3. Compose a claim on collision on behalf of the Master of a general cargo vessel.

32

A Running Moor

I refer to the Mars Report 200349 concerning "Anchor ran out too fast". Part of my seafaring career included service on a VLCC as Chief Officer, during which time I had the experience of doing a "running moor" at Jebel Dhanna - very interesting! I fully agree with everything contained in the report, although I take issue with the last paragraph, concerning communications. I served with a very enlightened company and all our equipment was of the best. However, I do not believe there is any way that good communications can be maintained between the forecastle and the bridge while the anchor is being let go, the background noise is just too much. We too had too much stern way when the first anchor was let go, we managed to stop the run away before we reached the bitter end (just) but we had sparks flying all over the forecastle head from the brake. Fortunately we were just out of dry dock and therefore gas free and also we had just inerted all tanks, I dread to think of the consequences otherwise. Incidentally just before my Jebel Dhanna trip I had taken my Master's and, during the orals, was asked about running moors (I had also served while a cadet in dry cargo ships) and the examiner suggested that I would not be too familiar with such operations!

1. Answer the questions:

1. On what kind of vessel did the incident take place?

2. Why was the equipment of the best?

3. What is the reason for not good communications between the forecastle and the bridge while the anchor is being let go?

4. When did the crew manage to stop the run away?

5. Why was the vessel gas free?

2. Decide if these statements are true or false. Correct the wrong ones.

1. Part of my seafaring career included service on a VLCC as Chief Mate.

2. I served with an uninformed company.

3. We too had too much steerage way when the first anchor was let go.

4. We had sparks flying all over the forecastle head from the anchor chain.

5. The examiner suggested that I would be unaware of such operations.

3. Match the words from the first column with words from the second one in order to form word collocations:

1. to let go a. the tanks

2. to maintain b. a running moor

3. to do c. communication

4. to reach d. anchor

5. to inert e. bitter end

33

Anchor Ran out too fast

A gas vessel was engaged in anchoring at a port where very strong tides of up to 5 knots are experienced. The vessel was anchoring at 0120, the 3rd. Officer and Bosun were at stations forward with the Master and 2nd. Officer on the bridge. The anchors were cleared and the starboard anchor made ready for letting go. The vessel was on hand steering and at 0130 reached her anchoring position. The vessel was turned to port to stem the tide and the engines were put astern. At this point there was an estimated 2.5 knots of ebb tide running. The depth of water was 20 metres, the weather was fine with a light breeze.

The propeller wash was not seen but the log showed about 0.5 kts stern way. At this point the starboard anchor was let go on the order from the bridge. The chain started to run out very quickly and the Third Officer was ordered to put on the brake. The Third Officer reported that the brake was not holding, however no report was made regarding the lay and scope of the cable. Finally the brake did take hold and the stopper was put in place.

By this time, 10 shackles had run out (there being 11 shackles on this anchor). The winch was put in gear and the chain hove back to 6 shackles in the water. Once the vessel had steadied up the anchors were screwed up and made secure.

The next morning the windlass was inspected for damage and it was seen that the brake lining had almost completely burnt away. The brake lining had to be renewed as soon as possible as the brake may not have held. If it had been necessary to use that anchor, it would have had to be "walked out".

The immediate cause for the incident was the large stern way which was estimated at 3 knots over the ground, also a contributing factor was the lack of communication from forward to the bridge with regard to the lay and scope of the chain. The anchoring plan had been discussed with the 3rd. Officer prior to him going forward. Firstly, if the Officer had reported the lay and strain on the cable in good time then the engine could have been used to relieve the strain on the chain. Secondly, the ground speed was not properly ascertained on the bridge when the anchor was let go. The speed through the water was known, as the log display is prominent on the console and the radar. Had the GPS been checked the ground speed would have been ascertained. It was assumed, wrongly as it turned out, that in shallow water the Doppler Log goes automatically into ground tracking mode and gives speed over the ground. However this is not the case with this particular model of log.

Communications between the Bridge and the people on stations fore or aft must be good, the bridge must be kept advised of all relevant information. During manoeuvring the Officers on the bridge must be aware of the limitations of the equipment they are using and what mode they are operating in.