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(Brooks, 1999; Robbins, 2006; Viles, 2002). Nonetheless, members of the majority can benefit from reparations. Majority members may achieve improved intergroup relations and an end to costly litigation if the minority is seeking reparations through the courts. Reparations also demonstrate the commitment of present majority members and the system to fairness and justice. By dissociating the present group from the past group and the present system from the past system, apologies and other reparations can help majority members maintain a positive image of their current group and a belief that the current system is fair.

We focused our study on reparations offered by the Canadian government in 2006 for the Head Tax and Chinese Exclusion Act. The Head Tax was a substantial immigration tax that the Canadian government levied only on Chinese between 1885 and 1923 to limit Chinese immigration. The Exclusion Act, implemented by the Canadian government from 1923 to 1947, barred Chinese from entering the country altogether. For many years, Chinese Canadians lobbied for reparations from the government for these discriminatory policies. To understand the impact of reparations, we (Blatz, Ross, Day, & Schryer, 2006) surveyed Chinese Canadians and other Canadians before and after the Canadian government provided reparations.

Before the Canadian government officially apologized and provided compensation, we described the Head Tax and Exclusion Act to Chinese and non-Chinese Canadians and then assessed their perceptions of the victims and the government. For the sample surveyed after the reparations offer, we provided the same information and also included the complete text of the official apology, as well as information about the compensation package. Chinese and non-Chinese Canadians were more likely to report that the Head Tax reflected poorly on the Canadian system of government before than after reparations were provided. We also asked participants from each group to assess the degree to which they shared a common identity (belonged to the same group) with the victims. Non-Chinese participants reported greater shared identity with the Head Tax payers after than before reparations were provided. Chinese participants’ reports of shared identity with the payers were high in either instance and not affected by reparations.

We asked additional questions only after reparations were offered to assess how Chinese and non-Chinese participants evaluated the government’s offer. Both groups assessed the offer quite favorably, but non-Chinese Canadians were particularly enthusiastic. Non-Chinese participants were more likely than Chinese to agree that the apology was complete, that justice had finally been done, and that the reparations package was acceptable. Chinese participants were much more likely than non-Chinese to indicate that the

children of Head Tax payers should have received compensation if neither parent was alive (they did not). Chinese respondents were also more cynical about the intent of the reparations offer than were non-Chinese, showing greater agreement with the statement that the Prime Minister apologized mainly to win Chinese votes in the next election. These group differences in evaluations of the reparations package were all statistically significant, but let us be absolutely clear: On the whole, Chinese participants viewed the offer favorably, albeit less favorably than the majority, non-Chinese group. Also, although the apology was aimed at all Chinese Canadians, relatively few, and none of our respondents, received direct financial compensation. It remains to be seen how those who receive direct financial compensation would respond to an offer of reparations.

Why were Chinese-Canadian participants less approving of the reparations offer than their non-Chinese counterparts? We focus on three complementary explanations. First, reparations do not restore justice for the minority in the sense that they remove the harm or re-establish the status quo. For example, Japanese Canadians did not have their property returned when they were compensated for being interned during World War II, and the amount of compensation they received was, on average, only a small percentage of their actual financial losses (Brooks, 1999). Similarly, the Head Tax compensation was labelled a “symbol of regret” rather than genuine financial compensation. Indeed, how could any current government compensate for the effects of the Head Tax and Exclusion Act on individuals and their families? The degree of loss and the relative inadequacy of compensation are probably more salient to those who belong to the victim group than to majority group members.

Second, it was the majority and its government representatives who committed the wrong. As a result, the wrong is possibly more threatening to the majority group’s social identity and their beliefs about the fairness of their system. As we have seen, members of the majority support reparations when they are feasible (Starzyk & Ross, 2008). Prime Minister of Canada, Stephen Harper showed that reparations were feasible by providing them; in turn, members of the majority may have been eager to view the reparations package as a successful remedy for an earlier injustice.

Finally, the content of apologies may explain why majority members are more enamored with them. In the next section, we consider how government leaders apologize and how the content of their apologies might contribute to the majority group’s greater enthusiasm. Formal government apologies for historical injustices are quite rare (Brooks, 1999), but there have been enough in recent decades for us to attempt an exploratory analysis.

How Governments Apologize

We begin this section by suggesting a template for how governments might devise an effective apology. We then assess, in detail, the degree to which the apology for the Head Tax conforms to this template. We also briefly consider several other government apologies.

In fashioning their apologies, government leaders probably have at least two audiences in mind: The victimized minority and the rest of the population. Government leaders need to make the case to an often sceptical majority that apology and compensation are warranted, especially if the financial package is large (Robbins, 2005; Viles, 2002). Typically, members of the minority will already regard reparations as justified (Viles, 2002). For them, the apology should have the characteristics of a sincere apology, an expression of regret that would satisfy an aggrieved party. Researchers (Darby & Schlenker, 1982; Meier, 1998; Scher & Darley, 1997; Tavuchis, 1991) suggest that an apology will appear sincere when it contains the following elements: Offenders acknowledge the injustice and the suffering it caused; explain their actions and accept responsibility for the harm; and express remorse, offer compensation, and promise to never commit the same injustice again. Most everyday apologies do not contain all of these elements. A simple “I’m sorry” or “sorry” is the norm (Meier, 1998), in part, perhaps, because everyday infractions are often minor rule violations. The historical injustices that result in apologies and material reparations are not trivial, however. As a result, leaders who apologize may go well beyond a simple expression of regret and offer a more complete apology.

The social identity and justice literatures also have implications for the content of government apologies. The apology should praise both the majority and minority group, so as to support positive social identities in both groups. The apology should also affirm the fairness of the current system and dissociate this system from past wrongs.

The apology offered by the Canadian Prime Minister Harper for the Head Tax effectively addresses these issues (Globe and Mail, 2006, June 22). He begins by emphasizing the gravity of the injustice committed against many hardworking, good Chinese immigrants, who were targeted for discrimination solely because of their “race.” Apology and other reparations therefore seem warranted. His statement also includes all of the qualities of a sincere apology. He recognizes the suffering of Head Tax payers: “We acknowledge the high cost of the Head Tax meant many family members were left behind in China, never to be reunited, or that families lived apart and, in some cases, in poverty, for many years. . . . This was a grave injustice . . .” He then explains why the injustice occurred: “An attempt to deter immigration.” He

accepts “moral responsibility,” for acknowledging “these shameful polices of our past.” He expresses “deep sorrow” . . . “over the racist actions of our past.” He offers “symbolic” financial compensation to the living Head Tax payers or their surviving spouses. He promises to “continually strive to ensure that similar unjust practices are never allowed to happen again.”

Harper also promotes the positive social identities of both groups. He asserts that the Chinese-Canadian community “continues to make such an invaluable contribution to our great country.” He addresses the social identity concerns of the majority by noting that every country makes mistakes and that Canadians are “good,” “just,” and “decent.” He affirms the current system by observing that the injustice happened long ago (“lies far in our past”) and in a different system (“a product of a profoundly different time” in which such discrimination was legal). He assures contemporary non-Chinese Canadians that neither they nor their government were responsible for the injustice, stressing that the apology is “not about liability today.” He also states that the current government and system are redressing past wrongs and will act to prevent future injustices of the same sort. As apologies go, Harper’s is a tour de force.

Is there anything in the apology that might be at least mildly disturbing to Chinese Canadians and contribute to the group differences that we observed in our Head Tax study? We have already noted one point: Chinese respondents in our survey were less satisfied with the government’s refusal to pay compensation to the descendents of Head Tax payers when the Tax payer and his spouse were deceased. We also wonder (and this is sheer speculation) whether there is a certain tension in trying to please two different constituencies and, in particular, whether Harper’s attempts to laud the majority group might have undermined the effectiveness of the apology for Chinese Canadians. Toward the end of his statement, Harper seemed to downplay the culpability of non-Chinese Canadians: “No country is perfect. Like all countries, Canada has made mistakes in its past, and we realize that . . . Canadians, however, are a good and just people, acting when we’ve committed wrong . . . it is the decent thing to do, a characteristic to be found at the core of the Canadian soul.” Non-Chinese Canadians might have appreciated this portrayal of the “decent” Canadian more than their Chinese Canadian counterparts, who might have wondered why such decent people behaved so deplorably in the past. Also, use of the term “mistakes” seems to minimize the injustice. The imposition of the Head Tax was not a minor gaffe (like a spelling mistake) or an isolated incident. The Head Tax was a key component of decades of deliberate legislative discrimination against Chinese immigrants.

The reparations package offered by Harper’s government was modeled on the apology and compensation package offered in 1988 to Japanese Canadians for their interment during World War II. Statements in that reparations

agreement and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney’s official apology reflected similar efforts to affirm the system and maintain the positive social identity of the majority group (Government of Canada, 1988). The reparations agreement notes that “the principles of justice and equality in Canada are reaffirmed.” In his apology in the House of Commons, Prime Minister Mulroney, like Harper, emphasized that to err is human: “Most of us in our own lives have had occasion to regret certain things that we have done. Error is an ingredient of humanity, so too is apology and forgiveness.”

The apology and reparations to Japanese Canadians did not include explicit indications that the injustices occurred long ago and were perpetuated by a different system. In contrast, such distancing efforts were clearly evident in a statement of regret offered by Ralph Klein (Government of Alberta, 1999), then Premier of Alberta. In 1928, the provincial parliament in Alberta passed the Sexual Sterilization Act, which permitted the forced sterilization of individuals deemed to be mentally disabled. About 2,800 residents of psychiatric institutions were forcibly sterilized from 1928 to 1970. The act was repealed in 1999. Following a great deal of litigation, the provincial Parliament agreed to apologize and financially compensate surviving victims of the sterilization. In offering the “apology,” then Premier Ralph Klein said, “We extend regrets for the actions of another government, in another period of time” (Government of Alberta Apology, 1999). Unlike Harper, Klein did not accept “moral responsibility” for the actions of his predecessors.

A far more generous apology for government-sponsored injustice was offered by former U.S. President Bill Clinton (Clinton Apology, 1993). In a letter addressed to Japanese Americans interned during World War II, Clinton wrote an apology that distanced the episode, expressed sincere regret, emphasized the magnitude of the injustice, condemned the actions of past governments, and affirmed the fairness of the current system:

Over fifty years ago, the United States Government unjustly interned, evacuated, or relocated . . . many . . . Japanese Americans. . . . I offer a sincere apology to you for the actions that unfairly denied Japanese Americans and their families fundamental liberties . . . we acknowledge the wrongs of the past and offer redress to those who endured such grave injustice. In retrospect, we understand that the nation’s actions were rooted deeply in racial prejudice, wartime hysteria, and a lack of political leadership. We must learn from the past and dedicate ourselves . . . to renewing the spirit of equality and our love of freedom. Together, we can guarantee a future with liberty and justice for all.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we examined how social identity concerns and justice motivations influence responses to historical injustices. We found that people

not belonging to a victimized group often seem unaware of historical injustices in their own country. When past government-sponsored injustices against a minority are made salient, people in the majority group are more inclined to downplay the degree of injustice, blame the victim group, and oppose reparations when the injustices occur in their own country rather than elsewhere. We argued that these results reflect, in part, people’s motivations to protect their social identity and the legitimacy of the social, economic, and political status quo. Our research shows that, when confronted with local historical harms, people can resolve threats to system integrity in a number of ways. They may erase the harm from the historical record, perceive the injustice as less severe, blame the victims for their problems, or dissociate the present system from the injustice. Alternatively, when government reparations for historical injustices are warranted and possible, people sympathize with still-suffering victims and support measures to alleviate the injustice.

In the final sections of the chapter, we examined the impact and content of government offers of reparations. Government apologies and compensation packages can lead members of both the victimized minority and nonvictimized majority to report more faith in the fairness of their political and economic system. Government reparations seem to produce an especially favorable response from members of the nonvictimized majority. The positive effects of government apologies are probably related to the actual content of the apologies. Governments often apologize in ways that address the identity concerns of both the victimized minority and the nonvictimized majority. Although they are generous in their praise of all of their people, governments seem less inclined to extol the fairness of their political and social system. Perhaps they suppose that the apology, itself, can serve this important psychological function.

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Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). That is, political ideology—an interconnected set of beliefs and attitudes that shape judgment—may not exist solely as a reasoned or explicit collection of beliefs and attitudes. Ideology has unconscious as well as conscious determinants, and the latter are well explicated elsewhere (Cunningham, Nezlek, & Banaji, 2004; see also Ferguson, Carter, & Hassin, this volume).

In this chapter, we examine the variation in ideological orientation in relation to implicit and explicit attitudes, with a specific focus on attitudes toward social groups. We start by revisiting Jost and colleagues’ (2003) theoretical argument (and supporting meta-analysis) that liberals and conservatives differ on two key dimensions: resistance to change and tolerance for inequality. We then focus on the key prediction that conservatives are more likely than liberals to have and express more positive attitudes toward high-status or advantaged groups and more negative attitudes toward low-status or disadvantaged groups. This occurs on both conscious and less conscious measures of intergroup attitudes. In this sense, the intergroup attitudes of conservatives tend to be more system-justifying than those of liberals, insofar as they support and perpetuate the existing social hierarchy (see Jost et al., 2004; Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008). We also find—using data from the American National Election Studies (ANES)—that liberals have at the forefront of the social movement toward racial egalitarianism, whereas conservatives’ attitudes were slower to change.

IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN

LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES

The “classic” conception of the authoritarian personality (Adorno, FrenkelBrunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), its modern instantiation (Altemeyer, 1996), recent perspectives on ideology stressing motivated social cognition (Jost et al., 2003), system justification (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost et al., 2004, 2008), social dominance (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), and moral foundations (Haidt & Graham, 2007) provide accounts of differences between the political left and right, or, more commonly in the United States, liberalism and conservatism. These perspectives converge on the expectation that, compared to liberals, conservatives are less concerned with equality, more comfortable maintaining the status quo, and more likely to show favoritism for highstatus or advantaged groups over low-status or disadvantaged groups.

To the extent that conservative, system-justifying attitudes are characterized by resistance to change and tolerance for inequality (Jost et al., 2003), their appeal should be maximized when stability and order are prioritized values. In the study of authoritarianism, psychologists have long observed