Analysis

Opposition and unrest characterized Morales' early years in office. His controversial agenda — one meant to redistribute wealth from the wealthier lowland department of Santa Cruz to the poorer highland areas — quickly prompted protests, which culminated in a recall vote in 2008. In these early years, Morales had to do everything possible to keep his constituents in the coca-growing areas and indigenous communities firmly behind him — efforts that eventually compelled him to break ties with the United States. Since then, Morales has consolidated his power. He did so, in no small part, by empowering historically marginalized indigenous citizens through the rewriting of the constitution and through the decentralization of political authority. He was re-elected in October 2014 with more than 60 percent of the popular vote, and his Movimiento al Socialismo party now boasts a two-thirds majority in both houses of the legislature. With more power and support, the president has room to maneuver as he re-engages the United States. What Has Hurt the Economy in the Past

The timing of the re-engagement may not be a coincidence. The United States is already re-engaging parts of Latin America, and Bolivia is looking to enhance its role now that Venezuela has to contend with its domestic problems. To that end, Bolivia and the United States formally restored ties through a new treaty of mutual respect in 2011. To resume normal diplomatic relations, however, the two countries still must exchange ambassadors. In addition, Bolivia's economy, healthy as it is now, would benefit from a better U.S. relationship. The Morales administration has presided over the country during a natural gas boom, and the revenue natural gas generated gave the president widespread political support. But natural gas now accounts for roughly 45 percent of Bolivian exports by value, the dangers of which are not lost on the government. Indeed, Bolivia historically has had to rely heavily on one commodity — once it was silver, then it was tin — and when the price of that commodity fell, the Bolivian economy suffered accordingly. Now, in light of the drop in oil prices, to which the value of Bolivian natural gas is tied, La Paz is eager to avoid what has hurt its economy in the past.

Графік

It is in this context that improved relations with the United States could help. When Morales broke ties with the DEA in 2008, Bolivia lost its preferential trade status with the United States under the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act, or ATPDEA, resulting in trade losses in 2009 (though natural gas production would help to offset those losses). By ingratiating itself with the United States, Bolivia could re-secure its trade terms under the ATPDEA and improve its domestic business climate. A better rapport with Washington could also lead to uninterrupted flows of foreign direct investment, which the country will sorely need amid this setback in energy prices. Gestures of Cooperation

But before any of that can happen, Bolivia would first have to make the gesture of cooperating with the DEA. That kind of cooperation would probably take the form of intelligence sharing. In his statements on the issue, Bolivian Interior Minister Hugo Moldiz has said that the DEA can help by providing data about suspected drug traffickers. The DEA also has the ability to provide satellite photos of coca cultivation, signals intelligence and radar support for detecting planes operating in the air trafficking route between the Apurimac, Ene and Mantaro river valleys in Peru and Santa Cruz, Bolivia.

Notably, there is precedent for external assistance from the United States since the 2008 rift. In 2011, Bolivia accepted $350,000 worth of satellite capability from the United States and Brazil to monitor on-the-ground eradication efforts.

The Morales government has made it clear that the DEA will not be allowed a physical presence in Bolivia, but the regional nature of anti-drug efforts makes it possible for the DEA to assist from afar. DEA operations continue in neighboring Peru, operations that enable intelligence gathering, and bilateral interdiction efforts between Peru and Bolivia are expected to begin in March. Lima is in the process of passing a law that would permit its air force to shoot down suspected smuggling planes on its side of the border, effectively resuming a policy suspended since 2001.

And so it appears that all the pieces are in place for Bolivia and the United States to cooperate with each other once again. La Paz will not be particularly friendly with Washington anytime soon, but the government recognizes the benefits of warmer ties.

Cuba's Problems Beyond the Embargo JULY 28, 2015

On Tuesday, Republican U.S. Representative Tom Emmer introduced the Cuba Trade Act of 2015, a bill intended to lift the United States' 54-year trade embargo on Cuba. The bill is one of several legislative efforts introduced over the past year to end the trade ban. Lifting the embargo is the next logical step in the United States' eight-month outreach to Cuba. U.S. President Barack Obama has already issued directives to expand financial interaction with Cuba and make it easier for U.S. citizens to travel to the island country, but presidential power only goes so far. According to U.S. law, much of the authority to amend or annul the provisions of the embargo depends on Congress' determination that a transitional government is in place in Havana. Consequently, the law must be changed if the United States is to proceed with lifting the embargo anytime soon.

With Cuban President Raul Castro stepping down in 2018, the United States could wait until then to see if Cuba meets the legislative criteria to lift the embargo. A second option, which Emmer and others are promoting, is for Congress to amend the law underpinning the embargo, thereby removing the legal rationale for maintaining the ban. Both options would eventually require negotiations within the Republican-controlled Congress and perhaps with Cuba. However, if resistance within Congress wears down, the second option could result in the embargo being lifted before Cuba's transition of power in 2018.

For Cuba — a capital-poor island only 90 miles from the world's largest economy — lifting the embargo would bring significant economic benefits. The Cuban government is eager to shift away from its state-led economic model toward a more sustainable system that allows Cuba to generate more wealth domestically and reduce its dependence on external patrons. But even with Washington's growing will to lift the embargo, Havana will not be in a position to receive the full benefits of economic trade with the United States for several years.

Even if Congress begins serious deliberations on lifting the embargo after its August recess, the main impediments to Cuba expanding trade ties with the United States are mostly internal economic considerations. Despite Havana's greater attempts to spur the national economy, starting with the legalization of Cuba's informal business activity in 2010, the imbalances created by five decades of economic isolation will remain the principal constraints on Cuba's economic growth. The Cuban government is by far the largest employer on the island, and state-owned exporting businesses (as well as limited joint ventures with foreign firms) are highly inefficient compared to foreign competitors. Cuba's two-tiered currency exchange rate also creates significant distortions and dissuades foreign investment. Moreover, the country's restrictive foreign investment law, which taxes foreign-owned firms heavily and limits international arbitration to settle disputes, is a major drag on foreign investment. If Congress lifts the embargo and travel ban in the near term, Cuba's elites will still benefit from increased tourism (already a multi-billion dollar industry controlled by Cuban military firms), although they likely will continue missing out on potentially higher-value economic activity for years.

Over the next few years, the Cubans will likely turn their attention to addressing these issues, and the end of the embargo would add to the sense of urgency surrounding economic reform. The Cuban government already plans to have a legal draft in place for the unification of the dual currency rates by sometime in 2016. But the pace of Cuba's opening to foreign capital will ultimately depend on whether the U.S. proposals to end the Cuban embargo come to fruition in the next few years.

In Cuba, a Potential for Prosperity AUGUST 5, 2015 

• Cuba and the United States will continue to strengthen political ties in the coming months and years.

• In the short term, Cuban tourism revenue could increase and certain financial restrictions ease, but the country may still feel the impact of Venezuela's economic downturn.

• In the longer term, the impact of the Cuba's opening will depend on Havana's ability to address structural issues in its economy and on when and how the United States decides to lift the trade embargo.

• The Cuban government will likely introduce reforms gradually and selectively to take advantage of economic opportunities while maintaining a firm grip on political power.

Cuba has been shunned for so long that it is easy to forget just how important it is to the United States. The island nation has a prominent position at the mouth of the Gulf of Mexico, separating access to the gulf into two chokepoints: the Yucatan Channel and the Straits of Florida. Cuba is also situated on the sea-lanes between the U.S. East Coast and the Panama Canal, the shortest route for naval traffic between the two coasts of the United States. Cuba, which lies just 145 kilometers (90 miles) off the coast of the United States, has thus been pivotal to safeguarding economic activity in the Gulf of Mexico and naval transport routes beyond that. When the United States and Cuba are on opposing sides, the U.S. imperative is to try and neutralize and counter foreign support to Cuba from more powerful sponsors interested in meddling in the United States' backyard. If Cuba is on friendly terms with the United States, this task becomes all the more manageable.

In terms of Cuba's own economy, it has historically been driven, like many Latin American countries, by the production and export of raw materials. Cuba's most important resources have traditionally been sugar and tobacco, although the country is also a significant producer of nickel and hard alcohol. However, in large part because of its strategic location and interest from external powers, Cuba has experienced a unique political and economic trajectory over the past six decades.

The Cuban Revolution of 1959, led by Fidel Castro, dramatically shifted Cuba's economic structure from a capitalist economy integrated with that of the United States to a socialist, centrally planned economy oriented toward the Soviet Union. With Castro's revolution came the nationalization of the Cuban economy, sweeping land reforms and radical wealth redistribution. The Cuban government took control of virtually all major economic activity in the country, even to the point of confiscating foreign — and particularly Western — businesses operating on its soil, including the extremely powerful U.S.-based United Fruit Company. At the same time, the new Cuba became closely dependent on the Soviet Union for key goods such as oil and food.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Cuba lost one of its major economic patrons. The highly subsidized oil shipments it had been receiving from Russia fell 86 percent from 1989 to 1992, and food imports from Russia dropped more than 40 percent in the same period. These factors, along with a major drop in sugar prices, provoked a major economic recession in Cuba in the early 1990s, which in turn sparked some important reforms to the Cuban economy: Fidel Castro's government opened the country to tourism and limited foreign investment, while semi-legalizing the use of the U.S. dollar.

Nevertheless, Cuba still remained largely closed off to the United States, which retained a trade and travel embargo on the island. Cuba eventually found a new economic patron in Venezuela, whose left-wing government under President Hugo Chavez began sending subsidized fuel shipments to Venezuela as the Soviet Union had done. Even with the political transition from Fidel to his brother Raul Castro in 2008, when Cuba began engaging in some limited economic reforms such as the legalization of informal business activity, the state continued to play a dominant role in an economy that remained largely closed off to the United States.

A Diplomatic Opening: Short-Term Effects

The death of Hugo Chavez in 2013 and rising political and economic instability in Venezuela over the past two years have once again endangered Cuba's primary economic patron, which in part explains the latest major development trend in Cuba's political and economic evolution: renewed diplomatic ties with the United States. Beginning in late 2013, there were signs of a warming between Cuba and the United States, including a handshake between U.S. President Barack Obama and his Cuban counterpart, Raul Castro, at a memorial service for Nelson Mandela, and the start of bilateral talks in 2014 over various issues, such as the U.S. embargo on imports from Cuba and the use of Guantanamo Bay. 

These talks culminated in a major breakthrough in December 2014, when Cuba released former U.S. contractor Alan Gross in exchange for three Cuban spies who had been held in the United States. Shortly thereafter officials from both countries announced high-level political discussions focused on renewing their diplomatic relationship. Then, in March 2015, the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control removed dozens of Cuban companies connected to tourism and shipping from the sanctions list. On July 1, Obama finally made the official announcement that the United States and Cuba were to re-establish diplomatic ties and eventually reopen embassies in Havana and Washington.

Washington has also loosened economic restrictions to allow more money to flow into Cuba. Americans currently send $2 billion to Cuba in the form of remittances each year, but new changes allow individuals to send up to $2,000 per quarter to family members in Cuba, up from $500 per quarter previously. In addition, U.S. banks can now process credit card transactions from Cuba, a move that enables Americans who travel to the island to use their credit and debit cards.

Thanks to the diplomatic thaw, the Cuban tourism sector is on the rise. Tourist traffic to the island is up 15 percent compared with the same period last year, with around 1.7 million people visiting in the first five months of 2015. Moreover, each of the first five months has seen a double-digit increase in visitors — many of whom are coming from the United States. For May that number jumped 21 percent. Perhaps not coincidentally, Cuba's economic performance in the first half of 2015 registered a growth of 4.7 percent, which shows a reversal of the downward trend between 2013 and 2014. Now Cuba's economy is projected to grow 4 percent this year, largely driven by the construction and agriculture sectors. That is almost four times its growth rate in 2014, the fastest climb Cuba has seen since 2008. Even if economic statistics out of Cuba are not always completely reliable, they can still help paint a general picture of the country's prospects for growth.

The Long-Term Outlook

The next few years may be promising for Cuba's economy. The island has a highly literate population, relatively cheap labor, abundant population and natural harbors. Cuba also has a small but promising biotechnology sector with the significant potential for medical and drug manufacturing. Indeed, many international pharmaceutical companies already having identified Cuba as a potential site for drug making. There is also potential for Cuba to serve as a transshipment hub, contingent on upgrades and expansions to the country's ports.

But despite these factors and the initially positive economic signs amid the thaw between Cuba and the United States, the imbalances created by five decades of economic isolation will constrain Cuba's long-term economic growth. The Cuban government remains by far the largest employer on the island, and state-owned exporting businesses (as well as limited joint ventures with foreign firms) are highly inefficient compared with foreign competitors. Cuba's two-tiered currency exchange rate — in which a convertible peso is pegged to the dollar and used for foreign trade and the tourism industry, while the local peso is used for local goods and for paying local wages — is also problematic and dissuades foreign investment. Moreover, the country's restrictive foreign investment law, which taxes foreign-owned firms heavily and limits international arbitration to settle disputes, is a major drag on foreign investment.

The Cuban government does have plans to have a legal draft in place for the unification of the dual currency rates by sometime in 2016, but the pace of Cuba's opening to foreign capital will in large part depend on whether the United States actually ends the Cuban trade embargo within the next few years. According to U.S. law, Congress has to see a transitional government in place in Havana before it has the authority to amend or annul the ban on trade with the island. With Cuban President Raul Castro set to step down in 2018, the United States could wait until then to see if Cuba meets the legislative criteria to lift the embargo. A second option, promoted by some members of the U.S. Congress from both sides of the aisle, is for Congress to amend the law underpinning the embargo, thereby removing the legal rationale for maintaining the ban.

Even if Congress does lift the embargo, Cuba must manage its internal structural problems, including a monetary policy divorced from trade, poor energy and transport infrastructure and lack of capital stock — all of which limit its economic growth. In the coming years, Havana will try to address these issues but take care to keep those economic reforms from undermining its strong grip on power as the presidency transfers from Raul Castro to First Vice President Miguel Mario Diaz-Canel Bermudez.

Given the tenuous political situation, Havana's reforms are likely to be measured and gradual, and certain structural issues may impede the process. Cuba nevertheless has the potential to become an attractive and competitive low-end and middle-end manufacturing environment and see strong economic growth in the wake of its opening with the United States.

How the Drug War Redefines U.S.-Mexico Relations JULY 23, 2015  

The escape of notorious Sinaloa drug trafficker Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman Loera has cast a shadow on Mexico's attempts to appear capable of combating organized crime. Nearly a week after Guzman's July 11 escape from the Altiplano maximum security prison, Mexico City's top officials are working in earnest to organize Guzman's recapture. Officials including Secretary of the Interior Miguel Angel Osorio Chong are also busy trying to ease the political fallout and temper international embarrassment from the prison break. Some 10,000 federal police officers reportedly have been assigned to the hunt, and Mexican federal officials are personally overseeing investigations of the case.

Though Guzman's escape will not directly alter the established trajectory of Mexican organized crime or the resulting levels of insecurity, the fact that one of Mexico's most famous crime bosses was able to elude authorities for a second time touches a nerve in Mexico City. Mexico has been trying to shake the image that it is corrupt and insecure, but to the dismay of many U.S. officials, the country is refusing to allow the United States to more actively intervene in the search for Guzman, a clear sign of the changing dynamic between Mexico City and Washington.

Analysis

Mexico's hesitance to give the United States free rein in the hunt for Guzman is due neither to deteriorating relations between the two countries nor to any decision by the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) to abandon efforts to capture the powerful crime boss. Rather, it is a sign of the changing relationship between Mexico and the United States: Mexico is determined to focus on itsrecent political and economic reforms and to take charge of managing its campaign against organized crime in the country.

Mexico City has implemented key fundamental economic and political reforms since the current administration was installed in December 2012, several of which have directly challenged the political culture that emerged during and soon after the Mexican Revolution. Energy reform ended the state's 76-year monopoly on its oil sector, reversing the nationalization implemented by the PRI's founders as they sought to incorporate organized labor into the political establishment and to address heightened nationalism during the revolution. Electoral reform was another step toward gradually liberalizing Mexico's political institutions, and it paved the way for an independent candidate to be elected state governor for the first time – a sign of the declining influence of the Mexican political party. Mexico City wants to maintain and accelerate the economic growth experienced over the past few decades with these reforms. However, for the economy to grow, Mexico must combat high levels of criminal violence, which escalated steadily until 2011 and is still heavy in some parts of the country, as well as address the rampant corruption exacerbated by powerful organized crime groups.

Apart from their close economic ties, both the United States and Mexico have prioritized combating the Mexican transnational criminal organizations that largely emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s as Mexican crime groups rose to power by leveraging their geography and the decline of their Colombian counterparts. This focus added a substantial facet to U.S.-Mexico bilateral relations, and security and intelligence cooperation steadily grew between the two countries. By the late 2000s, the United States essentially directed Mexico's anti-organized crime strategy.

For Mexico, organized crime had evolved into an exceedingly powerful social institution outside of the control of any central government, and the United States' law enforcement and intelligence capabilities were necessary to reverse the trend. For the United States, Mexico's increasing willingness to accept U.S. counternarcotics aid and direction meant U.S. law enforcement was better able to disrupt supply chains of illicit drugs entering the United States. However, the resulting breakdown of organized crime also gave rise to higher levels of criminal violence, which hampered Mexico City's efforts to grow the economy, so it changed its focus to reducing violence and containing the rapidly diversifying sources of revenue available to criminals, such as fuel theft. However, the United States' priority remained set on disrupting supply chains and putting Mexican crime bosses in prison; these conflicting goals naturally created tension.

Shared Goals, Divergent Interests

The interests of the United States and Mexico have substantially diverged regarding the management of organized crime, but overarching bilateral relations and Mexico's need for U.S. capabilities mean the two will ultimately continue to work together. But Mexico is seeking to redefine the terms of the relationship with its powerful northern neighbor. Rather than taking a backseat to the United States, Mexico wants to take control of the campaign against organized crime south of the border and work with the United States as a partner rather than as a subordinate.

This approach represents a substantial change from the previous U.S.-Mexico dynamic. During the Calderon administration, cooperation between U.S. and Mexican law enforcement grew close, and two factors allowed the United States to control the strategy for combating Mexican crime groups. First, even with the breakdown of organized crime, there were an increasing number of independent and sometimes conflicting crime groups that still had considerable power and resources. This meant that many distinct crime groups worked separately to corrupt military, law enforcement and political officials, giving each crime group their own military or police unit at their command. Thus, Mexico's security forces were fragmented, which made it impossible for Mexico City to stage a concerted effort against any specific criminal network.

Second, even as crime groups continually sought to corrupt security forces and acquire political protection, U.S. officials also sought to win the loyalty of their own Mexican military and law enforcement units. As a result, U.S. law enforcement was able to provide superior intelligence support and guidance where needed without oversight from Mexico City. Still, in many cases the Americans intentionally kept Mexico City in the dark because of concerns about corruption. Because of U.S. intelligence's much more extensive capabilities compared with Mexico City's fragmented security resources, the impetus for fighting organized crime in Mexico rested with the United States.

Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto took the first step toward re-establishing Mexico's control of the fight against organized crime in the country in 2013, when he ordered all U.S.-Mexico intelligence and law enforcement cooperation to be funneled through the Secretariat of the Interior, which had recently gained control of Mexico's Federal Police. The Pena Nieto administration was essentially forcing itself back into the process. Many U.S. officials initially perceived the consolidation of cooperation as an effort to limit their assistance, yet despite these initial concerns, the change had few long-term implications for U.S. counternarcotics efforts; cooperation continued as Mexican authorities made gains by capturing crime bosses from every major criminal camp. Still, Mexico was slowly moving away from the U.S. strategy, focusing its attention on crime that could impede economic development instead of concentrating primarily on stopping the flow of narcotics to the United States.

Mexico City's insistence on leading the hunt for Guzman shows how much importance it places on maintaining this newly redefined relationship with the United States. Guzman's escape certainly strains the Pena Nieto administration, which is dealing with a number of significant corruption scandals that broke over the past year, and federal troops will be hard-pressed to find the missing crime boss. (Guzman remained at large for nearly 14 years after his first escape.) Guzman's second jailbreak, from a maximum security prison ahead of a possible extradition to the United States, is certainly an affront to Pena Nieto's attempts to improve Mexico's international image, and accepting additional assistance from the United States could help alleviate some of the resulting pressure. Therefore, the two countries will undoubtedly continue to remain close economically and on security matters. However, considering recent events, it is clear that Mexico City fully intends to maintain the lead in its anti-organized crime efforts, and Mexico City will only accept any additional assistance from the United States on its own terms. Consequently, future anti-narcotics operations will be aimed at reducing violence and promoting economic growth rather than at blindly targeting cartel bosses, as the United States has advocated.

Improving U.S.-Cuban Ties Create Openings in Colombia and Venezuela July 1, 2015

U.S. President Barack Obama announced July 1 that the United States and Cuba will formally re-establish diplomatic ties. Both countries will eventually appoint ambassadors, while embassies in Havana and Washington will be opened on or after July 20. The opening of embassies is a crucial step in renewing relations with Cuba, though the Cuban embargo could take years to lift because of the need for congressional approval. The U.S.-Cuban rapprochement stands out because it allows the United States increased leeway to address two major events playing out in the hemisphere, both of which directly relate to Cuba.

The first of these issues is peace negotiations in Havana between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the Colombian government. Talks are progressing despite an upsurge in FARC attacks nationwide since late May. The violence — that has long been used to get more concessions out of talks — is a sign that substantive issues are likely under discussion.

Talks will continue on whether demobilized FARC leaders would receive punishment for crimes committed during the insurgency. Both sides have already committed themselves to setting up alternate courts where FARC members can confess their crimes, but the rebels are reluctant to face punishment. The issue of whether militants receive jail time, alternate punishments, or are forced to pay compensation for past crimes is also unresolved. One of the militants' key demands is that demobilized FARC members must not be extradited to the United States, which has pending extradition requests for numerous FARC militants accused of drug trafficking.

Many of the current FARC commanders were active during the Cold War and received support from Havana, which still respects the group enough to host the peace talks. Financial support from Cuba, however, declined with the end of the Cold War and the FARC increasingly relied on cocaine trafficking as a means of revenue, though ideological affinities between the two clearly remain. Consequently, deepening U.S.-Cuban ties may facilitate Washington's further involvement in the talks.

In February, retired U.S. State Department official Bernard Aronson joined the negotiations, suggesting the United States intends to become involved in helping settle the question of FARC amnesty and demobilization. Although improved U.S.-Cuban relations may help such a negotiated solution occur, the talks' ultimate success or failure hinges on the direct negotiations between the FARC and the Colombian government.

The second major issue is the U.S. attempt to influence the direction of Venezuela's deepening economic and political crisis. The United States kept tentative political links with Venezuela for years despite poor relations. Starting earlier this year, U.S. officials began a major diplomatic outreach to renew bilateral ties (Venezuela withdrew its ambassador to the United States in 2010) and potentially engineer a means to address Venezuela's looming crises.

The former aim is less ambitious than the latter. Though ties with Caracas can improve quickly as a result of U.S. involvement, finding a solution to the endemic shortage of foreign currency hampering Venezuela's way out of severe recession is challenging. Caracas is largely cut off from foreign lending, and low oil prices, major domestic economic distortions, and high foreign debt obligations will likely drive it to the brink of default later this year. Venezuela faces several billion in debt payments over the coming year and its depleted reserves and reduced oil income mean that the government will be hoarding all the dollars it can — at the expense of funding imports.

Moreover, while the United States seems to have been capable of securing a promise from Venezuelan officials to release political prisoners, the economic support that the United States can (and is willing) to deliver to Venezuela may be limited. Venezuela needs financial support to avert a sharp economic crash, and was the first to approach the United States regarding talks. Yet it isn't apparent whether Washington intends to provide any such assistance, or whether it simply intends to manage the country's economic decline to forestall a major political crisis from breaking out in the near term.

As far as U.S. foreign policy is concerned, Cuba and Venezuela remain closely linked. Cuba is a strategic ally of Venezuela because of the Castro family's closeness to top Venezuelan officials. For embargoed, cash-strapped Cuba, Venezuela is the sole consistent source of oil and refined products. Caracas prioritizes its ties with Havana to the point that, amid a major economic collapse, it has maintained around 80,000 to 90,000 barrels per day in oil shipments to Cuba. The sudden reversal in the U.S. stance toward Cuba in December 2014 likely motivated the Venezuelan government to begin its own outreach to the United States. The threat of additional sanctions on individuals or prosecution for drug trafficking charges will likely keep Venezuelan officials involved in the negotiations and could see them make political concessions to the United States or the Venezuelan political opposition.

Washington's rapidly improving ties with Havana provide a starting point for the United States to insert itself more firmly into the Colombian negotiations as well as embracing the Venezuelan diplomatic outreach. With the decline of Venezuela, Cuba's thawing relationship with the United States and the winding down of Colombia's insurgency, Washington has an opportunity to reassert its influence in Latin America over the coming years.