1. Choose the best variant.

2. Comment on the influence of globalization on the nation state.

Anti-globalism activists often depict the McDonald's, Disney, and Coca-Cola corporations as agents of globalism or cultural imperialism—a new form of economical/economic (1) and political domination. Critics of globalism argue that any business enterprise capable to manipulate/of manipulate/of manipulating (2) personal tastes will thrive, whereas state authorities/authority (3) everywhere will lose control over the distribution of goods and services. According to this view of world power, military force is perceived as/of as (4) hopelessly out-of-the way/out of step/out of the firing line (5) or even powerless; the control of culture (and its production) is seen as far/by far (6) more important than the control of political and geographic limits/borders/frontiers (7). Certainly, it is true that national boundaries are increasingly permeable and any effort by nations to exclude global pop culture usually makes the banned/barred/illegal (8) objects all irresistible/all the most irresistible/all the more irresistible (9).

Arguments regarding the overrosion/corrosion/erosion (10) of state sovereignty are particularly unsettling for nations that have become consumers not/then/rather then/than/rather than (11) producers of digital technology. the/a/x (12) Post-Soviet Russia, the/a/x (13) post-Mao China, and the/a/x (14) post-Gaullist France are but three examples of Cold War giants facing uncertain futures in the emerging global system. French intellectuals and politicos/politicians (15) have seized upon anti-globalism as an organizing/organized (16) ideology in the absence of other unifying/unified (17) themes. In Les cartes de la France à l'heure de la mondialisation (2000; “France's Assets in the Era of Globalization”), French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine announced/denounced/renounced (18) the United States as a “hyperpower” that promotes “uniformity” and “unilateralism.” Speaking for the French intelligentsia, he argued that France should take the plunge/take the lead/take the veil (19) in building a “multipolar world.” Ordinary/Regular/The rank and file (20) French citizens also were concerned about/with (21) losing their national identity, particularly as the regulatory power of the European Union began to have an effect/affect/sway (22) everyday life. Sixty percent of respondents in a 1999 L'Expansion poll agreed that globalization represented the greatest threat/risk/jeopardy (23) to the French way of life.

Ex. 31. ** Fill in the gaps with any suitable word.

When public diplomacy issues are discussed, __________ (1) tends to be on major powers that are particularly active in this field – China, Israel, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States and a few others. But Romania has now announced that it wants to __________ (2) the big guys' club, and it is taking __________ (3) steps toward doing so.

A new public diplomacy program has been __________ (4) within the office of Romania's president, Traian Basescu, who has put his personal __________ (5) behind its efforts. At a conference in Bucharest last week marking the beginning of the new public diplomacy venture, Basescu said, "Romania is proud of itself," and he criticized the common __________ (6) of Romania as the source of other countries' crime problems. This __________ (7) is at least in part a product of racism directed toward Romania's Roma, or Gypsy, population, members of which are actively __________ (8) against throughout much of Europe.

Former foreign minister Cristian Diaconescu, along with his colleague Dan Dima, is directing the public diplomacy __________ (9), which he defines as "the management of external perception... that aims to offer to the international realm the necessary arguments for a solid structuring of our credibility and reputation abroad." For those tempted to think Romania just needs a new "brand" identity, Diaconescu said that __________ (10) of Romania "cannot be magically created out of imaginative promotion, but must be built on policy."

All this is encouraging, but Basescu's team is in the __________ (11) of domestic political battling that is far nastier than anything seen in other countries. The president and the current foreign minister belong to different political parties and are so at __________ (12) that the foreign ministry chose to send no representative to the kick-off conference. This needs to be __________ (13). In any country, successful public diplomacy requires a long-term commitment that transcends __________ (14).

Romania's new __________ (15) on reaching out to foreign publics – not just other governments – should be considered a useful step forward in a __________ (16) of ways. It is likely to benefit Romania's regional __________ (17) and it will widen the circle of public diplomacy practitioners. In Europe, the collective political blood pressure tends to reach __________ (18) peaks. Public diplomacy may prove a helpful __________ (19).

Ex. 32. a) Read the following extract from an article and identify its topic and thesis.

b) Think of a possible title.

c) Comment on the ideas of the article.

In the digital world, the momentum is always with the upstarts. They are the gamechangers.

Once upon a time, Amazon were upstarts and the people who changed the rules of book retailing – now, for good or (mostly) ill, they are the gatekeepers of the book industry. For TV, Netflix are the ones who are shifting the goalposts. In news media, look to Buzzfeed. Right across the digital spectrum, it is the newbies who end up re-writing how content and services are delivered.

So could the same happen in diplomacy? Could a digitally adept nation change the rules of public engagement and become an influence far beyond their physical and financial resources? Why not?

For one thing, the digital diplomacy space needs positive presences. In some ways, it has become a slightly moribund arena, with innovation at a premium. It's a digital cliché, of course, but diplomacy needs its disruptors.

In recent years, digital diplomacy has become communications heavy, dependent on social media, but light on bright ideas, and there has been something of a minor vacuum, into which others have moved. At the extreme end, this has included the Israeli armed forces tweeting warnings/threats to those in the Gaza strip, and, of course, the grotesque propaganda of ISIS forces.

In the face of such extremes, the established players in digital diplomatic circles look a little tired, concentrating on upbeat communications, rather than invention or function, to look beyond the outputs of soft power and more towards digital as a driver of new relationships, with states and non-state actors, that can help create new policies. The time is right for new countries to step into that world and punch way above their weight, gaining influence above and beyond their more risk averse counterparts.

Unlikely as it may seem, Iran has found firm digital ground, not least with its use of social media. President Rouhani has, seemingly, found time to tweet both to all and sundry and to foreign leaders and managed to humanise the world's view of his government. The Twitter account @MeetIran openly admits it is 'dedicated to providing a more nuanced idea of #Iran. One tweet at a time', which has, shamefully, prompted one blogger to coin the word "Twipoganda".

On a more granular level, and proving that people react better to other people than to organisations, the likes of British Ambassador Tom Fletcher in Beirut have shown that creating networks and improving communications ('talking to people' in old money) can reap dividends in terms of the access and influence it engenders.

But while there are exemplars of good practice amongst countries big and small, sustained excellence has not been reached for some time. The opportunity is there, and its one that's worth taking, the prize is an important one.

The big shift that digital diplomacy can give us is not that governments can communicate regularly on new platforms, it's that they can do so with new groupings. Digital platforms enable people to group together for reasons other than mere geography and created bonds determined by something other than the traditional sense of nationhood. Some might be yolked together by region, rather than nation, or by religion, by economics, by gender, or by ideas. In the digital sphere, these groupings are every bit as legitimate, and often more vocal, than groupings decided by borders and flags.

These groups do not have the mechanics of traditional diplomacy, the ability to match ambassador to ambassador and to share the same arcane procedures. In this new world, a diplomat's clients are changing. Post-digital, post Arab Spring, and in a time of ISIS and Boko Harem, a diplomat is looking at groups which are based around a whole new set of values and loyalties that are not related to those borders drawn hundreds of years ago. Indeed, some members of those interest groups/fanatics/extremists are in your own country.

Those who the diplomat must engage with have shape-shifted, and hard diplomacy is difficult with people who don't share the same view of the rule of law; soft power is harder when faced with al Qaeda members in Arsenal shirts, and digital diplomacy is harder when groupings are fluidly forming in public and hidden areas of the web.

But a diplomat has to engage with these groups – because they are possible challenges to the nation that he/she represents. There're a few challenges – you have to find them first. And you have to engage with them when they have no duty to engage with you. A diplomat's job description, effectively, includes 'speak to other diplomats, foreign ones included' in amongst the list of core tasks. But a fluid group of people who have gathered round an abstract idea don't have any contract or job description, they don't wear white shirts and dark ties, and they may not want to respond, or converse in the way you want to. Where's the treaty, the protocols, the agreements, the furniture of diplomacy?

While we are in a period of change, it's only just beginning; the notion of nation still remains hugely strong. A diplomat can legitimately call on that concept as their main job. But it's altering and the speed of change is increasing. A diplomat is facing a different set of challenges and dealing with them will require a different skill-set. Some will have it, some do have it - but many do not. Digital diplomacy will no longer be about a certain elan on Twitter, it will be about identifying non-state actors and the channels of their choice, with which to monitor and engage with them to form new relationships.

And into that space, new nations can stand tall, just as new groupings can. On digital platforms, the size of your army doesn't matter (nor, really, does the size of your followers), it's the influence and use to which you put those platforms -- changing the way people think and act and using the crowd to inform policy decisions, while being, to some degree, agnostic about who you consider to be fit for connection.

Any country can begin to re-define this space, the incentive is with new, smaller nations, with less traditional power bases, to do so. The stage is set.

(Based on Jimmy Leach’s post at http://www.huffingtonpost.com)

Appendix