- •Contents
- •Interpretation of contracts
- •A. Principles of interpretation
- •Start (and end) with what the contract says
- •Parties' intention assessed objectively
- •Business common sense
- •The commercial purpose
- •Reasonableness
- •The whole contract approach
- •Correcting mistakes by construction
- •Diminishing role for strict interpretation
- •Directory and mandatory provisions
- •Inconsistent provisions
- •Same approach in law and equity
- •B. Continuing relevance of traditional rules of construction
- •Lawful effect
- •A party may not take advantage of its own wrong
- •Excluding or modifying legal remedies
- •Strict interpretation against one party (contra proferentem)
- •The express excludes the implied (expressio unius rule)
- •General words at the end of a list (the ejusdem generis rule)
- •Section 61 Law of Property Act 1925 presumptions
- •C. Relevant and admissible background
- •D. Precedent value of cases
- •Implied terms
- •A. Usage or custom
- •B. Previous course of dealings
- •C. Terms implied in fact
- •Business efficacy and officious bystander tests
- •Bp Refinery
- •Philips Electronique
- •Marks and Spencer
- •Admissible background
- •Certainty
- •Implication of terms compared with interpretation/construction and rectification for mistake
- •D. Terms frequently implied in fact
- •Right to terminate an indefinite contract
- •Contractual discretion must not be exercised arbitrarily
- •E. Good faith
- •F. Terms implied at common law
- •G. Terms implied by statute
- •H. Excluding implied terms
- •Misrepresentation a. What is a misrepresentation?
- •Types of representee
- •Misrepresentation of law
- •Statement of opinion
- •Implied representations
- •Silence
- •Other requirements for an effective misrepresentation
- •Intention to induce
- •B. Types of misrepresentation
- •Fraudulent misrepresentation
- •Negligent misrepresentation
- •Innocent misrepresentation
- •C. Remedies for misrepresentation
- •Rescission
- •Damages for misrepresentation
- •Innocent misrepresentation
- •D. Negligent misstatement at common law
- •E. Can a representation become a term of the contract?
- •F. Limiting liability for misrepresentation
- •Clauses in contracts
- •Entire agreement clauses
- •Structure and terms of commercial contracts a. Form
- •B. Skeleton structure
- •Front and cover page, back sheet
- •Commencement section and dates
- •Parties
- •Background, recitals, or preamble
- •Operative provisions
- •Preliminary clauses
- •Interpretation
- •Performance obligations
- •Payment obligations
- •Limitations and exclusions of liability
- •Subsidiary obligations
- •Boilerplate
- •Schedules, appendices and other attachments
- •Execution
Business efficacy and officious bystander tests
Traditionally the following two tests have been most commonly used when determining whether a term should be implied into a contract:
Business efficacy test. The proposed term will be implied if it is necessary to give business efficacy to the contract (The Moorcock [1889] 14 PD 64).
"Officious bystander" test. The proposed term will be implied if it is so obvious that, if an officious (interfering) bystander suggested to the parties that they include it in the contract, "they would testily suppress him with a common 'oh of course'" (Shirlaw v Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd [1939] 2 KB 206). In other words, the proposed term must be so obvious that it goes without saying.
Bp Refinery
In BP Refinery the Privy Council summarised the test established in earlier case law and suggested that any proposed implied term must meet the following conditions, which may overlap:
It must be reasonable and equitable.
It must be necessary to give business efficacy to the contract, so that no term will be implied if the contract is effective without it (the business efficacy test).
It must be so obvious that "it goes without saying" (the officious bystander test).
It must be capable of clear expression.
It must not contradict any express term of the contract.
However, in Marks and Spencer the Supreme Court held that:
Test (1) from BP Refinery may be disregarded; if a term satisfies the other requirements, it will also be reasonable and equitable.
Tests (2) and (3) from BP Refinery are alternatives; only one need be satisfied.
Philips Electronique
In Philips Electronique Grand Public SA v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [1995] E.M.L.R. 472 the Court of Appeal made the following key comments:
Because the implication of terms is potentially so intrusive (as the parties have made no such express provision), the law imposes strict constraints on it.
It is difficult to infer with confidence what the parties to a lengthy and carefully drafted contract must have intended. An omission may be the result of the parties' oversight or their deliberate decision.
It is tempting, but wrong, for a court, with the benefit of hindsight, to imply a term which reflects the merits of the situation as they then appear.
The term to be implied must be either the only contractual solution or the one which would, without doubt, have been preferred.
Marks and Spencer
In Marks and Spencer, in addition to the two comments on BP Refinery noted above, the Supreme Court said the following:
Reasonable people not actual parties. The implication of a term is not critically dependent on proof of an actual intention of the parties when negotiating the contract. What matters is not the hypothetical answer of the actual parties, but that of notional reasonable people in the position of the parties at the time at which they were contracting.
The fairness of a term or the fact that the parties would agree to it is insufficient. A term should not be implied into a detailed commercial contract merely because it appears fair or merely because one considers that the parties would have agreed it if it had been suggested to them. Those are necessary but not sufficient grounds for including a term.
It is important to correctly formulate the question asked by the officious bystander. Lord Neuberger cites Lewison in Interpretation of Contracts, 5th ed (2011) para 6.09 on this point, without further discussion. The book criticises questions which suggest only one answer and comments that a question may produce a different answer if put in a more neutral or easy to understand way.
Necessity for business efficacy involves a value judgment. The test is not one of “absolute necessity”, not least because the necessity is judged by reference to business efficacy. A more helpful way of putting the business efficacy requirement may be, as suggested by Lord Sumption, that a term can only be implied if, without the term, the contract would lack commercial or practical coherence.
