Церковников о деликтной ответственности за двойную продажу

Верховный суд высказался в пользу такой деликтной ответственности. В деле шла речь о продаже будущей недвижимости - квартиры, первоначальный продавец был коммерческой организацией. Конечный покупатель из одной из цепочек добился признания в судебном порядке сделок по отчуждению квартиры недействительными, а также ликвидации исполнения этих сделок - регистрация права на квартиру за другим конечным покупателем.

Представим себе, что в отношении одной и той же конкретной вещи гражданин - первоначальный продавец заключил два договора купли-продажи с разными покупателями. Те, в свою очередь, заключили еще ряд таких договоров. На концах цепочек оказались покупатели-граждане. Вещь и право на нее в силу последующего исполнения одного из первоначальных договоров была передана по одной цепочке. Конечный покупатель в другой цепочке, заплативший стоимость вещи своему продавцу (одному из перепродавцов), не смог вернуть деньги назад, например по причине несостоятельности перепродавца, и предъявил деликтный иск непосредственно к первоначальному продавцу.

"Вещная" гарантия на случай эвикции или деликт?

Прежде всего следует обсудить ответственность конечного продавца перед конечным покупателем.

В не отягощенной дополнительными элементами ситуации двойной продажи вещь по общему правилу остается у того из покупателей, которому было передано владение. В этом случае нечего эвинцировать у другого (пострадавшего) покупателя: вещь ушла по параллельной цепочке перепродаж, и он не получил её. Эвикции в смысле ст. 461 ГК РФ в таком случае не будет.

Если конечный покупатель не получил вещь и уже не получит ее, так как она прошаган и передана по другой цепочке перепродаж, он вправе на основании общих правил требовать от своего продавца возмещения убытков за неисполнение договора. Если же будет иметь место усложнение и покупатель в одной из цепочек получит владение вещью, тогда как в действительности право будет принадлежать другому покупателю, то в случае удовлетворения виндикационного иска второго покупателю к первому он сможет в споре со своим продавцом аппелировать к правилам об ответственности на случай эвикции, а до осуществления эвикции - расторгнуть договор и взыскать убытки по правилам ст. 450 и 460. Здесь нельзя не заметить, что практика высшей судебной инстанции исходит из договорного характера этих притязаний, и такой взгляд на сегодняшний день господствует и в правовой науке.

Соотношение ответственности первоначального и конечного продавцов. Высказывалось любопытное мнение, что возможность конечного покупателя взыскать убытки с первоначального продавца - это продолжение действия гарантий на случай эвикции из первого в цепочке договора купли-продажи. Но, во-первых, применительно к рассматриваемой нами ситуации двойной продажи без указанного выше усложнения - изъятия вещи одним покупателем у другого - нет места для обращения к правилам о гарантии на случай эвикции даже при рассмотрении спора между сторонами договора купли-продажи. А во-вторых, если изъятие все же случилось, имеются большие сомнения в возможности следования гарантии судьбе вещи.

Действительно, существуют судебные акты как российских судов, так и судов стран Западной Европы, из которых можно сделать вывод о том, что договорные гарантии следуют судьбе вещи: конечный приобретатель вправе воспользоваться и предьявить прямой иск к первоначальному отчуждателю, минуя того, у кого непосредственно приобретён данный объект. Такое явление, вероятно, можно было бы объяснить или вещным характером гарантии, или подразумеваемой уступкой гарантийных обязательств из первого договора в цепочке продаж.

Однако даже если признать следование гарантий за вещью или их подразумеваемые уступки, возникает вопрос: будет ли это обстоятельство исключать договорную ответственность конечного продавца перед конечным покупателем? Неужели подразумеваемая уступка гарантии предполагает еще и общее исключение или ограничение ответственности конечного продавца? Вряд ли.

Хуже того, если мы говорим о продаже чужого в чистом виде, а не о двойной продаже, первоначальный продавец может быть добросовестен, а один из перепродавцов - знать о пороке в праве. Или же вся цепочка будет в обоснованном неведении о правовой проблеме отчуждений до предъявления виндикационного иска.

В породившем интересующую нас дискуссию деле ВС РФ определенно не принял данный подход, четко противопоставив договорную ответственность конечного продавца перед конечным покупателем деликтной ответственности первоначального продавца, и такое решение представляется куда более удачным.

Гарантия от эвикции связывает конечного продавца по отношению к конечному покупателю и подчинена режиму их договора.

С одной стороны, если бы конечный продавец предупредил покупателя о возможной проблеме в праве на вещь, он не отвечал бы за убытки по ст. 461 ГК РФ. Освободила бы эта оговорка первоначального продавца, умышленно запустившего две цепочки перепродаж? С другой стороны, если бы ст. 461 ГК РФ позволяла ограничить ответственность конечного продавца до умысла (подобно ГК РСФСР 1922 и 1964 гг.), он не отвечал бы в нашем случае, если бы действовал неумышленно. Естественно, это никак не затронуло бы ответственность умышленно действовавшего первоначального продавца.

Вместе с тем, если бы первоначальный продавец по какой-то причине был признан невиновным и освобожден от деликтной ответственности перед конечным покупателем, то это никак не сказалось бы на строгой ответственности конечного продавца в смысле ст. 461 ГК РФ: он в любом случае отвечал бы перед конечным покупателем. Вопрос лишь в том, был бы ли он обязан в отсутствие своей вины вернуть лишь полученные деньги или же возместить все убытки в полном объеме. По букве ст. 461 ГК РФ, по смыслу гарантийного обязательства и разъяснениям Верховного Суда, скорее, верно второе.

Правда, проблема обостряется тем, что сам деликт на первый взгляд необычен: он заключается в исполнении одного обязательства, которое делает невозможным исполнение других обязательств, а не в уничтожении или повреждении имущества.

Более того, в предложенной нами модели речь, как правило, идет об осознанном, умышленном действии: запуске двух параллельных цепочек перепродаж с очевидным последствием в виде убытков покупателей в одной из них. При этом нельзя не заметить, что вопрос об ответственности третьего лица за создание их невозможности исполнения обязательства, в котором он не участвовал, не нов для отечественного права.

Поведение третьего лица - «интервента, знающего о существовании чужого обязательства, но, несмотря на это, создающего собственными действиями стимулы и условия для его нарушения», квалифицируются как деликт.

Солидарная ответственность из разных оснований?

В практике Верховного Суда, а ранее и Высшего Арбитражного Суда РФ, можно встретить правовые позиции о допустимости удовлетворения нескольких вытекающих из разных оснований, параллельных притязаний к разным должникам, которые направлены на защиту одного интереса. Значимым для нас примером будет признание возможности удовлетворения требований о возмещении одних и тех же убытков, одно из которых основывается на договорных отношениях, а другое - на факте причинения вреда.

В приведенных примерах нижестоящие суды исходили из того, что наличие одного обязательственного требования к одному лицу исключало другое обязательственное требование о защите того же интереса к другому лицу. Любопытно, как делается выбор в пользу того или иного обязательства.

С одной стороны, в деле про аварию в электрических сетях сработал подход, который мы можем условно назвать непосредственным причинением: отвечает тот из должников, чье поведение непосредственно вызвало убытки или на чье поведение повлияло событие, ставшее основной причиной убытков (риск). С другой стороны, имеется диаметрально противоположный вариант выбора, к которому склонились нижестоящие суды в обсуждаемом деле про двойную продажу недвижимости: договорная ответственность исключает деликтную, поскольку совершение двойной продажи первоначальным продавцом и убытки конечного покупателя отделены друг от друга иными обязательственными отношениями. Условно можно сказать, что сработал "принцип ближнего" - иск нужно предъявлять к тому, кто непосредственно обязался перед тобой.

Очевидно, что причинная связь - лишь ширма, которой прикрывается тот самый "принцип ближнего", согласно которому конкуренция требований недопустимо, одно обязательственное требование вытесняет другое. Ведь не вызывает сомнений, что, получив право на вещь и произведя ее отчуждение по параллельной цепочке, первоначальный продавец сделал невозможным исполнение в натуре как своего обязательства перед первым покупателем, так и последующих обязательств перепродавцов в цепочке, которая вещь не получила. Его действия - это как раз та самая наиболее вероятная причина, которая вызвала убытки покупателя.

Идея об исключении одного обязательственного требования другим означает как минимум перенос на кредитора риска неплатежеспособности одного из должников и освобождение от ответственности другого, непосредственно виновного в двойной продаже.

Нетрудно заметить, что такая позиция находится в явном противоречии и с принципом относительности обязательств: относительная связь кредитора и должника не должна влиять на совершенно другую связь этого же кредитора с другим должником, который не участвует в первом обязательственном отношении.

Правда, следуя этой логике до конца, нам придется признать, что и требовать фактического исполнения или исполнять судебные решения о защите этого интереса нужно столько раз, сколько мы имеем должников в самостоятельных обязательствах. Вот здесь, действительно, право вынуждено сделать исключение из принципа относительности обязательств: "исполнение одного из обязательств освобождает по отношению к кредитору должника по другому обязательству", что "является единственной характерной чертой солидарных обязательств".

Цель договорной ответственности конечного продавца и деликтной первоначального едина - возместить в полном объеме (п. 1 ст. 15 ГК РФ) убытки покупателя, но их основания и условия различны. И в принципе в такой ситуации нет проблемы в признании того, что обязанность первоначального продавца возместить вред и договорная ответственность конечного продавца могут координироваться между собой как солидарные.

Условия и пределы ответственности конечного продавца

Презумпция вины при двойной продаже становится практически неопровержимой. Продавая одну и туже вещь дважды, дееспособный продавец действует виновно, причем, как правило, умышленно.

Возвращаясь к двойной продаже, нужно сказать, что противоправность поведения первоначального продавца и причинная связь с убытками всех покупателей в цепочке перепродаж кажутся лежащими на поверхности: вещь уходит по другой цепочке именно благодаря действиям первоначального продавца, нарушившего обязательство перед одним из первоначальных покупателей и проигнорировавшего права всех прочих покупателей в одной из цепочек перепродаж.

Интересны пределы деликтной ответственности первоначального продавца перед покупателями, которые не являлись его контрагентами. Однако, вероятно, выработка подходов к таким пределам - дело будущего.

Так, полученное первоначальным продавцом от продажи вещи может быть несоизмеримо меньше убытков конечного покупателя, который, например, заплатил большую цену своему продавцу. Однако если бы каждый покупатель в цепочке взыскивал уплаченное по договору и иные убытки со своего продавца, то в идеальной ситуации эти убытки, как снежный ком, все равно добрались бы до первоначального продавца. Другое дело, какие возражения были бы ему доступны против такого иска и отличались ли бы они от возражений против прямого деликтного требования.

Бевзенко

КУПЛЯ-ПРОДАЖА БУДУЩЕЙ НЕДВИЖИМОСТИ И ОБЩЕЕ ИМУЩЕСТВО

НЕЖИЛОГО ЗДАНИЯ

КОММЕНТАРИЙ К ОПРЕДЕЛЕНИЮ СУДЕБНОЙ КОЛЛЕГИИ ПО ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКИМ

СПОРАМ ВС РФ ОТ 03.03.2016 N 307-КГ15-14692

Свои рассуждения Коллегия начинает с квалификации договора участия в долевом строительстве, отмечая, что он является разновидностью договора купли-продажи будущего недвижимого имущества.

Свои рассуждения Коллегия начинает с квалификации договора участия в долевом строительстве, отмечая, что он является разновидностью договора купли-продажи будущего недвижимого имущества. При этом Коллегия прямо отсылает к п. 4 Постановления N 54, посвященному конструкции купли будущей недвижимости.

Напомню вкратце смысл этой правовой позиции относительно продажи недвижимости, которая будет создана или приобретена в будущем. ВАС РФ констатирует, что:

- в принципе возможно принятие на себя обязательства передать другому лицу в собственность через какое-то время недвижимую вещь, которая физически не существует в момент заключения договора;

- такой договор (если он сопровождается обязательством уплатить цену, разумеется) является договором купли-продажи;

- с учетом положений ГК РФ о предмете купли-продажи (о том, что им может быть вещь, которая будет создана или приобретена в будущем) договор создает обязательство продавца передать собственность на вещь, как только та будет создана; в случае если вещь не будет создана либо будет создана, но передана другому лицу, договорные обязательства продавца перед покупателем оказываются нарушенными и тот должен возместить убытки и уплатить неустойку (если она предусмотрена договором).

Есть точка зрения, которая утверждает, что участие в долевом строительстве - это подряд. Такое предположение (о подрядной природе договора участия в долевом строительстве) ошибочно, потому что в силу положений ГК РФ по договору подряда заказчик должен передать подрядчику земельный участок и проектную документацию, чего, разумеется, никогда не бывает в рамках участия в долевом строительстве. (Структура этого договора, между прочим, очень проста: одно лицо обязуется передать индивидуально-определенную вещь (помещение в строящемся здании) в собственность другого лица, а то, в свою очередь, обязуется уплатить за эту вещь деньги; три тысячи лет такой договор называется у юристов куплей-продажей; в современной России его зачем-то назвали участием в долевом строительстве.)

Кстати, именно по причине наличия у заказчика по договору подряда обязанности передать земельный участок под застройку его право собственности на построенный объект возникает первоначальным образом - ведь вещь создается на земле заказчика, работает принцип superficies solo cedit. У покупателя же будущей недвижимой вещи право возникает производным способом, от продавца (который строит на своей земле).

Признав договор участия в долевом строительстве куплей-продажей будущей недвижимой вещи, Коллегия двигается дальше и провозглашает обязательность применения принципа единства судьбы прав на искусственную недвижимость и земельный участок.

Коллегия указывает, что поскольку у продавца будущей недвижимости - застройщика было право собственности на земельный участок, застраиваемый зданием, то и покупатели неизбежно также должны приобрести от него это право. Без этого продажа будущих помещений была бы ничтожной. Сегодня в ГК и ЖК есть норма о том, что земельный участок по умолчанию входит в состав многоквартирного жилого дома и становится собственностью собственников квартир. С нежилыми зданиями, в которых существует поэтажная собственность, ситуация с общим имуществом намного сложнее.

Начну с того, что ГК не знает такого режима вообще. Его создал ВАС РФ в Постановлении N 64. Любопытно, что в первоначальной редакции проекта этого Постановления земельный участок назывался в числе элементов общего имущества нежилого здания. Однако впоследствии в результате бурных дискуссий указание на участок из перечня общего имущества убрали и полной аналогии со ст. 36 ЖК РФ и режимом общего имущества в многоквартирных домах проведено не было.

Причина была довольно простой: если бы ВАС РФ признал, что участок входит в состав общего имущества нежилых зданий, это бы, по сути, лишило публичные образования, на чьих участках расположены сотни тысяч нежилых зданий, в которых существует поэтажная собственность на помещения, права собственности на эти участки. И вместо арендной платы публичные образования должны были бы заняться администрированием земельного налога. Но вряд ли такое тектоническое потрясение было бы правильно осуществлять через судебную практику, и ВАС РФ тогда не решился на столь серьезный шаг, оставив его законодателю (к слову, реформа вещных прав именно это и предусматривает).

Однако, разумеется, если у застройщика имелось право собственности на застраиваемый участок, он должен перейти в общее имущество собственников помещений в здании.

Zimmerman

The contract of sale (emptio venditio) was purely consensual. The sole basis for the respective obligations to deliver the goods and to pay the purchase price was the agreement between seller and purchaser. No form was needed, no witnesses had to be present, no rei interventio was required.

Nor was the handing over of an arrha necessary in order to make the contract binding. Arrha is an object (in Rome, usually a ring or a sum of money) given, upon entering into a contract, as an earnest.

Wherever such an earnest was given, it only provided some evidence that a contract of sale had been concluded. It did not have a constitutive effect or function, but merely played a confirmatory role (arrha confirmatoria). Once the contractual obligations had been discharged, the ring could be claimed back. 1fa sum of money had been given as arrha, it was set off against the purchase price.

The text also contains a pointed allusion to an alternative way of looking at arrha. This was the view prevailing in Greek law, which did not recognize consensual contracts and where the handing over of an earnest was therefore essential for creating (contractual) liability. Here both parties were interested in the arrha for it was not only the buyer who was penalized by its forfeiture if he failed to pay the purchase price: it also served to secure the seller's obligation in that, if he defaulted, he not only had to return the buyer's arrha, but he also had to pay him alterum tantum, i.e. as much in addition.

With the decline of consensualism, arrha (re)gained its attraction. Justinian even received and incorporated Greek arrha into the Corpus Juris Civilis, but only in respect of sales effected in writing.

Whenever it was envisaged to reduce the agreement into writing, the document that was to be drawn up was regarded as the contract. Prior to its written formulation, no binding obligations existed; there was still room for reconsideration and either vendor or purchaser could withdraw from the contract with impunity. Hence the need for arrha. Its function was penal (arrha poenalis). On the other hand, however, Justinian also revived and preserved the classical (purely) consensual sale. For these contracts "quae sine scriptura consistunt", arrha still had a merely evidentiary function.

As far as the position in the ius commune is concerned, the main point of controversy has always been the function of an arrha given after the sale had already come into existence: "Venditionc perfecta, et arris datis, emptor, seu venditor recusat implere promissa, quaestio est quid iuris?" Was the arrha merely argumentum emptionis et venditionis contractae (evidence that the contract had been concluded)? If one of the parties subsequently withdrew from the contract and did not render performance as promised, the other would then have had a claim for damages on the contract in exactly the same way as if no arrha had been given. Or are we dealing here with what came to be called arrha poenitentialis ("Reugeld")'? Both parties, it was often argued, had a right to withdraw from the contract; the purchaser, if he chose to exercise this right of withdrawal, forfeited what he had given as arrha, whereas the vendor, who no longer wanted to be bound by the contract, had to return double the amount of the arrha. According to this view, arrha weakened rather than strengthened the contract.

For a valid sale to come into existence, the parties had to agree on the object of the sale and the price. As long as object and price had been agreed upon, the contract could be classified as sale; at least with regard to these essential elements, the contract had to be the work of the parties and an expression of their private autonomy.

Almost anything could be the object of a contract of sale,28 whether corporeal or incorporeal: chattels (especially slaves) or land, claims against third parties or inheritances, servitudes, praedial or personal, etc. If, however, the benefit of the seller's services or the use of a thing was the subject matter of the transaction, the contract was not sale but hire (locatio conductio).

What, for instance, if I engage a goldsmith to make me a ring? The question, as we see, was controversial. Cassius even argued that we are dealing here with a mixed type of transaction. Eventually the opinion came to prevail that the contract was one of sale, provided the vendor (maker) supplied the material. The opposite was the case where the purchaser had given the goldsmith the gold; also in building contracts, for instance, where the "purchaser" had asked the "vendor" to build a house on his (the "purchaser's") ground.31 These are subtle distinctions. In the latter two instances the hire of the services clearly dominates the transactions, whereas the transfer of ownership from the maker/builder to the customer, which might point in the direction of sale, is, at best, only incidental.32 But to apply the rules of sale wherever the contractor is bound to produce the work from materials provided by himself (except in the "superfides-solo-cedit" situations), seems not always to be entirely satisfactory. Where the value of those materials, as compared with that of the work, is quite insignificant, it is hardly apposite to speak of a contract of sale.33 Or take the case where the contractor produces a non-fungible object for a specific customer: it may well be argued that the rules relating to the contract for work are more suitable in this instance, particularly in view of the fact that it will be difficult for the customer to sell this object elsewhere.

Things which are normally counted, measured or weighed and are therefore usually defined by reference to their genus could, of course, be sold, but only if they were either specified ("these two amphorae of Tusculan country wine") or if a whole (specific) stock of such non-specific goods was sold ("all the wine in my cellar"). Even the sale of generic goods from an identified source, i.e. from a specified mass or stock, was possible.

Another consideration may be added at this stage. Sale, as we have said, was an obligatory (or executory) act. It gave rise to certain obligations, which still had to be discharged, particularly the obligation to transfer the object sold. But at the same time the contract of sale itself contributed to the execution of this very obligation; it contained a "real" (as opposed to merely obligatory) element.

In § 433 I BGB we read that "by the contract of sale the seller of a thing is bound to deliver the thing to the purchaser and to transfer ownership of the thing". As far as this transfer of ownership is concerned, we have to refer to § 929 BGB. "For the transfer of ownership of a movable thing," this rule provides, "it is necessary that the owner of the thing deliver it to the acquirer and that both agree that the ownership be transferred." All in all, therefore, - three acts are necessary to conclude and carry out the transaction. There is, first of all, the (purely obligatory) contract of sale. Then there is traditio, the act of physical transfer of the object sold. But over and above that, there is a further contract accompanying the delivery: transferor and transferee have to agree on the transfer of ownership. This second contract is conceptually detached from and unconnected to the contract of sale (the principle of separation); in German law, furthermore, its validity has to be determined in abstracto, i.e. independent of whether the underlying contract of sale is void or valid {or whether, indeed, such an underlying contract has even been concluded—the principle of abstraction).45 It has been maintained that for the transfer of ownership in Roman law, apart from traditio, an agreement of this kind, separate from the contract of sale, was required — but (unlike in German law) not an abstract one: a causa traditionis in the sense of an agreement on the legal purpose of transferring ownership, a special legal act determining why traditio is actually made: venditionis causa, donationis causa, mutui causa, etc.

The contract of sale and traditio: no further acts were necessary. The contract of sale, then, had a double function: it was the obligatory act and iusta causa traditionis — iusta causa traditionis in the sense that it implicitly contained the will of the parties to transfer ownership on the basis of a contract of sale; and it was this common purpose that formed the basis of traditio and justified the transfer of ownership.

If the potential objects of a contract of sale were multifarious, a very basic requirement for its validity was that such object did in fact exist.

But what could the purchaser recover with his actio empti? Modestinus says "quod interfuit eius ne deciperetur"; Justinian formulates "quod sua interest deceptum eum non esse". This sounds like what the modern lawyers would call the negative interest. And, indeed, these texts did provide the historical basis and dogmatic point of departure for that doctrine.66 The aim of granting a claim for damages, so it was argued, is to put the injured party financially in whatever position he would have been in had the wrongdoer acted properly. Hence, in order to determine the quantum of damages, the fraudulent misrepresentation has to be eliminated in thought. If the vendor had not deceived the purchaser, the latter would not have entered into the contract. As a consequence, he can claim only his interest in the non-conclusion of the contract, not his (positive) interest in the validity of the contract. The hypothetical basis for assessing his damages should therefore be the position he would have been in had the contract not been concluded; not the position he would have been in if the contract had come into existence and been properly carried out.

With the commencement of their negotiations, the parties are entering into a (quasi-)contractual relationship giving rise to rights and duties. Based on the reasonable expectations engendered by the precontractual contact, these rights and duties go beyond the compass of the law of delict and are to be determined in accordance with the contract which the parties intend to conclude. Infringement of the duties in contrahendo by one of the parties entitles the other to claim the damages that he has suffered in relying on the eventual conclusion/validity of the contract. The liability is contractual and it is based on culpa; compensation is limited to the negative interest.

No valid sale without a thing to be sold: that was the rule. It sometimes happened, however, that objects were sold which had, as both parties knew, not yet come into existence, but were expected to do so in the foreseeable future; indeed, such transactions concerning res futurae were very old and common in Rome.

The sale was taken to be subject to a condition.80 Only if it eventually transpired that there was an object, did the contract of sale become effective (ex tune, i.e. with retroactive effect). If the crop failed, the contract of sale failed too. As a consequence, it was only in the former case that the prospective purchaser had to pay the purchase price. The

risk that the whole of his harvest might be destroyed by hail or inundation, or that his slave might turn out to be infertile was therefore still carried by the vendor. In order to provide for the possibility that the harvest be brought in, but prove to be disappointingly small, the purchase price was normally fixed proportionately to the actual yield (so and so much per bushel, per pound, etc.). If the vendor, subsequent to the conclusion of the contract, regretted the terms of the sale and therefore prevented fructus or partus (and with it the contract of sale) from coming into existence, the condition, in accordance with general principles,81 was deemed to have been fulfilled, the contract deemed to have become effective. This type of transaction has come to be known as emptio rei speratae.

However, the Roman lawyers were prepared to go even one step further. Could the parties not have intended to shift the risk of there being no crop onto the purchaser? One can easily imagine a situation where a farmer urgently needs money and, at the same time, wants to insure himself against the vagaries of the weather. The purchaser, on the other hand, might be prepared to speculate, and risk his money, in return for the chance of making a big profit.82 Where, in fact, a lump sum was fixed at a fairly low level for the whole yield, it could be surmised that the parties intended their transaction to work this way.

It is interesting to note that Pomponius acknowledged that this constituted, in fact, an exception to the rule "no sale without an object to be sold". At the same time, he gave an ingenious argument for allowing this exception. It is not necessarily the res futura which the purchaser buys; instead, if nothing comes up, it is the hope (spes) that something might have come up. Thus, one can look at the contract as if (not a res, but) a chance ("quasi alea"), which may or may not materialize, has been the object of the transaction.

A hereditas could be the object of a contract of sale, but only if the person in respect of whose estate the transaction was effected had already died—contracts concerning the estate of living persons are (and were) unacceptable for reasons of public policy and morality.92 If a person believed himself to be the heir and sold his inheritance, he was normally liable to the purchaser once it turned out that the inheritance had actually fallen to somebody else.93 This was not so if it had specifically been provided "ut quidquid iuris haberet vcnditor emptor haberet".94 The tacit guarantee was effectively excluded; the vendor was obliged to transfer the inheritance95 if he became heir; otherwise his obligation fell away. It did, however, happen that the parties went one step further and agreed that the vendor was not only exempted from liability if he had not, in fact, become heir, but that he should be allowed to retain the purchase price too.96 This is the situation referred to by Ulpianus, and this indeed resembles the purchase of the next haul of the net. It was an emptio spei. Of course, the vendor remained liable for dolus.

In conclusion then, the price generally had to consist in money. Furthermore, it had to be verum and certum but not necessarily iustum. The first of these requirements was fairly straightforward: "Cum in venditione quis pretium rei ponit donationis causa non exacturus, non videtur vendere."114 The price had to be seriously meant; otherwise the transaction was merely a donation in disguise. That the price was very low did not in itself invalidate the sale, as long as the vendor seriously intended to demand it. Only if it was derisory ("nummo uno")115 could it normally be assumed116 that the parties did not actually have in mind the conclusion of a genuine contract of sale.

The certainty requirement, on the other hand, led to a couple of very interesting borderline cases; for "certum pretium" was not taken to imply that the parties must necessarily name the actual figure. He seems to be very keen to have the object, whereas the vendor just has an interest not to sell at a loss. Perhaps he does not remember what he once had to pay for it when he himself bought the thing; hence, the parties do not specify a sum, but fix the price at "whatever sum the vendor has bought it for". Here the price is objectively certain, and this was sufficient for the validity of the sale. The fact that the parties did not know the actual amount, did not matter. In other words: the price had to be certum in the sense of at least being ascertainable.

The "certainty of price" requirement was primarily intended to help ensure that in its essential elements the bargain was the work of the parties. Secondly, however, the Roman lawyers seem to have wanted to ensure that the bargain was in actual fact struck; they tried to avoid recognizing a contract of sale where a breakdown of the transaction was still possible due to the fact that in the end a price might either be lacking or be unascertainable. The possibility existed that Titius did not want to or could not fix a price.

A different view was taken if the price had to be fixed, not by a third party, but by the purchaser. This was unacceptable in Roman law: "Illud constat imperfectum esse negotium, cum emere volenti sic venditor dicit: 'quanti velis, quanti aequum putaveris, quanti aestimaveris, habebis emptum'."125 The problem here was not so much that the purchaser might in the end not fix a price at all—it was rather that the vendor would have had an interest in the failure of this disadvantageous arrangement. The main objection of the Roman lawyers was probably that the determination of an essentiale negotii had been left to one party and that thus the institutional check against the danger of gross and unreasonable contractual imbalance (namely negotiation about the price) had been removed.

Modern legal systems tend to take a more liberal view with regard to the two last-mentioned problem areas. The German Code allows determination of the performance by a third party;126 if the third party cannot or will not make the determination, or if he delays it, either his declaration is substituted by court decision or the contract is void.128 The determination of the price may, however, even be left to one of the contracting parties, be it that he has to decide "in an equitable manner" or even in his free discretion. This represents a deviation from Roman law which is based on pandectist doctrine.

All these and a variety of other questions began to be asked in medieval jurisprudence; and as the principle expressed in C. 4, 44, 2 was generally accepted, it is clear in which way the answers were premised. A breathtaking expansion of the institute of laesio enormis took place, in the course of which all the arbitrary restrictions of the imperial constitution were thrown off:170 relief came to be granted not only to the vendor but also171 to the purchaser;172 the scope of application of the rule was extended from the sale of land to that of houses and of movables173 (this was supported by the general word "rem"); it was adopted from sale into all kinds of other contracts, including, for instance, letting and hiring, compromise, exchange and even donation.

Still, however liberally one was prepared to dispense with the limitations of C. 4, 44, 2, the very fact that the remedy for lacsio enormis originated in this text, led to some further consequential problems. Take, for example, the case where the purchaser is the disadvantaged party. How does one apply a remedy that has been designed for the reverse situation and therefore allows the seller to rescind the contract if he has obtained less than half of the true price?175 Should one give the purchaser the same option if he has had to pay more than double?176 Let us assume the "true value" of the object sold to be 100. The vendor would then enjoy the protection of the law if the purchase price was 49 or less, the purchaser only if it was 201 or more. Thus, on this construction, the purchaser seems to lose out, for from a purely arithmetical point of view the margin of what the law still expects him to tolerate before he can avail himself of a remedy is exactly double of what is laid down in the case of the vendor: the vendor can rescind if he has been overcharged by more than 50, whilst the purchaser must have been overcharged by more than 100. This is the reason why the glossators and commentators tended to reject the purely geometrical method (as they called it) of assessment if the purchaser had suffered laesio enormis and favoured an arithmetical calculation: the purchaser should be entitled to the remedy if he had had to pay more than the true value plus half, i.e., in our example, more than 150. On purely logical grounds, neither of these approaches can be faulted, and thus the dispute was never conclusively resolved.

However the limits might be fixed, and whatever the nature of its sanctions, the doctrine can work only if there is a true or just price for every article, against which one is able to assess what the parties have agreed upon. Economic liberalism denies the existence of such an objective yardstick. The value in a contract depends upon the judgement of the contracting parties themselves, not upon that of other people.

The astounding career of laesio enormis was possible only because the medieval scholastics, and later the natural lawyers, took an entirely different view of this matter and considered equality of exchange to be one of the basic principles of the law of contracts

Thus, the doctrine of equality in exchange was not based on the belief that each object has an intrinsic and immutable value, and that this value represents the iustum pretium.190 Neither was the just price of goods linked to their cost of production.

Once, however, the belief in one's ability to assess equality in exchange had been shaken and once the idea of private autonomy had again started to gain ground and to supersede metaphysical, "natural", or paternalistic notions of contractualjustice, the concept of laesio enormis was doomed.

§ 138 BGB is an example in point. According to its second subsection, it is not the disparity of values in itself that voids the contract; even a striking disproportion between performance and counterperformance is relevant only if it has been brought about by the exploitation of certain enumerated weaknesses on the part of the disadvantaged party. The code, in other words, proceeds from the assumption that, as long as both parties are in a position to assess their circumstances properly and to draw the appropriate conclusions from such an assessment,212 their contractual arrangements have to be given effect to. However, the courts have not always been happy to accept the results of such far-reaching party autonomy. On the one hand, they have begun to infer exploitation of one of the enumerated weaknesses, if the disproportion in the price is obvious and the contract therefore grossly unfair and inequitable.

A contract under which the one party obtains advantages in obvious disproportion to what he returns, is taken to be contra bonos mores, if the advantaged party displayed a reprehensible attitude, by either deliberately exploiting the weaker economic position of his opponent, or by grossly negligently failing to realize that the latter entered into the contract only because of his precarious situation.

These were twofold. Firstly, certain obligations arose on the part of both the vendor and the purchaser (sale obviously being a bilaterally binding contract), and for the enforcement of these obligations the law provided two actions, the actiones empti and venditi. Secondly, upon perfection of the sale (that is, normally with its conclusion) the risk of accidental loss passed to the purchaser. One consequence, in particular, the contract of sale did not have: the passing of ownership. This required a separate act of conveyance: mancipatio in the case of res mancipi, traditio as far as res nee mancipi were concerned, alternatively for both categories of things in iure cessio

In German and South African law conveyance of the property is not only separate from the underlying obligatory act, it is also to be evaluated entirely indepen- dently and on its own merits. It is thus abstract in the sense that ownership may pass, even though the contract of sale might be invalid or might not have come into existence at all. In Rome only mancipatio and in iure cessio were abstract. Traditio was causal in that, in order to transfer ownership, it had to be based on a iusta causa traditionis

According to both the Roman and the French construction of sale, of course, the purchaser acquires a right to enforce the vendor's obligation to transfer the object sold; but, whereas this is a mere ius in personam in the one system, it is a ius in rem in the other. This difference has practical consequences in two situations.5 If the vendor, after conclusion of the sale but before delivery, has fallen insolvent, the purchaser who is able to assert ownership and thus to remove his object from the bankrupt's estate, is in a much better position than his Roman counterpart, whose personal claim against the vendor competes with all the claims of other creditors. Again, the purchaser's position is more favourable under the French construction where the vendor first sold (but did not deliver) the object to him, and subsequently sold and delivered it to a third party, before either disappearing or becoming insolvent. He can then vindicate the object from the third party. According to Roman law, he would have only his fairly useless personal action against the vendor. Neither of the solutions, inciden- tally, can be said to be more just or equitable than the other. However one decides this conflict, one honest party (either the purchaser or the third party) will have to suffer for the act of a dishonest one. The Roman approach, however, seems to be more conducive to certainty of law and therefore more in line with the requirements of trade and commerce. Once delivery has been made, the position of the transferee is secure, at least in so far as he does not have to fear that previous purchasers might turn up and vindicate the thing from him.

Transfer of ownership in Roman law—and in the ius commune—was thus usually based on the two elements of iusta causa and traditio; or, to use the terminology of the German usus modernus, on titulus and modus.

It is, however, just in these cases, where the vendor has relied upon the purchaser's inclination and ability to pay the purchase price, that he would have needed the protection that the rule under discussion was obviously prepared to grant to him: namely that he should have been able, until the buyer had fulfilled his obligation, to assert his right of ownership and thus not lose out in case the purchaser became insolvent.

In the olden days, when sale necessarily meant executed sale, it was a matter of course that payment of the purchase price and transfer of the object sold coincided. er necessarily had to be paid at the time when the contract was concluded. It was not unreasonable at all, under these circumstances, to limit the practical consequences of this relaxation of the cash sale principle and to make (or rather: continue to make) transfer of ownership dependent upon payment of the purchase price.

Both the delivery of the thing and/or payment of the purchase price could be postponed and the special protection of the vendor was therefore no longer necessary in order to maintain the institutional balance of a sale transaction.

The vendor, then, who was prepared to grant the purchaser credit, but did not want to rely solely on the purchaser's solvency and honesty, was well advised to make special arrangements and let the purchaser have the object as a precarium tenens or as a conductor. This enabled the latter to use the object even before he had paid the purchase price, while at the same time securing the vendor's position. A traditio did not take place under these circumstances and the vendor therefore retained ownership (and in the case of locatio conductio even possession) of the object sold.

The purchaser had to pay the purchase price, that is, to transfer the purchase money into the ownership of the vendor: "[E]mptor . . . nummos venditoris facere cogitur."37 From the time of delivery of the object sold the vendor could charge interest on the purchase price ("item usurae pretii post diem traditionis [veniunt in hoc iudicium]");-TM furthermore, under certain circumstances he could claim reimbursement of expenses,39 the co-operation of the purchaser in implementing the contract,40 etc.

The vendor, on the other hand, had to deliver the object sold. He was bound to transfer vacuam possessionem,41 i.e. free and unimpeded possession, which the purchaser could enter into without being disturbed by either the vendor or a third party.42 Moreover, he had to maintain the purchaser in undisturbed possession and enjoyment of the object; he had to afford him his habere licere or, as some sources put it more fully, his uti frui habere possidereque licere.43 He was not bound, however, to make the purchaser owner.44 In other words, what he owed was a facere;45 he had to execute the legal act required for transferring ownership (mancipatio, in iure cessio or traditio, as the case may have been),46 but was not responsible for the result—the transfer of ownership—itself.

First of all, we have to remember what has been stated above48 about the structure of the Roman emptio venditio: the contract of sale contained everything that was necessary to transfer ownership except traditio (or mancipatio). Once the object was handed over (or mancipated), and provided the vendor himself had been owner, ownership passed). Nothing else was necessary. But if that was so, there was neither room nor necessity for postulating a special duty to make the purchaser owner.50 That would be the automatic consequence of traditio (or mancipatio), which, in turn, the vendor was bound to perform.

One may be tempted to ask whether this did not bring an imbalance into the contract: the purchaser had to make the vendor owner of the purchase money,51 whereas the vendor merely had to afford habere licere. This distinction does, however, quite correctly reflect the inherent difference between the object of the sale and the price. Money is available in random quantity, and the purchaser does not have to use specific coins to fulfil his obligation. Thus he can reasonably be expected to pay the price with coins of which he is able to make the vendor owner.

But what if it transpired after the contract of sale had been concluded that the object which had been transferred belonged to a third party? "Nemo plus iuris transferre potest quam ipse haberet" was the rule of Roman law, and acquisition of ownership in good faith on the part of the purchaser was therefore out of the question. That then left the purchaser in a somewhat awkward position:53 as long as his habere licere had not been interfered with, he did not have an action against the vendor. Nor could he resell the object since he was now aware of his lack of title. But, on the one hand, this unsatisfactory state of affairs would normally not persist for a long time. The period for usucaption was short

Periculum refers to the chance or possibility that the object of the sale might be lost, destroyed or damaged.m This risk has to be borne as a matter of course by the vendor before the contract of sale is concluded. That it attaches to the purchaser, once ownership had been transferred to him, is equally obvious.

Before being able to evaluate these criticisms, we first have to define more exactly the ambit of the rule. The risk passed only once the sale- was perfect, emptione perfecta. Normally, perfection and conclusion of the sale coincided. As soon as there was agreement about the exact object of the sale and about the price, and the sale had been concluded unconditionally, the obligations came into existence; nothing remained to be done except to discharge them. Under these circumstances, emptio was perfecta. Matters were different where the sale was not pura but had been concluded subject to a suspensive condition. Here the effects ot the contract were suspended, and the mutual obligations came into existence only once the condition had been fulfilled. Only then could the sale be said to be complete.

There was another factor which even further limited the scope of application of the risk rule, namely a very narrow understanding of the central concept of periculum. Of course, it did not refer to any incidents caused by the vendor's negligence.

After conclusion of the contract of sale, but before the object of sale has been handed over, the vendor is in the same position with regard to that object as a borrower. He is liable not only for negligence (be it according to the standard of the diligens paterfamilias or that of diligentia quam in suis) but for custodia.103 Or, to state the same thing from a different angle: it was only the risk of loss by way of vis maior (periculum vis maioris) which passed, emptione perfecta, to the buyer. Only if the object sold had been lost, destroyed or damaged due to an event which nobody—neither buyer, nor seller, nor the most ideal custodian—could have prevented, did the purchaser have to pay the purchase price without receiving anything; in cases of casus minor, however, the vendor was responsible for damages due to non- performance.

Whilst the transfer of the object (and with it the final act necessary for the transfer of ownership) could be postponed to a later date, one continued to think in terms of the cash sale pattern in some other respects, for instance with regard to the question of risk. But this does not mean that we are here dealing, as far as classical law is concerned, with an inappropriate atavism. Periculum est emptons is a reasonable solution to the difficult problem of risk allocation.111' corresponding entirely to the underlying economic interest structure. As between the parties, the object of the sale belongs (in an untechmcal sense) to the purchaser.11'' It has become part of his economic sphere. Hence the duty, on the part of the purchaser, to reimburse the vendor for the expenses necessary tor the maintenance of the thing whilst still m his possession;"7 hence the right of the purchaser to claim any accessions to or fruits of the thing which arose since completion (i.e. normally conclusion) of the sale.

The contract of sale embodies the will of the parties that the object of the sale shall belong to the purchaser, and we have seen119 that in this regard it was more than a merely executory agreement. It contained the will to transfer ownership and it was only the act of traditio that was postponed for the time being. Ex fide bona, therefore, what the parties were aiming at was to be given effect to as soon and as far as possible. Under these circumstances, a regime of periculum est emptoris is not unnatural. It must be emphasized again that risk in this context referred only to events which did not originate in the vendor's sphere and which had nothing to do with the fact that the vendor still kept the object of the sale in his possession.

True it is that both the writers and the legislators of the law7 of the Age of Reason were hostile to it.121 So were the fathers of the BGB.122 They did not see a rational justification for the rule and considered it to be in conflict with the nature and equity of the bilateral contract of sale. Hence, § 446 I 1 BGB provides: "On the delivery of the thing sold the risk of accidental destruction and accidental deterioration passes to the purchaser."

English law is very similar to French: the purchaser becomes owner with the conclusion of the contract ot sale;12* at the same time, the passing of the risk takes place.129 As far as this latter consequence is concerned, the position is therefore not different to that in Roman law.

For instance, the vendor's performance could become impossible (due to his tault or not) and either the vendor or the purchaser could be in detault with their respective performances. These problems could emerge in all types of contracts and therefore we shall delay our discussion until we have dealt with all of them.1 There are two situations, however, which specifically relate to contracts of sale: the vendor might fail to make the purchaser owner of the object sold; alternatively, that object might turn out to suffer from a latent defect. In any legal system, therefore, the question arises whether the law is prepared, under these circumstances, to protect the purchaser; whether, to use the terminology of modern English law, the contract of sale implies a warranty ot title and of proper quality.

In Roman law, emptio venditio did not imply a warranty of title.2 If the vendor was not the owner of what he sold, he was not able to transfer ownership to the purchaser: nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest, quam ipse haberet.3 That, of course, did not mean that the contract of sale was invalid,4 tor it was not (objectively) impossible to perform what had been promised. The purchaser could sue the vendor if the object was not handed over to him, but he did not have a remedy merely on account of his lack of title. This followed from the fact that there was no obligation on the vendor to transfer ownership;5 he merely had to grant the purchaser undisturbed possession. Being in possession, the latter was able to usucape and acquire ownership that way. However, the vendor was responsible not only for "vacuam possessionem tradere" but also for sustaining the continued enjoyment of the res.6 There was therefore an implied warranty of peaceable possession, for as soon as the true owner, by asserting his title, evicted the purchaser,7 the latter could hold the vendor responsible.

ought the rei vindicatio against him, he could call on the transferor as his auctor to render procedural assistance. If the transferor refused to render such assistance or if the action was lost in spite of it, resulting in eviction, he was liable towards the transferee for double the purchase price.

It had, of course, always been available in cases of dolus: if the vendor knew that the object sold either did not belong to him or was encumbered with a real right, or if he had specifically guaranteed the freedom from legal defects, he was liable—even before eviction had taken place—for the purchaser's interest in the proper implementation of this contract.24 Now one went a step further. The actio empti was a iudicium bonae fidei. It was available to provide the purchaser with what was due to him ex fide bona. That in turn, however, was not only tradere vacuam possessionem but also the sustaining of continued enjoyment of the res.

Furthermore, the defect in title might have caused damages to the purchaser without having led to a loss of possession: thus, the purchaser might have prevented eviction by acquiring the object from the third party (concursus causarum).34 Finally, it was possible that the actual damages were in excess of duplum. In all these cases it was of practical significance that, from the time of Julian, the actio empti was generally made available in cases of eviction, irrespective of whether there had been dolus on the part of the vendor or not.

Other texts describe what the purchaser could sue for as "quanti tua interest rem evictam non esse"37 or "omne quod interest emptoris servum non evinci".38 This is what modern parlance refers to as ' 'positive interest".39 What the judge had to estimate was the plaintiff's (purchaser's) interest in rem habere; he had to be placed, financially, in whatever position he would have been in had he not been evicted.

The most immediate consequence of the act of eviction was, of course, that the purchaser had lost the object sold to him. But did that mean that he could claim the value of this thing as at the time of eviction?54 Or is the purchase price to be taken as a basis for evaluating the purchaser's loss? Does quod interest under these circumstances not rather have two objects: restitution of the price paid on the one hand; payment of all the purchaser has suffered over and above it on the other?

This idiosyncrasy of Roman law, faithfully preserved also in the European ius commune down to the time of the pandectists, has been abandoned in the modern codes. They usually require the vendor, under the contract of sale, to transfer ownership. That has not hindered them, however, from making the vendor's liability still dependent upon eviction. The underlying policy is that the purchaser must not be allowed to claim damages and still have the thing sold at his disposal; hence this deviation from the normal rules of breach of contract. It is no longer necessary for the purchaser to defend an action brought by the third party; he can claim compensation for non- performance, even where he has voluntarily surrendered the object to him who claimed to have a better title, provided only that such surrender is not in conflict with the requirements of good faith.

If the object that has been sold and handed over to the purchaser subsequently turns out to suffer from a defect which diminishes its value for its ordinary use or for the use provided for in the contract, the purchaser, according to modern German law, has a choice between two remedies: he may demand annulment of the sale (with the result that the parties are obliged to return their mutual performances) or he can ask for a reduction of the purchase price. If a promised quality in the thing sold was absent at the time of the purchase, or if the seller has fraudulently concealed a defect, a third alternative is available to the purchaser; instead of cancellation or reduction, he may demand compensation for non-performance, i.e. his positive interest.

They proceeded from the basis of the objective equality of performances within a contract. Whether this principle was based directly upon the precepts of social ethics or upon the presumptive wishes of the parties (". . . in emtione venditione is esse videtur animus contrahen- tibus, ut observetur aequalitas, nisi fortes rationes adsint in contrarium"), latent defects in the object sold were for them one instance of inaequalitas which the law had to remedy. They did not present special problems and therefore did not need to be dealt with by way of a ius singulare.

One thing, however, Roman law and the English common law originally had in common: both accepted a fairly harsh idea of caveat emptor, before the attitude of the law gradually changed in favour of the purchaser. But, whereas this change came about at a relatively early stage in Rome, we still find English courts espousing the old idea in the beginning of the 19th century. If the object bought turned out to be defective, the purchaser could not normally avail himself of any remedy, because "it was [his] fault . . . that he did not insist on a [sc: express] warranty".

The purchaser has the object of the sale "before his eyes" and it can therefore be expected of him to examine it properly before he concludes the bargain.90 After all: "ius vigilantibus scriptum"; as long as he can see what he buys and is able to satisfy himself of its quality, the Roman paterfamilias can be relied upon to look after his own interests and not, for instance, to pay the normal purchase price for a slave who is without one arm or leg.

First of all, already in the ancient law we find the actio de modo agri.91 Where land was mancipated and the vendor had stated by way of a lex mancipio dicta (a formal declaration made in the course of mancipatio) that it was of a particular size, he was liable for the proportionate amount of the price if the actual acreage turned out to be less than asserted.

By the time of the late Republic the actio empti had become available where the vendor had acted in such a way that not to make him liable would have seemed in conflict with good faith. Two groups of cases fall into this category. Firstly, the vendor was responsible where he had fraudulently (dolo malo) failed to disclose a defect known to him.

Secondly, the vendor was also liable under the actio empti, where he had specifically assured the purchaser, in the course of concluding the sale, that the object was free from certain (or all) defects or that it possessed certain qualities.

The vendor is liable not only for the reduced value of the objects themselves but also for consequential loss.

If the purchaser wanted to make sure that the thing sold was either free from specific defects or that it had certain qualities, he could also ask the vendor for a stipulation to that effect.105 Such promissa were usually combined with the stipulatio duplae against eviction;106 unlike the latter, however, they did not lie for duplum, but covered the purchaser's interest in the truth of the affirmations

First of all, only those diseases or physical defects that were not apparent. The aedilitian remedies applied only to latent defects. Secondly, it is obvious that not every defect could reasonably be expected to be displayed on the board. There is no standardized human being; everybody has some or other characteristics which may possibly be classified as a "defect".

The aedilitian remedies were restricted to the sale of slaves and cattle; furthermore, they applied to market transactions only. The seller of land was liable only if he had overstated its actual acreage. The actio empti covered all types of objects of sale, but was available only in cases of dolus. If the purchaser wished the vendor to be liable on a broader basis, he had to ask him for express warranties (by way of formless dicta in venditione or by formal promissa). Unless such warranties were given, the purchaser's protection was far from perfect.

It is now widely recognized that we can see, in the course of classical jurisprudence, an energetic move towards a generalized liability for latent defects.

In other words: under the actio empti the purchaser could recover the difference between the contract price and what he personally would have paid had he known of the defect; the (aedilitian) actio quanti minoris225 allowed him to recover the difference between the contract price and the (objective) market price for an object with that defect.

As a consequence, the modern discussion still largely follows Roman thinking patterns. This does not have only beneficial effects. The question of when an object should be considered defective is often determined by reference to its fitness for use. This is in line with what Ulpianus sets out in D. 21, 1, 1, 8, but does not provide a useful criterion when it comes to (for instance) spurious paintings or imitated pearls. The limitation of the claim for damages to cases where a promised quality in the thing sold is absent or where the vendor has fraudulently concealed a defect, has given rise to great difficulties, in so far as it is hard to reconcile and coordinate this restrictive attitude with the general remedies of culpa in contrahendo and positive malperformance.2Sn In both these latter instances, a claim for damages is granted, as a matter of course, even in cases of mere negligence.

Today the actio empti is usually taken to apply, if a vendor guarantees the absence of defects or promises the presence of certain qualities in the thing sold. If he then delivers a thing that is defective or lacks the promised qualities, he is guilty of a breach of contract and liable, in accordance with general principles, for damages. Again, the vendor is liable under the actio empti where he intentionally conceals from the purchaser the presence of certain defects known to him or where he makes statements relating to the quality of the thing, which he knows to be wrong and which induce the purchaser to enter into the contract. Here we are dealing with fraudulent misrepresentation. Otherwise, that is, where the vendor sells a defective thing without, however, either giving an express or tacit guarantee or knowing about the defect, the purchaser can avail himself of only the actiones quanti minoris or redhibitoria. His choice is limited, in so far as the latter of these remedies applies only where he would not have bought the thing had he known about the defect, or where the defect is of such a nature, that it prevents the ordinary use of the thing.