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Financial crises hurt people directly and indirectly

Financial shocks such as banking crises hurt people through four channels: the financial system, labor markets, product markets, and social services. Evidence from 147 banking crises in 116 countries from 1970 to 2011 suggests that the impact of banking crises is transmitted to households most strongly through the labor market channel. The impact through the credit market seems to be less important. Only when banking crises coincide with currency crises (large local currency depreciations) are large changes in relative prices transmitted through the product market channel, where they affect urban households more than rural households. As for the social services channel, evidence from the Russian Federation suggests that the public sector cushioned rather than aggravated the impact of the 1998 banking, currency, and sovereign debt crisis.

In countries in which the banking crisis was accompanied by a sharp currency devaluation (Hungary, Ukraine), the accumulation of foreign currency debt (euros, Swiss francs) by some households before the crisis may have amplified the impact of income shocks.

How does systemic risk turn into a financial crisis?

Banking crises in Colombia (1982), Thailand (1997), and Ukraine (2008) were preceded by excessive credit growth of 40 percent, 25 percent, and 70 percent a year, respectively.32 Accordingly, a major concern for all countries is provision of the right amount of “equilibrium” credit: not too much and not too little. International standard setters have proposed estimating equilibrium credit as the trend in the credit-to-GDP ratio, obtained through statistical filtering.

Interconnectedness can transform the risk from a single institution (idiosyncratic risk) into systemic risk. Two aspects of interconnectedness are especially important for developing countries: banks’ ties to the shadow banking system, and cross-border banking.

From 2002 to 2012, the funds provided by banks from advanced economies to banks in developing countries increased from about $0.4 trillion to $1.7 trillion, translating into an average inflow of $130 billion a year.

This growing exposure to advanced economies can also pose potential dangers for financial stability, including exposing the domestic economy to foreign shocks. For instance, in response to a negative shock in the home country, foreign banks may decide to curtail lending or withdraw from the host country entirely. Many countries have managed such risk by requiring foreign banks to operate through an incorporated subsidiary with its own capital, rather than through a branch. Regional policy efforts to manage cross-border banking risk include the Vienna Initiative, which prevented regional banking groups from withdrawing liquid funds from Central and Eastern Europe in 2009.

Where did financial firms and past public policies fail the most?

Further, financial firms, including SIFIs, ignored their own contributions (negative externalities) to systemic risk, and market discipline failed to enforce consideration of these externalities.

The observations from the 2008 global financial crisis suggest significant influence of the industry lobby on the supervision of systemic risk, resolution of the crisis, and future regulatory reforms. The enduring challenge is to create mechanisms that can negate the “grabbing hand” of the financial industry and politicians, while creating strong incentives for official agencies to improve social welfare.45 Making regulators politically and financially independent is the first step in this direction.

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