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ПОСОБИЕ ЭП_ Клочков, Трибунская_ 2009_ Уч. пособие по переводу_ Тексты по Европ праву_ Ч 1.doc
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III. Additional texts for translation

The current institutional structure of the Communities was established for a system with a more limited membership; originally there were only six Member States. Since 1957 membership of the Communities (and then the Union) has more than quadrupled and significant policy areas, such as monetary union, have been added to the Community's remit and there is also the impact of the introduction of the Union itself and the issues included in the other two 'pillars' (FSP and JHA). Prior to the ToA, it was generally accepted that the current institutional structure was unable to function effectively in the modern Union and that institutional problems would only be exacerbated by further enlargement. Obviously, expanding the Community's competence itself increases the number of tasks the Community institutions have to perform, but increased membership brings further problems. It may be more difficult to reach agreement within the institutions: not only is it more difficult to reach agreement between a greater number of representatives, but with eastward expansion the Member States reflect a greater diversity of interests, traditions and languages. In addition to the sheer weight of numbers, there will be a risk of fragmentation as the Union becomes less cohesive. The current Member States were aware of this problem even before the ToA, resulting in a Protocol being annexed to the ToA regarding proposed institutional reform. Although this document envisaged a two-stage approach to reform, to commence negotiations with more than 10 candidate countries, it was decided to commence full-scale institutional reform foreseen by the second stage of the ToA Protocol. The result was the treaty of Nice. To what extent has it dealt with institutional problems identified prior to and immediately after the ToA?

In contrast to the TEU, Nice was not a treaty aimed at creating a momentus constitutional change to the EU structures. Instead, it aimed to revise the way the institutions worked, to prepare the Union for enlargement. On one level the treaty can be seen as successful: difficult points of principle, such as the composition of the Commission and the issue of qualified majority voting in Council, were agreed. Given the tension between the large and small nations, it is commendable that a balance between these different interests was found. On the other hand, one could argue that many changes to the internal workings of the institutions, such as the strengthening of the role of the President in the Commission, added little, if anything, to the revised working practices already in place following the reviews of 1999. Although points of principle have been agreed, many difficulties, such as the rotation of Commissioners, remain. Implementing these decisions may give rise to problems. Nice may have taken steps to prevent all the institutions turning into 'deliberative assemblies' but some issues relating to efficiency, such as the need for multiple translations, the six-monthly rotating presidency of the Council and democracy were not resolved.

The institutional provisions in the Treaty of Lisbon largely replicate those in the EU Constitution. Certain aspects of the new institutional regime are relatively uncontroversial. The increase in the power of the EP is clearly warranted, as is the decrease in the size of the Commission.

There is nonetheless greater room for differences of view concerning other institutional provisions. Those who favoured unified executive power built around the Commission President will be disappointed. So too will those who advocated a parliamentary regime. To be sure the power of the EP over legislative acts and non-legislative acts was increased. However state interests exercised through the Council and European Council were also reinforced through, for example, the creation of the longer-term Presidency of the European Council, and the European Council's retention of ultimate control over the choice of President of the Commission.

The reality is that the EU Constitution and Treaty of Lisbon embody a regime in which executive and legislative powers, are shared between the European Council, Council, EP and Commission. The sharing of such power has been a principal theme of the Community, and in this respect the EU Constitution and Treaty of Lisbon represent continuity with the past, rather than, some radical new departure. Thus while the powers of the President of the European Council are increased, the Commission, and its President, are still central to the new constitutional scheme. It is, for example, the Commission that is given power to initiate annual and multi-annual programming with the aim of securing inter-institutional agreement, and the Commission President co-operates with the President of the European Council in ensuring the preparation and continuity of the work of the European Council.