Часть 2

(1) AM: Ваше вступление в дарвинские войны многих удивило, хотя оно не было таким уж неожиданным. Вы оспариваете положения теории естественного отбора в том же ключе, в котором оспаривали бихевиоризм, не так ли? Что ошибочного вы находите во взглядах тех, кто сейчас безоговорочно поддерживает Дарвина, и почему, по Вашему мнению, его теория имеет недостатки?

(2) Jerry Fodor: That’s easy. Darwinism doesn’t have a mechanism for natural selection; in particular, the ‘theory of natural selection’ doesn’t provide one. That was the main theme of Piatelli and my book What Darwin Got Wrong. Darwin, like Skinner, is a ‘black box’ theorist; both insist that the non-random variables in explanations of biological traits are environmental .In consequence, Darwin is left with the hopeless problem, of (which the ‘linkage’ of traits is a parade example) how environmental variables could account for the effects of a creatures internal organisation in determining its phenotype. Hence the familiar loose talk about ‘Mother Nature’s role in guiding trait selection. Dawkins (among others) keeps assuring us that such talk is metaphorical. But he never does explain how to cash the metaphor. Skinner’s problem is exactly the same, except he’s interested not in innate phenotypes but in acquired ‘behavioral repertoires’.

(3) AM: Мне кажется, публике довольно сложно понять основные Ваши идеи, потому что Ваш стиль чтения лекций довольно сильно отличается от академического, Вы не высказываете формулировок, а даёте слушателям Ваши мысли в их течении. И в Ваших книгах немало метафор, которые не дают окончательных определений, а наводят на некоторые размышления. Конечно, вы не из числа критиков Дарвина от лица креационизма, и всё же не была ли для Вас шоком вся критика, обрушившаяся на Вас и Ваши книги?

(4) J.F.: I wasn’t surprised that the biologists missed the point; for better or worse, evolutionary biology is now a largely statistical science, so it’s practitioners generally don’t think much about the explanatory adequacy of other kinds of empirical theories. But that the philosophers missed the point too struck me as really shocking; contemplating issues about explanatory adequacy is a lot of what they’re supposed to do for a living. It should be kept in mind, however, both in biology and in the philosophy of biology, a lot of careers are built on firm adherence to Darwinism and Neo-Darwinism. So it’s hardly surprising that serious criticism of The Theory of Natural Selection (as distinct from the Creationist kind) provokes spasms. God save us from true believers on either side.

(5) AM: Алекс Розенберг, философ, был, пожалуй, одним из главных Ваших оппонентов, высказавших наиболее обоснованную критику, в отличие от биологов. Что Вы можете сказать по поводу его критики? Кажется, его идеи являются и критикой ассоцианизма. Верно?

(6) J.F.: Alex says (rightly) that selection for or against are contraries, not contradictories. (There are neutral traits as well as adaptive and anti-adaptive ones). I think Alec thinks we miss this logical point in What Darwin Got Wrong, but we didn’t. Since it is tautological that there can’t be selection for or against a neutral trait, it follows that, if there is selection at all, then it is selection for a trait if it isn’t selection against it. Still, let’s assume, for the sake of argument that whiteness wasn’t selected for in polar bears. What, in that case, was selected against? Being pink? Being green with orange stripes? Do Darwinists believe that there used to be green polar bears with orange stripes, but they all got eaten up by predators? If not, what does Alex think is gained by rejecting selection for in favour of selection against?

Задание

1. Проанализируйте и сравните несколько вариантов перевода. В каких из них средства перевода подобраны наилучшим образом?

2. Подумайте, какую роль и в каких ситуациях для устного переводчика играют уверенность, интонация и «подача себя»?

Упражнение 2. Переведите отрывок из книги Дж. Фодора, учитывая всю её полемичность.

Concepts: where cognitive science got wrong

Philosophical Introduction: The Background Theory

My topic is what concepts are. Since I’m interested in that question primarily as it arises in the context of ‘representational’ theories of mind (RTMs), a natural way to get started would be for me to tell you about RTMs and about how they raise the question what concepts are. I could then set out my answer, and you could tell me, by return, what you think is wrong with it. The ensuing discussion would be abstract and theory laden, no doubt; but, with any luck, philosophically innocent.

That is, in fact, pretty much the course that I propose to follow. But, for better or for worse, in the present climate of philosophical opinion it's perhaps not possible just to plunge in and do so. RTMs have all sorts of problems, both of substance and of form. Many of you may suppose the whole project of trying to construct one is hopelessly wrongheaded; if it is, then who cares what RTMs say about concepts? So I guess I owe you some sort of general argument that the project isn’t hopelessly wrong-headed.

But I seem to have grown old writing books defending RTMs; it occurs to me that if I were to stop writing books defending RTMs, perhaps I would stop growing old. So I think I’ll tell you a joke instead. It’s an old joke, as befits my telling it.

Old joke: Once upon a time a disciple went to his guru and said: ‘Guru, what is life?’ To which the Guru replies, after much thinking, ‘My Son, life is like a fountain.’ The disciple is outraged. ‘Is that the best that you can do? Is that what you call wisdom?’ ‘All right,’ says the guru; ‘don’t get excited. So maybe it’s not like a fountain.’

That’s the end of the joke, but it’s not the end of the story. The guru noticed that taking this line was losing him clients, and gurus have to eat.

So the next time a disciple asked him: ‘Guru, what is life?’ his answer was: ‘My Son, I cannot tell you.’ ‘Why can’t you?’ the disciple wanted to know. ‘Because,’ the guru said, ‘the question “What is having a life?” is logically prior.’ ‘Gee,’ said the disciple, ‘that’s pretty interesting’; and he signed on for the whole term.

I’m not going to launch a full-dress defence of RTM; but I do want to start with a little methodological stuff about whether having a concept is logically prior to being a concept, and what difference, if any, that makes to theorizing about mental representation.

It’s a general truth that if you know what an X is, then you also know what it is to have an X. And ditto the other way around. This applies to concepts in particular: the question what they are and the question what it is to have them are logically linked; if you commit yourself on one, you are thereby committed, willy nilly, on the other. Suppose, for example, that your theory is that concepts are pumpkins. Very well then, it will have to be a part of your theory that having a concept is having a pumpkin. And, conversely: if your theory is that having a concept is having a pumpkin, then it will have to be a part of your theory that pumpkins are what concepts are. I suppose this all to be truistic.

Задание

Работая в группе, сравните несколько вариантов перевода и сформируйте из них единый для всей группы перевод данного текста. Обоснуйте выбор варианта перевода того или иного элемента.