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way), Śiva, being thus, is one whose nature emerges,382 because he is one who appears as such. This is expressed in the following manner:

Otherwise, however, the generation (of images) would be independent, in accordance with their character.383

Thus, a second method is expressed for the expansion.384

3.94cd–95ab

On the other hand,385 [Somānanda] says:

īśvarasya svatantrasya kenecchā vā ’pi kalpyate 3.95. vibhavāmodabāhulyam athavoktā nimittatā

On the other hand, by what could the will of the independent Lord be doubted? Alternatively, the manifoldness of the one possessed of the delight of power may be said to be the cause.386

On the other hand, by what could his will be doubted, or not? Independence, first of all, is a certainty simply as a result of the nature of the Lord. The universe, consisting of that,387 is simply of such a condition. This much being so, it is established as that much.388

Alternatively, even though he is independent, he is one for whom there exists a particular nature, one for whom there exists an endless appetite for his own power in the form of the emission of his nature as the universe. It is he, as has

382The commentary here indicates that saratprakṛti (ŚD 3.94b) is an exocentric (bahuvrīhi) compound.

383The present is a quotation of SpKā 35. My translation is based on that of Dyczkowski 19922: xvii.

384In other words, Utpaladeva here wishes to suggest that Somānanda offers two distinct explanations for the unending appearance of the universe in all its forms. The first involves the immediacy of the arising of a subsequent cause following the one that precedes it (ŚD 3.92cd–93c). The second explanation appeals to the notion that the powers emerge as they do simply by nature (ŚD 3.93d–94ab). Somānanda quotes the SpKā in support of the second explanation, as the passage in question speaks to the nature of the yogin’s perception. The yogin is aware in the waking and dreaming states of the fact that his own consciousness creates the objects he experiences. Were he not aware, the yogin would be similar to a man in the world, one who experiences reality without being cognizant of his true identity as the supreme creator. In either case, the powers continue to manifest the images one experiences in the waking and dreaming states. In other words, the present passage exemplifies the fact that the powers simply emerge by nature, as argued in ŚD 3.93d–94ab.

385Here, Utpaladeva contrasts the idea expressed in the following with what precedes it. He has already described the flowing nature of Śiva’s powers, which cause Śiva to appear in the myriad universe. In what follows he reiterates the unchanging quality of Śiva’s nature.

386The present passage concludes Somānanda’s reply to the counterargument, anticipated in ŚD 3.31, that Somānanda must explain why Śiva’s will repeatedly asserts itself.

387Tat in the compound tanmaya refers to the aforementioned nature of the Lord (īśvaratva).

388The argument here is presented in a sort of telegraphic style but is clear enough. Utpaladeva wishes to suggest that Somānanda has here argued that it is impossible to doubt the existence of Śiva’s will.

been fully expressed, earlier,389 who is always the cause of the emission of the nature of the universe. Thus, in this way, there is no fault as regards the cause of the arising of a new will.390

3.95cd–96ab

viśvatucchatvavākyānāṃ vairāgyādyarthavādinām 3.96. tātparyeṇa na doṣo ’sti nānācittvaṃ na kalpate

No fault exists with the intention of the (scriptural) expressions regarding the insubstantiality of the universe, (and) which speak of dispassion, etc., as the goal. We do not conceive of the existence of a variegated consciousness.391

We do not contradict the (scriptural) utterances that speak of the universe as unreal, as similar to a bubble,392 even if they are uttered by Śiva, in consequence whereof no fault exists (in our view) as a result of any distance between our deliberations on the nature of the unitary Śiva and these [utterances], which explain the uses of dispassion, nonidentity with the self, etc.393

Moreover, the unwanted consequence—that the nature of consciousness is variegated—does not apply when everything has Śiva-nature.394

389See, e.g., ŚD 1.1 and ŚD 1.2 and Utpaladeva’s commentary thereon.

390The present interpretation relies on an emendation of the text here of nāsti for the nāstīti found in the four manuscripts of the commentary (G, J, P, and R) and in Ked.. The point here made is that there is no fault in Somānanda’s argument for the persistent reemergence of the power of will in all phenomena in the universe. To accept the reading as found in the published edition and the manuscripts would require one to understand the text to suggest precisely the opposite notion.

391The present passage constitutes a reply to the objection, anticipated in ŚD 3.32, that Somānanda’s conception of Śiva as one who creates the universe out of himself contradicts the descriptions of Śiva found in scripture.

392This is meant to be an example of something fleeting, a bubble that appears at one moment and disappears in the next. Perhaps Utpaladeva has in mind the following verse (Kaṭha Upaniṣad 2.1.11), which is also quoted in Rāmakaṇṭha’s commentary on NP 1.3: ekaṃ brahma paraṃ satyaṃ neha nānāsti kiñcana / idaṃ pheno na kiñcid vā budbudo vā na kiñcana. (The same analogy was used in the RT 5.279, as well, as quoted in the Introduction, section 4.) Yet, it is rather more likely he had a (heretofore unidentified) Śaiva tantric source in mind, given reference to Śiva as the one offering the utterance in question.

393As noted in the Introduction (section 8), Somānanda might well have the VBh in mind when making the present argument. See, e.g., VBh 102 (quoted in note 140 of the Introduction).

394Here, Utpaladeva, following Somānanda, wishes to argue that consciousness is not multiple in nature, because it can cognize apparently multiple entities without becoming divided when, and only when, everything cognized is equally the same Śiva. Thus, to reiterate the unity of consciousness here is to suggest that the vision of Śiva furnished in Somānanda’s ŚD does not contradict the unity conceived in the scriptural passages that promote dispassion and a disengagement with the manifested universe.

3.96cd–97ab

For instance:395

ekasminn eva dehe tu vibhedāt paramāṇugāt

3.97. ekatvāc chivarūpasya doṣo ’yaṃ bhedavādinām

According to those who maintain a dualistic view, a fault arises from the fact that the form of Śiva is unitary, because it is divided by the extremely small atoms found in just a single body.396

(Objection:) There are as many Śivas in just a single body as there are supremely small atoms. In this way, multiplicity must exist as a result of the multiplicity (of the atoms), even though it is found in the supremely small atoms.

(Reply:) This, too, the opposing view that there is an infinite number (of Śivas), is not a fault. Those many objects, extremely small atoms, etc., exist (only) in the form of the unitary Śiva. Therefore, how does multiplicity exist? For, Śiva does not exist in the form of the pots, etc., but rather the pots, etc., have Śiva as their form. Hence, there is no division of the one whose form is consciousness, because there is no division of place, time, and nature. This is taught in the Īśvarapratyabhijñā.397

There are those who perceive the atoms to be (mutually) distinct, however, and for them Śiva-nature exists by the nature of those atoms; and it398 is covered by impurity.399 Hence, if, due to the force of the cognition as expressed here, they manifest Śiva-nature, then there are many Śivas.400 Moreover, they are located in the body, and, since the atoms consist of him, are there not supremely small

395With the present, Somānanda apparently offers an example from a dualist Śaiva scriptural source. In other words, the present means to serve as an example of an instance where a Śaiva scripture that appears to contradict his theology does not. (Somānanda dealt with the concern—conformity to all scriptural sources—in ŚD 3.95cd–96ab. The issue was first raised as a potential objection in ŚD 3.32.)

396The present argument apparently anticipates a possible argument made by an opponent who argues that a scriptural source suggests that multiple atoms exist, thereby requiring Śiva to be divided thereby. Somānanda denies that this requires Śiva to be multiple in nature: the atoms have Śiva-nature; it is not the case that Śiva has an atomic nature. Note that I do not translate the connective particle (tu) found in ŚD 3.96c, as it appears merely as a verse filler (pādapūraṇa).

397See ĪPVṛ ad ĪPK 2.1.7, where Utpaladeva suggests that nothing appears distinct from Śiva, not even an atom. See also ĪPK (and ĪPVṛ ad) 2.4.2, where Utpaladeva suggests that no insentient reality may be a cause, not even an atom. Causality is therefore nothing but being the agent and the object of the action in question.

398The present reference is to the aforementioned Śiva-nature (śivatā) of the atoms in question.

399The idea here expressed is that an opposing school imagines Śiva-nature to be present in/as distinct atoms. That Śiva-nature is difficult to discern is the result of the presence of impurities somehow connected with it, presumably via the impurity of duality, which must be removed before the Śiva-nature in question is purified and made cognizable.

400There are apparently many Śivas, in this view, because he is manifested by a diversity of mutually distinct atoms.

atoms in the bodies of the atoms (as well)? Therefore, there are no Śiva-atoms.401 Thus, the view that the nature of consciousness is such that it possesses diverse, extremely small atoms is wrong. Hence, this fault exists only for them.402

3.97cd–99

ekādhiṣṭhānato vāpi teṣām api na dūṣaṇam

3.98.āntare kṛmicaitanye citratā svāmibhṛtyavat tāvad ekacitsvarūpaśivaprasaraṇena vā

3.99.pātañjalādīśvareṇa na sāmyam avibhedataḥ iha tadvan na vijñeyaṃ tasmāt sarvaṃ sthitaḥ śivaḥ

Another interpretation is that there is no fault for them, either, since (in their view) there exists a single locus (for the multiple atoms). The variegation that exists internally in (e.g.,) the awareness of a spider is similar to a master and his servant. Alternatively, it is so much because Śiva, whose nature is unitary consciousness, emerges. There is no similarity here403 with the Īśvara of the system of Patañjali, etc., since there is no duality (in our system). The same is not known (in other schools of thought). Therefore, Śiva is established as everything.

Another interpretation is that the variegated nature of consciousness is not a fault for them, i.e., for those holding the view that there is a diversity of atoms, because, as is the case in the non-dual Śaiva view, they404 have as their locus Śiva in the form of unitary consciousness, this because an absolutely unitary figure who has a variegated nature unfolds by means of his own māyā. We have also considered this in great detail in the Īśvarapratyabhijñā, itself.405 Moreover, the noncognition of non-duality is divided in different degrees, depending on the preponderance of enjoyment in the subtle body.406 The variegation in the awareness of, e.g., a spider is the result of the fact that the consciousness has a double nature, empowered and unempowered, the forms of which are of a master and his servant.407

401The argument here is unclear. It appears that Utpaladeva wishes to suggest that the atoms themselves are made up of infinitesimally small atoms. As such, there is no end to the layers of atoms, and as such one cannot say that Śiva-nature is encapsulated in such atoms. Why this leads one to conclude that there are no Śiva-atoms that exist/come into existence, however, is unclear.

402Here, Utpaladeva simply dismisses the argument that the atoms divide Śiva.

403That is to say, in the Śaiva view in question.

404This is the implied subject of the nominal sentence, “they” referring to the atoms in question.

405Utpaladeva may well have ĪPK 3.2 in mind, here. That “daily lesson” (āhnika) deals with the nature of reality and the effect of māyā on the unenlightened cognizer. It does not deal explicitly with the atoms, however.

406On the nature of the subtle body (puryaṣṭaka), see note 83 of chapter 1 of the present translation.

See, also, ĪPK 3.2.14.

407In other words, the spider, like a master, is conscious, has agency, and has an independent nature. Its web, like the servant is not conscious and has no independent agency. A similar theme is taken up in ŚD 4.2cd–3 and 4.4–5.

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