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P A R T V

Personality and Individual

Differences

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and the broader belief systems associated with them do not spring fully formed from the minds of individuals in the mass public. Rather, they are typically constructed by a highly involved group of political elites, and then filter downward to the mass public (e.g., Converse, 1964; Zaller, 1992). Importantly, research suggests that the ideological “packages” put together by elites diffuse rather unevenly through the mass public: in general, the most knowledgeable and attentive segments of the mass public are more likely to acquire, understand, and use them (see especially Converse, 1964, 2000). What this suggests is that, for psychological characteristics to operate as motives for the adoption of particular ideological contents, individuals may need to be familiar enough with key political ideas and debates—as propounded by political elites—to “correctly” select the orientation that satisfies their epistemic needs (cf. Sniderman & Bullock, 2004). In this chapter, we outline and test a model based on this central hypothesis. We begin our discussion with a brief review of previous work on the intersection between epistemic motivation and ideology.

EPISTEMIC MOTIVATION AND ITS

RELATIONSHIP WITH IDEOLOGY

Although research on the link between motivation and ideology has been guided by a variety of theoretical considerations (e.g., Adorno et al., 1950; McClosky, 1958; Rokeach, 1960), recent work has been particularly influenced by the theory of lay epistemics (Kruglanski, 1989, 1996). This theory proposes a “general cognitive-motivational orientation toward the social world that is either open and exploratory, on the one hand, or closed and immutable, on the other hand” (Jost, et al., 2003a, p. 348; see also Jost, Kruglanski, & Simon, 1999; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Perhaps most importantly, this perspective argues that individuals differ in their need for cognitive closure, or the manner and extent to which they are motivated to possess knowledge that is secure, stable, and permanent (Kruglanski, 1996). These differences can stem from both stable personality characteristics and features of particular situations (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994).

In general, the need for closure is associated with a tendency to “seize” on closure-providing information and to “freeze” on the resulting conclusions once they have been attained. Accordingly, the need for closure has been linked with a heavier use of stereotypes, a proneness to primacy effects in impression formation, a tendency to make the fundamental attribution error, resistance to persuasion, and hostility toward opinion deviates (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Kruglanski, 1989, 1996; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994; see also Jost et al., 2003a). Thus, in its focus on the need for closure, the

lay-epistemics approach suggests that individual and situational differences exist in the degree to which perceivers are open to new information and willing to entertain the possibility of “cognitive alternatives” to an existing state of affairs (Jost et al., 1999, 2003a).

This suggests that the need for closure may have important consequences for predispositions, attitudes, and judgments in the political realm, especially those linked to ideology. In particular, a “matching process” may exist, in which people adopt the ideological orientations (e.g., liberalism or conservatism) and associated political attitudes most consistent with their location on the need-for-closure continuum (Jost et al., 1999, 2003a; see also Golec & Federico, 2004). At the simplest level, the theory of lay epistemics suggests that the need for closure—insofar as it leads people to seize and freeze on any and all available constructs—may be associated with an acceptance of whatever ideological contents are dominant in particular context or to a particular individual. However, persons at various points along the need for closure continuum are also attentive to the specific contents of particular ideologies. As such, contents that promise stability, clarity, and a sense of order should be particularly appealing to individuals with a high need for closure. So, although the need for closure can be thought of as a nonspecific motivation, it can in fact produce a specific affinity for contents that are clearly closureproviding (Jost et al., 2003a,b; Kruglanski, 1989). Thus, to the extent that a conservative orientation suggests stability, clarity, and order, the logic of this argument implies that right-wing ideological content should be especially appealing to citizens with a high need for closure.

Consistent with this argument, a great deal of evidence suggests that a correlation exists between the need for closure (and related indices of cognitive motivation) and right-wing predispositions and attitudes. Among other things, a high need for closure appears to be associated with (a) a right-wing ideological orientation, (b) right-wing policy attitudes (e.g., strong support for the death penalty, hawkish foreign-policy positions, etc.), (c) greater authoritarianism, (d) higher levels of nationalism and militarism, and (e) greater religious conservatism (see Jost et al., 2003a, for a thorough review; see also Adorno et al., 1950; Federico, Golec, & Dial, 2005; Golec & Federico, 2004; Jost, 2006; Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Jost et al., 1999, 2007; Kemmelmeier, 1997; McClosky, 1958; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Moreover, whereas this body of work has focused heavily on the need for closure, its basic logic—focused on the notion of motivationally guided political choice—suggests that just about any motivational variable with distinct effects on the acquisition and use of knowledge about the world may also have an impact on individuals’ ideological affinities (Jost et al., 2003a). For example, a number of studies now suggest that the personality trait of openness to experience is reliably

associated with self-placement on the left–right spectrum (see Jost et al., 2003a, 2007; see also Rentfrow, Jost, Gosling, & Potter, this volume). Thus, rather than being psychologically random, affinity for various forms of ideological content appears to be reliably associated with variance in individuals’ fundamental orientations toward how different kinds of knowledge should be acquired and used to construct a view of reality.

THE ROLE OF ELITE POLITICAL DISCOURSE

As the preceding review suggests, past and present research makes a strong empirical case for the role of epistemic motivations—particularly the need for closure—in the shaping of individuals’ ideological orientations. Nevertheless, although this body of work sheds light on the motivational bases of ideology, it actually tells us very little about the mechanics of the relationship between epistemic motivation and ideology. Besides suggesting a basic affinity between a “closed” orientation toward the construction and use of knowledge and right-wing preferences, studies of this sort have had very little to say about the processes connecting them. In particular, they have generally avoided a detailed treatment of the role played by the broader social and cultural contexts in which epistemically motivated political affinities arise (but see Jost et al., 2003b).

In this vein, the new psychological look at ideology tends to ignore some of the points political scientists have made about the social origins of ideology. One of the most important of these conclusions is that a large portion of the mass public does not structure its political attitudes or perceptions in ideological terms, despite being aware of labels like “liberal” and “conservative.” As many studies have shown, the attitudes of most citizens do not display ideological constraint (i.e., they are not ideologically consistent with one another or with broader predispositions; see Bennett, 2006; Converse, 1964, 2000; Erikson & Tedin, 2003; Judd & Krosnick, 1989; Kinder & Sears, 1985; Luskin, 1987; Zaller, 1992), and only a relatively small portion of the mass public actively and accurately conceptualizes political life in terms of the content inherent in abstractions like liberalism and conservatism, even though a majority may identify themselves with one of these orientations (see Bennett, 2006; Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Erikson & Tedin, 2003; Nie, Verba, & Petrocik, 1976; Page & Shapiro, 1992; Stimson, 2004; but see Jost, 2006). Nevertheless, research of this sort also consistently indicates that political elites—elected officials, activists, political commentators, and the like—do identify with and make use of ideological constructs (Campbell et al., 1960; Jennings, 1992). Similarly, members of the mass public with high levels of political expertise—who are

more likely to attend to what elites have to say about politics—also tend to make greater use of ideology in organizing their political attitudes and perceptions (Converse, 1964, 2000; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Erikson & Tedin, 2003; Federico, 2004, 2007; Federico & Schneider, 2007; Judd & Krosnick, 1989; Kinder, 2006; Lavine, Thomsen, & Gonzales, 1997; Layman & Carsey, 2002; Zaller, 1992).

Together, these findings lead to two important conclusions about ideology. The first of these is that ideology is socially constructed by a discursively specialized minority within the body politic, namely, a highly involved stratum of political elites. For most citizens of advanced democracies, ideology is not an unmediated political expression of individual psychological needs; rather, it is a social representation made available to them ahead of time by a political culture constructed largely, although not completely, by others. The second of these conclusions is that the ideological contents articulated by elites diffuse only partially to the mass public, shaping opinion formation and organization to a much greater extent among those most aware of what elites actually have to say.

In turn, we believe these conclusions have important but largely unexamined implications for the role of epistemic motivation in attraction to different ideological packages. Above all, if ideology is primarily an elite construction that filters down unevenly to various segments of the mass public, then some citizens may be more capable than others of “selecting” the ideological content that matches their underlying epistemic needs. Specifically, a closed orientation toward the construction and use of knowledge should lead to an affinity for conservative ideological content, primarily among individuals who are likely to have attended closely to elite political discourse and incorporated it into their own cognitive structures—that is, those high in political expertise. Because of their familiarity with the elite conversations in which ideological constructs are articulated and used to make sense of political issues, these individuals should be able to match their epistemic orientation up with the “correct” ideological positions. In contrast, individuals who are low in political expertise should be less familiar with how political elites define and use ideological constructs, making it more difficult for them to appropriately identify the ideological positions consistent with their epistemic orientation. In other words, epistemic motives may have weaker ideological consequences among those who are less likely to attend to, understand, or fully internalize the abstract political concepts enunciated by elites.

Unfortunately, this hypothesis has yet to receive a great deal of attention. Although the relationship between different epistemically relevant motivations and ideology has been investigated in a variety of populations (see Jost et al., 2003a), most of the work in this area has had a “main effects” focus: it