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P A R T V I I

Implications for Self, Group, and Society

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outcomes by virtue of who they are (entitlement) or what they have done (deserving). People will judge an individual as receiving what he or she deserves when that individual’s inputs are proportional to his or her outcomes. The term inputs describes an individual’s contribution to a task, whereas the term outcomes refers to the consequences that an individual receives in exchange for his or her inputs (Walster, Berscheid, & Walster, 1973). The perception of behavioral inputs is highly influenced by the social groups to which people belong (Ridgeway, 2001). Therefore, judgments of entitlement and deservingness are closely intertwined. Furthermore, violations of deserving and entitlement lead to similar emotions. For these reasons, we use the terms entitlement and deservingness interchangeably (Major, 1994; but see Feather, 2002).

In this chapter, we begin by reviewing the research on the relationship between group status and entitlement. We consider two mechanisms that impact feelings of personal entitlement: social comparison processes and system justification. We describe our recent program of research on the role of system-justifying beliefs (SJBs) in creating group differences in personal entitlement. Finally, we discuss potential strategies for eliminating group differences in personal entitlement.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF GROUP STATUS FOR BELIEFS ABOUT ENTITLEMENT/DESERVINGNESS

Beliefs about personal entitlement and deservingness develop within social contexts that reward people differently on the basis of the social groups to which they belong (Ridgeway, 2001). For example, even after controlling for academic achievement, women and ethnic minorities earn less money than men and White people (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Unequal outcomes can affect beliefs about relative inputs through a number of processes. Cognitive biases, such as outcome bias, lead people to attribute characteristics to people that correspond to the outcomes that those people generate (Allison, Mackie, & Messick, 1996). Thus, it is not surprising that people who belong to some social categories (e.g., men and Whites) are widely perceived to be more socially worthy and competent than are those who belong to other categories (e.g., women and ethnic minorities, Jackman, 1994). In terms of entitlement theory, because of their greater assumed inputs, the former are seen as deserving of greater outcomes.

Pay differences between groups can also affect assumptions about relative inputs through status construction processes (Ridgeway, 2001). According to status construction theory, the mere recognition of a pay difference associated with group membership is enough to make people believe that the higher-paid group is more competent and worthy than a lower-paid group

(Ridgeway, 1991; Ridgeway, 2001). In one study, participants were randomly assigned to minimal groups. In the low-pay condition, participants learned that they and other members of their group were paid less compared to the other group. In the high-pay condition, participants learned that they and their group members were paid more than the participants from the other group. Next, participants engaged in dyadic interactions with confederates whom they believed to be members of the other group. Participants in the low-pay condition came to believe their group was less competent and lower in status (Ridgeway, Boyle, Kuipers, & Robinson, 1998). The mutually reinforcing nature of the relationship between status and entitlement helps to explain why status differences between groups are stable and difficult to change.

Unequal treatment of social groups can alter what people feel they personally deserve to receive (Major, 1994). Members of low-status groups, who regularly receive a disproportionately small portion of material and social goods, can come to believe they deserve less than members of high-status groups. In contrast, members of high-status and advantaged groups, who regularly receive all the benefits associated with their status, can come to believe they deserve more than members of low-status groups.

To date, the most direct evidence that group status affects perceptions of personal entitlement comes from research on gender differences in entitlement to pay (see Major, 1994 for a review). This research suggests that men experience an elevated sense of personal entitlement compared to women (Blanton, George, & Crocker, 2001; Bylsma & Major, 1992; Callahan-Levy & Messé, 1979; Crosby, 1982; Jost, 1997; Major, McFarlin, & Gagnon, 1984; Pelham & Hetts, 2001). In one study, Major and colleagues assigned male and female college students to work on a clerical task for 20 minutes (Major et al., 1984). Afterwards, under private conditions, participants were given $4 in change and asked to pay themselves the amount that they thought was fair for their work. Male participants paid themselves over $3 on average, whereas female participants paid themselves less than $2, suggesting that, when men and women’s actual inputs are equal, men believe they are entitled to greater outcomes (see Callahan-Levy and Messé, 1979, for similar findings). In a follow-up study, men and women were paid $4 and asked to do as much work as they thought was fair in exchange for the payment they had received. Men worked for significantly shorter periods of time, did less work, and did less accurate work than women (Study 2, Major et al., 1984). This study suggests that, when men and women’s outcomes are equal, men believe that they should contribute fewer inputs than women.

Status differences in feelings of personal entitlement affect cognition, emotion, and behavior. Gender differences in entitlement for pay have been proposed to underlie the “paradoxical contentment” displayed by working

women, who often report being just as content with their incomes as working men, despite the fact that they are paid less (Crosby, 1982). The belief that one is entitled to more than others may lead people to negotiate for higher salaries and to feel dissatisfied or angered when they fail to receive what they believe is their due. Feelings of personal entitlement can lead members of high-status groups to be blind to seeing when they are unfairly overbenefited, allow them to justify their privileged position, and lead them to regard efforts to “level the playing field” as grossly unjust. In contrast, a depressed sense of entitlement among members of low-status groups may prevent members of low-status groups from seeing when they are targets of discrimination (Major et al., 2002) and reduce the likelihood that they will engage in collective action to challenge the distribution of social goods (Crosby, 1982; Hafer & Olson, 1993). In this way, group differences in feelings of personal entitlement serve to perpetuate and maintain social inequality.

In the remainder of this chapter, we focus on social comparison processes and SJBs, which are two mechanisms through which group differences in status can be translated into group difference in feelings of personal entitlement.

The Role of Social Comparison

Biases to compare with others like the self and with one’s own past outcomes lead members of highand low-status groups to derive and use different standards of comparison when evaluating their outcomes. In the case of gender, men and women prefer to compare their own outcomes to the outcomes of other members of their sex. Major and Forcey (1985) randomly assigned men and women to work on one of three different jobs. After working on the task, participants were all paid an identical wage. Next, participants were asked their preference for seeing the average wage for men, women, or the combined average for men and women. Participants also had to decide if they wanted to see these averages for people who performed the same job or one of the other jobs. The vast majority of participants chose to see the average wage for people of the same sex who performed the same job. This research demonstrates that people have a preference for intragroup as opposed to intergroup comparison.

This intragroup comparison bias can lead to lower reference standards when one’s own group is disadvantaged. In a study by Major and Testa (1989), participants worked on one of two tasks and were then privately paid an identical wage. They were then given the opportunity to see the wage received by one other student who had presumably participated in the experiment earlier. They could select this student from a list of eight participants—two males and two females for each of the two jobs. Unbeknownst to the participants, in one job, the pay to males was higher than that to females, whereas in the other