Civil rights cases and the commerce clause Heart of Atlanta Motel V. United States – Local incident of interstate commerce

• Clark 1964. Congress can regulate the local incidents of interstate commerce.

• Facts. P was a motel located in downtown Atlanta, which refused to rent rooms to blacks.

• Contacts with interstate travel. The motel was near two interstate highways, derived 75% of its occupancy from out-of-state guests and solicited business in national media.

• Holding. SCt held that the motel could constitutionally be reached by the Civil Rights Act, under the Commerce Clause. SCt took note of Congress’ findings that racial discrimination discouraged travel on the part of a substantial portion of the black community, and that such discrimination discouraged travel on the part of a substantial portion of the black community, and that such discrimination could therefore be regulated by Congress in the aggregate. Furthermore, SCt held, “the power of Congress to promote interstate commerce also includes the power to regulate the local incidents thereof, including local activities in both the States of origin and destination, which might have a substantial and harmful effect upon that commerce.”

• Police powers motive acceptable. Nor was the SCt troubled by the fact that Congress’ motive for this legislation was not purely economic, but rather, principally moral and social.

Katzenbach V. McClung – Ollie’s bbq

• Clark 1964. Demonstrates even more clearly SCt’s approval of the use of the Commerce Clause to reach what seemed to be overwhelmingly local activities.

• Facts. This case involved a Birmingham, Alabama restaurant called Ollie’s Barbecue. The restaurant was relatively far from any interstate highway or train or bus station, and there was no evidence that any appreciable part of its business was in serving out of state travelers. However, 46% of the food purchased by the restaurant during the previous year had been bought from a supplier who had bought it from out of state. (Recall that the Civil Rights Act applies to any restaurant a substantial portion of whose food has moved in commerce).

• Application of Act upheld. SCt upheld the Act as applied to the restaurant. As in Heart of Atlanta case, SCt observed that unavailability of accommodations dissuaded blacks from traveling in interstate commerce. The SCt returned to the Wickard v. Filburn rationale. Even though Ollie’s itself was small, and the value of food it purchased from out of state had only an insignificant effect on commerce, the restaurant’s discriminatory conduct was representative of a great deal of similar conduct throughout the country, and this conduct in the aggregate clearly had an effect on interstate commerce. Therefore, Congress was entitled to regulate the individual case.

• Deference to Congress’ findings. Nor did the fact that the bill contained no congressional findings about the impact of restaurant discrimination on commerce render the Act unconstitutional. The SCt would not scrutinize the facts to make a de novo determination of whether restaurant discrimination affected commerce. Rather, “where we find that the legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our investigation is at an end.” Such a rational basis was present here.

• Koppelman:

• Unclear as to which factor determined SCt’s holding that Title II of 1964 Civil Rights Act applied to family-owned restaurant which was close to interstate highway and which bought ½ meat from supplier who purchased it out of state. [eh? Doesn’t opinion make it clear that racial discrimination is the factor?]: (1) Where Ollie’s Barbecue purchased its supplies; or (2) who its customers are.

• This case was a stretch; these cases should be under 13^th, 14^th amendments, rather than stretching CC. SC used CC because of favorable precedents (e.g. Wickard) whereas Civil War precedents were bad.

• This case implies absolutely limitless Commerce power.