Other Soviet-backed movements

In Rhodesia, where guerrilla activity has been sporadic, the Soviets back the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), one of three current movements seeking to liberate Zimbabwe (Rhodesia). Following Rhodesia’s unilateral declaration of independence in November 1965, ZAPU was banned in Rhodesia and began operating in exile. ZAPU came under Soviet influence through its association with the strongly Soviet-oriented African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, the two sharing their plight in exile. By the late 1960s dissident ZAPU students in Europe began contesting their movement’s Moscow orientation. They claimed ZAPU representatives abroad were puppets of “Soviet Revisionists” while their Chinese-backed rival, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), was making progress because of its “impartial, loyal, strong, and disinterested allies.”¹³ The charges of the ZAPU students may have been justified because nearly all the credit for current guerrilla campaign in Rhodesia has gone to ZANU. At least in Rhodesia, it pears the Soviets are not backing the leading contender.

In Namibia (South-West Africa) guerrillas the South-West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) carry on very sporadic activity in the Caprivi Strip from bases across the border. Some SWAPO members are known to have been trained in the U.S.S.R., and Moscow has been a principal source material aid. SWAPO, like ZAPU in Rhodesia, is much smaller in size and in the scope of its operations than any of the CONCP movements. Although neither SWAPO nor ZAPU seems remotely near achieving success, at least in SWAPO the Soviets enjoy the luxury of supporting the only effective movement to carry on the semblance of an armed struggle in the country it hopes to liberate. Therefore, Moscow is the sole beneficiary of any credit given for the support of Namibian liberation.

The South African ANC has been supported by the Soviets but is perhaps overshadowed by the South African Communist Party (SACP). The Soviet-oriented SACP has been around for many years (it sent representatives to Moscow in 1921), but it was forced underground by the Suppression of Communism Act in 1950. It has the title and prestige of being the first African Communist party, and it maintains close contact with both Moscow and the ANC. Like the ANC, it is mainly in exile. The ANC, composed of black Africans while the SACP has many whites, is thought to have been responsible for the detonation of several propaganda pamphlet bombs in the Republic of South Africa over the past few years. Although the ANC has been unsuccessful in initiating insurgency in South Africa, that country’s racial policies make continued Soviet support for the movement necessary if the Soviets wish to exploit the situation.

Dangers of world power involvement

The involvement of other world powers in the contemporary African liberation scene can only be a cause for concern in Moscow. Thus far it appears that competition with Communist China for the allegiance of the various movements is the chief threat to Soviet policy objectives. The West has not sought involvement in this arena. The Western powers have not taken any direct action to underwrite substantially the position of the white states fighting against the African nationalist movements, despite their self-professed importance to the West as bulwarks against the tide of Communism; and the West has done even less for the liberation forces. It might be argued that the West has not yet had to make a real decision on helping the staunchly anti-Communist white minority regimes because these regimes have not to date been seriously threatened by insurgency. Africa is probably also well down the list of priorities for all the major powers concerned.

The Soviets, as would any great power, face the danger of becoming too involved in these struggles. In certain circumstances, limited involvement has a spiraling effect: that is, the involvement of one great power in an East-West or Sino-Soviet rivalry has the effect of compelling its competitors to intervene. The danger would be greater if a power were propping up a government engulfed in insurgency. However, any situation where a great power’s prestige is on the line—even if backing the insurgents—has its inherent danger.