I think that they will be less angry.

Shall we assume that they are not only less angry but quite gentle,

and that they have been converted and for very shame, if for no other

reason, cannot refuse to come to terms?

By all means, he said.

Then let us suppose that the reconciliation has been effected. Will

any one deny the other point, that there may be sons of kings or princes

who are by nature philosophers?

Surely no man, he said.

And when they have come into being will any one say that they must

of necessity be destroyed; that they can hardly be saved is not denied

even by us; but that in the whole course of ages no single one of

them can escape --who will venture to affirm this?

Who indeed!

But, said I, one is enough; let there be one man who has a city obedient

to his will, and he might bring into existence the ideal polity about

which the world is so incredulous.

Yes, one is enough.

The ruler may impose the laws and institutions which we have been

describing, and the citizens may possibly be willing to obey them?

Certainly.

And that others should approve of what we approve, is no miracle or

impossibility?

I think not.

But we have sufficiently shown, in what has preceded, that all this,

if only possible, is assuredly for the best.

We have.

And now we say not only that our laws, if they could be enacted, would

be for the best, but also that the enactment of them, though difficult,

is not impossible.

Very good.

And so with pain and toil we have reached the end of one subject,

but more remains to be discussed; --how and by what studies and pursuits

will the saviours of the constitution be created, and at what ages

are they to apply themselves to their several studies?

Certainly.

I omitted the troublesome business of the possession of women, and

the procreation of children, and the appointment of the rulers, because

I knew that the perfect State would be eyed with jealousy and was

difficult of attainment; but that piece of cleverness was not of much

service to me, for I had to discuss them all the same. The women and

children are now disposed of, but the other question of the rulers

must be investigated from the very beginning. We were saying, as you

will remember, that they were to be lovers of their country, tried

by the test of pleasures and pains, and neither in hardships, nor

in dangers, nor at any other critical moment were to lose their patriotism

--he was to be rejected who failed, but he who always came forth pure,

like gold tried in the refiner's fire, was to be made a ruler, and

to receive honours and rewards in life and after death. This was the

sort of thing which was being said, and then the argument turned aside

and veiled her face; not liking to stir the question which has now

arisen.

I perfectly remember, he said.

Yes, my friend, I said, and I then shrank from hazarding the bold

word; but now let me dare to say --that the perfect guardian must

be a philosopher.

Yes, he said, let that be affirmed.

And do not suppose that there will be many of them; for the gifts

which were deemed by us to be essential rarely grow together; they

are mostly found in shreds and patches.

What do you mean? he said.

You are aware, I replied, that quick intelligence, memory, sagacity,

cleverness, and similar qualities, do not often grow together, and

that persons who possess them and are at the same time high-spirited

and magnanimous are not so constituted by nature as to live orderly

and in a peaceful and settled manner; they are driven any way by their

impulses, and all solid principle goes out of them.

Very true, he said.

On the other hand, those steadfast natures which can better be depended

upon, which in a battle are impregnable to fear and immovable, are

equally immovable when there is anything to be learned; they are always

in a torpid state, and are apt to yawn and go to sleep over any intellectual

toil.

Quite true.

And yet we were saying that both qualities were necessary in those

to whom the higher education is to be imparted, and who are to share

in any office or command.

Certainly, he said.

And will they be a class which is rarely found?

Yes, indeed.

Then the aspirant must not only be tested in those labours and dangers

and pleasures which we mentioned before, but there is another kind

of probation which we did not mention --he must be exercised also

in many kinds of knowledge, to see whether the soul will be able to

endure the highest of all, will faint under them, as in any other

studies and exercises.

Yes, he said, you are quite right in testing him. But what do you

mean by the highest of all knowledge?

You may remember, I said, that we divided the soul into three parts;

and distinguished the several natures of justice, temperance, courage,

and wisdom?

Indeed, he said, if I had forgotten, I should not deserve to hear

more.

And do you remember the word of caution which preceded the discussion

of them?

To what do you refer?

We were saying, if I am not mistaken, that he who wanted to see them

in their perfect beauty must take a longer and more circuitous way,

at the end of which they would appear; but that we could add on a

popular exposition of them on a level with the discussion which had

preceded. And you replied that such an exposition would be enough

for you, and so the enquiry was continued in what to me seemed to

be a very inaccurate manner; whether you were satisfied or not, it

is for you to say.

Yes, he said, I thought and the others thought that you gave us a

fair measure of truth.

But, my friend, I said, a measure of such things Which in any degree

falls short of the whole truth is not fair measure; for nothing imperfect

is the measure of anything, although persons are too apt to be contented

and think that they need search no further.

Not an uncommon case when people are indolent.

Yes, I said; and there cannot be any worse fault in a guardian of

the State and of the laws.

True.

The guardian then, I said, must be required to take the longer circuit,

and toll at learning as well as at gymnastics, or he will never reach

the highest knowledge of all which, as we were just now saying, is

his proper calling.

What, he said, is there a knowledge still higher than this --higher

than justice and the other virtues?

Yes, I said, there is. And of the virtues too we must behold not the

outline merely, as at present --nothing short of the most finished

picture should satisfy us. When little things are elaborated with

an infinity of pains, in order that they may appear in their full

beauty and utmost clearness, how ridiculous that we should not think

the highest truths worthy of attaining the highest accuracy!

A right noble thought; but do you suppose that we shall refrain from

asking you what is this highest knowledge?

Nay, I said, ask if you will; but I am certain that you have heard

the answer many times, and now you either do not understand me or,

as I rather think, you are disposed to be troublesome; for you have

of been told that the idea of good is the highest knowledge, and that

all other things become useful and advantageous only by their use

of this. You can hardly be ignorant that of this I was about to speak,

concerning which, as you have often heard me say, we know so little;

and, without which, any other knowledge or possession of any kind

will profit us nothing. Do you think that the possession of all other

things is of any value if we do not possess the good? or the knowledge

of all other things if we have no knowledge of beauty and goodness?

Assuredly not.

You are further aware that most people affirm pleasure to be the good,

but the finer sort of wits say it is knowledge

Yes.

And you are aware too that the latter cannot explain what they mean

by knowledge, but are obliged after all to say knowledge of the good?

How ridiculous!

Yes, I said, that they should begin by reproaching us with our ignorance

of the good, and then presume our knowledge of it --for the good they

define to be knowledge of the good, just as if we understood them

when they use the term 'good' --this is of course ridiculous.

Most true, he said.

And those who make pleasure their good are in equal perplexity; for

they are compelled to admit that there are bad pleasures as well as

good.

Certainly.

And therefore to acknowledge that bad and good are the same?

True.

There can be no doubt about the numerous difficulties in which this

question is involved.

There can be none.

Further, do we not see that many are willing to do or to have or to

seem to be what is just and honourable without the reality; but no

one is satisfied with the appearance of good --the reality is what

they seek; in the case of the good, appearance is despised by every

one.

Very true, he said.

Of this then, which every soul of man pursues and makes the end of

all his actions, having a presentiment that there is such an end,

and yet hesitating because neither knowing the nature nor having the

same assurance of this as of other things, and therefore losing whatever

good there is in other things, --of a principle such and so great

as this ought the best men in our State, to whom everything is entrusted,

to be in the darkness of ignorance?

Certainly not, he said.

I am sure, I said, that he who does not know now the beautiful and

the just are likewise good will be but a sorry guardian of them; and

I suspect that no one who is ignorant of the good will have a true

knowledge of them.

That, he said, is a shrewd suspicion of yours.

And if we only have a guardian who has this knowledge our State will

be perfectly ordered?

Of course, he replied; but I wish that you would tell me whether you

conceive this supreme principle of the good to be knowledge or pleasure,

or different from either.

Aye, I said, I knew all along that a fastidious gentleman like you

would not be contented with the thoughts of other people about these

matters.

True, Socrates; but I must say that one who like you has passed a

lifetime in the study of philosophy should not be always repeating

the opinions of others, and never telling his own.

Well, but has any one a right to say positively what he does not know?

Not, he said, with the assurance of positive certainty; he has no

right to do that: but he may say what he thinks, as a matter of opinion.

And do you not know, I said, that all mere opinions are bad, and the

best of them blind? You would not deny that those who have any true

notion without intelligence are only like blind men who feel their

way along the road?