Investigations indicate that the root cause of the incident was:

Imprudent speed ordered by the Pilot and condoned by the Master during a period of restricted visibility. The Master relinquished command authority to the Pilot and did not insist on a safe speed even after an unknown target was observed on the radar, and at a critical course change and closing distance with a radar target, both the Master and Pilot took apparent conflicting manoeuvring actions.

All Company Masters have been trained in "Bridge Team Management", and the company's "Bridge Team Management" manual is part of the Safety Management System. The aforementioned documentation clearly states that despite the duties and obligations of a pilot, it does not relieve the Master or Officers in charge of a watch from their obligations for the safe navigation of the vessel.

Rules concerning speed in restricted visibility are defined in the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972, and all Masters and Navigating Officers must adhere to these regulations.

The experienced and prudent Master will realise that no matter how well planned and conducted a passage may be, there may come a time when, due to change of circumstances, the planned passage may have to be changed or adapted as the voyage develops, according to changing circumstances.

1. Answer the questions

1.What vessels collided in the entrance channel?

2.Why couldn't the vessel leave the port?

3.What was the ship's speed?

4.Why was the vessel's speed reduced to half-ahead on passing buoys 11 and 12?

5.Why did Master and Pilot go immediately to the port bridge wing?

2. Decide if these statements are true or false. Correct the wrong ones.

1. The sailing had been delayed due to the presence and movements of ships in the port._________

2. The bridge and engine room was manned with a Bosun and AB stationed on the bow for lookout.____

3. The Pilot stated that there was no traffic visible by radar._______

4. The Pilot explained to the Master that ha had agreed with the tug's Master to be overtaken on port side._______

5. The Master maneuvered the vessel to anchor west of the channel near the buoy 5._______

3. Compose a claim on collision on behalf of the Master of the outbound vessel.

37

Communication with the Pilot Vessel

Vessel "A" was proceeding out with a Pilot on board towards a Pilot Station. Some 30 minutes prior to arriving at the Pilot Vessel (PV), the ship contacted PV and informed them of her position astern of another outbound vessel and confirmed that, on arrival at Buoy "X", she would alter course to starboard in order to align with the outbound TSS. The onboard Pilot informed the Bridge Team that ship "B" was the first inbound vessel and that the Pilot Boat would put a Pilot on board ship "B" before coming alongside "A" to take off her Pilot. The Pilot Boat would come on the starboard side of "A" due to the fresh southerly wind and sea. Ship "A" should therefore pass about 0.5' to the North of the PV and that the safe speed for the disembarkation of the Pilot would be about 4 knots.

As ship "A" was approaching the Pilotage Cautionary Area (PCA), the PV was heard requesting ship "B" to alter her course to port. Within the next two minutes PV requested "B" to steer 065 and 040 respectively. At the same time "A" entered the PCA on a course of 270 and a speed of 9.2 knots. One and a half minutes later "A" confirms to PV that she would pass to the North and had already started altering course to starboard.

Shortly after this the engine was put to HALF AHEAD. Immediately afterwards, the PV called "B" and advised her of the intended track of "A" and requested "B" to steer more to port. Ship "B" had been acquired by "A" on the ARPA, "B" was also visually observed to alter her course to port and her masthead and starboard lights were visible. "B" was next observed to have slowed to about 7 knots and her bearing was opening to port.

Two minutes later, "A" was heading 285 and her engines were ordered to SLOW AHEAD - one minute later to DEAD SLOW AHEAD whilst her speed was about 7 knots. Just under two minutes later, the Pilot on "A" contacted PV and requested them to instruct "B" to alter her course to starboard. PV contacted "B" and informed her that the small pilot boat was under way towards her and requested that she adjust her course to steer 090. This instruction was confirmed by "B". At this point, "B" was observed to pick up speed and head towards the bow of "A". One minute later "A" called "B" and warned her not to cross her bow. This was confirmed by "B". Twenty five seconds later PV called "B" and urged her to immediately put her helm hard-a-starboard, this was again confirmed by "B". Thirty seconds later "A" calls "B" again and says that her own helm is hard-a-starboard.

These last calls from "A" went unanswered by "B" and there was no response from the sound signal of five short blasts. Thirty seconds later, when the distance between the two vessels was about 5 cables, "A" called "B" and asked her to put her engines ASTERN to avoid a collision. At the same time "A" increased her speed to gain more manoeuvrability. One minute later, with "A" heading 3000 at about 6 knots, the two ships collided.

There were two distinct instances when PV requested "B" to steer "more to port". At the first instance "B" replied "O.K., to port, port-to-port". At the second instance the reply was "Roger, port-to-port". In both these instances, the reply was unchallenged by the PV. It would appear that the PV was trying to minimise the distance which the small pilot boat would have to travel in rough seas. The PV's skipper maintained that he interpreted the response "port-to-port" to mean "A" and "B" passing port-to-port. However, it is contended that "B" could have equally meant to pass port-to-port with PV. Particularly as "A" was still outside the PCA in the first instance. If these ambiguous communications had been challenged, it may have averted the collision. The communications were further confused by the Pilot on "A" talking to PV in the local language.

It would appear that the OOW on "B", at least in the beginning, was somewhat hesitant in executing the course change directions from PV and there is reason to believe that the Master may not have been on the bridge in the initial stages of this incident.