced shortly before the end of the conference by the newly elected prime minister, Clement Attlee. Because the Allies had demanded total capitulation, they not only assumed total control over Germany after their victory, but they also had to take full responsibility for the future of the country. This included the economic assistance to Germany, the design of new political structures, and measures to stamp out National Socialism and punish the worst offenders of the Nazi regime. France was not invited to participate in these conferences that determined Germany’s future because it had played a very minor part in the victory over Nazi Germany. France had been occupied by Hitler’s forces in 1940. It was freed in the latter part of 1944 after the Normandy invasion. Even though French troops under the leadership of General Charles de Gaulle had been involved in the liberation of France, the country had not been granted equal status as an ally, much to the chagrin of de Gaulle.