jost_j_t_kay_a_c_thorisdottir_n_social_and_psychological_bas

Table 14.1 Effects of ideology and interaction of procedural justice with ideology in predicting satisfaction with decision maker.

Note. * = p < .05

**= p < .01

***= p < .001

To interpret this interaction, we conducted a follow-up analysis to compare the effect of procedural justice on satisfaction separately for liberals and conservatives. Following Preacher and colleagues (2006), we calculated the simple slopes for procedural justice at one standard deviation above and below the center point of the scale for ideology. Results indicate that the fairness of procedures had a greater influence on liberal respondents: B = 0.997, SE = .022, t(932) = 44.93, p < .001, than on conservative respondents: B = 0.923, SE = .031, t(932) = 30.28, p < .001. Therefore, the interaction between procedural justice and ideology indicates that decreasing fairness of procedures resulted in a greater decrease in satisfaction for liberals than for conservatives (Fig. 14.1). In other words, as people experienced greater levels of injustice, they became less satisfied. However, liberals became significantly less satisfied in response to evidence of injustice than did conservatives.

A second regression analysis was conducted to assess the extent to which procedural justice and ideological orientation predicted acceptance of the decision reached by the authority figure, and the extent of interaction be-

Table 14.2 Effect of ideology, and interaction of procedural justice with ideology, in predicting decision acceptance.

Note. * = p < .05

**= p < .01

***= p < .001

the simple slopes for procedural justice at one standard deviation above and below the center point of the scale for ideology. Results indicate that the fairness of procedures had a greater influence on liberal respondents: B = 0.546, SE = .044, t(919) = 12.41, p < .001, than on conservative respondents: B = 0.440, SE = .044, t(932) = 9.99, p < .001. Therefore, the interaction between procedural justice and ideology indicates that decreasing fairness of procedures resulted in a stronger decrease in acceptance for liberals than conservatives (Fig. 14.2). In other words, as people experienced greater levels of injustice, they became less accepting of the decision reached. However, liberals became significantly less accepting in response to evidence of injustice than did conservatives.

Is the Pattern Symmetrical?

Based on prior theory and research, we expected that negative experiences with authorities would create psychological conflict and lead to an increase

This pattern is consistent with our argument concerning motivational effects on interpretation of justice information. If liberals were simply more responsive, they would decrease more in response to injustice, and increase more in response to justice. They would, in other words, simply react more strongly to whatever experience they had. But the regression pattern does not support this view. The divergence occurs with respect to negative experiences only, suggesting that people are reacting differently to the threat posed by unjust experiences as a function of their chronic motivation to justify the system.

DISCUSSION

Accurate Versus Motivated Interpretations

of Procedural Justice Information

Prior research has shown that people place a great deal of emphasis on procedures in forming evaluations and legitimacy judgments of authorities and social institutions. Extensive research demonstrates that people use procedural justice to derive socially relevant information needed to make sense of one’s social settings and to evaluate groups and institutions (Tyler & Blader, 2000; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002). However, the current study suggests that processing and interpretation of procedural justice information may be subject to motivational biases. When faced with injustice from authorities and systems, people may be threatened and experience conflicts between the motivation to veridically process information about social reality and the motivation to justify extant institutions and the status quo.

On the basis of research on SJT and political orientation we hypothesized that people with a conservative orientation would experience more conflict in the face of injustice because of a greater need to view the world as just and reasonable and because of less tolerance for uncertainty and inconsistent information. As a result, we predicted a divergence between liberals and conservatives in response to information that may discredit existing authorities and institutions. We suggested that liberals would process injustice information in a manner more consistent with the actual negative experience, whereas conservatives would be more resistant to recognizing and reacting to negative information about the unfairness of procedures in the social system.

The results of this study provide evidence of motivated social cognition, and indicate that people with different political orientations interpret procedural information in different ways. More conservative respondents appeared to be less sensitive to negative experiences and evaluated authorities in a more positive light. Specifically, conservatives reported more positive overall evaluations of satisfaction with their experience, as well as willingness to accept the

decisions reached by the authority. In addition, increasing system justification tendencies were associated with a smaller negative impact of procedural injustice. Respondents who were more motivated to justify the system (i.e., conservatives) were less sensitive to decreases in procedural justice, and evaluated authorities and decisions more positively in the face of injustice, as compared with those who were less motivated to justify the system (i.e., liberals).

These findings provide support for the argument that a greater need to perceive the extant system as just gives rise to motivated processing and interpretation of justice information (Haines & Jost, 2000; Jost et al., 2004; Kay et al., 2007). As the available information increasingly threatens the view of institutional procedures as just, and thereby the legitimacy of institutions and authorities, respondents with a greater need to justify the system show a positively biased interpretation of procedures.

Implications for Legitimacy of Authorities and Systems

Models of justice judgments suggest that motivations to justify the status quo may interfere with an accurate understanding and evaluation of social institutions. By engaging in motivated reasoning, people become unable to veridically process and react to justice information, and as a result may fail to acknowledge procedural or distributive failures or take actions to address these. As a result, the injustices that social institutions perpetrate may not result in disapproval or negative evaluation. Thus, system justification may prevent responses that challenge institutions or attempt to alleviate unjust situations (see also Wakslak, Jost, Tyler, & Chen, 2007). In other words, motivated reasoning that results in distorted information processing may lead to inhibition of collective action and institutional change.

The Palliative Function of System Justification

Another conclusion suggested by the results of this study is that engaging in system justification serves a palliative function by improving evaluations and providing a sense of reassurance and legitimacy that is not necessarily warranted (Jost & Hunyady, 2002). Respondents who were more highly motivated to justify the system reported more satisfaction with the authority and a greater willingness to accept the decisions reached by the authority, even under conditions of injustice. Although further studies are needed to assess the accuracy and impact of these positive evaluations, they can be expected to lead to more positive emotional states (see Napier and Jost, 2008).

Limitations and Future Directions

The analysis presented here is based on subjective evaluations of procedural justice. In the same way that system justification motives influence

interpretation of procedural justice information, they may also lead to distortions in the extent to which people perceive their experiences with authorities as procedurally just. To the degree that such distortions occur, they are not captured in the analysis we report. Hence, we might well be underestimating the magnitude of the motivated reasoning that is occurring. In other words, motivated reasoning driven by system justification needs can be expected to influence both the perception of procedural information, as well as its interpretation in forming evaluations. Although the current analysis focused on motivated interpretation of justice information, a more complete analysis is needed to assess both facets of influence of system-justifying motivations on evaluations of authorities and institutions.

In addition, the current analysis did not include a direct measure of system justification, but relied instead on individual differences in ideological orientation that have been shown to be consistently associated with systemjustification tendencies (Jost et al., 2008; Napier & Jost, 2008). These shortcomings need to be addressed by studies that directly assess respondents’ system justification needs and experimentally manipulate procedural justice, to assess the effects of motivation to justify the system on the perception of procedural information and its interpretation in evaluating the fairness and legitimacy of authorities, institutions, and systems.

CONCLUSIONS

In sum, the present research demonstrates that motivation to justify the system influences the way people form judgments about authorities and institutions on the basis of procedural justice information. Greater motivation to justify the system decreases the negative impact of injustice on evaluations and leads to a more positive reinterpretation of unjust procedures. As a result, those who are motivated to justify the system are able to maintain more positive evaluations of the system and the authorities who represent it, even in the face of injustice.

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