1. Make an outline of the text

Why Strategy?

Every organization operates on a Theory of the Business* that is, a set of assumptions as to what its business is, what its objectives are, how it defines results, who its customers are, what the customers value and pay for.

Strategy converts this Theory of the Business into perfor­mance. Its purpose is to enable an organization to achieve its desired results in an unpredictable environment. For strategy allows an organization to be purposefully opportunistic.

Strategy is also the test of the Theory of the Business. Failure of the strategy to produce the expected results is usually the first serious indication that the Theory of the Business needs to be thought through again. And unexpected successes are often also the first indications that the Theory of the Business needs to be rethought. Indeed, what is an “opportunity” can only be decided if there is a strategy. Otherwise, there is no way to tell what gen­uinely advances the organization toward its desired results, and what is diversion and splintering of resources.

But what can strategy be based on in a period of rapid change and total uncertainty, such as the world is facing at the turn of the 21st century? Are there any assumptions on which to base the strategies of an organization and especially of a business? Are there any certainties?

There are indeed FIVE phenomena that can be considered cer­tainties. They are, however, different from anything present strate­gies consider. Above all, they are not, essentially, economic. They are primarily social and political.

Management Challengers for the 21st Century

By P.F, Drucker, p. 43

The Growing Incongruence between Economic Reality and Political Reality

The final fundamental on which to base strategy in the period of worldwide structural change and uncertainty is the growing incongruence between economic reality and political reality.

The world economy is increasingly becoming global. National boundaries are impediments and cost centers. As discussed in the first chapter of this book, business—and increasingly many other institutions as well—can no longer define their scope in terms of national economies and national boundaries. They have to define their scope in terms of industries and services worldwide.

But at the same time, political boundaries are not going to go away. In fact, it is doubtful that even the new regional economic units, the European Economic Community, the North American Free Trade Zone (NAFTA) or Mercosur, the proposed economic community in South America, will actually weaken political boundaries, let alone overcome them.

There has been talk about the “end of sovereignty” since well before 1918. But nothing has emerged yet to take the place of national government and national sovereignty in political affairs. In fact, since 1914, the trend has been toward increasing splintering. Gone are the empires that politically unified the largest areas of the world before 1914—Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire; the British, the French, the Dutch; the Portuguese and the Belgian Empires; the Eurasian Empire of Tsars and Communists. At the same time, small political units have become economically viable because money and informa­tion have become “transnational” (which actually means that they have no nationality whatever). Since 1950 one mini-state after the other has come into being, each with its own government, its own military, its own diplomatic service, its own tax and fiscal policy and so on. So far there are no signs yet of any global institutions, not even in the economic sphere, for example, a global Central Bank con­trolling the totally reckless flows of money worldwide, let alone a global institution controlling tax and monetary policies worldwide.

Even within transnational economic units, national politics still overrule economic rationality. Despite the European Economic Community, for instance, it has proven all but politically impossible to close a totally redundant plant in Belgium and shift the work to a French plant of the same company only thirty miles away, but on the other side of a national border.

We have in fact three overlapping spheres. There is a true global economy of money and information. There are regional economies in which goods circulate freely and in which impedi­ments to the movement of services and of people are being cut back, though by no means eliminated. And then increasingly there are national and local realities, which are both economic, but above all political. And all three are growing fast. And busi­nesses—and other institutions, for example, universities—have no choice. They have to live and perform in all spheres, and at the same time. This is the reality on which strategy has to be based. But no management anyplace knows yet what this reality actually means. They are all still groping.

Many—perhaps most—large multinationals in manufac­turing, in finance, in insurance have organized themselves into worldwide “business units” across national bound­aries. The leasing business of a financial services company is, for example, run as one business, whether in Spain or in Hong Kong. And it is run separately from any other business of the same financial services company in Spain or in Hong Kong, for example, the company’s foreign exchange business. But company after company has learned that for the local government or the local labor union—or any other local political agency—the “business unit” is a meaningless fiction. For them Spain or Hong Kong are the only meaningful reality and the Spanish or Hong Kong businesses of the company are therefore the only units they perceive and accept and are willing to deal with. No company I know has yet been able to figure out in advance what decision and action can actually be han­dled as a decision or action of the “business unit” and which will have to be handled as a “national” one—let alone how to work out in advance how to make an action or a decision fit both realities, the economic reality of the transnational business unit and the political reality of Spanish or Hong Kong “sovereignty.”

But some implications are already clear. First, it is clear what not to do—that is, to be willing to be bribed to subordinate eco­nomic decisions to local politics. Because the political unit is becoming increasingly less powerful economically, it is increas­ingly tempted to offer all kinds of bribes—exemption from taxes, for instance; special-tariff protection; a guaranteed monopoly; all kinds of subsidies, and so on—to obtain an economic advantage. A typical example is the lavish subsidies given to European and Japanese automobile companies by some Southeastern U.S. states to bribe the companies into putting their new U.S. plants into the state. But of course there are hundreds—and probably thou­sands—of additional examples.

And a good many of them are much worse examples. The European and Japanese automobile companies had good economic reasons (at least they thought so) to build plants in the United States. In many other cases—for instance the bribes offered by small countries—the bribe is the only reason for a company to go into a certain country or to bail out a local company in trouble. It is absolutely predictable, however, that a decision motivated by such a bribe rather than by economic reality will turn into a disaster.

This is what happened, for instance, to every single manu­facturing plant put by a U.S. company in the 1960s and 1970s into a small Latin American country, because that country’s government promised to give the company a monopoly in the national market.

“There ain’t no bargains” is old folk wisdom. The first rule for a business in managing the incongruence between economic real­ity and political reality is therefore NOT to do anything that does not satisfy economic reality. The first question has to be: “If we didn’t get the bribe, would we do this as part of our business strat­egy?” If the answer is “no,” don’t do it however tempting the bribe. It will be a costly failure. But even if the answer is “yes,” it is almost certainly wise to say “no” to the proffered bribe. All experi­ence—and there is plenty of it—indicates that, in the end, one pays and pays heavily for accepting such bribes.

Closely related is another “Don’t.” Do not expand or grow globally by going into businesses—especially not by acquisition— unless they fit into the company’s Theory of the Business and its overall strategy.

In different regions or different countries, different prod­ucts and/or services will behave differently. In France, for instance, the Coca-Cola Company does far better selling fruit juices than it does selling carbonated Cokes. In Japan one of its major products is coffee dispensed in vending machines. But both fruit juices and prepared coffee fit Coca-Cola’s Theory of the Business and its strategy. Physically they are different from the original Coke. In every other aspect, that is, as businesses, they are exactly the same.

To repeat something said earlier in this chapter: A strategy enables an institution to be purposefully opportunistic. If what looks like an opportunity does not advance the strategic goal of the institution, it is not an opportunity. It is a distraction. Even if it fits—or seems to fit—a particular national, that is, political, reality, it is still a distraction and is to be left alone. Otherwise it is practi­cally bound to end in failure.

So much for the “Don’ts.” And now the two “Do’s” we already know.

Business growth and business expansion in different parts of the world will increasingly not be based on mergers and acquisi­tions or even on starting new, wholly owned businesses there. They will increasingly have to be based on alliances, partnerships, joint ventures and all kinds of relations with organizations located in other political jurisdictions. They will, in other words, increasingly have to be based on structures that are economic units and not legal—and therefore not political—units.

There are many other reasons—some of them discussed earlier—that growth henceforth will be based on partner­ships of all sorts rather than on outright ownership and command and control. But in all likelihood one of the most compelling ones will be the need to operate in both a global world economy and a splintered world polity. A partnership is by no means a perfect solution to this prob­lem. In fact, partnerships have enormous problems of their own. But at least the conflict between economic real­ity and legal reality is greatly lessened if the economic unit is not also a legal unit, but is a partnership, an alliance, a joint venture that is a relationship in which political and legal appearance can be separated from economic reality.

The final implication: All businesses will have to learn to manage their currency exposure. Every business, even a purely local one, is in the world economy today. As such, it is subject to currency fluctuations even if it does not sell outside its own coun­try, or does not buy outside it.

Even the most provincial and most local Mexican com­pany was severely hit by the sudden collapse of the Mexican peso a few years ago. Even the most purely local Indonesian company was severely hit by the sudden col­lapse of the Indonesian currency in 1998.

There is no country today that is immune to sudden currency fluctuations—for the simple reason that the world is awash in “virtual money,” that is, in liquidity for which there is no prof­itable investment. Every country, therefore, is awash in money that is not invested in property, in businesses, in manufacturing or in service enterprises, but kept in liquid and volatile “portfo­lio” investment. And very few countries have enough of a surplus in their balance of payments to service the interest on this “port­folio investment,” let alone to pay it out should it take flight. Every country’s currency, in other words, is at the mercy of short­ term movements of money for which there may not be any eco­nomic rationale whatever.

This is the exact opposite of what was expected in 1973 when President Nixon cut the dollar loose from any fixed value and made it “float.” The idea then was that this would limit currency fluctuations to minor adjustments.

But because governments—beginning with the American government—grossly abused this new “freedom,” curren­cies have become extremely unstable. They can be expected to continue to remain unstable. There is practi­cally no reason to expect that the political units, that is, the various nations, will subordinate their fiscal, mone­tary and credit policies to any but their own political authority. It is to be hoped that the new European Bank will be able to maintain the Euro stable as a regional cur­rency. But it is much too much to hope that the individ­ual countries within the European unions will then sub­ordinate their domestic policies to the stability of the Euro.

In other words, strategy has to be based on the assumption that currencies will continue to be volatile and unstable. One implication of this is that every management will have to learn what so far few managements can do: manage their foreign exchange exposure.

The realities discussed in this chapter do not tell an institu­tion what to do, let alone how to do it. They raise the questions to which strategy has to find the answers for the individual institu­tion. And there are questions that strategy so far has rarely, if ever, considered. But unless an institution starts out by considering these new realities, it will not have a strategy. It will not be pre­pared for the challenges that the next few years, if not the next few decades, are certain to raise. Unless these challenges can be met successfully, no enterprise can expect to succeed, let alone to prosper, in a period of turbulence, of structural change and of economic, social, political and technological transformation.

Management Challenges for the 21-st Century

By P.F.Drucker pp. 63 - 69