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speech—since they say that the two408 are one when they say things like “beginningless and endless”—the knowers of words, i.e., the grammarians, achieve thereby—by that conflation—an ignorance of every (other) philosophical view. For it is not the case in any philosophical view, be it that of the Sāṅkhya or another, that the mundane409 organ (of action) and object (of that action) are thought to be identical.

And in this way, in describing speech as supreme, beginningless and endless, unitary—the last because theirs is a non-dual doctrine—even the hand, that is, the organ of action, is consequently the same as that which it grasps, i.e., the object (it grasps).

2.84–88

Even if you say that paśyantī is Brahman’s power of cognition, then in as much as you accept that, you also have to accept another410 that is more subtle. Thus, [Somānanda] says:

2.84.paśyantī hi kriyā tasyā bhāgau pūrvāparau sthitau etad draṣṭavyam ity eṣo vimarśaḥ pūrvato bhavet

2.85.yathā kartuḥ kulālāder ghaṭaḥ kārya itīdṛśaḥ vimarśa icchārūpeṇa tadvad atrāpi saṃsthitam

2.86.sā sthitā pūrvatas tasyā icchāyāḥ prasaraḥ katham yāvan na sūkṣma ullāsaś citaḥ kāryonmukhaḥ sthitaḥ

2.87.tasyā api sāmarasye vyavasthāvān sthitaḥ śivaḥ evaṃ bhavatprakriyāyā api sūkṣmatarā sthitiḥ

2.88.sthitā sā na punaḥ satyā vāco vāyugamātmanaḥ iṣyate brahmarūpatvaṃ ghaṭāder api kathyatām

Indeed, paśyantī is an action that has earlier and later parts. The thought “I should look at this” must be earlier. Just as an agent of action, a potter, etc., thinks such a thought, in the form of a desire, as “I should make a pot,” so it is the same here, as well.411 That [desire] exists first of all. How could that desire come forth before the subtle joy of consciousness, which is eager for the effect of the action, exists? When that, for its part, is in a state of unity, Śiva is established as the one possessed of that condition. In this way, there is a condition more subtle than even the process of creation.412

You should accept that it exists, and you should not hold that real speech,

408Kaul suggests that this dual word refers to Brahman and paśyantī as the śabdatattva and vāktattva, respectively. The important point is that one is the cognizer (grāhaka), the other the thing cognized (grāhya). See also ŚD 2.2–4.

409The adjective here used is vyāvahārika.

410The neuter pronoun anyat could well refer to Brahman.

411That is, it is the same with regard to Śiva’s reflective awareness (vimarśa) prior to manifesting the universe.

412See ŚD 1.3–4. This is the quiescent condition of Śiva prior to creation.

consisting of the movement of air, is of the nature of Brahman. (If you do:) That must also be said of of pots, etc.413

Indeed, paśyantī, by nature the act of seeing, has an earlier part and a later part, and the earlier is the thought “I should look at this,” the nature of which must be the desire (to act), like that of a potter, etc., in the production of pots, etc.414

It is the same here, as well: everything exists in this way. In this way, moreover, the desire is the first condition of the act of seeing, and how could that desire, for its part, come forth, in the manner previously explained,415 in the absence of the extremely subtle joy, characterized by an eagerness for the desired objects of cognition and action that is connected to the nature of consciousness?

As for that [consciousness], as you know,416 Śiva Bhaṭṭāraka, being without sequence, is established as the one possessed of, i.e., as the locus of, the state of unity—the unity of penetration417—of consciousness, abiding in the sequence or the absence thereof418 of delight, eagerness, will, cognition, and action.419

In this way, that is, even according to your thinking that she is the power of cognition, there also exists another condition, a supreme form, that is more subtle than the process of “seeing” that is characterized by becoming.420 Thus, you must also admit to that [condition], as well, and you should not hold that real speech, consisting of the movement of air, is of the nature of Brahman.421 Holding such a view,422 you will have to say the same for pots, etc., as well, there being no distinction vis-á-vis the fact of being manifested.

2.89–91

2.89. yathā sarvapadārthānāṃ bhagavacchivarūpatā tadvad vāgindriyasyāpi na punaḥ sā parā daśā

413Note that I read the verb iṣyate in ŚD 2.88c twice, once with sthitā sā in ŚD 2.88a, and once with brahmatattvaṃ in ŚD 2.88c.

414In other words, a pot maker does not make something out of clay until he chooses to do so. In the same way, one does not look at something prior to having a subtle, internal impulse to do so.

415This could refer to the process of manifestation described in ŚD 1, esp. ŚD 1.7cd–8.

416This is a rendering of the force of the particle iti.

417Literally, samāveśaviṣaya means “relating to penetration” or “the range of penetration.” Compounds ending in viṣaya are often exocentric (bahuvrīhi) compounds, but this one is not.

418Due to sandhi, one can also read krama for akrama. Thus, one can translate either “the absence

of sequence” or “the sequence.”

419See ŚD 1.3–4.

420Bhavalakṣaṇāṃ prakriyām is a gloss of bhavatprakriyāṃ in ŚD 2.87c. More literally, this means, “the procedure concerning/relating to creation.”

421The argument made here cuts to the heart of Somānanda’s critique of the grammarians. If the divine is conscious and not inert, then all activity must be preceded by the sort of desire, the volition or will, here described. This simply is the nature of action, which is performed by independent agents of action. See the Introduction, section 5; cf. section 13, subsection entitled “Somānanda’s Arguments against the Grammarians’ paśyantī.”

422That is to say, by holding the view that real speech is Brahman, the following obtains.

2.90. kaṇṭhādau vadane vāyor vyāpāro vāgrutasya sā karaṇaṃ nādarūpādiśabdasyāsti śivātmatā

2.91. tasyāpi kathitā pañcatattvadīkṣāvidhau kvacit na vāca iṣyate tadvat tasmāt sarvaṃ śivātmakam

Just as every object exists in the form of the Lord Śiva, so too does the organ of speech. However, it is not the supreme condition. It is the instrument for the sound of speech, the activity of air in the mouth, in the throat, etc. (Objection:) Speech in the form of nāda, etc., also has Śiva-nature, as is said of it in places in the five-tattva initiation rite. (Reply:) We do not hold the same for (the organ of) speech. Thus, everything has Śiva-nature.423

Even if you argue that, just as all objects, within the range of cognition because they enter into consciousness, ultimately exist in the form of the Supreme-Lord-as-consciousness,424 so too does the organ of speech, as well, because it is included among all of the (aforementioned) objects of cognition, this because it would not be real, etc.,425 if it were not an object of cognition, (we reply:) even so, the condition of the organ of speech is not supreme, because it arises by means of the power of māyā, that is, by the noncognition of Śiva’s non-duality.

This is to say that it is the instrument that does the work of striking the throat, the palate, and so on, i.e., some location in the mouth, with air, which is the cause of the manifestation of speech, called sound, and this is without a doubt a mundane condition,426 consisting of duality.

Now, if you argue that mantric speech, whether coarse in the form of nāda, subtle, or supreme, is of the nature of Paramaśiva, then we reply: we accept that this is stated in the five-tattva initiation rite, i.e., in the śāstra on initiation, but it is not the case that, in this way, speech, i.e., the organ of action, is supreme, nor is it appropriate that the world is made up of it.427 Hence, it is fitting only that everything is comprised of Śiva alone. That is what [Somānanda] has said.

423Cf. ŚD 1.48. The point here made is that Śaiva non-dualism is correct, while that of the grammarians is not.

424More literally, cillakṣaṇaparameśvararūpatā means “the fact of being in the form of the Supreme Lord, whose mark is consciousness.”

425The term etcetera (ādi) in the compound asatvādi probably refers to the effable nature of speech.

426That is, it is the aparāvasthā.

427The initiation by five tattvas is a Saiddhāntika rite. An example of this may be found in the eighth chapter of the Sārdhatriśatikālottaratantra. (See edition of Bhatt 1979: 62–86.) Although this text does not speak explicitly of the identity of speech with Paramaśiva, it does point to knowledge of the mantras as the path to liberation. See Sārdhatriśatikālottaratantra 8.37cd–38ab: pṛthivādyabjanāḍīr vai śabdādiguṇavāyubhiḥ / ātmādhidevatā mantrāñ jñātvā muktas tu mocayet. The point of the present passage, of course, is that the opponent wishes to suggest that Somānanda must accept the supremacy of speech, because the Śaiva scriptures that he takes to be authoritative do so, as well. Somānanda of course rejects this argument, because he distinguishes everyday speech from the divine form of speech associated with Śiva himself. The same issue is taken up again in some detail on ŚD 3.10–15ab.

Chapter Three of the Śivadṛṣṭi and Śivadṛṣṭivṛtti: The Arguments against the Śāktas

The (Pratyabhijñā) doctrine of non-duality having been established, [Somānanda], immediately following his consideration of paśyantī, now turns his attention to philosophically proximate1 proponents of (a related form of ) nondualism.2 Accordingly,3 they say:

1The term here used, svayūthya, literally means “one’s possession” or “belonging to one’s own troop/herd.” Kaul glosses with svasamānajāti, “those being of the same class as one’s own.”

2Note that Kaul suggests that Somānanda does so not to contradict the Śākta point of view, this by glossing pratīdanīm ārambhaḥ with na tu nirākaraṇam ity arthaḥ. My reasons for disagreeing with this assessment is, simply, that it is clear that the Śāktas in question, namely Bhaṭṭa Pradyumna and those who followed him, adopted to a substantial degree the philosophy of Bhartṛhari and the grammarians, in particular the doctrine of the supremacy of the feminine power, paśyantī, something Somānanda finds utterly untenable. Proof of the acceptance of the doctrine of paśyantī by the Śāktas criticized by Somānanda herein may be found in ŚD 3.9 and the ŚDVṛ on the same passage, where Somānanda says as much explicitly; in ŚD 3.15cd–16ab, where Somānanda considers a potential counterargument from the Śāktas, one based on the assumption that paśyantī is the means to liberation; and in ŚD 3.30cd, where Somānanda considers another objection of his Śākta opponents, who suggests that Śiva must be identical with paśyantī insofar as he is experienced in/as the universe, an objection answered in ŚD 3.85cd–86ab and 3.86cd–88ab. Finally, the reader is asked to compare ŚD 3.10a, where Somānanda argues that speech cannot be more than an organ of action, with ŚD 2.12cd–13ab and ŚD 2.89–91, where he leveled the same argument against the grammarians.

Somānanda, then, does in fact criticize the Śāktas represented by Bhaṭṭa Pradyumna in the present chapter. This does not mean, however, that he is opposed to all those who worship the goddess as the supreme deity. In fact, Somānanda’s position is rather this, that to praise śakti as supreme is proper, because Śiva and his powers are identical. Thus, when worshiping the goddess, one honors Śiva by implication, the two being identical in every way. As the identity of the power and the possessor of it is central to his view of the nature of reality, Somānanda has no place criticizing those who worship Śiva by way of honoring his form as power (śakti). He can, however, strongly criticize the Śākta who does not conceive of the goddess in this manner, as he has indeed done when suggesting (ŚD 3.4–5ab) that the Śāktas’ system would suffer the fatal fault of reductio ad absurdum in the absence of the recognition of śakti as a name for Śiva, for example. Simply, Somānanda is not antagonistic to those worshipers of the goddess-as-śakti who understand her to be identical with Śiva. At the same time, he is highly critical of those Śāktas who truly believe that the goddess-as-śakti is supreme to the exclusion of Śiva. Those claiming the supremacy of paśyantī, the feminine divine in the form of “seeing” (i.e., the power of cognition), of course fall into the category of philosopher-theologians who have earned themselves Somānanda’s unbridled scorn. Cf. the Introduction, section 14. Note that my translation of pratīdanīm ārambhaḥ with “now turns his attention to” is idiomatic, the passage literally meaning “now commences with (his consideration of).”

3In other words, tathā ca should be understood here to mean that the Śāktas say the following in accordance with their fidelity to non-dualism.

yasyā nirupādhijyotīrūpāyāḥ śivasaṃjñayā

vyapadeśaḥ parāṃ tāṃ tvām ambāṃ nityam upāsmahe

We worship you constantly, Ambā, you who are the supreme mother, the form of limitless light, the one whom people call “Śiva.”4

3.1

Regarding this, [Somānanda] says:

3.1. atha śakteḥ parāvasthā yair bhaktyā parigīyate yuktyā prakāśito devas tataḥ śaktidaśā yataḥ

Now, those who out of devotion proclaim that the supreme condition belongs to śakti promote God under a pretense, because the śakti condition immediately follows him.

It is simply (an act of) devotion to speak of the object that one thinks of as śakti herself as the form of the supreme condition,5 because there otherwise would be no way to specify the gender (of her name, śakti),6 for it7 is not separated from Śiva,8 since there is no possessor of power other than him;9 although being defined by a distinction (of her from him), this by dint of the signification (of

4The quotation is from the Tattvagarbhastotra (TGSt) of Bhaṭṭa Pradyumna, which is now lost. My translation substantially follows that of Dyczkowski (19921: 123). On the source of the quotation, see Dyczkowski 19921: 53; Torella 1994: xiv; and Sanderson 20071: 418, fn. 629. Cf. the Introduction, section 14.

5The meaning of the present passage—śaktitvenaivābhimatasyārthasya parāvasthārūpābhidhānaṃ bhaktir eva—is complex. Utpaladeva here is careful to indicate that the object (artha) praised by the Śāktas as the supreme condition is thought by them to be the goddess in the form of śakti. It is not in fact śakti but rather the supreme Śiva who is the possessor of the power(s) in question, according to Somānanda. What this means is that Utpaladeva constructs the present passage to suggest both that the Śāktas praise a form of the supreme condition and that they wrongly consider her to be the goddess, śakti, to the exclusion of her identity with Śiva.

6Kaul glosses: “This means: ‘in the absence of the masculine gender being the unmarked one’” (sāmānyaṃ puṃlliṅgaṃ vinety arthaḥ).

7This refers to the devotion, bhakti. To worship power, śakti, involves worship of Śiva himself by implication, this because there is no distinction between the power and the possessor of the power (ŚD 3.2cd) in the Pratyabhijñā. See, supra, note 2.

8The text literally refers to the “possessor of power” (śaktimant) in the compound śaktimadabhinnā, which can refer to Śiva alone and none other.

9The argument here put forward is that one cannot conclude that reference to the feminine divine involves a distinction of her from Śiva, no more than a distinction may be made between a power and the possessor of that power, the two being identical in the Pratyabhijñā. Rather, the use of the feminine gender is merely the result of the conventions of grammar: the use of the feminine gender must be the result of a transformation from the unmarked, masculine gender of the name of the deity. In other words, worship (bhakti) of the supreme in the form of a feminine deity involves merely the semantics of the gender of the various words for the divine. It is not, Utpaladeva suggests, the result of differentiating the feminine śakti from the masculine Śiva. Moreover, if reference to the supreme form of the divine as a feminine deity necessarily involved a distinction of the goddess from Śiva, then there would be no way

her name), it10 is able to point to the one immediately preceding her, because she is dependent on him.11

Because they themselves say that the śakti condition is “a minimal swelling,”12 etc., one that immediately follows him, i.e., follows after the supreme condition, the ones who praise the supremacy of śakti promote God, i.e., Śiva, under a pretense, that is, by means of (the) genuine non-duality (of Śiva and śakti), by means of (the expression of devotion to) that [śakti condition], it being a quality he possesses, he being based in himself, independent.

There is, moreover, absolutely no reason to enter into questions regarding the feminine gender, which is the marked gender; for masculinity is the unmarked gender of both the feminine and masculine [genders], while the neuter [gender], it not being a way of speaking of the state of being empowered,13 does not merit examination when one refers to the Lord of the universe in such a(n empowered) form. Thus, the power and the possessor of it are associated with the masculine [gender] in order to express (their) non-duality.

3.2ab

3.2. tathā tadvyapadeśaś ced vyapadeśaḥ śivātmakaḥ

Thus, if you argue that a reference is made to him, the reference is related to Śiva.14

to differentiate the grammatical genders of the various Sanskrit terms in question. This is so, because a difference in gender would always necessitate a difference in the very nature of the entity in question. For example, in this view any reference to Śiva’s powers, the powers being referred to by a term (śakti) that is feminine in gender, would immediately suggest that they are utterly distinct from Śiva, whose name is masculine in gender.

10That is, the act of devotion.

11In a manner similar to Somānanda’s overlapping pairs of powers (see the Introduction, section 5), the argument here put forward suggests that śakti, power, is directly related to the agent who possesses it, namely Śiva, as the former exists in a latent form in the latter.

12Bhaṭṭa Pradyumna, we are told, refers to śakti in this way. See ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.13cd–17. Cf. the Introduction, section 14.

13Note that I understand the long ā of śaktatā to assimilate an initial short a, the so-called alpha-privitive, of the following term. In other words, I understand the compound to be composed of the following three words: śaktatā-aparyāya-rūpa. Thus, it speaks to the fact that the neuter gender is not used to refer to the state of being empowered. To understand the compound not to include the alpha-privitive would of course be to understand the compound to carry precisely the opposite meaning.

14Here, Somānanda argues that, insofar as the Śāktas refer to śakti as one “people call Śiva,” this demands that Śiva is also the referent, this on the argument that the masculine gender is primary, the feminine being a modification of it. In other words, he is appealing to a norm of grammar to argue that even the statement of the Śāktas points to the supremacy of Śiva, not the supremacy of the goddess. The reference to śakti as one called Śiva is, of course, found in what I have labeled TGSt passage #1, which was quoted by Utpaladeva in his introduction to ŚD 3.1, above.

Thus, if you maintain that the feminine gender makes reference to Paramaśiva himself,15 then that reference, according to the aforementioned rule,16 is itself actually17 a name for Śiva.

3.2cd–3

[Somānanda] says absolutely no difference exists:

na śivaḥ śaktirahito na śaktir vyatirekiṇī

3.3. śivaḥ śaktas tathā bhāvān icchayā kartum īdṛśān śaktiśaktimator bhedaḥ śaive jātu na varṇyate

Śiva does not exist apart from śakti;18 śakti is not different (from Śiva). And Śiva is empowered to create such19 entities at will. In Śaivism, no difference whatsoever between power and the one possessing the power is described.20

Even if Śiva does not exist apart from, i.e., absent of, śakti, are they one? To this, [Somānanda] says, “śakti is not different (from Śiva).”21 For instance, even in the everyday world, no difference (between Śiva and his power) exists as a result of the manifold diversity (that is the universe itself), for Śiva is empowered to create such ones, i.e., those created with difficulty, by his mere will;22 no difference of power from the one who possesses it, since it is not present, is ever

15Utpaladeva here suggests that tadvyapadeśa in ŚD 3.2a is a genitive determinative (tatpuruṣa) compound, with the pronoun tat referring to Paramaśiva.

16As Kaul notes, the aforementioned rule is the one that suggests that, according to the Sanskrit grammarians, it is the masculine gender that takes precedent, the feminine gender being a modification of it: puṃlliṅgaṃ sāmānyam iti nyāyāt. See p. 96, fn. 1 of the KSTS edition.

17This is a possible translation for kārya, “made, or done, fit right, etc.”

18As Kaul suggests, this is to say that there is no reason to assume use of the feminine gender indicates a distinction between Śiva and his power: “He (here) indicates his own final view, viz., that no mutual difference between the two [i.e., Śiva and śakti] is tenable, because of which a name in the feminine gender would have to be used (to distinguish śakti from the masculine Śiva)” (na cānayoḥ parasparaṃ bhedo yukto yena strīliṅgavyapadeśo ’py upapatsyata iti svamatena siddhāntayati). See p. 96, fn. 2 of the KSTS edition. In other words, because Śiva is, according to the Pratyabhijñā, identical to his powers, reference to śakti does not differentiate her from him simply by virtue of reference to her with a term of the feminine gender. See, supra, note 2.

19The Sanskrit, īdṛśa, literally means “endowed with such qualities.” See the commentary for Utpaladeva’s gloss: atiduṣkara, i.e., “those created with difficulty.”

20The present passage closely echoes VBh 18. Cf. ŚSū 1.17.

21Utpaladeva here exercises the commentator’s prerogative to explain in greater detail what he suggests is implied in the mūla, the source text on which he comments. Here, he wishes to account for the apparent redundancy of ŚD 3.2cd. It is not sufficient, he suggests, merely to state that Śiva is never found apart from his power, for to do so might suggest that the latter is a mere instrument of the former. He suggests, then, that the second quarter-verse (pāda) makes it clear that the two are mutually inseparable, which is to say they are identical.

22In other words, at the moment of the manifestation of the universe, there is no distinction to be made between Śiva and the powers he uses to manifest reality. The two are one and the same. If there is no distinction between Śiva and his powers in this apparently dualistic condition, then there is never under any circumstances any distinction to be made of the one from the other.

described in Śaivism, whether with respect to mutual difference or any other,23 as it is elsewhere in the philosophical systems that lack authority.

3.4–5ab

Pondering this itself, [Somānanda] says:

3.4. śakter eva svatantratvāt kartuṃ bhāvān vicitrakān sāmarthyaṃ yadi kalpyeta tan nāmānantyam eva vā 3.5. bhede hi śaktiḥ kiṃ kāryaṃ karoty uta ca śaktimān

If you conceive of śakti’s very capacity to create variegated entities as being the result of her independence, then (śakti is) a name (for Śiva); otherwise, it is simply an infinite regress. For, if they are different,24 what object could śakti make, and what about the one possessing śakti?

Regarding this,25 it is a fatal error if the instrument of action belongs to one who is unempowered.26 If she is empowered, then, she being connected to another power, śakti has to be a name for Śiva himself, who is the basis of power.27

Now, if you argue that it is to a(nother) power that the real, undivided śakti is connected,28 then we reply: it is that distinct śakti that must create the object.

23The term avāntara, “mutual difference,” refers to the type of difference whereby both A is not B and B is not A. The particle api is here used to impart the notion that all forms of difference, be it mutual difference or another, are ruled out in the examination of the relationship of power and the possessor of it.

24Following the commentary, it is clear that bhede, a locative absolute construction comprised of a single word, refers to the possibility that a difference exists between the power and the possessor of the power in question.

25This is to say that the present passage considers the fact that there is no difference between Śiva and his powers, as was mentioned in ŚD 3.3cd.

26According to Kaul, such a position would allow anything to be created from even a mere void, the cause of any entity being devoid of the capacity to create the given entity. Kaul glosses: śūnyād api sarvabhāvotpattiḥ syāt. aniṣṭāpattiḥ prasaṅgaḥ. See p. 97, fn. 3 of the KSTS edition.

27Here, Utpaladeva comments in ŚD 3.4a–c, suggesting that if the Śāktas understand śakti to be that which creates, then she must either be empowered (śakta) or not. In the case of the former, śakti would merely be a name for Śiva, i.e., for the possessor of power, and thus the Śāktas’ worship of the goddess is done merely out of devotion and not to distinguish her from Śiva (the two being anyway identical according to Śaiva theology). On the other hand, Utpaladeva suggests that it is impossible for the śakti that creates to be devoid of power, meaning it is illogical to conceive of śakti as anything other than another name for Śiva, the possessor of power. To conceive of her otherwise would demand that one consider the power to create to be devoid of agency. As Kaul suggests, it is the very fact of being empowered that is not different from Śiva’s nature, because there would be no discussion of being empowered unless there is some connection to śakti. Kaul glosses: tad eva śaktatvaṃ yat svātmani śaktyavicchedaḥ, śaktisamavāyaṃ vinā śaktatvasyaivānirvāhāt. See Kaul’s note 4, p. 97 of the KSTS edition.

28Note that I understand satyābhinnaśaktiyogas to be a single compound, while Ked.records the same as two separate words, viz.: satyā bhinnaśaktiyogas.

Otherwise, how could an unempowered [śakti] create?29 (However:) if [the latter power] is (also) empowered, infinite regress would result from conceiving of another śakti, because there would be no end (to the empowered powers).30

3.5cd–6ab

Moreover:

śaktimān eva śaktiḥ syāc chivavat karaṇārthataḥ

3.6. śakteḥ svatantrakāryatvāc chivatvaṃ na kvacid bhavet

Śakti, like Śiva, must be no one other than the possessor of power, because there has to be an instrument of action.31 Śiva-nature would not exist anywhere as a result of śakti being possessed of an independent effect of action.32

As for śakti, she, acting as a result of being associated with another power, must be none other than the possessor of power;33 this is so because an instrument of action that is the cause of creation must exist, which means that this is so because she must be an agent, as is Śivabhaṭṭāraka.34

29In other words, it is the second śakti that must create the object in question, not the first, which is not independently empowered in this view, but is only powerful insofar as it is the possessor of the second śakti. Thus, the second śakti, which must be empowered, creates the object. Yet, this second power, being like the first, itself is empowered only by being dependent on another, a third, śakti. This, in turn, must depend on a fourth, and so on ad infinitum. On the other hand, if what we have labeled the second power is instead conceived of as belonging to what we have labeled the first power, the two being identical entities distinguished only by the semantics of discussing them, then what we have labeled the first power is simply Śiva by another name. The first power is thus a perfect analog for Śiva, because its identity and function are identical to those of Śiva.

30Utpaladeva, glossing Somānanda, here wishes to suggest that there can only be two śaktis, one that accomplishes some action, and another that possesses or weilds the first. He wishes to suggest that the Śāktas pay homage to the first śakti, the possessor of the latter one, which is to say they pay homage to the possessor of power (śaktimant), i.e., to Śiva by another name.

31In other words, on the view that śakti is supreme, Śakti must be a name for Śiva, because there must be an agent who wields the powers in question, who directs them and moves them according to his/her will. In the absence of such an agent, there can be no instrument that is employed to create anything. There would only be an infinite regress of powers relying on other powers, as argued above in ŚD 3.4–5ab.

32The idea here expressed is simply this: there is no conceivable way for “power” (śakti) to create the universe in the absence of a creator, an agent who possesses the power(s) in question. This is so because the nature of Śiva, being the agent who possesses the powers and exercises his will, would exist nowhere. There would be only a chaos of powers, an infinite regress of powers depending on other powers to create the objective universe. Simply, there must be an order to the functioning of the powers, a “Śiva-nature” that shapes all reality.

33The idea here explored relates to the hypothesis that only śakti creates, without the participation of Śiva. In such an instance, śakti would herself be empowered (śaktā), lest she be impotent (see, supra, ŚD 3.4–5ab), and thus she must be connected to some additional power (śakti) that is under her control.

34Put differently, there must be some agent who wields the powers. If śakti is not considered the possessor of power, then there would be no cause for creation, no agent choosing how and when to act.

Moreover, the independent, self-reliant effect of śakti’s action would not have a basis in anything else.35 Thus, Śiva-nature would not exist anywhere at all.36 This is not appropriate for a Śaiva philosophy of those who are philosophically proximate (to our Śaiva non-dualism).37

3.6cd

muñcato ’pi nijāṃ śaktiṃ svātantrye jñānam āpatet

As for him, if he, freeing his own power(s), were independent (of śakti), his (power of) cognition would be compromised.38

If one were to accept Śivabhaṭṭāraka as freeing, i.e., as being separated from, (his own) power(s) . . . in reality, there being independence . . . [the cognition] acquires . . . the nonexistence of the state of being established as the object of cognition, because it does not cause the object of cognition to appear, and that . . .

Alternatively, if his own power were relinquished . . . for, that independence . . . cognition would exist in that very manner . . . due to the power being separated from the one possessing it, cognition would exist only with respect to a single object; [Somānanda] in this way refers to the possessor of power as something that arises from the cognition of that single object, the essence of the everyday world, empowered, one that is similar to that [cognition].39

35Utpaladeva here wishes to suggest, following Somānanda, that the production of an effect of action (kārya) by a power (śakti) in the absence of a possessor of the power in question (śaktimant) implies that the effect would be independent. It would not be linked to the agency and therefore the volition of the possessor of the power who has reasons for creating what he does. As a result, there would be no particular order to the universe, which would merely be a vortex of powers producing results. An effect that is not independent, then, is one that is not merely “self-reliant” (svanibandhana), but is linked to the intelligent design, as it were, of the agent who created it.

36That is, Śiva-nature would not exist anywhere, because the effect of the action would be entirely independent, totally separated from the volition of the possessor of power, the agent, who the Śāktas are here imagined not to accept.

37Utpaladeva would like again to suggest that the differences between the two schools must simply involve questions of semantics. The Śāktas cannot truly conceive of śakti as existing in the total absence of Śiva, for to do so, as we have seen, would lead to infinite regress (ŚD 3.4), and moreover the goddess as śakti would essentially perform all the functions of Śiva-the-possessor-of-power. In the absence of a possessor of power, the effect of action would not be linked to any volition of the its creator. It would be independent. The universe, as a result, would be chaotic. Therefore, the Śāktas must accept that their śakti, the goddess as power, must be a possessor of power, an agent. The difference, in short, is either a matter of nomenclature, not of true philosophical differences, or the Śāktas espouse an illogical, unfounded view of the existence of an endless chain of pure power.

38In other words, if one considered Śiva to be autonomous on the basis of his being separated, albeit willfully, from his own power, the following would obtain. Note that the possibility of śakti existing in the absence of Śiva was considered in ŚD 3.5cd–6ab; the present passage considers the possibility of the existence of Śiva without his powers. Note that the commentary to the present passage survives only in fragments.

39The pronoun (tat) in tatsamāna refers to the aforementioned “cognition” (pratīti).