23 Cf. Saffrey and Westerink's note ad loc.

The Sacred Discourse is also referred to as the authority for the Orphic and Pythagorean source of Greek, i.e. Platonic, theology in the Commentary on the Timaeus (III 161, 3-6). In Chapter 9 below evidence will be presented showing that in the Commentary on the Timaeus Proclus also regards Plato's physics as 'Pythagorean'. Finally, in providing valuable information on the history of mathematics in his Commentary on Euclid Proclus gives Pythagoras a pivotal role: he credits him with the introduction of a philosophical approach to geometry, as compared with the non-philosophical approach that preceded it: ²⁴ 

²⁴ In Eucl. 65, 15-19; this has been noted by Breton (1969), 25-7.

After these Pythagoras transformed the understanding <'philosophy'> of geometry so that it could serve to educate the free man, examining its first principles from a basis transcending them and investigating the theorems in an immaterial and intellectual manner.

In other words Pythagoras raised geometry to the role mathematics is given in Plato's Republic: to introduce the soul to immaterial reality; to receive its grounding for the true philosopher in more ultimate principles.

Proclus also accepted his teacher's Iamblichean understanding of the history of philosophy as a tradition of the revelation of divine truth by the souls not only of Plato, but also of Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus, and even Syrianus himself. ²⁵ 

²⁵ Cf. Theol. Plat. I 5, 6-7, 8; In Parm. 618, 1-13; Saffrey (1976), 204-12.

He too considers the souls of true philosophers to be superior to ordinary souls, to be participants in the divine vision of the Phaedrus that are sent down to save mankind. Thus his interpretation of the figure and function of Socrates in the Alcibiades, in his Commentary on that dialogue, is in its essentials the same as Syrianus' treatment of Socrates in the Phaedrus. Already the etymology of Socrates' name as Proclus understands it—'saviour of the strength of the soul' (In Crat. 8, 18-19)—indicates the nature of his function. There is much more information to be found in Proclus on the theory of superior saving souls, and I shall return to it in more detail in the next section.

In general, then, philosophy for Proclus, as for Iamblichus and Syrianus, is a tradition of divinely revealed truth conveyed to fallen souls for their salvation by a select, i.e. Platonic, succession of superior

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souls. In the texts cited above it appears also that Platonism, in theology, mathematics, and physics, can be reduced to Pythagoreanism. However this reduction, although occurring in Proclus, is not as radical as it is in Iamblichus and Syrianus, and does not give a balanced view of Proclus' general attitude to the relation between Pythagoras and Plato. As this point is of some consequence in determining Proclus' position with respect to the ideas of Iamblichus and Syrianus and relates to important modifications in the use he makes of mathematics in philosophy, it will repay closer attention here.

In reading Proclus, one soon notices that he tends to attribute so much importance to Plato that Plato emerges from the shadow of Pythagoras and even dominates him. This may be illustrated from the very same opening pages of the Platonic Theology in which Plato's dependence on 'Pythagorean' theology is stressed. While indicating briefly that Platonic philosophy had a long and changing life, Proclus insists that it was one man, Plato, who revealed the secrets of theology to men (5, 6-6, 7). The unique place of Plato is stressed again a little later (13, 8 ff.), where Proclus claims that what distinguishes Plato's theology from that of the Orphics, Pythagoreans, and Chaldaeans is its scientific character (20, 4-25). Proclus is thinking here of the science of dialectic which he takes to be the proper science of theological objects and which he finds expounded in particular in Plato's Parmenides. He assumes that such a science is not to be found in the Pythagoreans, who employ an inferior approach, namely mathematical analogies directed upwards to the divine (loc. cit.). Thus, from a scientific point-of-view, Plato's dialectic is superior as theology to the mathematical theology of the Pythagoreans.

A similar tendency to play down the scientific claims of the Pythagoreans can already be found in the early and most Pythagoreanizing of Proclus' works, the Commentary on the Timaeus: there Proclus characterizes the Pythagorean approach as lofty, inspired, symbolic, anagogic, revelatory, whereas that of Socrates is ethical, demonstrative ( ποδ ικτικ ν); in the Timaeus Plato combines the revelatory style of Pythagoreanism with the demonstrative method of Socrates (17, 21-8, 4). One will readily agree with Proclus that Plato's dialogues embody scientific method far more than do such supposedly early Pythagorean works as the Sacred Discourse. But Proclus' recognition of this fact implies a significant revaluation of the respective importance of Pythagoras and Plato, and a noteworthy departure from Iamblichus' position. For Iamblichus, Pythagoras was the first 'scientific' philosopher.

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Hence Pythagorean literature was to be seen as the standard against which the rest of Greek philosophy, including Plato, was to be read. Plato was made more 'scientific', i.e. more Pythagorean, through a syllogizing of his dialogues. For Proclus, however, Plato had greater claims to being scientific. As a consequence Plato's dialogues receive a primacy and centrality in Proclus' philosophy that go beyond what is allowed for by Iamblichus' position. Specific expressions and consequences of this important shift in perspective will be encountered further on.

This contrast between Proclus and Iamblichus must not, however, be exaggerated. It would be misleading to conclude, for example, that Proclus had doubts about the authenticity and priority of the Pythagorean documents invoked by Iamblichus and Syrianus. Apart from the Sacred Discourse and Philolaus (his favourite Pythagorean authority), Proclus makes use of the Golden Verses, Timaeus of Locri, the Hymn to Number, and other similar (pseudo-) Pythagorean works. ²⁶ 

²⁶ Cf. In Tim. I 199, 3-4; 203, 25-7; 316, 18-24; II 8, 9-10; 53, 2-7 (for Timaeus of Locri cf. below, Ch. 9); In Remp. II 69, 2-3. Proclus' usual practice, however, is to cite 'the Pythagoreans' in general, rather than specific Pythagorean authorities and works. An exception is Philolaus, who is singled out in particular, it appears, for his closeness to Plato's Philebus; cf. Theol. Plat. I 26, 4-9; III 30, 19-23 (with Saffrey and Westerink's note, 120 n. 8).

Nor can it be inferred that Proclus went so far as to find a doctrinal difference between Plato and Pythagoreanism. Rather, as Iamblichus believed that Pythagoras first gave scientific form to revelations of great (Chaldaean, Egyptian) antiquity, so Proclus included Orphism and Pythagoreanism in the ancient revelations and first found scientific expression of them in Plato.

3. The Theory of Superior Souls

Often enough it has been noted that Proclus, following Iamblichus and Syrianus, did not accept Plotinus' contention that part of the human soul remains 'above' in the intelligible world even when the soul descends in its preoccupation with the material world. ²⁷ 

²⁷ Cf. Dodds's comments (309), in Proclus, El. theol.; above, p. 38; Saffrey (1984), 164-6.

Hardly any notice has been taken, however, of the fact that certain qualifications need to be introduced into this view of Proclus' position. For him some souls possess a privileged connection with the transcendent

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world in virtue of which they can in their descent reveal truth and bring about the return of souls that have fallen from their intelligible 'fatherland'. Aspects of this theory have been encountered above in Iamblichus, Hierocles, and Syrianus. It can be found described in some detail in a number of Proclus' surviving works which thus allow of a fuller description and clarification of the theory at least in the version that it assumes in Proclus.

The Commentary on the Timaeus discusses at various points the different degrees in the descent of the soul in the world. At the top Proclus places the souls of the gods that do not descend into the world, but govern it from above without being affected or changed in any way in their transcendent independence. ²⁸ 

²⁸ On these cf. Dodds, op. cit. 295-6.

These divine souls are 'accompanied' without interruption by lower souls who never descend. Below these come souls who do descend, but remain pure ( χ αντος), untarnished by vice and affections. And these are followed in turn by souls who not only descend but also become corrupted by the material world. ²⁹ 

²⁹ III 259, 11-27; cf. I 131, 28-132, 5; II 112, 23-5 (same theory in In Alc. §§ 32, 13-34, 10). The systematic triadic arrangement of everything in the El. theol. leaves no room for the distinction between the third and fourth degrees in that work (cf. Propositions 185, 202, 204).

From the first two degrees of this structure it can be seen that it represents a formalization of the divine company of gods and their followers, unfallen and fallen, of the Phaedrus. ³⁰ 

³⁰ Cf. Dodds, op. cit. 296.

The Commentary elsewhere provides more details on the class of descended but pure souls: they accomplish great things in the world (I 111, 14-19); their descent is accompanied by natural portents (113, 4-7)—one thinks of such portents as Iamblichus recounts in On the Pythagorean Life; they are called 'heroes' by Plato (II 230, 7-9)—the reference is to Cratylus 397 d, as will soon be clear; and, most importantly, they possess in their descent a superior knowledge inspired in them by the gods: the examples of the Sibyl and Heracles are given. ³¹ 

³¹ III 159, 29-160, 12; cf. also In Alc. §§ 132, 10-133; 13; De prov. § 19.

Heracles is named again in the notes taken from Proclus' comments on Cratylus 397 d: there he is one of a class of 'heroic souls' who descend into the material world but remain pure ( χ αντος) and more insightful (νο τ ος) than other descended souls. Such heroic souls descend so as to benefit ( γ σ α) mankind, sharing as they do in the part that 'weighs' man down, but also in the power to lead up and escape from matter (In Crat. 68, 17-29). These souls are 'heroes' or

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'demons', however, by relation (σχ σ ι), not by nature ( σ ι): in their higher status as souls they can be compared to heroes and demons which, however, are ontologically different and superior, and correspond, it appears, to the souls that continuously follow the gods of the Commentary on the Timaeus. ³² 

³² In Crat. 68, 13-19; 77, 14-18; cf. In Remp. II 310, 18-21; Dodds, loc. cit. The demons and heroes proper also play a role in elevating man (In Crat. 75, 19-76, 4), as exemplified for example in Eros' action on Socrates (above, p. 126).

The theory of superior souls is found also in the essays of the Commentary on the Republic, in particular in the sixteenth essay. There, in discussing the figure of Er in Plato's Republic, Proclus appears to hesitate as to whether Er possesses a soul superior in substance to other human souls or merely superior in kind of life (II 123, 23-124, 12). Proclus prefers, it seems, to assign to Er a superior substance. At any rate, through his superiority, Er was given the power by the gods to receive the vision which he imparts in the Republic (123, 14-124, 8). A little later Proclus mentions other souls who have communicated to men divine mysteries, divination, medicine . . . (153, 5-154, 5). He does not make clear the ontological rank(s) of such souls, but suggests that soul can be raised to a superior rank by the divine theurgic power in the universe as well as by philosophy (154, 1-12).

Less compatible with the classifications of the Commentaries on the Timaeus and on the Cratylus is the theory presented later in the same essay (331, 10-332, 3) that 'heroic souls', superior in being to human souls, descend into and assume a human existence. If these heroic souls were to correspond to the souls of the heroes proper mentioned in Proclus' other two commentaries, then they ought not to descend. Neither do they correspond to the 'heroic souls' that occur in those works which are superior in relation, but not in being, to other human souls. It seems we must suppose that the psychic hierarchy is more complicated than it at first appears, and includes undescending heroes, descending heroes in human form, descending pure human souls, and descending impure human souls. Or one might infer that Proclus changed his mind in his interpretation of the ontological rank of the heroic communicators of divine truth to man. The latter possibility might account for the difference between the ideas of the sixteenth essay and the fairly standard doctrine of the commentaries on the Timaeus, Cratylus, and Alcibiades. But the fact that the various accounts of the doctrine in these commentaries are not necessarily exhaustive makes it difficult to be certain about this.

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The distinction in being between (human) 'heroic souls' and heroes or demons proper entails of course a greater distinction between such souls and the gods. Proclus emphasizes the latter distinction in the Commentary on the Timaeus in arguing against Plotinus' view (as he understands it) that fallen human souls are identical in nature with those of the gods (III 245, 19-246, 23). It nevertheless remains that in allowing for higher insight and divine inspiration in a certain class of descended souls, Proclus preserves at least for part of humanity that access to higher truth that Plotinus' theory was designed to make possible. ³³ 

³³ One might also mention in this regard Proclus' doctrine of the 'flower' of the soul which, in providing an ontological link with the transcendent, also mitigates his anti-Plotinian position; cf. Grondijs (1960), 37 ff.; Beierwaltes (1963), 261-6; (1985), 174-82.

4. Learning, Discovery, and Revelation

Besides providing more details on the ontological character and place of the superior descended souls who communicate insight to man, Proclus also throws light on some problems connected with their saving mission. One of these problems has been raised above in Part I on the subject of Iamblichus' interpretation of the figure of Pythagoras: Pythagoras is said to have 'discovered' many things, but how is this to be related to the impression given that he learnt much from the Egyptians and Chaldaeans and with the claim that he (merely) revealed divinely inspired truths? Another problem may also be raised: can fallen souls, by their own efforts—as appears to be the case in Plotinus—return to true intelligible insight, or do they depend entirely on the intervention of superior souls to make their return possible? Much help with these questions can be found in Proclus' Commentary on the Alcibiades which, in so far as it discusses the interaction between Socrates and Alcibiades in the dialogue, is largely devoted to explaining the problems and methods of a philosophical, i.e. soteriological, education.

It is clear from Proclus' commentary, first of all, that learning from another and discovering by oneself are not to be distinguished in such a way as to represent alternatives in the acquisition of knowledge. Rather, both learning and discovery are to be understood as a process of recollection: in learning, the pupil is guided by the teacher so as to

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discover within himself the knowledge that is innate in his soul. More advanced souls also discover the knowledge innate in them, but are capable of this without having so much recourse to a teacher. There are therefore degrees in learning-discovery relating to the degrees to which the souls have fallen: at lower degrees souls require teachers and guides to arouse or provoke in them the discovery which is self-discovery; at higher degrees souls are more capable of such discovery and require less guidance. ³⁴ 

³⁴ In Alc. §§ 225, 4-226, 7; 277, 10-278, 13; 280, 2-281, 14.

These ideas might be suitably applied, I believe, as a Procline account of Pythagoras in his role as both scientific discoverer and pupil of barbarian sages: his discovery of the sciences was a self-discovery, a disclosure of the intelligible principles innate in his soul; for this purpose, in his youth at least, some stimulation was provided by his teachers, although one must assume that, in view of the superior status of his soul, his need for this was minimal!

Both Pythagoras and his teachers revealed divinely-inspired truths. However we must be careful again not to set divine inspiration against self-discovery. Proclus introduces divine inspiration as the highest degree in a hierarchy descending through discovery down to learning (§ 242, 4-11). This suggests some continuity between divine inspiration and self-discovery, a continuity also implied in the fact that the principles that are the objects of self-discovery are psychic images of higher divine principles (below, p. 159) and thus are already themselves inspirations deriving from above. These innate principles are cited, in one unfortunately corrupt passage, as the reason why we need (or don't need, in another reading of the passage) a guide for learning that transcends our nature. ³⁵