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way, that is, similarly to this [king], with the various modes that are proper to the various beings. Play is vibration seeking out joy.286

1.39–41ab

To summarize the aforementioned tattvas, beginning with (the) śakti(-tattva), [Somānanda] says:

1.39.itthaṃ śivo bodhamayaḥ sa eva paranirvṛtiḥ saiva conmukhatāṃ yāti secchājñānakriyātmatām

1.40.saiva śāktaśarīrādinārakāntaṃ hi bhūtatā prasūyate svacidrūpapramukhaṃ pārthivāntakam

1.41.padārthatvena bhagavān sarvatraiva tadātmatā

Thus, Śiva is made up of consciousness;287 he alone is supreme delight, and that alone becomes eagerness,288 which becomes289 will, cognition, and action.290 Most assuredly, that291 is itself the state of existing as a living being, which he produces as those (beings) beginning with bodies that are made of power292 and down to those dwelling in hell.293 The Lord (also) produces,294 as things,295 that which begins with the one in the form of his consciousness296 and ends with the earth(-tattva).297 His nature is truly omnipresent.

286Utpaladeva here defines play (krīḍā) technically: it occurs when Śiva amuses himself through his pulsating consciousness.

287Kaul suggests that this is a reference to ŚD 1.2. See Kaul’s note 1, p. 29 of the KSTS edition:

ātmaiva sarvabhāveṣv iti nayena.

288As Kaul suggests, this is a reference to the stage of manifestation described in ŚD 1.7cd–8. See Kaul’s note 3, p. 29 of the KSTS edition: yadā tu tasyetyādinā.

289The verb yāti should be read twice, with both what precedes and what follows it.

290The present passage refers to eagerness becoming fully manifested, not to the power of delight (nirvṛti) becoming the three powers—will, cognition, and action—directly, as the syntax of the present, telegraphic passage would allow. See ŚD 1.13–17 and Utpaladeva’s commentary thereon concerning this stage of manifestation. Cf. ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.19–20ab, where Utpaladeva describes eagerness as the first budding of consciousness.

291As in ŚD 1.40ab, the syntax here is ambiguous. Utpaladeva’s commentary suggests that the feminine pronoun (sā) in ŚD 1.40c accords with bhūtatā (ŚD 1.40d), but I understand it to refer to the immediately preceding stage in the sequence of manifestation, the state of being ( ātmatā) will, cognition, and action. This interpretation mirrors the syntax of 1.40ab, where the subject of the verb is properly understood to be unmukhatā, not paranirvṛti. In both cases, the standard rules of anaphora suggest the interpretations supported in the present translation.

292This is a reference to Vidyās, etc. See ŚD 1.31b–d. These beings do not have material bodies, but rather they have bodies made purely of śakti or power.

293For Śiva as the one occupying hell, see ŚD 1.36–37ab, above.

294Following Utpaladeva’s gloss, the verb prasūyate should be employed twice in this verse, once here, and once with śāktaśarīrādinārakāntaṃ in ŚD 1.40ab.

295The term here used is padārtha.

296This is a reference to the first of the thirty-six tattvas, the śivatattva.

297See ŚD 1.29cd–33.

In the aforementioned manner,298 the Lord Śiva is always299 one whose form is pure consciousness, is complete, autonomous, and blissful.

Then, by dint of the power of māyā, i.e., by not perceiving himself,300 he, as if separated from bliss, becomes the tattvas in order to be established in the form of a desire to create the world.301

Because that302 is an action,303 it becomes eagerness, the first portion of [desire],304 and that becomes, in order, will, cognition, and action.305

Having so much agency,306 he produces, i.e., he himself is born in, the form beginning with bodies made out of power307 and down to the ones dwelling in hell,308 and that is the state of existing as a living being, i.e., the manifestation of beings.

The Lord (also) produces a form, referred to by various others as a “thing,” that begins with the śivatattva in the form of his own pure consciousness, and ends with the earth-tattva.309 Thus, his nature is truly omnipresent, and [Somānanda] will state the proof (of this, later on).310

298Śiva is said to be one whose nature is delighted consciousness in ŚD 1.2. Note that Utpaladeva’s commentary opens with “in the aforementioned manner” (anenoktaprakāreṇa), which serves to gloss “thus” (ittham), found in ŚD 1.39a.

299The commentary here reads sadaiva, which might suggest that ŚD 1.39b should read sadaiva paranirvṛtiḥ, rather than sa eva paranirvṛtiḥ. None of the manuscripts that I have consulted attests to this reading, however.

300This is a reference to the oft-mentioned nonperception of Śiva’s non-dual nature. Here, Utpaladeva might be referring to Śiva’s manifestation as the first of the tattvas, the śivatattva.

301Śiva, though he exists in the form of perfect bliss, can choose to desire to create something. In doing so, he sets in motion the creation of the universe. As mentioned elsewhere, the power of bliss is pure delight, while the power of delight (nirvṛti) may also be associated with, delimited by, some object that Śiva chooses to engage, in which case it is known as “eagerness” (aunmukhya), the first stage of will (icchā). See ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.22. Cf. ŚD 1.7cd–8, 1.19–20ab and 1.29cd–30a and the commentatorial passages thereon. That Śiva is said by Utpaladeva to become the tattvas suggests that Śiva stands beyond the thirty-sixfold schema, despite the identification of the śivatattva with all of the tattvas (for which, see supra, note 226 of the present chapter of the translation). In other words, the present passage amounts to an expression of Utpaladeva’s panentheism, which, as noted in the Introduction (section 6), is not found in the ŚD, which is an expression of Somānanda’s strict pantheism.

302This refers to the desire, just mentioned, to create the world.

303See Utpaladeva’s commentary on ŚD 1.19–20ab for the identification of will as an action.

304See ŚD 1.7cd–8.

305See ŚD 1.19–21.

306That is to say that the form in question has limited agency.

307See ŚD 1.31.

308See ŚD 1.36–38.

309See ŚD 1.29cd–33. The present passage again distinguishes Śiva from the thirty-six tattvas (about which see supra, notes 226 and 301 to the present chapter of the translation), though one should note that it is possible that nijacinmātrarūpaśivatattvādipārthivatattvāntam means to identify Śiva with the first tattva, it being possibly translated as follows: “beginning with the śivatattva, the form of which is his own pure consciousness, and extending down to the earth-tattva.”

310See the fourth chapter of the ŚD, which begins: athedanīṃ pravaktavyaṃ yathā sarvaṃ śivātmakam.

1.41cd–43

To point out that there are five (types of) agents in the created world of beings, [Somānanda] says:

svaśivatvam ivājānan paśvātmavyapadeśataḥ

1.42.tadrūpatvena vā paśyan sthitaḥ śānta iva kvacit kevaleśadṛḍhatvena kvacit kevalaśambhutā

1.43.aprabuddho niṣkalaś ca kvacit pralayakevalī ātmabodhī vikalavat kvacid vijñānakevalī

As if not knowing his own Śiva-nature, he exists as one who is designated a bound soul, or, seeing himself as having that nature, he sometimes exists as if he were peaceful. Sometimes, he exists as the solitary Śambhu, (seeing himself) as the one confirmed to be the solitary Īśvara.311 Sometimes he is an unaware and undivided Pralayakevalin.312 Sometimes, aware of his own self, (but otherwise) similar with the Pralayakevalin, he is a Vijñānakevalin.313

As if not knowing his own Śiva-nature, he is designated as a bound soul; for, it is the noncognition of the non-duality of his nature, which is made by the power of māyā, that is established as the nature of the world of transmigration, which takes form as the objects and agents of cognition.314 Of these,315 the agent of cognition is a bound soul, i.e., is consciousness delimited by a subtle body. That alone, since it is limited, is the monadic being;316 because it has consciousness as his nature, it is eternal and lacking of a material form; it is ignorant because he abandons his universal nature; because it is not independent, it is devoid of

311Note that I here follow Utpaladeva’s commentary, wherein it is suggested that the present passage refers to the firm conviction, held by the Vaiśeṣikas and others, that there exists a solitary deity, Īśvara, who is the efficient cause of the universe.

312This is a reference to beings that rest in suṣupti or deep sleep. They are affected by only one of the three impurities or malas, namely, āṇavamala or the impurity of limited agency. They are not affected by the impurity of limited action (kārmamala) or the impurity that creates diversity (māyīyamala). See Pandit 1997: 170.

313According to Pandit, Vijñānākalas are “aware of their pure and infinite Consciousness, free from all psychic and physical coverings, but do not yet experience awareness of their divine potency or the powers of Godhead.” In other words, they are not limited by the three impurities, except perhaps a very slight trace of āṇavamala, but they also have not yet reached the stage of total awareness as the absolutely non-dual Śiva. See Pandit 1997: 189.

This fivefold classification of agents (pramātṛs) is of interest because it is at variance with other systems of classification, notably the sevenfold one sometimes put forth by Pratyabhijñā writers, such as Utpaladeva. For more on the types of agents in tantric Śaivism, see Pandit 1997: 39–52. See also ĪPK 3.2.1–13 and Torella 1994: 199–200, fn. 11.

314The terms here used for agents and objects of cognition are grāhaka and grāhya, respectively.

315Tatra is partitive, here.

316The term here used is aṇu.

the quality of (independent) action and is not the Lord;317 inasmuch as it enjoys as an object of perception that the nature of which is the subtle body, which appears to be distinct, it reflects on the means to enjoyment; (but) it exists in the bowels of māyā, because it is made from māyā.318

It is not appropriate (however) that Śivabhaṭṭāraka is ignorant of his own Śiva-nature, because his nature is always free of impurity, this because the impurities themselves do not arise in the absence of that [Śiva-nature], since he presides over them.319 Thus, it is due to the force of the power of māyā that he becomes, in that very moment,320 a monadic being who is ignorant of that [Śiva-nature].321 This is how the pair of impurites, āṇava and māyīya, arise, and the kārma impurity is caused by them.322

He says “as if” in the phrase “as if (not knowing) his own Śiva-nature” and says “is designated” to state the nature of ignorance, but in reality no division

317Utpaladeva here echoes KT 1.15: paśur nityo hy amūrto ’jño niṣkriyo nirguṇaḥ prabhuḥ / vyāpī māyodarāntastho bhogopāyavicintakaḥ. The ŚDVṛ here reads: sa eva parimitatvād aṇuś caitanyātmatayā nityo ’mūrtaś ca, viśvātmatātyāgenājñaḥ, asvātantryāt kriyāguṇarahito ’nīśvaraś ca, vedyapuryaṣṭakātmani bhinna iva rāgitayā bhogopāyavicintakaḥ, māyākṛtatvān māyodarāntasthaḥ. Cf. PTV, p. 91 (Singh’s edition) for Abhinavagupta’s quotation of the same verse. His commentary thereon is as follows: sa paśur apy anena jñātamātreṇa, vidhānaṃ jñā ca yasya sa kartā jñātā ca viṣayasaṃgatakaraṇaṃ prati jāyate. yajanaṃ cāsyāpūrṇam api pūrṇaṃ bhavatīti sarvamayatvād dhṛdayasya. To say that a bound soul is devoid of action is to suggest that it is ultimately only Śiva who acts. Utpaldeva has said as much in suggesting that the agent who pays homage to Śiva has no true agency of his own, he being merely “possessed” by Śiva (ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.1), as he has indicated elsewhere (ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.23) that, e.g., it is Śiva who makes a pot, not the potter, since all agency is ultimately Śiva’s alone.

318This is to say that consciousness limited by a subtle body is complex. On the one hand, it knows only the delight (nirvṛti) of Śiva’s nature, his consciousness, because it sees itself as an agent capable of achieving desired ends, etc. On the other hand, it is a state limited by ignorance of the true, unlimited nature of Śiva’s consciousness, and it is thus bound by (and in) māyā.

319Utpaladeva has already stated (ŚDVṛ ad ŚD 1.11cd-13ab) that “Only erroneous nonawareness of (Śiva’s) non-duality is impure (kutsita)” (abhedāparāmarśanam eva bhrāntirūpaṃ kutsitam). The present passage should be understood to reflect this maxim: Śiva by definition is omniscient, is self-aware consciousness, and thus he cannot be defiled by the impurity of ignorance. It is rather his own free will that obfuscates his nature, allowing for the “impurities” of ignorance to arise.

320This refers to the moment when he designates himself a bound soul (paśu).

321That is to say it is only due to his own power of illusion (māyāśakti) that he is apparently ignorant of his own Śiva-nature.

322The first impurity, āṇavamala, limits the individual’s freedom, creating a limited agent out of limitless consciousness. Utpaladeva describes it as follows: svātantryahānir bodhasya svātantryasyāpy abodhatā / dvidhāṇavaṃ malam idaṃ svasvarūpāpahānitaḥ (ĪPK 3.2.4.) Torella translates: “Consciousness that is devoid of freedom and, vice versa, freedom devoid of consciousness; these are the two forms of maculation—so called because it obliterates one’s own true nature—called āṇava.” (See Torella 1994: 198.) The second of the two mentioned here, māyīyamala, is the impurity that creates the subjectobject dichotomy out of the same limitless consciousness. Finally, the third impurity, kārmamala, is that which determines one’s birth and experiences. See ĪPK 3.2.5: bhinnavedyaprathātraiva māyākhyaṃ janmabhogadam / kartary abodhe kārmaṃ tu māyāśaktyaiva tattrayam. Torella translates: “There being āṇava maculation [atriava], the apparition of a cognizable reality differentiated (from the subject) constitutes the maculation called māyā; that, then, which in a subject endowed with agency, but lacking the full light of consciousness, determines births and experiences the karmic maculation. All three are solely the work of the power of māyā.” (See Torella 1994: 198.)

of agent and object of cognition exists whatsoever. This is also investigated with precision in my Īśvarapratyabhijñā.323

Sometimes, by dint of the power of vidyā, also called mahāmāyā,324 seeing himself as having that nature, i.e., Śiva-nature, he, being one who perceives his universal nature completely, is as if peaceful. Here also, he uses the expression “as if” to say that the peaceful nature is a type of cognition, but in reality he is not separated from his universal identity. The term “as if” should be applied in the same sense in what follows as well.325

And, because the power of vidyā is gradated,326 i.e., because of duality, he sometimes exists as what is firmly conceived of, in the Vaiśeṣika and other schools of thought, as none other than the solitary Īśvara, a division of Śiva sometimes called the solitary Śambhu.

Sometimes he becomes a Pralayakevalin, one made up of nothing but knowledge located in a particular condition, one who is an unwithered bound soul,327 who is unassociated with the objects of cognition that are established by the impurity called “māyā.”328

Elsewhere, he is aware of himself but is not associated with a subtle body, and, unassociated with objects of cognition, like the Pralayākala, not being in contact with the kārma impurity, he exists in the form of a Vijñānakevalin.329

Note that I take tatprabhava to be an exocentric (bahuvrīhi) compound. This suggests that kārmamala is created by the first two impurities, which seems to be slightly problematic. Utpaladeva states that all of the impurities are created by māyā, and one would rather expect them to come forth sequentially, rather than the first two effecting the third. The idea seems to be that kārmamala, which Utpaladeva labels as that which effects experience in the world of transmigration (for which, see ĪPK 3.2.10: devādīnāṃ ca sarveṣāṃ bhavināṃ trividhaṃ malam/ tatrāpi kārmam evaikaṃ mukhyaṃ saṃsārakāraṇam), is the result of limited agency and subject-object dichotomy. In other words, the first two impurities should perhaps be understood as prerequisites for the world of transmigration, directly caused by the third.

323See ĪPK 1.4, esp. 1.4.8, where Utpaladeva explains memory in terms of the unity of consciousness. See also, e.g., ĪPVṛ ad ĪPK 4.1, where Utpaladeva describes Maheśvara as akaṇḍitagrāhakākaṇḍitagrāhyatanmelanācamatkāropabṛṃhita. More generally speaking, the entire ĪPK can be said to be an effort to prove such unity of agent and object of cognition in the form of non-dual consciousness.

324See Utpaladeva’s commentary on ŚD 1.29cd–33 and my notes on the same. He there mentions the two views regarding the location, as it were, of mahāmāyā: it either exists at an interstitial level, between the śuddhavidyātattva and the māyātattva, or it is a synonym for the śuddhavidyātattva.

325In other words, the reader should understand Somānanda to suggest that Śiva is “as if” Śambhu, a Pralayākala, and a Vijñānākala, though the particle in question (iva) is not repeated in Somānanda’s treatment of these states of being.

326Again, vidyā should be understood to refer to the śuddhavidyātattva.

327The Pralayakevalin, though bound, stands at the level of the śuddhādhvan, the pure tattvas, and is not fettered by the impurities that affect those trapped in the world of transmigration. It is for this

reason that Utpaladeva describes this bound soul (paśu) as “clean” or “unwithered” (amlāna).

328See ĪPK 3.2.8.

329See ĪPK 3.2.6–7 for a description of the same.

1.44–45ab

Thus, he is established by the force of will. [Somānanda] expresses this with an illustration that is taken up by many thinkers:330

1.44. yoginām icchayā yadvan nānārūpopapattitā

na cāsti sādhanaṃ kiñcin mṛdādīcchāṃ vinā prabhoḥ 1.45. tathā bhagavadicchaiva tathātvena prajāyate

Just as various forms can arise by the will of yogis, and there is no extrinsic means whatsoever, be it the clay, or something else, apart from the Lord’s will, in the same way, it is the Lord’s will that arises as reality.

By the mere will of yogis various forms, houses and so on, can arise. Supply “by (the power of will) reaching the state of having visible331 action as its nature.” Moreover, unlike carpenters and so on, they require no extrinsic means whatsoever, such as clay or wood, beyond the Supreme Lord’s will; for they create by entering into him in that form. In the same way, it is only the Lord’s will that brings forth the universe in the form it has.

1.45cd–46ab

[Somānanda] mentions an observable332 example:

dṛśyante ’tra tadicchāto bhāvā bhītyādiyogataḥ

1.46. tatra mithyāsvarūpaṃ cet sthāpyāgre satyatedṛśām

By his will, entities are seen here that are associated with fear, etc.333 If you argue that they334 have an erroneous nature, I will establish the reality of such entities later on.335

330Utpaladeva himself refers to this example. See ĪPK 1.5.7: cidātmaiva hi devo ’ntaḥsthitam icchāvaśād bahiḥ / yogīva nirupādānam arthajātaṃ prakāśayet. Utpaladeva’s Vṛtti thereon reads: cittattvam eva īśvaratvāt svātmarūpatayopapannābhāsanam anantaśaktitvād icchāvaśān mṛdādikāraṇaṃ vinaiva bāhyatvena ghaṭapaṭādikam artharāśiṃ prakāśayet. ĪPK 2.4.10 is perhaps an even closer parallel with the present: yoginām api mṛdbīje vinaivecchāvaśena tat / ghaṭādi jāyate tat tat sthirasvārthakriyākaram. Cf. ŚD 3.35–37. Note that Kaul suggests that it is rather Bhaṭṭadivākaravatsa whom Somānanda has in mind. See Kaul’s note 1, p. 32 of the KSTS edition.

331The term here translated is upapatti.

332Kaul glosses dṛṣṭa with pratyakṣasiddha.

333Note that, following all four manuscripts of the commentary (G, J, P, and R), I understand ŚD 1.45d to read bhāvā bhītyādiyogataḥ, rather than bhāvāḥ kāmādiyogataḥ, the reading post correctionem of Ked.. Note also, then, that prior to Kaul’s correction in the errata, the reading of Ked.accords with the one that I accept.

334Literally, the text reads “in that” (tatra), i.e., in such entities. See Utpaladeva’s commentary, below, for a similar use of the word tatra.

335As Gnoli notes, this verse challenges Dharmakīrti’s position concerning the nature of erroneous cognition: “According to Dharmakīrti, the yogin, in his meditation, can have direct, i.e., non-discursive forms of knowledge. These experiences are caused by the force of the yogin’s mind, by his power of reflection (bhāvanā). The same thing, Dharmakīrti says, can be seen in ordinary life. ‘He who is blinded by intense desire, by sorrow, by fear, by drunkenness, by dreaming of thieves, etc., can see, as clearly as if they were before him, things that, in reality, do not exist.’ ” (Gnoli here quotes PV 3.282. See

Moreover, by association with desire, sorrow, fear, etc., various entities are seen appearing in plain sight. These are caused solely by the Lord’s will,336 because the force of the feelings (one has) toward such entities results from penetration by the fact of being Īśvara;337 nor do they, i.e., thieves and so on, appear in an erroneous form,338 as I will clearly prove the reality of such entities later on.339

1.46cd–47

Similarly, he will also explain the following, later on. Thus, [Somānanda] says:

evaṃ sarveṣu bhāveṣu yathā sā śivarūpatā 1.47. nīrūpatā nirvṛtir vā śaktitritayayogitā

sacittvaṃ saṃsthitaṃ nityaṃ kathanīyaṃ tathāgrataḥ

Similarly, I will explain later on how Śiva-nature, formlessness, delight, the fact of being connected to the three powers, and the state of being consciousness eternally abide in all entities.

In verse 1.41, [Somānanda] already said that by being the tattvas everything has Śiva-nature. Now, (Somānanda says that) he will have to explain, later on, how Śiva-nature,340 along with the formlessness that exists together with the limited forms, this because their form is that [Śiva-nature],341 delight,342 the fact of being connected to will, etc.,343 and the fact of being consciousness, i.e., the fact of not being insentient,344 abide—are properly established345—even in entities such as pots and cloth.

Gnoli 1957: 28.) On Somānanda’s view that even erroneous cognitions are real, see ŚD 4.7cd–11ab and 4.13cd–31. The fourth chapter of the Śivadṛṣṭi, and to a lesser extent, the third chapter, also deal in general with the issue of the ontological reality of all entities, for which discussion, see ŚD 4.6–7ab, 4.11cd–13ab and 4.33cd–39ab.

336Literally, “it is the Lord’s will alone that is the cause there/in this” (tatra bhagavadicchaiva kāraṇam).

337This refers to Śiva as the supreme being and not to the īśvaratattva.

338This is a reference to and refutation of Dharmakīrti’s assertion that imagined phenomena, the appearance of thieves, etc., are false appearances.

339See ŚD 4.7cd–11ab and 4.13cd–31. See also: ŚD 4.6–7ab, 4.11cd–13ab and 4.33cd–39ab.

340See chapter 4 of the ŚD.

341In other words, even apparently delimited entities are in reality “formless,” because they are in reality nothing other than Śiva himself. The present passages probably should be taken to refer to the various matters taken up in the fifth chapter of the ŚD.

342See chapter 5, particularly ŚD 5.6 and 5.37, as well as ŚD 7.35–36.

343See chapter 3 of the ŚD.

344See chapter 5, particulalry ŚD 5.101.

345Here, Utpaladeva glosses “abiding in” (saṃsthita) with “properly established” (samyag eva sthitam upapannam), thus providing an etymological explanation of the former term. He thus suggests that the upasarga (sam) of saṃsthita stands for samyak (“proper”), and that sthita means upapanna (“established”).

1.48

This being so,346 what follows? [Somānanda] says:

1.48. evaṃ sarvapadārthānāṃ samaiva śivatā sthitā parāparādibhedo ’tra śraddhadhānair udāhṛtaḥ

Thus, all things have the very same Śiva-nature. Those adhering to faith here347 refer to the division into the parāparā (condition), etc.

What is meant is that the very same Śiva-nature of things exists, from Paramaśiva all the way down to pots, etc., neither less nor more, the (only) restriction for all being that it does not excel the one whose form is complete consciousness, and, as a result of experiencing such a state of unity, there is a certain order. And thus, because Śiva’s form exists in a state of unity in everything, the division of entities into the parāparā (condition), etc., in the form of purity and impurity, which consist of the noncognition of that [state of unity], is (merely) expressed. Those348 belong to the people on account of their just believing (in them) without reason, but the objects are in no way pure or impure.

1.49

[Somānanda] says that, in this way, everything is real:

1.49. evaṃ bhedātmakaṃ nityaṃ śivatattvam anantakam tathā tasya vyavasthānān nānārūpe ’pi satyatā

Thus, the śivatattva is the nature of the divisions,349 is eternal, and endless.

Thus, because he is so disposed, his real nature exists in the various forms, as well.

By the aforementioned sequence,350 it is the nature of the divisions, but the multiple things are not separate from it. The things also have its nature. For this reason, it is endless, i.e., if distinct things really existed, it would have an end, because it would not extend beyond their forms. Thus, because his nature is so disposed, his, i.e., the Supreme Lord’s, absolutely real nature exists in the various forms, as well, i.e., in the (form of the) universe. This is conclusive.

346That is to say that, given that Śiva-nature, etc., exist in all things, the following obtains.

347The word atra here could either mean “here [in our system]” or “here [in the world].”

348Literally, tatra means “in that,” and it refers to purity and impurity.

349This is to say, as Gnoli notes, that Śiva is indistinguishable from that which appears to be distinct.

See Gnoli 1957: 22.

350See ŚD 1.39–41ab.

Chapter Two of the Śivadṛṣṭi and Śivadṛṣṭivṛtti: The Arguments against the Grammarians

2.1

To say that only the non-dual Īśvara1 doctrine (of the Pratyabhijñā) adheres to reason, while the non-dual doctrine of the Supreme-Brahman-as-speech does not, [Somānanda] says the following in beginning to refute the non-duality of speech accepted by the grammarians:

2.1. athāsmākaṃ jñānaśaktir yā sadāśivarūpatā vaiyākaraṇasādhūnāṃ paśyantī sā parā sthitiḥ

Now, what for us is the power of cognition in the form of Sadāśiva is for the honorable grammarians paśyantī, the supreme state.2

Even if paśyantī, reflecting the universe in the form of sound, is fully endowed with the state of being in the form of the power of action, she nevertheless is very far from having the form of Paramaśiva, even if one appeals to the fact that her having the form of the power of cognition is implied by the primacy of perception in the word paśyantī.3 And that is not the highest state: it

1By Īśvara is here meant Śiva, not the īśvaratattva, the fourth of the thirty-six tattvas. 2The present passage is quoted in PTV ad PT 5–9ab (p. 44 of Singh’s edition).

3Note that words for seeing and sight often refer to the power of cognition, and, of course, paśyantī literally means “seeing.” (See ŚD 1.2 and Utpaladeva’s commentary thereupon, for example, where the term dṛk refers to the power of cognition.) The argument of this passage runs as follows. (1) Insofar as paśyantī reflects the universe in the form of sound, she must have such a form as to be possessed of the power of action, i.e., the power to create the universe. (2) However, she is not equivalent in status to Paramaśiva, despite the fact that the Pratyabhijñā claims that Paramaśiva is the one who manifests the universe. This power exists in a seminal form in Paramaśiva, along with the powers of will and of cognition. (3) Now, insofar as the term paśyantī, “seeing,” implies an act of knowing or of cognition, the grammarians might argue that paśyantī, like Paramaśiva, also has a form that is possessed of the power of cognition. Be this as it may, however, Utpaladeva suggests that this still fails to elevate her to the level of Paramaśiva, because in the Pratyabhijñā the power of cognition exists at the level of the sadāśivatattva, the third of thirty-six tattvas.

is the parāparā condition here [in our system], because the power of cognition has Sadāśiva as its form. Nevertheless, they understand her as the supreme condition.4

What is more, when she has Sadāśiva as her form, that does not mean that the power of action, for its part, is absent, as it is said:

Cognition and action exist at what is called the Sāda(-level).5

Because power and the one who possesses the power are identical,6 Sadāśiva is endowed with the power of cognition. The one whose power of action is increased is called Īśvara.7

For the same reason Śiva,8 consisting of the power of will, in as much as he is (fully) endowed with the power of the independence of consciousness, is, at the highest level, Paramaśiva.9 In addition, it is possible that there is an additional tattva here in the interval (between the Śivatattva and the Śaktitattva) related to

The argument as presented here is somewhat awkward, because Utapaldeva begins by acknowledging the existence of the power of action in paśyantī. The verse, however, identifies her with the power of cognition and the sadāśivatattva. Utpaladeva is quick to add (for which, see below) that the power of action, though only fully manifested at the level of the fourth tattva, the īśvaratattva, also is present in a nascent form in the sadāśivatattva. Thus, Utpaladeva suggests, the grammarians’ paśyantī is analogous to the sadāśivatattva, where the power of cognition is prevalent, but the power of action is also present in a nascent form. He makes the case for this by first considering the creative, active element of paśyantī, allowing for her to be elevated only as high as the level at which action is nascent and cognition prevalent.

4The term parāvasthā stands in contrast to the parāparā condition mentioned above.

5This quotation remains untraced. While the power of action is normally associated with the next tattva, the īśvaratattva, Utpaladeva here suggests that it exists in a seminal form at the preceding level, that of the sadāśivatattva. See Utpaladeva’s commentary on ŚD 1.29cd-33 for more on the inherence of the powers of cognition and action in the sadāśivatattva. Cf., also, ĪPK (and ĪPVṛ ad) 3.1.2 and Torella 1994: 190, fn. 4 for the various interpretations of the term here translated. Finally, see the Introduction, section 5, for a discussion of the system of overlapping pairs of powers articulated in the ŚD.

6Cf. ŚD 3.3cd: śaktiśaktimator bhedaḥ śaive jātu na varṇyate.

7Utpaladeva here explains the difference between the power of action at the levels of the sadāśivatattva and the īśvaratattva. Though the power of action exists (in a nascent form) at the level of the sadāśivatattva, it is predominant at the level of the īśvaratattva. Note that there is an implicit reference here to ŚD 1.30b–d: kadācij jñānaśaktitaḥ / sadāśivatvam udrekāt kadācid aiśvarīṃ sthitim. Note also that I take udriktakriyāśakti to be an exocentric (bahuvrīhi) compound.

8Utpaladeva might refer to the śivatattva here with the term śiva.

9Insofar as the power and the one possessing it are identical, Paramaśiva and the śivatattva, made up of the power of will, are identical.