Gibbons V. Ogden – New York steamboat monopoly

• Marshall. Seemingly of two minds regarding “exclusivity” of federal power over interstate commerce  Marshall left behind good confusion.

• There is bright line distinction between intrastate and interstate commerce. Federal government had exclusive power in interstate commerce. (even where federal government is silent, states cannot regulate)

• However, perhaps inconsistently, Marshall also approved of local inspection and quarantine laws, which he regarded as legitimate exercise of state police power.

Willson V. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co.

• 1829. Marshall held state regulation establishing dam on stream was constitutional because as long as states do not intend to obstruct interstate commerce  state law is constitutional.

Cooley V. Board of Port Wardens (1851) – “Cooley test” – That which is by nature national

• Cooley Test. Held that Congress has exclusive power to legislate on matters that “are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system.”

• Scalia argued this distinction is useless because “metaphysical.”

• However, it was clear from Cooley test that any state law clearly intended to obstruct interstate commerce (e.g. benefit in-staters at expense of out-of-staters) will be struck down.

Modern dcc doctrine

• Based on distrust of states (Stone 294) combined with view that Congress is too busy to police the states (Jackson 296).

• Since no one else can be trusted to prevent abuses of state regulatory power, SCt must.

• Koppelman: Even if this rationale makes sense pragmatically, does it explain why SCt has constitutional authority to invalidate state laws on this basis? If authority is not explicit, does this mean that framers in Philadelphia made a whopping error? If so, what ought SC do about it?

City of Philadelphia V. New Jersey – dcc – No solid waste

• Stewart 1978. Most basic black letter law of DCC.

• Facts. This case involved a NJ statute prohibiting the importing of most solid or liquid waste into the state. The law was enacted in response to the use of NJ landfills for disposal of waste from cities in Pennsylvania and NY. Several NJ operators and out-of-state users of the landfill sites (including Philadelphia) sued to have the statute invalidated on the ground that it discriminated against interstate commerce.

• Holding

• Statute stricken. By 7-2 vote, SCt struck the statute as violative of Commerce Clause. Stewart concluded that the law was “basically a protectionist measure,” rather than a way of resolving legitimate local concerns.

• Stewart noted two ways in which states could violate DCC.

1. “Simple Economic Protectionism,” for which there is a “virtually per se rule of invalidity.”

2. Incidental burdens on interstate commerce that are clearly excessive in relation to the local benefit [a balancing test from Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. (304)]. State bears burden of showing that burdens on interstate commerce are incidental rather than intentional, and that local benefit is not excessively outweighed by burden on interstate commerce.

• Stewart held NJ’s law was discriminatory on its face and therefore flunked test of “simple economic protectionism.”

1. Purpose unclear. The opinion declined to decide whether the main purpose of the statute was to protect the state’s environment and its inhabitants’ health and safety (as NJ claimed) or to stabilize the costs of waste disposal for NJ residents at the expense of out-of-state interests (as Ps claimed).

2. Discriminatory means. However, it was unnecessary to decide this issue because “the evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends.” Since NJ had chosen a discriminatory means of furthering its objectives (whatever those objectives were), it was a protectionist measure. That is, “it imposes on out-of-state commercial interests the full burden of conserving the State’s remaining landfill space. It is an attempt by one State to isolate itself from a problem common to many by erecting a barrier against the movement of interstate trade.”

3. Per se rule of invalidity. In striking the statute, SCt suggested, though it did not explicitly state, that the same “virtually per se rule of invalidity” which had previously been applied in cases of protectionism should be extended to non-economic regulations such as the one at hand.

• Quarantine laws distinguished. Stewart’s opinion attempted to distinguish quarantine laws (e.g. laws preventing the importation of diseased or otherwise dangerous livestock or goods into a state), which had often been upheld by SCt. Such quarantine laws banned importation of materials which, at the moment of importation, were hazardous. Here, by contrast, the solid waste whose importation was prohibited by NJ endangered health (if at all) only when buried in landfill sites, by which time there was no valid reason to differentiate between out-of-state and domestic garbage.

• Dissent - Rehnquist. Contended that quarantine law cases supported NJ law. He saw no reason why NJ “may ban the importation of items whose movement risks contagion, but cannot ban the importation of items which, although they may be transported into the State without undue hazard, will then simply pile up in an ever increasing danger to the public’s health and safety.” Dissent found it reasonable for NJ to guard against a worsening of its own waste disposal problem by banning addition of out-of-state waste.