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LICENSED TO:

CHAPTER 18

The International Monetary System: Order or Disorder?

377

| SUMMARY |

1.Exchange rates state the value of one currency in terms of other currencies and thus translate one country’s prices into the currencies of other nations. Exchange rates therefore influence patterns of world trade.

2.If governments do not interfere by buying or selling their currencies, exchange rates will be determined in free markets by the usual laws of supply and demand. Such a system is said to be based on floating exchange rates.

3.Demand for a nation’s currency is derived from foreigners’ desires to purchase that country’s goods and services or to invest in its assets. Under floating rates, anything that increases the demand for a nation’s currency will cause its exchange rate to appreciate.

4.Supply of a nation’s currency is derived from the desire of that country’s citizens to purchase foreign goods and services or to invest in foreign assets. Under floating rates, anything that increases the supply of a nation’s currency will cause its exchange rate to depreciate.

5.Purchasing-power parity plays a major role in very- long-run exchange rate movements. The purchasingpower parity theory states that relative price levels in any two countries determine the exchange rate between their currencies. Therefore, countries with relatively low inflation rates normally will have appreciating currencies.

6.Over shorter periods, however, purchasing-power parity has little influence over exchange rate movements. The pace of economic activity and, especially, the level of interest rates exert greater influences.

7.Capital movements are typically the dominant factor in determining exchange rates in the short and medium runs. A nation that offers international investors higher interest rates, or better prospective returns on investments, will typically see its currency appreciate.

8.An exchange rate can be fixed at a nonequilibrium level if the government is willing and able to mop up any excess of quantity supplied over quantity demanded or provide any excess of quantity demanded over quantity

supplied. In the first case, the country is suffering from a balance of payments deficit because of its overvalued currency. In the second case, an undervalued currency has given it a balance of payments surplus.

9.The gold standard was a system of fixed exchange rates in which the value of every nation’s currency was fixed in terms of gold. This system created problems because nations could not control their own money supplies and because the world could not control the total supply of gold.

10.After World War II, the gold standard was replaced by the Bretton Woods system, in which exchange rates were fixed in terms of U.S. dollars and the dollar was in turn tied to gold. This system broke up in 1971, when the dollar became chronically overvalued.

11.Since 1971, the world has moved toward a system of relatively free exchange rates, but with plenty of exceptions. We now have a thoroughly mixed system of “dirty” or “managed” floating, which continues to evolve and adapt.

12.Floating rates are not without their problems. For example, importers and exporters justifiably worry about fluctuations in exchange rates.

13.Under floating exchange rates, investors who speculate on international currency values provide a valuable service by assuming the risks of those who do not wish to speculate. Normally, speculators stabilize rather than destabilize exchange rates, because that is how they make profits.

14.The value of the U.S. dollar has been volatile. It rose dramatically from 1980 to 1985, making our imports cheaper and our exports more expensive. From 1985 to 1988, the dollar tumbled, which had precisely the reverse effects. Then the dollar climbed again between 1995 and 2002, leading once again to a large trade imbalance. From 2002 to 2004, and then again in 2007–2008, the dollar fell further.

15.The European Union has established a single currency, the euro, for most of its member nations.

 

 

 

| KEY TERMS

|

 

 

Exchange rate

362

 

Purchasing-power parity

Capital account

370

 

Appreciation

362

 

theory 367

Gold standard

371

 

 

 

 

Depreciation

362

 

Fixed exchange rates 369

Bretton Woods system

371

 

 

Devaluation

363

 

Balance of payments deficit

International Monetary

 

 

and surplus 369

 

Revaluation

363

 

Fund (IMF) 374

 

 

 

 

 

Current account 370

 

 

 

Floating exchange rates

363

Dirty or managed float

374

 

 

 

 

 

Copyright 2009 Cengage Learning, Inc. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part.

378

PART 4

The United States in the World Economy

| TEST YOURSELF |

1.Use supply and demand diagrams to analyze the effect of the following actions on the exchange rate between the dollar and the yen:

a.Japan opens its domestic markets to more foreign competition.

b.Investors come to believe that values on the Tokyo stock market will fall.

c.The Federal Reserve cuts interest rates in the United States.

d.The U.S. government, to help settle the problems of the Middle East, gives huge amounts of foreign aid to Israel and her Arab neighbors.

e.The United States has a recession while Japan booms.

f.Inflation in the United States exceeds that in Japan.

2.For each of the following transactions, indicate how it would affect the U.S. balance of payments if exchange rates were fixed:

a.You spent the summer traveling in Europe.

b.Your uncle in Canada sent you $20 as a birthday present.

c.You bought a new Honda, made in Japan.

d.You bought a new Honda, made in Ohio.

e.You sold some stock you own on the Tokyo Stock Exchange.

3.Suppose each of the transactions listed in Test Yourself Question 2 was done by many Americans. Indicate how each would affect the international value of the dollar if exchange rates were floating.

4.We learned in this chapter that successful speculators buy a currency when demand is weak and sell it when demand is strong. Use supply and demand diagrams for two different periods (one with weak demand, the other with strong demand) to show why this activity will limit price fluctuations.

| DISCUSSION QUESTIONS |

1.What items do you own or routinely consume that are produced abroad? From what countries do these items come? Suppose Americans decided to buy fewer of these things. How would that affect the exchange rates between the dollar and these currencies?

2.If the dollar appreciates relative to the euro, will the German camera you have wanted become more or less expensive? What effect do you imagine this change will have on American demand for German cameras? Does the American demand curve for euros, therefore, slope upward or downward? Explain.

3.During the first half of the 1980s, inflation in (West) Germany was consistently lower than that in the United States. What, then, does the purchasing-power parity theory predict should have happened to the exchange rate between the mark and the dollar between 1980 and 1985? (Look at Table 1 on page 363 to see what actually happened.)

4.How are the problems of a country faced with a balance of payments deficit similar to those posed by a government regulation that holds the price of milk above the equilibrium level? (Hint: Think of each in terms of a supply-demand diagram.)

5.Under the old gold standard, what do you think happened to world prices when a huge gold strike occurred in California in 1849? What do you think happened when the world went without any important new gold strikes for 20 years or so?

6.Explain why the members of the Bretton Woods conference in 1944 wanted to establish a system of fixed exchange rates. What flaw led to the ultimate breakdown of the system in 1971?

7.Suppose you want to reserve a hotel room in London for the coming summer but are worried that the value of the pound may rise between now and then, making the room too expensive for your budget. Explain how a speculator could relieve you of this worry. (Don’t actually try it—speculators deal only in very large sums!)

8.In 2003 and 2004, market forces raised the international value of the Japanese yen. Why do you think the government of Japan was unhappy about this currency appreciation? (Hint: Japan was trying to emerge from a recession at the time.) If they wanted to stop the yen’s appreciation, what actions could the Bank of Japan (Japan’s central bank) and the Federal Reserve have taken? Why might the central banks have failed in this attempt?

Copyright 2009 Cengage Learning, Inc. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part.

LICENSED TO:

EXCHANGE RATES AND THE MACROECONOMY

No man is an island, entire of itself.

JOHN DONNE

O ne prominent aspect of globalization is that economic events that originate in one country reverberate quickly around the globe, sometimes at the speed of electricity. A stunning example arose in 2007, after the housing boom ended in the United

States. A number of so-called subprime mortgages (meaning mortgages granted to people with questionable credit) started to go bad. As the trickle of defaults turned into a flood, it triggered a worldwide financial crisis when several financial businesses in—of all places—France and Germany ran into serious trouble. Why there? It turned out that these institutions, thousands of miles away, had invested heavily in U.S. subprime mortgages. It is indeed a small world.

This was just one example of a general phenomenon. Fluctuations in foreign growth, inflation, and interest rates profoundly affect the U.S. economy. And economic events that originate in our country reverberate around the globe. Anyone who ignores these international linkages cannot hope to understand how the modern world economy works.

The macroeconomic model we developed in earlier chapters does a bit of that, but not enough because it ignores such crucial influences as exchange rates and international financial movements. The previous chapter showed how major macroeconomic variables such as gross domestic product (GDP), prices, and interest rates affect exchange rates. In this chapter, we complete the circle by studying how changes in the exchange rate affect the domestic economy. Then we bring international capital flows into the picture and learn how monetary and fiscal policy work in an open economy. In particular, we build a model suitable for a large open economy with substantial capital flows and a floating exchange rate—in short, a model meant to resemble the contemporary United States, which is indeed not “an island, entire of itself.”

An open economy is one that trades with other nations in goods and services, and perhaps also trades in financial assets.

C O N T E N T S

ISSUE: SHOULD THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TRY TO

FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICIES IN AN

ON CURING THE TRADE DEFICIT

STOP THE DOLLAR FROM FALLING?

OPEN ECONOMY

Change the Mix of Fiscal and Monetary Policy

INTERNATIONAL TRADE, EXCHANGE

Fiscal Policy Revisited

More Rapid Economic Growth Abroad

 

 

RATES, AND AGGREGATE DEMAND

Monetary Policy Revisited

Raise Domestic Saving or Reduce Domestic

Relative Prices, Exports, and Imports

INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF DEFICIT

Investment

Protectionism

The Effects of Changes in Exchange Rates

REDUCTION

 

AGGREGATE SUPPLY IN AN OPEN ECONOMY

The Loose Link between the Budget Deficit and the

CONCLUSION: NO NATION IS AN ISLAND

Trade Deficit

 

 

ISSUE REVISITED: SHOULD THE UNITED

THE MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF

 

SHOULD WE WORRY ABOUT THE TRADE

STATES LET THE DOLLAR FALL?

EXCHANGE RATES

DEFICIT?

 

Interest Rates and International Capital Flows

 

 

 

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380

PART 4

The United States in the World Economy

ISSUE:

SHOULD THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TRY TO STOP THE DOLLAR FROM FALLING?

 

 

For years before it actually started happening, economists predicted that America’s huge trade deficits would eventually drive the international value of the U.S. dollar down. In early 2002, this prophecy finally started to come true. However, the dollar declined only for about two years, before stabilizing at the end of 2004. Then, after a two-year hiatus, dollar depreciation resumed in 2007 and into 2008, when the greenback tumbled sharply. This time

the dollar’s weakness even grabbed the headlines—a rare event in our country. People looked on in amazement as the British pound topped $2, the euro soared above $1.50, and the Canadian dollar became worth more than the U.S. dollar for the first time since the 1970s.

Some observers were alarmed by the falling dollar. They urged the United States government to fight the dollar’s decline. Both European and Japanese businesspeople complained that they were losing export markets to the Americans, which was damaging European and Japanese growth. But there was also a bright side: The massive U.S. trade deficit at last started to shrink. Weighing the pros and cons, the U.S. government decided that currency values should remain “flexible,” that is, determined in world markets by the forces of supply and demand that we studied in the previous chapter. It refused to intervene to try to stop the dollar from falling.

Who was right? We will examine this question as the chapter progresses.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE, EXCHANGE RATES, AND AGGREGATE DEMAND

 

We know from earlier chapters that a country’s net exports, (X 2 IM), are one component

 

of its aggregate demand, C 1 I 1 G 1 (X 2 IM). It follows that an autonomous increase in

 

exports or decrease in imports has a multiplier effect on the economy, just like an increase

 

in consumption, investment, or government purchases.1 Figure 1 depicts this conclusion

 

on an aggregate demand-and-supply diagram. A rise in net exports shifts the aggregate

FIGURE 1

demand curve outward to the right, pushing equilibrium from point A to point B. Both

GDP and the price level therefore rise.

The Effects of Higher

 

 

But what forces might make net exports increase? One

Net Exports

 

 

 

 

factor mentioned in Chapter 8 was a rise in foreign incomes.

 

 

 

 

 

 

If foreign economies boom, their citizens are likely to

 

D1

S

spend more on a wide variety of products, some of which

 

 

 

 

will be American exports. Thus, Figure 1 illustrates the

 

 

 

 

 

 

effect on the U.S. economy of more rapid growth in for-

D0

B

 

eign countries. By like reasoning, a recession abroad

 

 

would reduce U.S. exports and shift the U.S. aggregate

Level

 

 

 

 

demand curve inward. Thus, as we learned in Chapter 9:

 

 

 

Price

 

 

Booms or recessions in one country tend to be trans-

 

 

mitted to other countries through international trade

 

A

D1

in goods and services.

 

 

 

A second important determinant of net exports was

S

D0

 

mentioned in Chapter 8, but not discussed in depth

 

 

 

there: the relative prices of foreign and domestic goods.

 

 

 

The idea is a simple application of the law of demand.

 

Real GDP

 

Namely, if the prices of the goods of Country X rise, peo-

 

 

 

ple everywhere will tend to buy fewer of them—and

1 An appendix to Chapter 9 showed that international trade lowers the numerical value of the multiplier. Autonomous changes in C, I, G, and (X 2 IM) all have the same multiplier.

Copyright 2009 Cengage Learning, Inc. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part.

LICENSED TO:

CHAPTER 19

Exchange Rates and the Macroeconomy

381

more of the goods of Country Y. As we will see next, this simple idea holds the key to understanding how exchange rates affect international trade.

Relative Prices, Exports, and Imports

First assume—just for this short section—that exchange rates are fixed. Think about what happens if the prices of American goods fall while, say, Japanese prices are constant. With U.S. products now less expensive relative to Japanese products, both Japanese and American consumers will buy more American goods and fewer Japanese goods. That means America’s exports will rise and its imports will fall, thus adding to aggregate demand in the United States. Conversely, a rise in American prices (relative to Japanese prices) will decrease U.S. net exports and aggregate demand. Thus:

A fall in the relative prices of a country’s exports tends to increase that country’s net exports and, thereby, to raise its real GDP. Analogously, a rise in the relative prices of a country’s exports will decrease that country’s net exports and GDP.

Precisely the same logic applies to changes in Japanese prices. If Japanese prices rise, Americans will export more to and import less from Japan. So X 2 IM in the U.S. will rise, boosting GDP here. Figure 1 applies to this case without change. By similar reasoning, falling Japanese prices decrease U.S. net exports and depress our economy. Thus:

Price increases for foreign products raise a country’s net exports and hence its GDP.

Price decreases for foreign products have the opposite effects.

The Effects of Changes in Exchange Rates

From here, it is a simple matter to figure out how changes in exchange rates affect a country’s net exports, because currency appreciations or depreciations change international relative prices.

Recall that the basic role of an exchange rate is to

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

convert one country’s prices into another country’s cur-

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

TABLE 1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

rency. Table 1 uses two examples of U.S.–Japanese trade

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Exchange Rates and Home Currency Prices

 

 

 

to remind us of this role. Suppose the dollar depreciates

 

 

 

 

¥30,000 Japanese

 

$1,000 U.S.

from 120 yen to 100 yen. Then, from the American con-

 

 

sumer’s viewpoint, a television set that costs ¥30,000

 

 

TV Set

 

 

Home Computer

 

Exchange

Price in

Price in

 

Price in

Price in

in Japan goes up in price from $250 (that is, 30,000/120)

 

Rate

Japan

the U.S.

 

the U.S.

Japan

to $300 (that is, 30,000/100). To Americans, it is just as

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

$1 5 120 yen

¥30,000

$250

$1,000

¥120,000

 

if Japanese manufacturers had raised TV prices by

 

 

$1 5 100 yen

¥30,000

$300

$1,000

¥100,000

 

20 percent. Naturally, Americans will react by purchasing fewer Japanese products, so American imports will decline.

Now consider the implications for Japanese consumers interested in buying American personal computers that cost $1,000. When the dollar falls from 120 yen to 100 yen, they see the price of these computers falling from ¥120,000 to ¥100,000. To them, it is just as if American producers had offered a 16.7 percent markdown. Under such circumstances, we expect U.S. sales to the Japanese to rise, so U.S. exports should increase. Putting these two findings together, we conclude that

A currency depreciation should raise net exports and therefore increase aggregate demand. Conversely, a currency appreciation should reduce net exports and therefore decrease aggregate demand.

The aggregate supply-and-demand diagram in Figure 2 on the next page illustrates this conclusion. If the currency depreciates, net exports rise and the aggregate demand curve shifts outward from D0D0 to D1D1. Both prices and output rise as the economy’s equilibrium moves from E0 to E1. If the currency appreciates instead, everything operates in reverse: Net exports fall, the aggregate demand curve shifts inward to D2D2, and both prices and output decline.

Copyright 2009 Cengage Learning, Inc. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part.

LICENSED TO:

382

PART 4

The United States in the World Economy

FIGURE 2

The Effects of Exchange Rate Changes on Aggregate Demand

 

D1

 

 

 

S

 

D0

 

 

 

E1

D2

(depreciation)

 

Level

E0

 

Price

(appreciation)

D1

 

E2

 

 

 

 

 

D0

 

 

D2

 

S

 

Real GDP

This simple analysis helps us understand why the U.S. trade deficit grew so enormously in the late 1990s and early 2000s and has fallen a bit recently. We learned in the previous chapter that the international value of the dollar began to climb in 1995. According to the reasoning we have just completed, within a few years such an appreciation of the dollar should have boosted U.S. imports and damaged U.S. exports. That is precisely what happened. In constant dollars, American imports soared by over 40 percent between 1997 and 2002, while American exports rose by only 7 percent. The result was that a $105 billion real net export deficit in 1997 turned into a monumental $471 billion deficit by 2002. More recently, the dollar’s decline has helped push the trade deficit down from a record $625 billion in 2006 to “only” $556 billion in 2007.

AGGREGATE SUPPLY IN AN OPEN ECONOMY

FIGURE 3

The Effects of Exchange Rate Changes on Aggregate Supply

D

Price Level

S1

S0

S2

So far we have concluded that a currency depreciation increases aggregate demand and that a currency appreciation decreases it. To complete our model of macroeconomics in an open economy, we must turn to the implications of international trade for aggregate supply.

Part of the story is already familiar. We know from previous chapters that the United States, like all economies, purchases some of its productive inputs from abroad. Oil is by far the most prominent example. But we also rely on foreign suppliers for metals such as titanium, raw agricultural products such as coffee beans, and thousands of other items used by American industry. When the dollar depreciates, all of these imported inputs cost more in U.S. dollars—just as if foreign prices had risen.

The consequence is clear: With imported inputs more expensive, American firms will be forced to charge higher prices at any given level of output. Graphically, this means that the aggregate supply curve will shift upward (or inward to the left).

When the dollar depreciates, the prices of imported inputs rise. The U.S. aggregate supply curve therefore shifts inward, pushing up the prices of American-made goods and services. By exactly analogous reasoning, an appre-

 

 

 

ciation of the dollar makes imported inputs

 

 

 

 

 

 

cheaper and shifts the U.S. aggregate supply curve

 

 

S1 (depreciation)

outward, thus pushing American prices down. (See

 

 

S0

Figure 3.)

 

 

S2

Beyond this, a depreciating dollar has addi-

 

 

(appreciation)

 

 

 

 

 

tional inflationary effects that do not even show

E1

up on an aggregate demand-and-supply diagram,

because the price level depicted on the vertical

E0

E2

axis is the price of gross domestic product. Most obvi-

ously, prices of imported goods are included in

 

 

 

 

 

 

U.S. price indexes like the Consumer Price Index

 

 

 

(CPI). So when the dollar prices of Japanese cars,

 

 

 

French wine, and Swiss watches increase, the CPI

 

 

D

goes up even if no American prices rise. For this and

 

 

 

other reasons, the inflationary impact of a dollar

Real GDP

depreciation on consumer prices is greater than

 

 

 

that indicated by Figure 3.

Copyright 2009 Cengage Learning, Inc. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part.

LICENSED TO:

CHAPTER 19 Exchange Rates and the Macroeconomy 383

THE MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF EXCHANGE RATES

Let us now put aggregate demand and aggregate supply

 

 

 

 

 

 

FIGURE 4

together and think through the macroeconomic effects of

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Effects of a

changes in exchange rates.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Currency Depreciation

First, suppose the international value of the dollar falls. Re-

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ferring back to the blue lines in Figures 2 and 3, we see that this

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

depreciation will shift the aggregate demand curve outward

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

S1

and the aggregate supply curve inward. The result, as Figure 4

 

 

 

 

 

D1

 

 

S0

shows, is that the U.S. price level certainly rises. But whether

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

real GDP rises or falls depends on whether the supply or de-

 

 

 

 

D0

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

mand shift is the dominant influence. The evidence strongly

 

Level

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

suggests that aggregate demand shifts are usually larger, so we

 

 

 

 

A

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

expect GDP to rise. Hence:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Price

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

A currency depreciation is inflationary and probably also

 

 

 

 

E

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

expansionary.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The intuitive explanation for this result is clear. When the

 

 

 

 

S1

 

 

D1

dollar falls, foreign goods become more expensive to

 

 

 

 

S0

 

 

D0

Americans. That effect is directly inflationary. At the same

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

time, aggregate demand in the United States is stimulated by

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

rising net exports. As long as the expansion of demand out-

 

 

 

 

 

Real GDP

weighs the adverse shift of the aggregate supply curve

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

brought on by currency depreciation, real GDP should rise.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

But wait. By this reasoning, the massive depreciations of several Southeast Asian curren-

 

 

 

 

cies in 1997 and 1998 should have given these economies tremendous boosts. But instead, the

 

 

 

 

so-called Asian Tigers suffered horrific slumps—as did Mexico when the peso tumbled in

 

 

 

 

1995. Why? The answer is that our simple analysis of aggregate supply and demand omits a

 

 

 

 

detail that, while unimportant for the United States, is critical in many developing nations.

 

 

 

 

Countries that borrow in foreign currency will see their debts increase whenever their

 

 

 

 

currency values decline. For example, an Indonesian business that borrowed $1,000 in July

 

 

 

 

1997, when $1 was worth 2,500 rupiah, thought it owed 2.5 million rupiah. But when the

 

 

 

 

dollar suddenly became worth 10,000 rupiah, the company’s debt skyrocketed to 10 million

 

 

 

 

rupiah. Many businesses found themselves unable to cope with their crushing debt burdens

 

 

 

 

and simply went bankrupt. So although currency depreciation is expansionary in the

 

 

 

 

FIGURE 5

United States, it was sharply contractionary in Indonesia.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Returning to rich countries such as the United States,

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Effects of a

let’s now reverse direction and look at what happens

 

 

 

 

 

 

Currency Appreciation

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

when the currency appreciates. In this case, net exports fall,

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

so the aggregate demand curve shifts inward. At the same

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

time, imported inputs become cheaper, so the aggregate

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

S0

supply curve shifts outward. Both of these shifts are shown

 

 

 

D0

 

 

S2

in Figure 5. Once again, as the diagram shows, we can be

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

D2

 

 

 

 

sure of the movement of the price level: It falls. Output

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

also falls if the demand shift is larger than the supply

Level

 

 

 

 

E

 

 

 

 

shift, as is likely. Thus:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

A currency appreciation is disinflationary and probably

Price

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

also contractionary.

 

 

 

 

 

B

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

This analysis explains why many economists and finan-

 

 

 

S0

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

cial experts cringed a bit when the yen and the euro appre-

 

 

 

S2

 

 

D0

ciated relative to the dollar in 2002–2004 and then again in

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

D2

2007. Japan, in particular, was just emerging from defla-

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

tion, and growth there was mediocre. The last thing it

 

 

 

 

 

Real GDP

needed, they argued, was a decrease in aggregate demand.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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384

PART 4

The United States in the World Economy

Interest Rates and International Capital Flows

International capital flows are purchases and sales of financial assets across national borders.

One important piece of our international economic puzzle is still missing. We have analyzed international trade in goods and services in some detail, but we have ignored international movements of capital up to now.

For some nations, this omission is inconsequential because they rarely receive or lend international capital. But things are quite different for the United States because the vast majority of international financial flows involve either buying or selling assets whose values are stated in U.S. dollars. In addition, we cannot hope to understand the origins of the various international financial crises of the 1990s and 2000s without incorporating capital flows into our analysis. Fortunately, given what we have just learned about the effects of exchange rates, this omission is easily rectified.

Recall from the previous chapter that interest rate differentials and capital flows are typically the most important determinants of exchange rate movements. Specifically, suppose interest rates in the United States rise while foreign interest rates are unchanged. We learned in the previous chapter that this change in relative interest rates will attract capital to the United States and cause the dollar to appreciate. This chapter has just taught us that an appreciating dollar will, in turn, reduce net exports, prices, and output in the United States—as indicated in Figure 5. Thus:

A rise in interest rates tends to contract the economy by appreciating the currency and reducing net exports.

Notice that this conclusion has a familiar ring. When we studied monetary policy in Chapter 13, we observed that higher interest rates deter investment spending and hence reduce the I component of C 1 I 1 G 1 (X 2 IM). Now, in studying an open economy with international capital flows, we see that higher interest rates also reduce the X 2 IM component. Thus, international capital flows strengthen the negative effects of interest rates on aggregate demand.

If interest rates fall in the United States, or rise abroad, everything we have just said is turned in the opposite direction. The conclusion is

A decline in interest rates tends to expand the economy by depreciating the currency and raising net exports.

Exercise Provide the reasoning behind this conclusion.

FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICIES IN AN OPEN ECONOMY

We are now ready to use our model to analyze how fiscal and monetary policies work when capital is internationally mobile and the exchange rate floats. Doing so will teach us how international economic relations modify the effects of stabilization policies that we learned about in earlier chapters. Fortunately, no new theoretical apparatus is necessary; we need merely remember what we have learned in the chapter up to this point. Specifically:

•A rise in the domestic interest rate leads to capital inflows, which make the exchange rate appreciate. A currency appreciation reduces aggregate demand and raises aggregate supply (see Figure 5).

•A fall in the domestic interest rate leads to capital outflows, which make the exchange rate depreciate. A currency depreciation raises aggregate demand and reduces aggregate supply (see Figure 4).

Fiscal Policy Revisited

With these points in mind, suppose the government cuts taxes or raises spending. Aggregate demand increases, which pushes up both real GDP and the price level in the usual manner. This effect is shown as the shift from D0D0 to the blue line D1D1 in Figure 6. In a

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CHAPTER 19

Exchange Rates and the Macroeconomy

385

closed economy, that is the end of the story. But in an open economy with international capital flows, we must add in the macroeconomic effects that work through the exchange rate. We do this by answering two questions.

First, what will happen to the exchange rate? We know from earlier chapters that a fiscal expansion pushes up interest rates. At higher interest rates, American securities become more attractive to foreign investors, who go to the foreign-exchange markets to buy dollars with which to purchase them. This buying pressure drives up the value of the dollar. Thus, at least for a rich country that can easily sell its bonds on the world market,

A fiscal expansion normally makes the exchange rate appreciate.

A closed economy is one that does not trade with other nations in either goods or assets.

FIGURE 6

A Fiscal Expansion in

an Open Economy

Second, what are the effects of a higher dollar? We

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

know that when the dollar rises in value, American goods

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

become more expensive abroad and foreign goods be-

 

 

 

D1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

come cheaper here. So exports fall and imports rise, driv-

 

 

D2

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ing down the X 2 IM component of aggregate demand.

 

D0

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The fiscal expansion thus winds up increasing both

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

S0

Level

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

America’s capital account surplus (by attracting foreign cap-

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

S2

ital) and its current account deficit (by reducing net exports).

Price

 

 

 

 

 

 

B

 

 

In fact, the two must rise by equal amounts because,

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

under floating exchange rates, it is always true that 2

 

 

 

 

A

 

 

 

 

 

 

Current account surplus 1 Capital account surplus 5 0

 

 

 

 

 

C

 

 

 

D1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Because a fiscal expansion leads in this way to a trade

 

 

S

0

 

 

 

 

D2

deficit, many economists believe that the large U.S. trade

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

S2

 

 

 

D0

deficits of the 1980s were a side effect of the large tax

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

cuts made early in the decade—and that the tax cuts of

 

 

 

 

 

Real GDP

 

 

 

 

 

 

2001–2003 once again pushed the trade deficit up. We

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

will return to that issue shortly.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

For now, note that the induced rise in the dollar will shift the aggregate supply curve outward and the aggregate demand curve inward, as we saw in Figure 5. Figure 6 adds these two shifts (in brick-colored lines) to the effect of the original fiscal expansion (in blue). The final equilibrium in an open economy is point C, whereas in a closed economy it would be point B. By comparing points B and C, we can see how international linkages change the picture of fiscal policy that we painted earlier in the book.

Two main differences arise. First, a higher exchange rate makes imports cheaper and thereby offsets part of the inflationary effect of a fiscal expansion. Second, a higher exchange rate reduces the expansionary effect on real GDP by reducing X 2 IM. Here we have a new kind of “crowding out,” different from the one we studied in Chapter 15. There we learned that an increase in G will crowd out some private investment spending by raising interest rates. Here an increase in G, by raising both interest rates and the exchange rate, crowds out net exports. But the effect is the same: The fiscal multiplier is reduced. Thus, we conclude that

International capital flows reduce the power of fiscal policy.

Table 2, which shows actual U.S. data, suggests that this new in-

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

TABLE 2

 

 

 

 

 

ternational variety of crowding out was much more important

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Percentage Shares of Real GDP in the United

than the traditional type of crowding out during the huge fiscal ex-

States, 1981 and 1986

 

 

 

pansion of the 1980s. Between 1981 and 1986, the share of invest-

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Year

C

I

G

X 2 IM

ment in GDP barely changed despite the rise in the shares of both

 

 

1981

64.5%

14.3%

20.5%

0.2%

 

consumer spending and government purchases. Only the share of

 

net exports, X 2 IM, fell—from 10.2 percent to 22.8 percent.

1986

67.3

14.5

21.2

22.8

 

Change

12.8

10.2

10.7

23.0

 

American economists thus learned an important lesson. In 1981,

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

many economists worried that large government budget deficits

NOTE: Totals do not add up because of rounding and deflation.

2 If you need review, turn back to Chapter 18, page 370.

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386

PART 4

The United States in the World Economy

would crowd out private investment. By the end of the decade, most were more concerned that deficits were crowding out net exports and producing a massive trade deficit.

FIGURE 7

A Monetary

Contraction in an

Open Economy

D0

D1

D2

Price Level

S0

S2

Monetary Policy Revisited

Now let us consider how monetary policy works in an open economy with floating exchange rates and international capital mobility. To remain consistent with the history of the 1980s, we consider a tightening, rather than a loosening, of monetary policy.

 

 

 

 

 

As we know from earlier chapters, contractionary mon-

 

 

 

 

 

etary policy reduces aggregate demand, which lowers both

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

S0

real GDP and prices. This situation is shown in Figure 7 by

 

 

 

 

the shift from D0D0 to the blue line D1D1, and it looks like

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

the exact opposite of a fiscal expansion. Without interna-

 

 

 

 

S2

tional capital flows, that would be the end of the story.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

But in the presence of internationally mobile capital,

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

A

we must also think through the consequences for interest

 

 

rates and exchange rates. As we know from previous

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

B

chapters, a monetary contraction raises interest rates—just

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

like a fiscal expansion. Hence, tighter money attracts for-

 

 

 

 

 

eign capital into the United States in search of higher rates

 

 

C

of return. The exchange rate therefore rises. The appreci-

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

D0

ating dollar encourages imports and discourages exports;

 

 

D1

so X 2 IM falls. America therefore winds up with an

 

 

D2

inflow of capital and an increase in its trade deficit. In

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 7, the two effects of the exchange rate appreciation

 

 

Real GDP

appear in the brick-colored lines S2S2 and D2D2: aggregate

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

supply shifts outward and aggregate demand shifts

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

inward. This time, as you can see in the figure,

International capital flows increase the power of monetary policy.

In a closed economy, higher interest rates reduce investment spending, I. In an open economy, these same higher interest rates also appreciate the currency and reduce net exports, X 2 IM. Thus, the effect of monetary policy is enhanced.

It may seem puzzling that capital flows strengthen monetary policy but weaken fiscal policy. The explanation of these contrasting results lies in their effects on interest rates. The main international repercussion of either a fiscal expansion or a monetary contraction is to raise interest rates and the exchange rate, thereby crowding out net exports. But that means that the initial effects of a fiscal expansion on aggregate demand are weakened, whereas the initial effects of a monetary contraction are strengthened.

INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF DEFICIT REDUCTION

We have now completed our theoretical analysis of the macroeconomics of open economies. Let us put the theory to work by applying it to the events of the 1990s, when fiscal policy was tightened and monetary policy was eased. Should reducing the budget deficit (or raising the surplus) strengthen or weaken the dollar?

As discussed in Chapter 15, the U.S. government transformed its mammoth budget deficit into a notable surplus during the 1990s by raising taxes and cutting expenditures. Column (1) of Table 3 reviews the predicted effects of a fiscal contraction: It should lower real interest rates, make the dollar depreciate, reduce real GDP, and be less disinflationary than normal because of the falling dollar. This information is recorded by entering 1 signs for increases and 2 signs for decreases.

Eliminating the budget deficit reduced aggregate demand. But the Federal Reserve restored the missing demand by lowering interest rates so that the economy would not

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