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Does paśyantī exist internally within the body, or is she established externally everywhere? Internally, she is not all-pervasive; if externally, of what use is madhyamā, etc.?

Does paśyantī exist internally within the body, i.e., at the level of egoity,211 or is she also established externally and therefore everywhere?

If the former is proper, she is limited; if the latter, what is the use of distinguishing her from speech in the form of madhyamā and vaikharī, given that she pervades the madhyamā level, as well as that [level] which is made up of the external objects of knowledge?212

2.42cd

prasaren nādabindvādisāpekṣā ced anīśvarī

If you argue that she proceeds with the assistance of nāda, bindu, etc.,213

(we reply:) she is not autonomous.

If you argue that paśyantī, operating with the assistance of bindu and nāda in the form of the out-going and in-going breaths, proceeds with creation and dissolution (of the universe), then we reply: even so, she would be neither allpervasive nor even non-dual. This means that she is not autonomous.

211The expression here used (ahantābhumi) makes use of a technical term, ahantā, which in the Pratyabhijñā is contrasted with idantā. Once multiplicity begins to become apparent in the world, one begins to distinguish oneself from other entities. “I-ness” (ahantā) refers to that which one considers to be oneself, “that-ness” (idantā) to that which one considers external. Although Somānanda does not make regular use of these terms, Utpaladeva does, as does his grand-disciple, Abhinavagupta. See, e.g., ĪPVṛ ad ĪPK 4.3, ĪPK 3.1.8, and ĪPK (and ĪPVṛ ad) 3.1.5. Cf., also, ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.21cd–22ab (and note 108), where Utpaladeva makes use of the term idantā.

212Idantāvedyamayi here refers to vaikharī, which extends all the way to the point of appearing as distinct objects in the world. See ŚD 2.7–8ab.

213The word “etcetera” (ādi) possibly refers to sound (dhvani). It is likely that Somānanda here is referring to a positively tantric interpretation of the VP: Bhartṛhari does not explicitly make this correlation between nāda and bindu on the one hand and the two breaths on the other, nor does he use these terms to explain the manifestation of sound. (George Cardona, personal communication, May 2004.) Bhartṛhari does suggest, however, that the manifestation of speech takes place because it is manifested by gross sound (nāda). See VP 1.100: “Just as a connection is accordingly accomplished between the perceiver and the thing perceived, it is exactly the same for sphoṭa and nāda, although they are that which manifests and that which is manifested” (grahaṇagrāhyayoḥ siddhā yogyatā niyatā yathā / vyaṅgyavyañjakabhāve ’pi tathaiva sphoṭanādayoḥ). Note that the connection is not permanent, the implication being that there is a specific restriction (niyati) between eye and color, etc., and so also between sphoṭa and nāda. See also VP 1.149–150: “Since coarse sound [nāda] is created sequentially, that nonsequential [speech] that is neither prior nor posterior is created as if it has parts, in a sequential form. Just as a reflection that appears elsewhere seems to move because of the activity of the water (in which it is reflected), so that is the condition of nāda and sphoṭa”

(nādasya kramajātatvān na pūrvo na paraś ca saḥ / akramaḥ kramarūpeṇa bhedavān iva jāyate. pratibimbaṃ yathānyatra sthitaṃ toyakriyāvaśāt / tatpravṛttim ivānveti sa dharmaḥ sphoṭanādayoḥ). Bhartṛhari mentions the term bindu only once in the Vākyapadīya (VP 2.158cd): bindau ca samudāye ca vācakaḥ salilādiṣu. For the tantric use of the terms, nāda and bindu, see Padoux 19901: 86–124. Cf. Kavirāja 1945–1946.

2.43–44ab

2.43.pratidehaṃ pṛthak kiṃ sā sarvatraikyena vā sthitā nānātvaṃ tatpṛthaktvena tadaikyāt samaśabdatā

2.44.śarīraiḥ pravibhāgaś cet tāny asatyāni te sthitiḥ

Is she established separately in each body, or everywhere as one? She would be multiple as a result of being established separately; there would be unity of speech as a result of her being unitary. If you argue that the bodies divide her, (we reply:) your view214 is that they are unreal.

Moreover, she, i.e., paśyantī, must exist separately in each body or as one and the same in every body.

If she exists separately, there would be many paśyantīs, and therefore there would be no non-duality.

When she is unitary, (then,) because every living being would be connected to the same paśyantī, a particular utterance, arising in the places of articulation that were struck by the breaths directed by the efforts of just one speaker,215 would be uttered by absolutely everyone, even by those who are sitting silently. Otherwise, she would not be unitary, because, as a result of somewhere failing to produce the same effect, her nature would be divided.216

Now, you might argue that, although she is unitary, she, like a crystal, is divided by the bodies.217

We reply: not so. Your view stipulates that they218 are unreal,219 and, to put it plainly, something unreal, i.e., something that has no form,220 cannot be of service anywhere.

214Kaul glosses the term in question, sthiti, with “the restriction of your śāstra” (śāstraniyama).

215My translation of ekatrāpi vaktari tatpūrvaka is idiomatic. Literally, this means “(directed by the efforts) dependent on him, although in a single mouth.” The compound X-pūrva(ka) is an exocentric (bahuvrīhi) compound that can come to mean “dependent on X”; in other words, it can be synonymous with X-apekṣā. Here it is used adjectivally in a descriptive (karmadhāraya) compound, describing the efforts in question. They are (articulatory) efforts “dependent on him” that, “although located in a single mouth,” are uttered by all. The translation here is meant to capture this meaning in idiomatic English.

216If paśyantī were unitary, then anything uttered by one person would be uttered by everyone. If paśyantī produced sound in one place but not another, then as a result of producing different phenomena in different places, paśyantī would be divided as well. I have emended the text here, replacing the masculine, genitive pronoun, tasya, with a feminine, genitive pronoun (tasyāḥ) that refers to paśyantī. Otherwise, the sentence would suggest that the particular sound, and not paśyantī, would not be unitary as a result of not universally producing a single effect.

217The argument here considered suggests that, just as the various objects that are placed near a crystal change or “divide” the appearance of the same, so too does paśyantī appear differently when different bodies come into close proximity with her. Kaul explains, “The meaning is: just as a crystal [sphaṭikaratna], although unitary, appears differently by nature, because it takes on the colors of the various [entities], so also does paśyantī” (yathā sphaṭikaratnaṃ svarūpata ekam api tattadrāgoparāgeṇa bhedenāvabhāsate, tathā paśyanty apīty arthaḥ). Note that Utpaladeva might refer here to VP 3.3.40–41.

218This refers to the bodies.

219Kaul refers the reader to VP 1.1cd to support this claim.

220The present expression, “that which has no form” (akiñcidrūpa), is an exocentric (bahuvrīhi) compound.

2.44cd–45ab

avibhāgetyādikena lakṣaṇena sulakṣitā

2.45. paśyantī yadi varṇyeta lakṣaṇaṃ tadvilakṣaṇam

If you argue that paśyantī has been described properly with attributes such as “she is without distinction,”221 (we reply:) the attribute (in question) is an attribute that is absent222 from her.

Moreover, if you say paśyantī has been described properly—by avoiding definitions that are too narrow or two broad223—with attributes such as:

avibhāgā tu paśyantī sarvataḥ saṃhṛtakramā (VP 1.167ab)

and paśyantī is nondistinct, (and) is in every way one whose sequence is contracted,224

then we reply: the attribute (in question), being absent from [paśyantī], is just too marvelous. This is a mockery, since an absent attribute is the attribute of an attribute insofar as it is absent.225

2.45cd

Regarding this, [Somānanda] says:226

avibhāgā kathaṃ sā syād yataḥ paśyanty asau smṛtā

How could she be nondistinct, since you consider her to be “seeing?”

Given that you consider paśyantī to be directed toward distinct objects of sight, how could she be nondistinct, since the consequence of this would be

221See VP 1.167ab, and ŚD 2.11ab, where Somānanda quotes this passage. See also ŚD 2.45cd and ŚD (and ŚDVṛ ad) 2.48cd–49.

222I take vilakṣaṇa in tadvilakṣaṇa to refer to an “absent attribute,” or, perhaps, to a “nonattribute.”

223The Sanskrit reads suṣṭhv avyāptyativyāptiparihāreṇa lakṣitā. This is a gloss of sulakṣitā, interpreting the prefix (upasarga) su, literally meaning “good, well,” to refer to the fact that the description is neither inadequate in extent (avyāpti) nor overly general (ativyāpti). Note that Somānanda contrasts sulakṣitā (ŚD 2.44d) with vilakṣaṇa in ŚD 2.45b.

224As noted above, this is a quotation of VP 1.167ab. The second half of the verse reads: svarūpajyotir evāntaḥ sūkṣmā vāg anapāyinī. Iyer translates this as follows: “It is the Inner Light, the subtle word, imperishable.” (See Iyer 1965: 126.)

225I remain unsure of my translation of this passage, which reads: yato vilakṣaṇaṃ lakṣaṇasya yal lakṣaṇaṃ tadvigamāt. I think the idea is as follows. If an object is said to be, e.g., “not blue,” then “not blue” is not an attribute of the object in question. All that has been said of the object in question is what it is not. Instead, “not blue” describes “blue;” it tells us that the color is absent. As such, “not blue” conveys an attribute, i.e., absence, of the attribute in question, i.e., of blue, which does not really describe the object in question.

226Somānanda here comments further on the grammarians’ description of paśyantī, in particular the one found in VP 1.167ab, concentrating on their description of her as a “nondistinct” entity (avibhāgā).

that she would not resemble the words you use to describe her, and vice versa.227

2.46–47ab

For instance:

2.46. yāni paśyati kiṃ svākyarūpadikkālabhāgaśaḥ atathā yadi paśyantī mithyā paśyantyudāhṛtā

2.47. yathārūpeṇa paśyantī nirvibhāgā kathaṃ bhavet

Does she see those228 in a manner that accords with their respective forms and physical and temporal locations? If “seeing” is not thus, she would be erroneously called paśyantī.229 How (on the other hand) could paśyantī be nondistinct if she sees properly?230

One should supply “that she set out to see”: does she see those objects of sight that she set out to see in a manner that accords with their respective forms and physical and temporal locations? For this is appropriate.231

If, however, “seeing” is not thus, i.e., if she is otherwise, then paśyantī is erroneous, i.e., exists in the form of an erroneous cognition; alternatively, what is meant is that paśyantī is erroneously called paśyantī.232 However, she would then be undivided, because the distinct objects of sight would not exist.233

227The Sanskrit reads yato lakṣyalakṣaṇapadayor anyonyavirahaḥ, and my translation is idiomatic. More literally, the passage means “there is [i.e., would be] a mutual distinction of the word for the attribute and the thing described thereby.” Given that the grammarians say that paśyantī sees distinct objects, she must register this diversity in herself (ŚD 2.46–47ab). As such, she must have within her, as it were, the distinctions that she sees. Therefore, she cannot be called “nondistinct.” To do so would be to destroy the concomitance of the word denoting an attribute and the entity possessing it: though paśyantī distinguishes between the various objects she sees, she would be described as the absence of such distinction (avibhāgā).

228That is, the objects of sight.

229Utpaladeva notes that the present expression has two possible meanings, the second being “that which you call paśyantī would be erroneous.” I here translate as I do because the concern at hand is the attributes that the grammarians attribute to paśyantī, a line of argumentation beginning with ŚD 2.44cd–45ab.

230I here translate paśyantī twice, once as a proper noun and once as a verbal form referring to the act of seeing.

231That is, this is the only appropriate way for paśyantī to see the objects in question.

232Utpaladeva suggests that ŚD 2.46cd can be read in two ways. First, the passage may be understood to suggest that if paśyantī does not see worldly objects in their respective forms, etc., then she is erroneous, because she would not properly see the world. In the second interpretation—wherein mithyā is taken adverbially to describe paśyantyudāhṛtā—it is the act of calling paśyantī “seeing” that is erroneous. Here, as elsewhere, Utpaladeva gives significant weight to the etymological meaning of the term paśyantī, as does Somānanda. See also, e.g., ŚD 2.20cd–22ab.

233The present expression involves a sort of backhanded concession, for while admitting that paśyantī would be undivided (avibhaktā) if she were not to see the objects of sight in their respective forms, etc., Utpaladeva indicates that she would be thus only at the cost of sacrificing her nature as seeing: the distinct objects of sight (bhinnadṛśyavastu) would not exist in this instance. This line of argumentation constitutes a critique of the grammarians description in VP 1.167 of paśyantī as avibhāgā, which Utpaladeva quoted in ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.44cd–45ab.

On the other hand, in accordance with her nature as “seeing,” paśyantī, which conforms to the distinct objects of sight, sees properly, i.e., either in a manner that accords with the forms (in which they appear)234 or in a manner that does not transgress her nature.235 As [Somānanda] has said, “how could she be nondistinct?”236

The derivative svākya simply stands for svaka, “their own.”

2.47cd–48ab

bhaviṣyantaṃ vartamānaṃ kathaṃ paśyanty anāgatam 2.48. anyadigdeśagenānyadigdeśe saty adarśanam

How can paśyantī see a future entity that has not yet come into existence as an entity that is present? Something in one physical and temporal237 location cannot see that which exists in another place and at another moment in time.238

First of all, any agent of cognition, being one who experiences objects that are suitably proximate both physically and temporally, has an experience in

234The present expression, yathāsthitena rūpeṇa, glosses yathārūpeṇa (ŚD 2.47a), translated adverbially in the verse with “properly.” The idea here is that paśyantī sees the objects of sight (the dṛśyavastus) in accordance with their forms. In other words, yathārūpa is here understood by Utpaladeva to describe the conformity of paśyantī’s seeing to the objects of sight. A second interpretation, one that suggests the adverbial construction in question points to a conformity of paśyantī’s seeing to her own nature (as “seeing”), is offered immediately following this one. Note that the verb to see is implied by the literal meaning of paśyantī: “the seeing one.”

235Insofar as she is “seeing,” it does not transgress her nature (svarūpānatikrama) to conform to the appearance of the distinct objects of sight. Here, we are given a second interpretation of yathārūpa (ŚD 2.47a), which, in the present interpretation, refers to the form of paśyantī, as opposed to the form of the objects seen, as was the case in the preceding interpretation (for which see, supra, note 234).

236In other words, it is asked how paśyantī can be described as “nondistinct” when she sees a diversity of objects. Her very name implies that she sees this diversity of objects, moreover, as paśyantī is a present, active participle, meaning “seeing,” which of course suggests not only the presence of a subject-object dichotomy, but also the presence of multiple objects of sight.

237The text here literally reads “space and place.” See ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 2.73cd–74ab for a gloss of the terms in question.

238Somānanda here is making an argument about the time at which paśyantī performs the act of seeing. Insofar as the term paśyantī is a present participle, it connotes an act of seeing occurring in a present moment of time and in a fixed location. Yet paśyantī must, according to the grammarians, be all-seeing. How, then, it is asked, can she see entities that appear to be spatially and temporally distinct? As the commentary suggests, there are two ways of breaking the sandhi in ŚD 2.48ab. The first possibility is that anyadigdeśagena should be read as one word, declined in the instrumental, and saty adarśanam should be read as two words. The second possibility is that anyadigdeśage (ŚD 2.48a) is a word declined in the locative, followed by the negative particle, na, and satyadarśanam (ŚD 2.48b) is a compound. See the commentary and notes, following.

himself.239 Regarding this, how could “seeing” see a future object—that which has not come to her,240 i.e., that which she simply has not (yet) reached—as an entity that is present, i.e., in the state of being present, which is to ask how she can be correct seeing.241

So, when something is located in one fixed physical space, that which is located in another fixed physical space cannot be seen properly, which means that paśyantī is not correct seeing.242 Also: a cognition in one physical and temporal location cannot see the object being cognized when it exists in another place and at another moment of time.243

And thus, how could paśyantī, seeing what is present, i.e., only what is suitably proximate physically, see a future entity that has not come (to her), i.e., that she has not (yet) reached, and is located in another place?244 And you hold that she is omniscient!245

Here, place and time are mutually designatory.246

2.48cd–49

atha sādhāraṇaṃ jñānaṃ tādṛk kiñcana paśyati 2.49. tathāpi tadvibhedena bhedatā tadabhedataḥ na kiñcana gṛhītaṃ syāt tathānyā saṃhṛtakramā

239The meaning of the present expression remains somewhat obscure to me, but apparently the idea is that the individual experiences entities by being present in his own person.

240Note that I take tadanāgatam to be a compound. It is also possible that the present term is not a compound, in which case one would translate “that which has not yet come into existence,” which glosses (on this reading in an unilluminating manner) anāgata in ŚD 2.47d.

241Kaul glosses: “The meaning is that seeing as present an entity that she has not yet reached is an error” (aprāptasya vartamānatve darśanaṃ bhrāntir ity arthaḥ).

242Utpaladeva here interprets ŚD 2.48ab to read: anyadigdeśage nānyadigdeśe satyadarśanam.

243Utpaladeva here interprets ŚD 2.48ab to read: anyadigdeśagenānyadigdeśe saty adarśanam.

244Note that the verb to see is implied in the etymological meaning of paśyantī.

245The point of this verse is to suggest that the spatial and temporal limitations implied by the term paśyantī challenge the grammarians’ notion that she is supreme: insofar as the term paśyantī suggests an act of seeing, it requires the presence of a distinct agent and a distinct object of seeing. Both must be spatially and temporally located. As such, paśyantī must be located in a particular place and time. Any entity thus situated cannot be supreme: she would not be able to see spatially or temporally distant objects.

246In other words, whenever Somānanda refers to time, he refers to space as well, and vice versa. Thus, when he says digdeśa, which literally means “direction and place,” he should be taken to refer to both space and time. Note that Utpaladeva glossed anyadigdeśaga, above, with anyadigdeśakālagata, thereby suggesting that deśa, “place,” should be understood to refer to kāla, “time.”

Now, you might argue that she sees such a one247 that is a generic, indefinite248 cognition. Even so, it249 would be distinct, because they are distinct. If she were undifferentiated,250 nothing whatsoever would be cognized. And (you say) she is also something else, she is saṃhṛtakramā.251

(Objection:) There exist absolutely distinct cognitions that grasp the spatially and temporally distinct objects.252 She, i.e., paśyantī, sees in them such a one that is single, generic,253 which is able to pervade all of those cognitions;254 it is indefinite, i.e., indeterminate; it is what remains of the determinate cognitions

247Both Kaul and Caturvedi understand the present passage to explain the manner by which paśyantī sees future entities. The argument here presented is that she sees the generic properties of the cognitions in question, she sees a cognition that sees the particular cognitions. As such tādṛk here refers to the future objects of cognition mentioned in ŚD 2.47cd–48ab. See Chaturvedi 1986: 57. Kaul explains (KSTS edition, p. 68) as follows: “[Somānanda] here says that it is with the following concern in mind that he says what is said in ŚD 2.48cd–49: (Grammarian:) it is indeed a cognition of a particular entity which here represents future entities, etc.; but paśyantī has a generic form, nor is a representation of a future entity, etc., possible in her [tatra]. Thus, since she is not divided by time, we do not speak of the insane idea that she truly sees an entity of an unknown and different place” (atrāha viśeṣajñānaṃ hīdaṃ yad atra bhaviṣyadādikālavyapadeśaḥ, paśyantī tu sāmānyarūpā, na tatra bhaviṣyadādivyapadeṣo ’pi saṃbhavatīty akālakalitatvān na satyadarśanam ajñātaparāśayasyonmattabhāṣaṇam ity āśaṅkyāha atha sādhāraṇam iti.).

248Note that Gnoli translates kiñcana with “indeterminata.” See Gnoli 1959: 70. I reserve this term for aniyata, with which Utpaladeva glosses kiñcana, below.

249The pronoun here refers to the generic cognition.

250Somānanda here considers the possibility that the generic (sādhāraṇa) cognition is not differentiated from other cognitions. To my knowledge, Bhartṛhari does not conceive of cognition in the manner presented here. He does, however, make a distinction between particular objects, in which the particular qualities (guṇas), such as color, reside, and the general class (jāti) to which they belong. What Somānanda here proposes is akin to suggesting that, rather than seeing the particular objects, paśyantī sees this general class of objects (jāti). For example, rather than seeing a particular cow that appears in a particular moment in time, paśyantī (which after all is, gramatically speaking, a present participle meaning “seeing”) sees the “cowness” of the cow, which is the same in every cow. (For the concept of jāti in the VP see Iyer [1969] 1992: 78 and 101–102.)

251Having considered the problems arising from the description of paśyantī as “nondistinct” (avibhāgā), Somānanda here suggests that problems arise from her being labeled saṃhṛtakramā. This is a continuation of Somānanda’s critique of Bhartṛhari’s description of paśyantī in VP 1.167ab: avibhāgā tu paśyantī sarvataḥ saṃhṛtakramā. See ŚD 2.44cd–45ab, and following.

252Following Harunaga Isaacson’s suggestion, I punctuate before rather than following sā paśyantī.

253The adjective in question, sādhāraṇa, is contrasted with asādhāraṇa, below, and points to the general, universal nature of the cognition in question.

254The compound in question, sarvatajjñānaprapañcanavyāpanakṣama can be translated more literally with “which is capable of pervading the proliferation of all of those cognitions.” The idea is that it is here proposed that paśyantī might not cognize the particular objects directly; she does not see the aforementioned, temporally and spatially distinct cognitions directly, but rather cognizes a general cognition the content of which is the class (jāti) of the object cognized, rather than the particular object in itself.

it perceives, blue, yellow, etc.255 She sees that,256 which means paśyantī sees everything.

(Reply:) Even so, since the specific, determinate cognitions of blue, etc., are distinct, it257 would also be distinct, that is, be differentiated and not uniform, because it would not be separated from them.258 Accordingly, if this were so,259 nothing whatsoever, future entities, etc.,260 would be cognized, this because paśyantī, not being separated from the cognition of a future object, would cognize it261 at that very moment.262

Alternatively, like the cognition of blue, yellow and so on, paśyantī herself would be differentiated, because she, too, would be made variegated by the temporally distinct objects,263 blue, etc.

Now, you might argue that she is not variegated by future entities, etc., but rather knows absolutely no divison, as she has pure consciousness as her form. (We reply:) Hence, because she is undifferentiated, she perceives nothing

255It is also possible that paridṛśyamānanīlapītādiniyatajñānottara means “higher than the determinate cognitions it perceives, blue, yellow, etc.”

256That is to say that she sees the generic cognition. It is also possible that the neuter pronoun tat is nominative and not accusative, in which case tat paśyati sarvaṃ paśyantīty arthaḥ would mean “it [i.e., the generic cognition] sees everything [=all of the determinate cognitions], which means paśyantī sees everything.”

257That is, this refers to the generic cognition, the sādhāraṇa cognition.

258That is, it is not separated from the specific cognitions. Utpaladeva here suggests that, even when cognizing the generic cognition rather than the specific cognitions of future entities and the like, paśyantī nevertheless sees the specific qualities of the particular cognitions in question, this because she sees the general form of them in the generic cognition in question. As such, the generic (sādhāraṇa) cognition is not uniform, but rather is varied in the same manner as the various determinate cognitions are varied. To offer an example: while a cognition of the generic (sādhāraṇa) form of the color “blue,” i.e., of the class (jāti) “blueness,” allows one not to see the particulars of a specific (asādhāraṇa), determinate (niyata) cognition of, say, a blue pot, cognition of the class “blueness” nevertheless may be differentiated from that of, say, “yellowness.” The same, moreover, can be said of the lack of temporal distinction in the generic cognition.

259This refers to the possibility that the generic (sādhāraṇa) cognition is indeterminate (aniyata).

260See also ŚD 2.47cd–48ab.

261The present passage refers to the future object mentioned in the compound anāgatārthajñānāvibhinnā. It is possible that one should read tat for tam and take the accusative pronoun to refer to the generic cognition (sādhāraṇajñāna). See also Kaul’s note 8, p. 68 of the KSTS edition: tadabhedata ity arthabhāgaṃ vivṛṇoti tathā ceti. ayaṃ bhāvaḥ. viśiṣṭajñānodaye ’pi yadi sā sādhāraṇī tarhi tadabhedato viśiṣṭajñānodaye ’py atītānāgatādiviśeṣābhāvāt, tataś ca nānāgatāvekṣaṇam iti kim atra dṛśyaṃ nāmeti.

262This refers to a present moment of time, because paśyantī is, grammatically, a present participle referring to the act of seeing. This is an oft-noted problem with the way in which the grammarians describe her, a line of argumentation begun in earnest in ŚD 2.44cd–45ab, and also in ŚD 2.20ab and 2.20cd–21ab. Here, the problem is articulated as follows: If the grammarians are right that paśyantī sees only a generic cognition, one that is indeterminate (aniyata), unclear as to its differences with other cognitions of, say, other colors, or entities existing in other moments of time, then what it sees is spatially and temporally indistinct. As a result, paśyantī would not see anything at all, because she would not distinguish future objects from present ones, etc. Without the mutual distinction of the objects of sight, nothing can be seen.

263Literally, bhaviṣyadvartamānārtha means “the future and present objects.”

whatsoever, in the form of blue, or otherwise. Hence,264 how could she be “seeing?”

And they maintain that paśyantī is identified by another attribute: she is saṃhṛtakramā.

2.50–51

2.50.saṃhṛtaḥ krama ity asyāṃ saṃhartā jāyate paraḥ yayā kramaḥ saṃhṛto vā kim ātmany aparatra vā

2.51.ātmanaḥ sakramatvaṃ syād anyatrāparasaṃgamaḥ kiṃ pūrvaṃ sakramābhūt sā rūpadvitvaṃ prasajyate

If saṃhṛtakramā means “in whom sequence is concluded,” another who stops it is produced. Alternatively, she is the one by whom sequence is concluded. How? Within herself or elsewhere? (If the former:) She herself would have sequence; when elsewhere, she would be connected with something else. (Objection:) Couldn’t she have sequence at an earlier time? (Reply:) That produces the unwanted consequence of having two forms.

The word iti (ŚD 2.50a) should be construed as out of sequence, in this way: “saṃhṛtaḥ kramo ’syām iti.”265 Thus, if saṃhṛtakramā is an exocentric [bahuvrīhi] compound with a locative meaning that refers to paśyantī—she is the one in whom sequence is contracted—then you will have to rely in this case on another object that stops it.266 This contradicts your own view.

Alternatively, saṃhṛtakramā is an exocentric compound with an instrumental meaning—it is by paśyantī that sequence is concluded—but in this way, since a locus is needed, there is the alternative that it is concluded either within herself or elsewhere, and when the grammatical construction is: the conclusion of sequence occurs in she herself, she267 herself would have sequence. Now, if you (instead) argue that it occurs elsewhere, (we reply:) she is (thus) connected to a second thing, and that results in the fault of dualism.

Now, you might argue that, because she is sequential at an earlier time, sequence is subsequently concluded, i.e., suppressed, within herself alone, and it is not concluded elsewhere since that would lead to the fault of dualism. (Reply:) Even so, this would occasion the fault of her having two forms, a sequential one and a nonsequential one.

264Kaul glosses: “this means: because there is no action” (karmābhāvād ity arthaḥ).

265In other words, Utpaladeva here explains that Somānanda has placed the word iti out of the normal word order in the verse, for metrical reasons, and it should be read following asyām, even if it appears before it in the verse.

266That is, there must be another who causes the contraction of sequence within paśyantī. The possibility that she herself contracts the sequence is considered, below.

267Note that the pronoun in question is not feminine in gender because it refers to the neuter word

ātman.