IV. Meso-theories: deviant voluntary associations (dvAs)

The general study of DVAs is in its infancy, particularly in regard to theory, but also in regard to systematic comparative study. There are many case studies of DVAs (see references in Smith 2015a; Smith and Stebbins 2015a) by historians, anthropologists, and other social scientists. However, there have been very few attempts to develop theories or models explaining how DVAs of specific types or DVAs in general function.

1. Social Movement Organizations (smOs)

One exception to the foregoing generalization is theory about social movements and their constituent social movement organizations (SMOs), which are usually DVAs. Many scholars have developed with varying degrees of generality models and theories of social movements and SMOs in the past half-century (Buechler 2011; Gamson 1990; Laraña, Johnston, and Gusfield 1994; Lofland 1996; McAdam and Snow 1997; Morris and Mueller 1992; Snow, Soule, and Kriesi 2004; Zald and McCarthy 1987). We will consider only two examples here.

1. Zald and Ash-Garner theory of SMOs:

Zald and Ash (1966; in slightly revised form as Zald and Garner 1987) presented a theory of SMO growth, decay, and change with 17 propositions. This was unusual, because it seems to be the first orderly and extensive set of propositions about SMOs as DVAs ever to be published. To give a flavor of their theory, consider these sample propositions:

1. “Proposition 5: [SMOs] with relatively specific goals are more likely to vanish following success than [SMOs] with broad general goals” (Zald and Garner 1987:130).

2. “Proposition 8: A becalmed [SMO] is most likely to follow the Weber-Michels model [of goal displacement, oligarchy, and organizational maintenance] because its dependence on and control of material incentives allows oligarchization and conservatism to take place” (Zald and Garner 1987:131).

3. “Proposition 13: Exclusive [SMOs] are more likely than inclusive [SMOs] to be beset by schisms” (Zald and Garner 1987:135).

2. Gamson theory of effective SMOs:

Gamson (1990[1975]) presented and tested a general theory of SMO effectiveness and impact, based on careful coding of published qualitative material describing a random sample of 53 U.S. SMOs from 1800 to 1945. He did not state all his propositions as such, but they can be inferred from hypotheses in his text and graphs reporting data testing them. For present purposes, we focus on his dependent variable new advantages as the outcome/impact criterion. Here are a few of the propositions, with statements of the propositions and numbering by the present first author. Note that all of these might be true of all DVAs and perhaps of all groups in general:

1. Proposition 2: SMOs that focus mainly or solely on a single issue tend to achieve more new advantages than multiple-issue SMOs (Gamson 1990:46).

2. Proposition 8: SMOs that use selective incentives (special inducements or constraints for members only) to recruit and retain members tend to achieve more new advantages than SMOs that rely only on solidarity incentives, such as appeals to values or group loyalty (Gamson 1990:69).

3. Proposition 15: SMOs that have both more bureaucratic structure (written Constitution or equivalent, formal list of members, three or more levels of internal divisions/levels) and also greater centralization of power/authority tend to achieve more new advantages than SMOs that are less formally organized (Gamson 1990:91-95).

4. Proposition 17: SMOs that avoid factionalism (serious internal splits) tend to achieve more new advantages than SMOs that experience factionalism (Gamson 1990:105).