- •Introduction
- •1.1 Formation of the Main Strategic Principles of China in Central Asia
- •1.3 Chinese Economic Strategy in Central Asia
- •1.3 Implementation of Energy Policy of China in Central Asia
- •1.4 Shaping of New Silk Road concept
- •2. Chinese Economic presence in Kazakhstan
- •2.2 Behind the drive of Chinese Heavy Investments
- •Sino-Kazakh Water Problems
- •3.1 Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Eurasian Customs Union compared
- •3.Kazakhstan’s response to Chinese advance
1.4 Shaping of New Silk Road concept
Recently, one can observe the promotion of new slogans in China. Apart from the “Chinese Dream,” the main symbol of Xi Jinping’s administration, the new leaders are trying to formulate other mottos to indicate their domestic and foreign agendas. Now, we are witnessing a revival of the “Silk Road” slogan. It is an obvious hint to the ancient trade and cultural routes between China and Central and South Asia, Europe and the Middle East that were created during the Han Dynasty, about AD 200 BC. In Chinese leaders’ view, the New Silk Road concept consists of a “new Silk Road economic belt,” which indicates stronger economic relations with Central Asia with a special focus on trade. Recently, the Chinese leaders have also mentioned a “maritime Silk Road,” which is perceived to be an attempt to improve relations with South and Southeast Asia – in this case the emphasis is on maritime trade security. The importance of these two slogans is indicated by the fact that both concepts were mentioned in a document revealed after the 3rd plenary session of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party held in mid-November in Beijing [7].
The New Silk Road concept is not a new idea. This notion was seriously taken into consideration in the 1990s after the Soviet Union’s collapse. At that time, a new world order and China’s newborn Western neighbors, with which the PRC had border delimitation discussions, meant it was pivotal to launch and then strengthen cooperation with the new counterparts. Nevertheless, the Shanghai Five mechanism established in 1996 (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), which eventually resolved the border issues, as well as China’s “keep a low profile” policy to which it embarked after the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989, slowed down implementation of the New Silk Road concept. After Deng’s southern inspection tour in 1992, where he confirmed his vision of economic reforms based on China’s coastal development (e.g., special economic zones in coastal provinces, open coastal cities, eastern comprehensive development zones), there was no strong impulse to develop the inland parts of the PRC [7].
Nowadays, the situation is different. China is facing economic perils. The global economic crisis and domestic social problems have made the current export - and Foreign Direct Investment-driven economic model less effective. Against this backdrop, China needs to find new export markets or preserve existing ones, as well as narrow development gaps between the well-developed coastal areas and the less-developed inland parts of the country and preserve stability inside China and its neighborhood. This is the main reason why the current group of Chinese leaders has coined the slogan “a New Silk Road,” which is widely quoted by Chinese media and analyzed by journalists and experts.
In her article Justyna Szczudlik-Tatar also explains in detail the concept of New Silk Road Economic Belt proposed by Xi Jinping during his state visits.
The concept of a New Silk Road Economic Belt was presented during Xi Jinping’s landmark 10-day visit to Central Asia in September this year. Xi visited four Central Asian states: Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. He also took part in the 13th Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Bishkek and went to Russia to attend the G20 summit in Saint Petersburg.
The concept was announced in Xi’s speech in Astana and reiterated in Xi’s address at the SCO summit. Xi presented a five-point proposal to jointly build the New Silk Road Economic Belt to strengthen relations between China, Central Asia and Europe. They are:
Strengthen policy communication, which may help “switch on a green light” for joint economic cooperation;
Strengthen road connections, with the idea to establish a great transport corridor from the Pacific to the Baltic Sea, and from Central Asia to the Indian Ocean, then gradually build a network of transport connections between eastern, western and southern Asia;
Strengthen trade facilitation, with a focus on eliminating trade barriers and taking steps to reduce trade and investment expenses;
Strengthen monetary cooperation, with special attention to currency settlements that could decrease transaction costs and lessen financial risk while increasing economic competitiveness;
Strengthen people-to-people relations [7].
As Justyna Szczudlik-Tatar thinks, this strategy has consequently been implemented by China for the last several years. Although a Chinese economic offer based on China’s non-interventionism principle seems to be attractive for the region, the PRC’s rising political influence is seen as a potential threat to Central Asia, which fears it could be overwhelmed. States from the region are beginning to maneuver between China and Russia (e.g., Kazakhstan’s accession to the Russia-led Customs Union). Under these circumstances, Xi’s spectacular visit to the region with a new strategy and slogans is a clear attempt to drag the region away from Russia and win over the Central Asia states.
As other two scholars, Raffaello Pantucci and Alexandros Petersen, noted in their joint article “for China, the “Silk Road Economic Belt” that Xi spoke of in Kazakhstan starts in Xinjiang, acting as the connective tissue that binds China’s crowded and prosperous eastern seaboard with Eurasia, Europe and the Middle East” [8]. In other words Central Asia is not the final destination for Chinese goods; rather it plays a role of transit corridor.
China’s interest in Central Asia is primarily a selfish one. This is not unusual in national interests: foreign policy is naturally focused on self-interest. But with China in Central Asia, the key role of Xinjiang distinguishes it from China’s relations with other parts of the world. For Beijing, Central Asian policy aims at both increasing China’s connectivity to Europe and the Middle East as well as enjoying the benefits of the region’s rich natural resources, but also about helping foster development and therefore long-term stability in Xinjiang. A province periodically wracked by internal violence and instability, Beijing has quite clearly made the calculation that to stabilize the province, more economic development should be encouraged.
Considering all of these expert opinions we may conclude that New Silk Road concept definitely became the visit card of the new generation of Chinese leaders. And they are determined to finish this complex project as it provides unprecedented opportunities for China:
The first is the development of the western part of PRC which is of crucial importance for Beijing. The final aim is not only to improve well being of the people living there but rather with improvement of well being to secure the weakening of separatist sentiments.
The second is an access to European markets which is noted by some scholars as a final aim of the New Silk Road concept. This can be partially true. Economic capabilities of Europe are much higher than of Central Asia and this perfectly fits Chinese interests. From the other hand the mere access to European markets does not seem to be the final result which Chinese leaders expect to get from their project. The New Silk Road plays a much bigger role and its implications are far more beneficial and promising. It is well known from the history that the Silk Road was not only the instrument that helped East and West to trade, but it also was the tool of diplomacy and cultural exchange. Economic strategies are never implemented without political component. Therefore trade facilitation is only a part of New Silk Road diplomacy.
