somananda e-book

Moreover, the one who is made up of consciousness134 has as his nature the universe, because entities exist insofar as they are nothing but pure consciousness, just as reflections are real (insofar as they appear) in a mirror.135 All of this, moreover, is illuminated with skill in my Īśvarapratyabhijñāṭīkā.136

Since he is Śiva, that is, the one who is said to have five types of activities, his activities being of five kinds, viz., creation, maintenance, dissolution, favor and concealment,137 he is engaged in conduct that is his own, that is, he is bent upon that (activity) the form of which is expansion in the form of the tattvas, etc.138 So, what need is there to search for motives, compassion and so on? In other words, one ought not to question why he proceeds in this way, for there is simply no good reason to question his motives.

Thus, [Somānanda] has established that the realm of (Śiva’s) eagerness is truly not impure.139

1.13cd–17

Now, to clarify by way of example, [Somānanda] says:

gacchato nistaraṅgasya jalasyātitaraṅgitām

1.14.ārambhe dṛṣṭim āpātya tad aunmukhyaṃ hi gamyate vrajato muṣṭitāṃ pāṇeḥ pūrvaḥ kampas tathekṣyate

1.15.bodhasya svātmaniṣṭhasya racanāṃ prati nirvṛtiḥ tadāsthāpravikāso yas tad aunmukhyaṃ pracakṣate

1.16.kiñciducchūnatā saiva mahadbhiḥ kaiścid ucyate tasyecchā kāryatāṃ yātā yayā secchaḥ sa jāyate

1.17.aunmukhyasya ya ābhogaḥ sthūlaḥ secchā vyavasthitā na caunmukhyaprasaṅgena śivaḥ sthūlatvabhāk kvacit

134This is, of course, a reference to Śiva.

135The analogy in question concerns that of a mirror and the entities appearing in it. The entities appearing in the mirror are real and multiple, but their appearance in no way diminishes the singular nature of the mirror itself. In the same manner, the universe is real, according to the Pratyabhijñā, insofar as it is a reflection of Śiva’s very form, which is consciousness, but the appearance of the universe does not diminish Śiva’s unity, the former existing only in the form of the latter. See also ĪPVṛ ad ĪPK 2.4.19, where reference is made to the same analogy.

136The ĪPṬ is of course lost, excepting in fragments that have been edited and published by Torella in recent years (for which see Torella 1998, 20071, 20072, 20073, and 20074.) See instead, e.g., ĪPK 1.5.10 and Utpaladeva’s Vṛtti on the same.

137In the present passage, Utpaladeva suggests that pañcaprakārakṛtyokti is an exocentric (bahuvrīhi) compound meaning that pañcaprakārakṛtyoktiśivatvāt could be literally translated “because there is Śiva-nature for the one whose activities are said to be of five types.”

138The word “etcetera” (ādi) in tattvādirūpaprasaraṇarūpa refers to the manifestation of different agents, worlds (bhuvanas), and so on. See ŚD 1.29cd–33 and ŚD 1.34. See also ŚD 1.39–41ab.

139Since everything is Śiva himself, nothing is impure, and therefore Śiva does not turn his attention toward any impure entity. He only turns his attention to that which interests him. Moreover, given his dynamic nature, that to which Śiva turns his attention is in reality Śiva himself in the form of consciousness.

This same eagerness is described as a minimal swelling by Bhaṭṭa Pradyumna in the Tattvagarbha(stotra),148 and (it is described) with words such as “a swell” and “a wave” by others still.

Of it, i.e., of eagerness, the result is will. Indeed, the extension of it—its latter part, which is capable of producing the effects beginning with (the power of) cognition,149 which is expanded, solid and hence, because the budding of the (first) stage of creation becomes solid, is coarse—is will (fully) manifested.150

Śiva, moreover, unlike a seed,151 does not share in being coarse as a result of his connection with eagerness, called a “swelling,” etc.;152 in reality, the one whose nature is consciousness153 is never coarse, be it when the will, etc., do not exist in manifestation,154 or on any other occasion, because entities (in the world), conceived of as reflections, do not add anything to the nature of

148The TGSt is now lost. The verse to which Utpaladeva here refers the reader is the one I have labeled TGSt passage #2. See section 14 of the Introduction under the subsection entitled “Known and Heretofore Unidentified Passages of the Tattvagarbhastotra.” See also note 209 of the Introduction, where I consider the possibility that Somānanda obliquely mocks Bhaṭṭa Pradyumna in the present passage.

149The term ādi here refers to the power following in the sequence after the power of cognition, i.e., the power of action.

150In other words, the power of will (icchā) is the product of eagerness (aunmukhya); it, in turn, produces the power of cognition (jñāna), etc.

151This is a typical example of the satkārya theory of causal relation, the doctrine that the effect is inherent in the cause. A seed, in generating a plant, progressively grows to become a sprout, a stem, etc. These later developments exist in potential form in the seed, but the seed ceases to exist as a seed once the process of manifesting the plant commences. Thus, Utpaladeva here suggests that the Pratyabhijñā adheres to a satkārya theory insofar as it understands the result of action to be inherent in the cause—what Śiva sees is inherent prior to appearing in his consciousness—but he suggests that the Pratyabhijñā position is different from the materialist satkārya doctrine insofar as the Pratyabhijñā suggests that the result of the action in no way transforms the cause.

152As Gnoli mentions, the term ucchūnatā refers to the development of a seed into a sprout (a typical example of the satkāryavāda, about which see note 151, above). Somānanda can therefore be read implicitly to compare Śiva’s act of creation to that of a seed becoming a plant, as Utpaladeva here makes the analogy explicit. See Gnoli 1957: 20.

153Although cidātman literally means “whose nature is consciousness,” Utpaladeva uses this term here and elsewhere to refer to Śiva. See, for example, ĪPK 1.5.7 and the Vṛtti thereon.

154The term icchādyasadbhāve literally means “if/when there is no real existence of will and the rest.” It refers to the condition in which will (icchā) and Śiva’s other powers are in a premanifested condition. This occurs in the parā condition, in which the universe, which is coarse in form, is not manifested. Kaul glosses the term with nirākāṅkṣatādaśāyām, which echoes the language Utpaladeva has used to describe the nature of Śiva’s consciousness: nirvṛtā vedyanirākāṅkṣā pūrṇā cid yasya saḥ [Śivaḥ]. (See Utpaladeva’s commentary on ŚD 1.2.) One should therefore take the passage in question to refer to the unmanifested state of the powers as opposed to their utter nonexistence.

consciousness,155 nor is the manifestation of his nature an error. All of this is stated in my Ṭīkā.156

1.18

Not even a conventional duality exists there,157 because there is no cessation to the awareness that things are thus. For this reason, [Somānanda] says:

1.18. goḥ stanāt pātataḥ kṣīre vikāras tata eva hi na ca na kṣīram ity eṣa vyapadeśo ’sti tatkṣaṇam

Indeed, a change occurs in milk just after it falls from the cow’s udder, yet it is not said not to be milk at that instant.158

A change occurs in milk just after, that is, immediately after, it falls from the cow’s udder. Yet it is not the case that, at that instant, one is not aware that it is milk. Inasmuch as awareness is one, there is always oneness.159

155Note that I read cidātman twice, with both what precedes and what follows it (dehalīdīpavat), and I understand the term to be an exocentric (bahuvrīhi) compound (referring to Śiva) when read with what precedes it, and a determinative (tatpuruṣa) compound when read with what follows it. The point of this passage is to suggest that Śiva is not made coarse because of the cognitive contact he has with the world. The reason for this is that the world he creates is merely a reflection of his consciousness, and as such it does not add anything to him. The world does not exist in some form that is different from Śiva, but rather it exists in the form of Śiva’s consciousness, reflecting on itself. For this reason, there is nothing in the world to “taint” Śiva’s purity.

156Utpaladeva here refers to his Īśvarapratyabhijñāṭīkā (ĪPṬ), also called the Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛti. The text, as already noted (see ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.11cd–13ab and my notes thereon; cf. note 17 of the Introduction), is now lost, excepting in fragments. See instead, e.g., ĪPK 2.4.18–19 and in particular the Vṛtti on 2.4.19, where Utpaladeva invokes the metaphor of the mirror: ekātmano vibhedaś ca kriyā kālakramānugā / tathā syāt kartṛtaivaivaṃ tathāpariṇamattayā. na ca yuktaṃ jaḍasyaivaṃ bhedābhedavirodhataḥ / ābhāsabhedād ekatra cidātmani tu yujyate. “The differentiation of a unitary entity is action, occurring in temporal succession. In this way we necessarily return to our thesis of an agent subject, as being that which becomes modified in the various forms. But this is not possible for an insentient reality, because differentiation would conflict with unity, given the manifold forms of manifestation. On the contrary, it is possible in the case of a conscious unitary reality.” (Translation Torella’s. See Torella 1994: 185–186.) The Vṛtti on ĪPK 2.4.19 reads: jaḍasyābhinnātmano bhedenāvasthiter virodhād ayuktam, svacche cidātmany ekasminn evam anekapratibimbadhāraṇenāvirodhād yujyate. “This is not possible for an insentient reality, because its nature which is single would conflict with its appearing in differentiated forms. On the contrary, it is possible for an absolutely limpid [svaccha], unitary, conscious reality, because there is no conflict here between its unity and its capacity to receive manifold reflections.” (Translation Torella’s. See Torella 1994: 186.)

157The term in question, evamādi, here translated simply with “there,” is an exocentric (bahuvrīhi) compound referring to Śiva and literally meaning “in one whose beginning is thus.” That is, it refers to the universe that is manifested in the form of consciousness, the existence of which is generated with the first movement of Śiva’s will, with aunmukhya.

158Literally, the Sanskrit says, “yet it is not called ‘not milk’ at that instant.” The moment in question is the one immediately following the fall of the milk from the cow’s udder.

159The issue at hand is the unity of Śiva, which persists even when his consciousness reflects the multiple, changing universe. Utpaladeva here suggests that proper awareness allows one continuously

1.19–20ab

In this way, [Somānanda] has said that there is an eagerness of will;160 and now, to prove that, he says:

1.19.yata icchati taj jñātuṃ kartuṃ vā secchayā kriyā tasyāḥ pūrvāparau bhāgau kalpanīyau purā hi yā

1.20.tatkarmanirvṛtiprāptir aunmukhyaṃ tad vikāsitā

Since he desires to know or to do something, the activity is by means of will.161 Two parts of it, an earlier one and a later one, must be distinguished. Indeed, the earlier one is eagerness, the obtainment of delight in the object in question. It is expanded.162

Since it is said that the Lord desires either to know or to act, [Somānanda] expresses the verbal form of it as “activity by means of will,” that is, activity in the form of will.163

Two parts of it, i.e., of will, an earlier one and a later one, must be distinguished, because he refers to will as an action, and an action must be divided into earlier and later parts.164 Will, etc., share the same nature to an even greater

to recognize Śiva’s oneness, for it continues to appear as long as one is aware of it. Just as milk begins to change the very moment it leaves the cow, yet, despite this transformation, one nevertheless sees it as milk for some time after that moment, so too one can recognize Śiva’s unity, even while the transformations of the universe, appearing as reflections of his consciousness, are under way. As long as one is aware of this unity, it will appear, just as milk naturally appears to be milk for some time, despite the immediate and continuous changes in its makeup. Of particular note is the fact that the example Somānanda here employs, that of the transformation of milk, is a paradigmatic example of the satkārya theory of causation, the theory of the real preexistence of an effect in its cause. Here, Somānanda emphasizes not the causal relation but the continuity of the nature of the entity that is produced, by analogy suggesting that the apparent transformations of the contents of consciousness are epiphenomenal to their existence qua being consciousness.

160Somānanda has suggested that eagerness (aunmukhya) produces will (icchā), and the latter is the coarse form of the former. See ŚD 1.17ab: aunmukhyasya ya ābhogaḥ sthūlaḥ secchā vyavasthitā.

161Since Śiva desires to know or act, he engages the act of desiring in doing so. For this reason the

power of will (icchā) leads to the action (kriyā) in question.

162ŚD 1.19–20ab is quoted in PTV ad PT 5–9ab (p. 63 of Singh’s edition).

163In other words, since it is said that Śiva wishes to know or act, to do either implies a preceding action of desire.

164This is an axiom of the Grammarians, for which, see Iyer [1969] 1992: 330–335. Gnoli suggests the same: “Action, according to the grammarians, is formed by a series of distinct moments ordered towards a single end.” (See Gnoli 1957: 20.) Kaul does so, as well, quoting Bhartṛhari’s famous definition of action found in VP 3.8.4, which reads as follows: guṇabhūtair avayavaiḥ samūhaḥ kramajanmanām / buddhyā prakalpitābhedaḥ kriyeti vyapadiśyate. (See Kaul’s note 1, p. 17 of the KSTS edition.) It is not at all clear that Somānanda knew Bhartṛhari’s definition of action, however, about which see my Introduction, notes 60 and 180. Finally, Utpaladeva also refers to action as having earlier and later parts, for which see ĪPVṛ ad ĪPK 1.2.9.

degree in the śakti condition,165 and it is therefore taught that there is ultimately only one power: “there is only one empowered one.”166

In speaking about their arising, however,167 (Somānanda says that) eagerness is that which exists in the earlier part of the will, i.e., the obtainment that is the delight in the object in question.168 To be precise, eagerness is delight limited by the object; the power of bliss is unlimited, pure delight.169

He (further) says that it, i.e., eagerness, is expanded, i.e., is the first budding of consciousness.170

1.20cd–21

anantaraṃ hi tatkāryajñānadarśanaśaktitā

1.21. jñānaśaktis tadarthaṃ hi yo ’sau sthūlaḥ samudyamaḥ sā kriyāśaktir uditā tataḥ sarvaṃ jagat sthitam

Following that is the power of cognition, the fact of having the power to perceive the cognition of the object in question. Following that171 is

165Utpaladeva has just suggested that the power of will implies an action insofar as wishing or willing is itself an action. More generally, each power implies the presence of the others, even when they appear in the sequence of manifestation. Here, Utpaladeva suggests that the shared nature (anyonyātmatā) of the powers is stronger, as it were, at the level of the śaktitattva, the second of thirty-six tattvas, which exists in the perfectly non-dual state of the parā condition, than it is at the level of the lower tattvas. If the powers of action and will intermingle in the parāparā and aparā conditions, he argues, so much more is it so in the parā condition. Utpaladeva apparently raises this issue here to suggest that the sequence that appears to exist is not ultimately real, that ultimately will is utterly undivided, as all the powers are ultimately one, as well (about which see below).

166In other words, by the time one reaches the level of the śivatattva, only one power remains. The overlapping pairs of powers are utterly collapsed at the level of Śiva, where they exist in posse in the one whose nature is delight, the unrestrained form of nirvṛti. Note that Somānanda also made a similar point in ŚD 1.3–4, where he described Śiva’s powers as a perfect unity. This quotation remains untraced.

167The preceding passage discussed the nature of the powers in the parā condition. Here, Utpaladeva addresses the nature of the powers as they are manifested. As Utpaladeva mentioned in his avataraṇikā to ŚD 1.7cd–8, Somānanda discusses the powers in the order in which they are manifested, and aunmukhya is the first in the series.

168Utpaladeva indicates in the commentary that tatkarmanirvṛtiprāpti should be understood to be a locative determinative (tatpuruṣa) compound composed of two parts, each of which (tat-karma and nirvṛti-prāpti) should be understood to be descriptive (karmadhāraya) compounds.

169In the premanifested state, Śiva’s delight (nirvṛti) is indistinct. It is not directed toward anything in particular. When Śiva begins to manifest phenomena in his consciousness, his power of bliss is directed toward something more particular. This is the karmāvacchinnā nirvṛti, delight defined by the object in question. It exists insofar as an unlimited delight exists prior to it, from which the qualified one is born. See also Utpaladeva’s commentary on ŚD 1.22, as well as my Introduction, section 5, for a discussion of the types of “delight” (nirvṛti) and their inclusion in Somānanda’s theory of the overlapping pairs of powers.

170The idea expressed here is paradoxical. Though Śiva manifests entities by limiting his consciousness, by concentrating his attention on distinct entities, in doing so he “expands” his consciousness by directing it toward new entities. Compare the language used here, cidāsthāpravikāsa, with that of ŚD 1.15cd: tadāsthāpravikāso yas tad aunmukhyaṃ pracakṣate.

171Utpaladeva glosses tadartham, more commonly meaning “therefore, on that account, with that object, for that end,” with anantaram. I follow his gloss.

a coarse arising called the power of action. From that the entire world is established.

After that is the cognition of the object, i.e., of the universe, which is Śiva’s172 very existence in the form of the power of illumination; unbeknown to any (mundane) perceiver, it appears as an object in the mind, as it were, since it is the power of cognition.173

After that is the power of action, an arising, directly related to will, that results in the birth of the appearance of the coarse objects that can be known by any agent of cognition.174

The end (of manifestation) comes from that alone, because the worldly objects are obtained from it. This he says with the phrase, “from that the entire world is established.”

1.22

The fact of being in the form of power exists in this way not only when the world is created, but it exists in this way in the moment when each and every pot is produced, as well. Thus, [Somānanda] says:

1.22. evaṃ sarvasamutpattikāle śaktitrayātmatā

na nivṛttā na caunmukhyaṃ nivṛttaṃ nāpi nirvṛtiḥ

Similarly,175 the threefold power does not cease in the moment anything is created, nor does eagerness cease to exist, nor does delight.

Will, cognition, and action truly exist in the moment pots, etc., are produced. The same is true for eagerness, which is the first part of will in the form of a particular delight that is limited by an object;176 nor does the other delight,177 in the form of unlimited bliss, cease to exist: this is because, if it were absent, the

172Here I take cidātman, literally “the nature of consciousness,” to be an exocentric (bahuvrīhi) compound referring to the one who possesses the nature in question. In other words, I take the compound to refer to Śiva.

173In other words, at this stage, only Śiva is aware of the object of cognition, which is, as it were, mental in form and thus not cognizable by other agents in the world. One should note that Somānanda does not explain the matter in this way, as he nowhere refers to these two stages of creation, one in which the world is imperceptible to agents in the world, and a second when it is. See the Introduction, section 6, esp. note 76.

174This stage contrasts with the previous, which, as Utpaladeva has explained, involves the appearance of an object that cannot be known by any mundane perceiver (sarvapratipattṛ¯ṇām avedyam). See above.

175This is to say, in the same manner as described in ŚD 1.19–21.

176The language here used (karmāvacchinnaviśiṣṭanirvṛtirūpa) reflects that of Utpaladeva’s commentary on ŚD 1.19–20ab: icchāyāḥ purobhāge yā tasmin karmaṇi tatkarmaniṣṭhā nirvṛtiprāptiḥ, tad aunmukhyam, karmāvacchinnā nirvṛtir aunmukhyam. When Śiva desires to know or to act, he focuses his will on a particular entity. The delight (nirvṛti) that is the nature of his consciousness is thereby

limited, focused.

177See the commentary on ŚD 1.19–20 for an explanation of the two types of nirvṛti.

delight of specification would not exist, just as the knowledge of a particular pot and so on would not exist if (the general) knowledge (“pot”) did not exist.178 It is for this reason that he used the word “obtainment” (ŚD 1.20a) earlier in saying that delight acquires particular forms.179

Yet, the word “delight” (also) indicates “the power of complete consciousness” to refer to the five powers.180

1.23

No object would arise if even one power were absent. Thus, [Somānanda] says:

1.23. yad ekataraniryāṇe kāryaṃ jātu na jāyate tasmāt sarvapadārthānāṃ sāmarasyam avasthitam

Because no object whatsoever is generated in the absence of one of the two,181 it follows that the state of unity exists for every object.

Since [Somānanda] says that no object would exist at any time in the absence of, that is, upon the loss of, one of the two, i.e., one of the powers, it follows that the śivatattva, which is made up of all the tattvas, is employed in the moment any object is produced. Therefore, (for objects,) there is never an absence of full contact with Śiva’s form.182

“State of unity” means that the flavor of the contact with the Supreme Lord is absolutely unbroken even when each and every entity is created, as it is at the very beginning of the great creation.183 That means that even a potter who

178In other words, the general form must exist in order for the specific form to exist. This is analogous to the manner by which language denotes meaning, according to Bhartṛhari: words denote the class (jāti) of entity in question, as well as the particular entity. For example, by uttering the word “pot,” the hearer understands the idea of a pot, the “pot-ness” (ghaṭatva) of the pot. Only with this does he understand the particular pot in question, perhaps the one to which the speaker draws his attention by uttering the word “pot.” Similarly, the general form of “delight” must exist when the specific form is manifested. Without it, the specific form could not exist.

179As there are two type of nirvṛti, a general and unlimited one and a particular and delimited one, Somānanda can speak of the latter as delight (nirvṛti) that is acquired by association with a particular object. The general form of delight, however, is unlimited, and it exists prior to the specific one, as just explained here. See also Utpaladeva’s commentary on ŚD 1.19–20ab.

180This statement is meant to contrast with the immediately preceding one. First, Utpaladeva mentions that delight takes particular forms, becomes delimited by particular objects. Here, he suggests that the word nirvṛti in ŚD 1.22d refers to the power of complete consciousness, which may be taken to refer to all of the powers.

181That is, in the absence of either eagerness (aunmukhya) or delight (nivṛti). Note that Gnoli takes this to refer to the three powers. See Gnoli 1957: 20. This reading is supported to a certain extent by Utpaladeva, who glosses “one of the two” (ekatara) with “one of the powers” (śaktibheda), though he also refers specifically to the suffix tara as referring to aunmukhya and nivṛti. (See the commentary, following.) Somānanda may mention only the two because he treats the first three powers in ŚD 1.22.

182Utpaladeva uses similar language in his commentary on ŚD 1.5–6ab: jñānajñeyānābilajñātṛsvarūpasaṃsparśa.

183This refers to the moment Śiva begins to create the universe.

makes a pot is Śiva endowed with all his powers, but out of ignorance of this one thinks that the potter makes the pot.

The use of the suffix “of the two” in “of one of the two” refers to the pair, eagerness and delight.184

1.24–25

All of the powers exist not only in the moment when pots and so on are produced but also in the moment when one apprehends them.185 Thus, [Somānanda] says:

1.24.ghaṭādigrahakāle ’pi ghaṭaṃ jānāti sā kriyā jānāti jñānam atraiva niricchor vedanakṣatiḥ

1.25.aunmukhyābhāvatas tasya nivṛttir nirvṛtiṃ vinā dveṣye pravartate naiva na ca vetti vinā citam

Even in the moment one apprehends, e.g., a pot, the cognition of the pot is an action.186 Cognition exists here, as well, in the form “he cognizes.”187 There can be no perception for someone who has no will.188 Were eagerness not to exist, that189 would desist. In the absence of delight, one never engages in that which is reviled,190 nor does one perceive in the absence of consciousness.191

In the moment one cognizes pots, etc., the cognition of the pot, i.e., the appearance of knower and object of knowledge in the form of a pot (on the one hand,) and (an agent,) Devadatta, (on the other,) which are distinguished by the

184Here, Utpaladeva explains the reason for Somānanda’s use of the comparative suffix -tara in the expression ekataraniryāṇa, here used in lieu of the superlative suffix -tama. The suffix is normally used to refer to a choice between one of two entities, not one of many entities. Now, insofar as eagerness and delight are the last of the powers mentioned in ŚD 1.22, it makes sense grammatically, by standard rules of anaphora, to understand the present passage to refer to them. Theologically, however, one would expect Somānanda to suggest that no object could be generated in the absence of any of the powers, including the triad of powers, will, cognition, and action. The logic of the present passage, if it is anything more than an explanation for Somānanda’s inelegant (or, perhaps, imprecise) expression, might be to suggest that nirvṛti refers to the unlimited form of “delight,” while aunmukhya, “eagerness,” being the first movement toward manifestation, stands as a shorthand for all the remaining powers.

185In other words, Utpaladeva suggests, all the powers exist not only when Śiva creates the universe, but also when individual agents within the universe perceive it and act within it.

186Literally, the passage says that “it is an action that cognizes the pot.” That is to say that the power of action (kriyāśakti) exists at that time, because cognition is an action.

187That is, the particular action in question is a cognitive act, as is indicated by the form of the verb, which indicates that one actively cognizes some object, the verb being an active, transitive verb in the present tense. Therefore, cognition involves both the power of action (kriyā) and the power of cognition (jñāna).

188The power of will (icchā) therefore must be present in cognition.

189The referent of the pronoun is ambiguous; it refers either to the agent or the perception. See Utpaladeva’s commentary, below.

190That which is reviled (dveṣya) is the everyday world of transmigration (saṃsāra). This is a manner of speaking about the everyday world. It is, according to Gnoli, “what one wants to abandon (heya), the

limited knowledge, the saṃsāra, etc.” (See Gnoli 1957: 21.)

191ŚD 1.24–25 is quoted in PTV ad PT 5–9ab (p. 62 of Singh’s edition).

variegation that is caused by the noncognition of the non-duality of consciousness, that [cognition of the pot],192 being a sequential, new form, is an action called cognition, which becomes divided into earlier and later parts.193 It does not arise only in the moment one proceeds to say “I know.”194

Since it has the form “he cognizes,” this makes it clear that the cognition consists of an action here as well.

Perception would not arise for someone who has no will, i.e., for one who is devoid of intentions, because he would not be guided by the mind.195 Will is nothing but cognition imbued with one’s intentions. Moreover, the first part of that act of willing is eagerness,196 which is delight in a particular act.197 Therefore, were eagerness not to exist, that, i.e., either the cognitive agent or the perception, would desist, because one does not engage in that which is reviled in the absence of delight in the act, in the form of eagerness.

192The relative pronoun, yat, on line 222 of the present edition of the first chapter of the ŚDVṛ (p. 19, line 15 of the KSTS edition) appears by epanalepsis.

193The language here, yat kramikam apūrvaṃ rūpaṃ sā jñānalakṣaṇā kriyā pūrvāparībhūtāvayavā, echoes that of Utpaladeva’s commentary on ŚD 1.12–13ab (na tv apūrvasya kasyacit prathā) and ŚD 1.19–20ab: pūrvāparau bhāgau kalpanīyau pūrvāparībhūtāvayavatvāt kriyāyā icchāyāḥ kriyātvābhidhānena. (See also an earlier portion of the same passage of the commentary: tad ākhyātapadam icchayā icchālakṣaṇāṃ kriyām āha). Regarding the former passage, Utpaladeva suggested in his commentary on ŚD 1.11cd–13ab that Śiva does not manifest any unprecedented (apūrva) entity. Here, however, because the everyman, Devadatta, is the agent in question, previously unknown entities can be perceived. (Cf. ĪPVṛ ad ĪPK 2.3.1–2.) Regarding the latter passage, we are here told that action is made up of a sequence of earlier and later stages. However, Somānanda has mentioned here an action characterized by cognition, as opposed to the earlier action characterized by will. The action characterized by will, mentioned earlier, refers to Śiva’s act of wishing to know or act. Here, the action is characterized by cognition in that the act results in the agent knowing something previously unknown. The first combination, action with will, relates to Śiva’s creative capacity; the second combination, that of action with cognition, relates to Śiva’s reflective capacity.

194In other words, the cognition, being an action, exists in (two) parts, or stages, this by the rule that an action must involve a series of events directed toward a single end (about which see, note 164, above, in the present chapter of the translation). The first part is the cognition itself, the second the moment in which one becomes fully aware of the cognition. This latter stage, in which one becomes fully aware of what the cognition reveals, is referred to in ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.5–6ab as the fruit or result of the cognition. Cf. ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.11cd–13ab. It is also possible that the present passage refers to the notion that there is more to cognition that the acquisition of a piece of knowledge, but rather that all cognitions involve the very process of manifestation that generates an apparent division between agent and object of cognition, which occurs prior to and is (obviously) a prerequisite for mundane cognitions.

195Literally, manasānadhiṣṭhānāt means “because of want of superintendence by the mind.” Utpaladeva here refers to the process of cognition at the mundane level of the individual agent, whose faculties of sense (jñānendriyas) must be directed by the mind (manas), as per the standard system of the dualist Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika schools.

196It is possible, if unlikely, that icchākriyāpūrvabhāga is declined in the locative, indicating the locus of eagerness (aunmukhya).

197For the relationship of nirvṛti to the act of knowing, see ŚD 1.20ab (tatkarmanirvṛtiprāpti) and Utpaladeva’s commentary thereon. In the same passage, Somānanda has suggested that Śiva’s will implies an action: desiring. It is in this sense that will is here said to be an action. Tatkarmanirvṛti here refers to the delight (nirvṛti) that is limited by the object in question (karmāvacchinnā nirvṛtiḥ). See Utpaladeva’s commentary on ŚD 1.22 for a description of unlimitless bliss (ānandaśakti) and the aforementioned delight associated with an action, i.e., aunmukhya.