jost_j_t_kay_a_c_thorisdottir_n_social_and_psychological_bas

estimation procedure identical to the one used with the UCLA data. The models were specified in the same fashion, and the analyses again relied on Satorra and Bentler’s (1994) mean-corrected maximum likelihood technique and robust standard errors.

Results for the 2006 CPS structural-equation analyses are shown in Table 11.4; estimates for the measurement models are not displayed. Again, two models were run: the first constrained the effect of the latent interaction to zero, whereas the second freely estimated the path coefficient for the effect of the interaction as well. Both models produced showed an excellent global fit (with nonsignificant chi-squares and CFIs equaling 1).7 Replicating the OLS results, Model 1 indicated a significant first-order effect of the need for closure (γ = .44, p < .001), with those high in the need for closure showing greater conservatism; and in a reversal, a negative effect of expertise (γ = –.25, p < .01), with those high in expertise tilting to the left. In turn, the estimates for Model 2 again indicated a significant effect of the latent interaction (γ = .22, p < .05). To probe this interaction, simple slopes for the relationship between the need for closure and ideological orientation at high and low levels of expertise were computed using the same Aiken and West (1991) procedure as before. These analyses indicated that the relationship between need for closure and ideological orientation was significant and relatively large among those high in expertise (γ = .65, SE γ = .16, p < .001), but smaller and only marginally significant among those low in expertise (γ = .21, SE γ = .11, p < .10).8 Thus,

parcels were created by (1) averaging items 1 and 2, (2) averaging items 3 and 4, and

(3) averaging items 5 and 6. In this case, the choice of which items to pair within each construct made little difference with respect to the internal consistency of each parcel. Thus, the items were simply combined in order.

7 Note that the two structural-equation models show smaller sample sizes than the corresponding OLS regression models. This is due to the different way in which missing values impact the effective sample size in the structural-equation analyses: since matrices of moments must be computed for all pairs of observed variables prior to the analyses, more opportunities are present for missing data on different variables to cause a case to drop out of the analyses. In any case, when the two models in Table 11.4 were rerun using the Mplus 4.1 full-information maximum-likelihood procedure for missing data (Muthen & Muthen, 2007), the estimates were similar in terms of significance, direction, and magnitude.

8 To ensure that the 2006 CPS results were also robust to estimation technique, we again replicated our analysis using the aforementioned LMS approach. As before, the LMS estimates revealed a significant interaction between the need for closure and expertise (γ = .34, SE

γ = .06, p < .05), attesting to the robustness of our original result.

Table 11.4 Interactive effects of the need for closure and political expertise on composite ideological orientation: Structural equation model (2006 Core Predispositions Study).

Note. Entries are unstandardized mean-corrected maximum-likelihood estimates with robust standard errors.

+p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

the structural-equation analyses again provide reinforcing support for our hypothesis.9

DISCUSSION

Interest in the relationship between psychological needs and citizens’ political orientations has experienced something of a resurgence in recent years (e.g., Jost, 2006). In particular, recent work suggests that various epistemic motivations—needs related to the acquisition and use of social information— are especially relevant to the construction of ideologically linked preferences ( Jost et al., 2003a; Van Hiel et al., 2004; see also Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). According to this perspective, individuals whose epistemic motivations are

9 An alternative hypothesis would suggest that those who are high in the need for closure and high in expertise should simply be more extreme in their orientation, regardless of whether it tends toward the left or right (cf. Jost et al., 2007; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). To examine this possibility, we folded the ideological orientation scale at its midpoint of 4 in each data set and regressed this “extremity” measure on the full set of predictors from each data set. In both data sets, the interaction between the need for closure and expertise failed to significantly predict variance in the folded extremity measure (both p > .30), ruling out this alternative hypothesis.

closed, rigid, or simplistic—those with a high need for closure, for example— should be particularly likely to adopt a right-wing ideological orientation.

This prediction has received relatively consistent support over several decades’ worth of empirical research (Jost et al., 2003a, b). However, little effort has been made to connect this useful psychological approach to ideology with a broader tradition of research on the social construction and diffusion of ideological constructs. This research tradition, rooted primarily in political science, argues that ideology is created largely by highly involved political elites, and that it is more likely to diffuse to those members of the mass public who are most aware of elite discourse—that is, those high in political expertise (Converse, 1964; Judd & Krosnick, 1989; Zaller, 1992). Thus, for the average citizen, the development of an ideological orientation—if one is developed at all—is not likely to be a direct response to particular psychological needs. Rather, it is best thought of as attraction to one of a set of preexisting “menu” items offered by political elites (Sniderman & Bullock, 2004).

In our opinion, this body of findings has critical implications for the hypothesis that ideology reflects “motivated social cognition.” Namely, if ideology is more likely to be understood and used among those who are most attuned to and who have best internalized the content of elite discourse, then epistemic motivation should be more strongly predictive of citizens’ ideological orientations among those high in political expertise. In this chapter, we have provided two tests of this hypothesis with respect to a key epistemic motivation, namely, the need for closure. Across two different data sets and two different regression methodologies, the analyses provided a clear pattern of support for our basic hypothesis. In the 2000 UCLA student survey, individuals with a high need for closure were more likely to display a rightwing political orientation when they were also relatively high in political expertise. Moreover, analyses using data from our 2006 CPS survey revealed a similar result: survey respondents with a high need for closure were more likely to lean to the right at high levels of political expertise. Taken together, these findings suggest that the political implications of epistemic motivation do not manifest themselves in a discursive vacuum. Rather, the relationship between right-wing politics and a closed cognitive–motivational orientation appears to be most pronounced among those who are “in the know” with regard to elite ideological discourse. Whereas those who are politically knowledgeable have the information needed to match up their epistemic orientation with the “appropriate” ideological orientation, those who are lacking in political expertise—and less aware of the ideological “packages” constructed by elites—appear to choose more haphazardly.

More broadly, the interactive model we develop here points toward a useful integration of the differing perspectives on ideology provided by

psychology and political science. Like the psychological perspective, our model suggests that ideological orientations may be shaped by generalized needs and motivations whose relevance and operation extend well beyond the realm of politics. However, echoing conclusions reached by political scientists interested in the (uneven) diffusion of belief systems, it also notes that psychological variables may be of little or no relevance to ideological orientation in situations in which political socialization—in particular, exposure to the ideological constructs central to elite political discourse—is incomplete. As such, the model outlined here helps fill the gaps in each discipline’s approach to study of ideology. With respect to the psychological approach, our model adds an awareness of the elite construction of ideological packages and their somewhat fragmentary diffusion to the public at large. In particular, by considering the role of political expertise, the perspective developed here provides clues about when motivated social cognition is likely to matter in the construction of ideologically linked preferences. In turn, with respect to the political-science approach, our model provides psychological insight—rooted in current work on the political implications of epistemic motivation—into why citizens who are aware of elite ideological packages might be more attracted to one rather than another. In other words, our perspective helps reinforce a point sometimes overlooked by work on belief systems in the mainstream of research on public opinion: namely, that ideological affinity is not a purely accidental or stochastic process; rather, it varies systematically as a function of deeply rooted psychological needs (see Jost, 2006).

Despite these contributions, the present study does raise a couple of questions for future research. First, although our results clearly suggest that political expertise moderates the relationship between epistemic motivation and orientations linked to the left–right ideological dimension, other studies suggest that this may not be the case with regard to all politically relevant orientations and attitudes. For example, a variety of analyses indicate that core values—durable normative beliefs about desirable end states or modes of action—inform the political judgments of citizens both low and high in political expertise (e.g., Feldman, 1988; Goren, 2004). That is, unlike use of the left–right dimension, “successful” value-based judgment does not appear to be dependent on a keen awareness of elite political discourse. Thus, insofar as certain widely understood value orientations suggest order, clarity, and simplicity, individuals with a closed epistemic orientation may be able to “select” them regardless of how familiar they are with elite discourse. If this is the case, then we might expect variables like the need for closure to have the usual main-effect relationship with values that promise order, stability, and the like, but no interaction with expertise.

Second, in spite of our model’s focus on the role of political elites in the construction of the ideological packages “consumed” by the mass public, it has very little to say about the processes that lead elites to construct particular ideologies in the first place. Although the elite construction of ideology is heavily shaped by strategic interactions among party leaders and opinion makers (e.g., the formation of strategic coalitions between elites with different policy interests; Aldrich, 1995; Downs, 1957), it may also be governed by a less-instrumental desire to see certain issues linked together as part of an overall ethical or philosophical posture (Noel, 2004). Insofar as the psychological processes highlighted by current work on epistemic motivation and ideology are universal, then we might expect the ideologybuilding activities of elites to be shaped by many of the same motivations known to affect ideological preferences in the mass public. Thus, psychological needs—particularly those linked to epistemic motivation—may have an influence not just on how members of the mass public choose between the “menu items” offered by a political culture, but also on how elites construct the menu itself. Although an investigation of this possibility is beyond the scope of this chapter (and our data), it strikes us as an ideal and largely unexplored avenue for future work on interface between psychological functioning and political ideology.

CONCLUSION

Drawing on approaches derived from work in psychology and political science, we have argued that the relationship between psychological needs— especially epistemic ones relevant to the acquisition and use of information— and individuals’ ideological orientations may be critically dependent on the extent to which they are attuned to, understand, and have internalized the categories of elite ideological discourse. On one hand, a “closed” epistemic orientation leads to the usual affinity for right-wing ideological content among individuals who are highly aware of elite discourse—that is, those high in political expertise. Given their understanding of how elites define and make use of ideological constructs, these individuals are able to choose the ideological orientation consistent with their epistemic orientation. On the other hand, individuals who are low in political expertise are less aware of the elite discussion in which ideology takes shape, making it more difficult for them to adopt a stance consistent with their epistemic needs. Given this novel integration of divergent lines of work on the psychological and sociopolitical bases of ideological affinity, we believe that our interactive model provides a unique and more comprehensive approach to the analysis of belief systems.

288 PERSONALITY AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES

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