1. Answer the questions

1.What vessel was proceeding on manoeuvering speed towards One fathom Bank?

2.What vessel in ballast was ahead of her?

3.What actions had the post-panamax container vessel to take in order to avoid collision?

4.Why did the Master of the TEU container give the order to alter the course to port?

5.What was the only action taken by container vessel?

2. Decide if these statements are true or false. Correct the wrong ones.

1. The 2^nd mate was on watch when a fast container was heading NW with a speed of 26 knots._______

2.Behind the TEU container was a VLCC in ballast.__________

3. The 2,824 TEU container vessel was keeping the speed of 19 knots in order to give way to the VLCC.__________

4.When the situation became too serious the fast container reduced her speed._________

5. The TEU container vessel had a dangerous cargo light on._______________

25

Readers Feedback

1

The Master submitting this report suggests that his container vessel may have been mistaken for a tanker "because we had a dangerous cargo light on". I would be intrigued to learn under what authority and for what purpose a container ship displays this signal when under way.

2

I am frequently dismayed at some of the reports sent into MARS that complain about the manoeuvres of others not observing good seamanship and not following the rules, when in fact the actions of those making the report are questionable at best. Own ship quite rightly in my opinion had her engine ready for manoeuvre, but, does not appear to have had any intention to use it. Overtaking the VLCC in a narrow part of the lane could have easily been avoided by reducing speed. This would have also given the overtaking container vessel more space to overtake if she so wished. Although the report does not say what, if any, traffic was in the other lane, the alteration to port into the other lane was a dangerous departure from the rules. Situations like this could easily be avoided with a little forward thinking and dealing with situations early before they develop into near miss situations.

Another point in this report is that own ship is displaying, what he refers to as a "dangerous cargo light". This in itself is a clear violation of rule 20(b). What is the purpose of telling other vessels that you have dangerous cargo on board? Having dangerous cargo on board does not alter the fact that you are a "power driven vessel" and still fully obliged to comply with the rules.

26

No time to Familiarize

Own vessel was outbound from Boston (USA), in the TSS approaching the precautionary area off Nantucket Shoals. The weather was calm with dense fog and visibility less than fifty meters. Speed about 12 knots, lookout posted, whistle blowing, two ARPA's running, etc. Except for two small stationary targets well to port, the only other target on the radar was right astern with a speed of about 19 knots and overtaking us. The ARPAs fairly consistently gave a CPA of less than one cable on our port side. When this large target had closed to less than two miles without showing any signs of taking avoiding action, own vessel made a large, seventy degrees, alteration to starboard. At about the same time the target reduced speed rapidly to about 9 knots and altered course to port, now passing across our stern at about one mile. We returned to our original course and the target increased speed and moved out into the precautionary area. Soon thereafter, the target itself made a large alteration of course to starboard, having presumably reached a navigation waypoint. A close quarters situation was once again had developing, with the same target now crossing from port to starboard at 19 knots and with a CPA of substantially less than one mile. This was just too much, as I believe that manoeuvring any vessel at speed in the open sea in nil visibility, at distances counted in meters instead of miles, is totally unacceptable, no matter what electronic aids one has available. We elected to take a long slow round turn to starboard to give the guy all the sea room he wanted.

Now I have a confession to make. This occurred last year. My OOW and I had just joined our vessel at Boston the day before and we had not yet fully familiarized ourselves with the newly installed AIS, which was a stand-alone unit not linked to the radars. The fact that the daylight reflecting on the small display screen made it almost impossible to read is no excuse. If we had utilized the potential of the AIS, we would have known that the target, one of the newer and larger passenger cruise ships, was bound for New York, and was therefore likely to be altering course to starboard to head in that direction upon reaching the end of the TSS. It might have been wiser for us to make our very large alteration to port instead of to starboard, but even with hindsight I am not sure. With a known identity, we could also have initiated a VHF conversation to discuss intentions, but then so could our target vessel (though I do not subscribe to the US practice of arranging all passing of vessels by VHF, which is fine in their inland waterways but has always had the potential for disaster in the open sea with unknown vessels.