- •Constitutional Law – Spring 1999
- •Federalism - Vertical distribution of government power a government of enumerated powers - Why does federalism matter?
- •Implied powers - McCulloch V. Maryland – Bank of the u.S.
- •“Substantially affecting” commerce
- •Pre New Deal Gibbons V. Ogden – New York steamboat monopoly
- •United States V. E.C. Knight - Manufacture vs. Commerce – Sugar monopoly
- •Substantial economic effects and stream of commerce
- •The Shreveport Rate Cases – Substantial economic effects – Railroad rates
- •Police power
- •Champion V. Ames - The Lottery Case
- •Hammer V. Dagenhart - Child labor
- •Stafford V. Wallace - Stream of commerce
- •Summary of pre-New Deal law on commerce clause
- •The New Deal Crisis and the Rise of the Welfare State
- •Schechter Poultry Corp. V. United States
- •Carter V. Carter Coal Co.
- •Modern Trend
- •Nlrb V. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. - Expanded “substantial economic effect”
- •Wickard V. Filburn - The “cumulative effect” theory
- •United States V. Darby - police power regulations - Minimum wage
- •Civil rights cases and the commerce clause Heart of Atlanta Motel V. United States – Local incident of interstate commerce
- •Katzenbach V. McClung – Ollie’s bbq
- •Effect of Lopez
- •Judicial abdication during New Deal
- •United States V. Lopez – Latest word – Guns and schools do mix
- •Reconciling Lopez with New Deal
- •Current status of commerce clause
- •Does Lopez provide workable rule of law?
- •Spending power United States V. Butler - Beyond enumerated powers
- •Steward Machine Co. V. Davis
- •South Dakota V. Dole - National drinking age
- •Pennhurst State School & Hospital V. Halderman
- •Dormant commerce clause (dcc) – Protection against facial discrimination
- •Gibbons V. Ogden – New York steamboat monopoly
- •Willson V. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co.
- •Cooley V. Board of Port Wardens (1851) – “Cooley test” – That which is by nature national
- •Modern dcc doctrine
- •City of Philadelphia V. New Jersey – dcc – No solid waste
- •West Lynn Creamery, Inc. V. Healy – Milk tax subsidizes in-state farmers
- •Bobbitt’s modalities and the dcc?
- •Garcia V. San Antonio mta - Overruled National League of Cities – Minimum wage
- •Use of state’s lawmaking mechanisms
- •New York V. United States - Waste disposal
- •Printz V. United States – Brady Bill – Don’t No commandeer state executive
- •Possible McCulloch theory underlying New York and Printz
- •U.S. Term Limits V. Thornton
- •Other Federalism premises The treaty and war powers Missouri V. Holland – Migratory birds
- •Woods V. Cloyd w. Miller Co.
- •The taxing power Bailey V. Drexel Furniture Co.
- •The guarantee clause and the reconstruction amendments
- •Texas V. White
- •Validity of 13th and 14th Amendments
- •The power to enforce the reconstruction amendments
- •Katzenbach V. Morgan – Spanish speaking voters
- •City of Boerne V. Flores – rfra Unconstitutional
- •Limitations on state regulation
- •Typology of Powers
- •Preemption
- •The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV
- •United Building Council V. Camden - No market participant exception for pic
- •Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. V. Ward
- •Facially neutral statutes with significant effects on interstate commerce
- •Exxon Corp. V. Governor of Maryland
- •Hunt V. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n
- •Separation of powers - Horizontal distribution of national power Distribution of national power - Why does separation of powers matter?
- •Formalism vs. Functionalism
- •Judicial review Marbury V. Madison – Supreme Court review of congressional statutes
- •Theoretical foundation of judicial review
- •Martin V. Hunter’s Lessee – Supreme Court review of state court decisions
- •Judicial exclusivity Cooper V. Aaron - Federal judiciary is supreme – sCt binds states
- •Does judicial review imply judicial supremacy?
- •Departmentalism
- •Jurisdiction and standing
- •Ex Parte McCardle - Congressional control of appellate jurisdiction
- •United States V. Klein
- •Good confusion
- •Case or Controversy Requirement
- •Standing
- •Allen V. Wright - irs tax-exempt status for segregated private school
- •Lujan V. Defenders of the Wildlife – Endangered Species Act
- •Raines V. Byrd - Line item veto
- •Perspective on cases
- •Political question doctrine
- •Baker V. Carr - Apportionment of the Tennessee Assembly
- •Luther V. Borden - Guaranty clause non-justiciable
- •Why is there a political question doctrine?
- •Davis V. Bandemer - Unconstitutional gerrymandering justiciable
- •Nixon V. United States - Impeachment non-justiciable
- •Coleman V. Miller - Congress gets to say whether usc has been amended
- •Dames & Moore V. Regan - Iran hostage settlement
- •Executive privilege United States V. Nixon – Watergate tapes
- •Reviewability of executive privilege decisions
- •Scope of executive privilege
- •Presidential immunity
- •Mississippi V. Johnson
- •Nixon V. Fitzgerald
- •Harlow V. Fitzgerald
- •Clinton V. Jones
- •Law versus politics
- •Nixon V. Administrator of General Services
- •Law as politics
- •Impeachment
- •Law and politics
- •Bicameralism and presentment
- •Ins V. Chadha - One house veto provision stricken
- •General critique by Koppelman
- •Single-house actions approved by usc
- •Chadha in context - Legislative control of the bureaucracy
- •Future directions
- •Administrative agencies and the separation of powers
- •Meyers V. United States
- •The rise of independent agencies
- •Humphrey’s Executor V. United States - ftc member removal
- •Wiener V. United States - War Claims Commission removal
- •Buckley V. Valeo - Appointments Clause and fec – Officer of the u.S.
- •Various assessments of Myers, Humphrey’s Executor, and Buckley.
- •Bowsher V. Synar - Good-bye Gramm-Rudman
- •Commitment and the budget
- •Appointments power - Congressional control over administrative officials Chadha and Bowsher
- •Morrison and Bowsher
- •Koppelman on Morrison and Mistretta
- •Freytag V. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
- •Weiss V. United States
- •Edmond V. United States
- •Justice Scalia’s Bowsher and Mistretta dissents
- •Congressional control of administrative agencies after Chadha and Bowsher
- •Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority
- •Non delegation doctrine and “quasi-constitutional” statutes
- •Introduction
- •Panama Refining Co. V. Ryan
- •Schechter Poultry Corp. V. United States
- •Demise of non-delegation doctrine
- •Amalgamated Meat Cutters V. Connally
- •Touby V. United States
- •Loving V. United States
- •Arguments in favor of reviving non-delegation doctrine d. Schoenbrod
- •Industrial Union V. American Petroleum Institute – Rehnquist dissent
- •Ely (Democracy and Distrust)
- •Stewart – against non delegation doctrine
- •Lowi’s assessment of the “new” Constitution
- •Structural statutes
- •Executive authority – foreign Control of foreign affairs
- •United States V. Curtiss-Wright Corp. – Foreign arms sales embargo
- •Text, history, and presidential power
- •Functionalism and the autonomy of constitutional interpretation
- •Allocation of war making authority
- •Approaches toward reconciling these provisions
- •Prize Cases - President’s power to use armed forces
- •Orlando V. Laird – Vietnam non-justiciable
- •Dellums V. Bush – The Persian Gulf War
- •Un “peacekeeping” or “peace enforcement”
- •Legislative authority - foreign The War Powers Resolution
- •War Powers Resolution is unconstitutional
- •The War Powers Resolution is constitutional
- •Practice under the Resolution
- •The Constitution without courts – War Powers and Boland
- •Other separation of powers premises Treaties
- •Executive Agreements
- •Dames & Moore V. Regan - Constitutional limits on scope of executive agreements
- •United States V. Belmont
- •Congressional-executive agreements
- •Impoundment
- •Line item vetoes
- •Unfunded mandates
- •New York V. United States – No unfunded mandates – 10th Amendment
- •Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of 1995.
- •Contract with America
- •Constitutional amendment to balance the budget
- •Morrison V. Olson – Special prosecutor laws
- •Mistretta V. United States – u.S. Sentencing Commission
- •Final thoughts on separation of powers
- •Individual rights Overview
- •Equal protection Utility of equal protection analysis
- •Race and the Constitution
- •Slavery and the Constitution
- •State V. Post
- •Dred Scott V. Sanford
- •Reconstruction and retreat Strauder V. West Virginia – Invalidated law barring blacks from juries
- •Plessy V. Ferguson – Separate but equal – Railroad cars
- •Equal protection methodology - strict scrutiny Korematsu V. United States (Black 1944) – Japanese wwii interment
- •Overview of equal protection doctrine
- •The attack on Jim Crow Brown V. Board of Education of Topeka (Brown I) – School desegregation
- •Bolling V. Sharpe - 14th Amendment equal protection federal via 5th Amendment
- •Brown II
- •Facially neutral laws that disadvantage minorities Washington V. Davis
- •Privileges or immunities – 14th Amendment
- •The Slaughter-House Cases – New Orleans slaughtering monopoly
- •Slaugheter-House remains good law
- •Incorporation
- •Barron V. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore
- •Murray V. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.
- •Twining V. New Jersey
- •Palko V. Connecticut – Double jeopardy
- •Adamson V. California – Black dissent - Total incorporation
- •Duncan V. Louisiana
- •Contracts clause - Protecting economic liberties - Textual Fletcher V. Peck – Corrupt land sale contract not voidable by State
- •Ogden V. Saunders – State bankruptcy law valid prospectively
- •Calder V. Bull – Ex post facto - Historical Modality – Criminal only
- •Home Building and Loan Assn. V. Blaisdell
- •Modern contracts clause law and ak analysis
- •Substantive due process - Protecting economic interests - “Redistribution”
- •Lochner V. New York – Time to make the donuts – No maximum hours for bakers
- •Ak’s lecture on Lochner
- •Civil War makes Lochner look less crazy
- •Structural and ethical basis for Lochner holding
- •Dissent - Harlan
- •Dissent - Holmes
- •Forming an opinion of Lochner
- •Lochner Era - most significant judicial interventions in American history
- •Munn V. Illinois - Escape hatch from Lochner – “Public interest”
- •Muller V. Oregon – Another escape hatch – Women “special class”
- •Bailey V. Alabama – Personal service contracts enforced by jail time no more
- •Nebbia V. New York
- •West Coast Hotel Co. V. Parrish – The death of Lochner – Female minimum wage
- •United States V. Carolene Products Co. – Filled milk
- •Williamson V. Lee Optical - Full employment for ophthalmologists
- •Ferguson V. Skrupa
- •Summary of substantive due process - Economic rights
- •Privacy, personhood, and family - Modern Substantive due process West Virginia State Board of Education V. Barnette - Overview
- •The right of privacy
- •Individual rights after the New Deal
- •Meyer V. Nebraska – Okay to teach foreign language to school children
- •Pierce V. Society of Sisters
- •Griswold V. Connecticut - Condommania
- •Eisenstadt V. Baird
- •Abortion
- •Roe V. Wade
- •Roe and Griswold
- •Planned Parenthood V. Casey – Abortion waiting period and other restrictions
- •Ak’s approach to abortion question
- •Bowers V. Hardwick - Sodomy
- •Washington V. Glucksberg - Physician-assisted suicide
- •Sex and sexual orientation Reed V. Reed
- •Frontiero V. Richardson – Classification based on sex inherently suspect
- •Craig V. Boren – Beer sales to 18 – 20 year-old women only, not men
- •United States V. Virginia – vmi gender integration
- •Other Candidates for heightened scrutiny Romer V. Evans – Special rights for gays
- •Brown V. Board of Education (1954): 14th Amendment, Equal Protection
- •Bolling V. Sharpe (1954): 5th Amendment, Equal Protection, Due Process
- •Marbury V. Madison (1803): Judicial Review, Interpret Constitution
- •Cooper V. Aaron (1958): Judicial Review, Interpret Constitution
- •Swann V. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. Ed. (1971): 14th Amendment, Segregation
- •Freeman V. Pitts (1992): 14th Amendment, School Desegregation
- •Martin V. Hunter’s Lessee (1816): Supremacy Clause, Judicial Review
- •McCulloch V. Maryland (1819): Implied Power, 10th Amendment
- •Us Term Limits V. Thornton (1995): 10th Amendment, Term Limits
- •Gibbons V. Ogden (1824): Commerce Clause, Federal V. States
- •Us V. E.C. Knight (1895): Commerce, Anti-Trust
- •Champion V. Ames [lottery case] (1903): Commerce
- •Swift & Co. V. Us (1905): Commerce, “Current of Commerce”
- •The Shreveport Rate Case (1914): Commerce, “close and substantial relation”
- •Hammer V. Dagenhart (1918): Commerce, 10th Amendment
- •Nlrb V. Jones & Laughlin (1937) Commerce Clause, New Deal legislation
- •Us V. Darby (1941): Commerce Clause, Child Labor, Manufacturing
- •Heart of Atlanta Motel (1964): Commerce Clause, Civil Rights Act 1964
- •Katzenbach V. McClung (1964): Commerce Clause, Civil Rights Act 1964
- •Us V. Lopez (1995): Commerce Clause, Guns in school zone
- •South Dakota V. Dole (1987): Commerce Clause, 21st Amendment
- •Missouri V. Holland (1920): 10th Amendment
- •Katzenbach V. Morgan (s.Car.) (1966): 14th a., Due Process, Literacy to Vote
- •Boerne City V. Flores (1997): 1st a. Free exercise V. 14th a. Legislative authority
- •Jones V. Mayer Co. (1968): 13th Amendment, Equal Housing
- •Garcia V. San Antonio Metro Transit Auth. (1985) 10th a., Federalism
- •New York V. United States (1992): 10th Amendment, Supremacy Clause
- •Printz V. United States (1997): 10th a., Commerce Clause, Original Intent
- •Cooley V. Board of Wardens (1852): Federalism, Concurrent Powers
- •City of Philadelphia V. New Jersey (1978): Dormant Commerce Clause
- •Kassel V. Consolidated Freightways Corp. (1981): Safety V. Commerce
- •West Lynn Creamery, Inc. V. Healy (1994): Interstate Commerce
- •Corfield V. Coryell (1823): Privilege and Immunity Clause
- •United Bldg. V. Camden (1984) Privilege & Immunity V. Commerce Clause
- •Youngstown Co. V. Sawyer (1952): Separation of Powers, Emergency power
- •Us V. Curtiss-Wright Corp. (1936) Separation of Power, External V. Internal
- •Dames & Moore V. Regan (1981): Implicit powers
- •Korematsu V. United States (1944): Emergency Executive Order
- •United States V. Nixon (1974): Executive Privilege
- •Clinton V. Jones (1997): Separation of Powers, Presidential Immunity
- •Mistretta V. United States (1989) “Non delegation” of Congressional Power
- •Ins V. Chadha (1983): Legislative Veto
- •Clinton V. City of New York (1998): Separation of Powers, Line Item Veto
- •Bowsher V. Synar: (1986): Separation of Powers
- •Morrison V. Olson (1988): Separation of Powers, Independent Counsel
- •Northern Pipeline Co. V. Marathon (1982): Separation of powers, delegation
- •Commodity Futures t.C. V. Schor (1986): Separation of Power, delegation
- •Ex Parte McCardle (1869) Separation of Powers, Exceptions clause
- •Baker V. Carr (1962): Limits on Judicial Power, Political Questions
- •Nixon V. United States (1993): Limits, Political Question
- •Raines V. Byrd (1997): Limits, Standing
- •Allen V. Wright (1984): Limits, Standing
- •Lujan V. Defenders of Wildlife (1975): Limits, Standing
- •Missouri V. Jenkins (II) (1990): Limit, Scope of remedy
- •Missouri V Jenkins (III) (1995): Limits Jurisdiction
- •Fletcher V. Peck (1810): Economic Liberties, Property Rights
- •Ogden V. Saunders (1827): Economic Liberties, Contracts Clause
- •Calder V. Bull: (1798): Economic Liberties, Ex post facto
- •The Slaughter House Cases (1873): Economic Liberties, 13th, 14th a, Monopolies
- •Palko V. Connecticut (1937): Double Jeopardy, Due Process (14th a.)
- •Adamson V. California (1947): 5th a. Not part of Due Process (14th a.)
- •Skinner V. Oklahoma (1942): Due Process, Sterilization
- •Lochner V. New York (1905): Substantive Due Process, Freedom to Contract
- •Bailey V. Alabama (1910): 13th a., Race Discrimination
- •West Coast Hotel V. Parrish (1937): 5th, 14th a., Freedom to Contract
- •Williamson V. Lee Optical (1955): 14th a., Due Process, Judicial Power
- •Meyer V. Nebraska (1923): 14th a., Due Process, Privacy
- •Poe V. Ullman (1961): 14th a., Due Process, Individual Rights, “Ripeness”
- •Griswold V. Connecticut (1965): 14th, 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 9th a., Privacy
- •Roe V. Wade (1973): Privacy, Abortion (9th, 14th a.)
- •Planned Parenthood V. Casey (1992): Privacy, Abortion
- •Bowers V. Hardwick (1986): Fundamental Rights, Sodomy, 8th a.
- •Washington V. Glucksberg (1997): Privacy, Right to Die, 14th a.
- •Railway Express Agency V. New York (1949): 14th a., Rational Basis review
- •Fcc V. Beach Communications (1993): 5th, 14th a, Rational Basis Review
- •Bradwell V. Illinois (1873): 14th a., Gender Discrimination
- •Frontiero V. Richardson (1973): 5th a., Gender Discrimination
- •Craig V. Boren (1976): 14th a., Gender Discrimination
- •U.S. V. Virginia (1996): 14th a., Gender Discrimination
- •Watkins V. U.S. Army (1989): 14th a, Gay Discrimination, Status V. Conduct
- •Romer V. Evans (1996): 14th a., Gay Discrimination, political participation
- •Baehr V. Lewin (1993): Gay Marriage, Equal Rights
Meyer V. Nebraska – Okay to teach foreign language to school children
1923. SCt struck down a state law that prohibited the teaching of foreign languages to young children. SCt held that the term “liberty,” as used in the 14th Amendment, included many non-economic, but nonetheless important, rights; the right of teachers to teach, and that of students to acquire knowledge, were among these. SCt applied what appears to have been a “mere rationality” test (rather than any kind of strict scrutiny), but nonetheless concluded that the statute was “without reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the State.”
Pierce V. Society of Sisters
1925. SCt struck down a state statute requiring children to attend public schools, and thus preventing them from attending private and parochial ones. This decision rested on the “liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.” SCt denied the power of the state to “standardize its children” by forcing them to accept only public instruction.
Griswold V. Connecticut - Condommania
Douglas 1965. First major modern-era case which used a substantive-due-process-like approach to protect a fundamental right; invalidated a statute that prohibited the use of contraceptives.
Facts. The statute at issue was a Connecticut law which forbade the use of contraceptives (and made this use a criminal offense); the statute also forbade the aiding or counseling of others in their use. The Ds were the director of the local Planned Parenthood Association and its medical director; they were charged with aiding and abetting the violation of the statute. Before the decision, Planned Parenthood operated buses to shuttle women to NY, where they could legally visit birth control clinics. What was really at stake was whether the organization could provide birth control information within the state’s boundaries. Ds were convicted of counseling married persons in the use of contraceptives. No users, married or single, were charged in the case.
Relevance to Lochner.
Griswold might have been conceptualized in Lochner terms: the sale of contraceptives involved willing buyers, willing sellers, and a meddlesome interference by the state.
That argument was a sure loser in 1905: one of the most important exceptions to Lochner’s libertarianism was the protection of “public morals.” [but realize that in litigation in 1939, Planned Parenthood’s citations to Lochner-like cases persuaded lower CT court to strike down statutes as unconstitutional, before 1940 decision of CT SCt upheld statute as legitimate regulation of public morals.]
In 1965, Lochner itself was long dead. But Bruce Ackerman emphasizes the unresolved question of how much of the old order had been slain. “How sweeping was the New Deal transformation?
Should it be interpreted as completely obliterating the Founding affirmations of private ordering previously expressed in the rhetoric of freedom of contract? Or
Should the courts continue to re-present the Founding concern for personal liberty by marking off for special protection areas of life that seem far removed from the New Dealers’ demand to regulate ‘free’ markets for the general welfare?”
Majority strikes statute. SCt, by a 7-2 vote, struck down the statute.
Douglas began by rejecting the invitation to follow Lochner; majority opinion declined to make explicit use of the substantive due process doctrine. Instead, he turned to the text, specifically the guarantees of the bill of rights. He held that these “have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help given them life and substance.” (942). The SCt then concluded that the right of married persons to use contraceptives fell within this penumbra. For him, the text, once again, points beyond itself to a larger principle. That principle, however, is in the text. [Douglas, no more than Peckham, adopts any “notion of a living constitution.”].
The text led Douglas to a structural and purposive analysis from which, through inductive reasoning, he arrived at the right to privacy. Argument on 942 can be summarized thus.
Purpose of the guarantees of the first, third, fourth, and fifth amendments is to protect the privacy of the home.
This law could not be enforced without violating that privacy.
Therefore, the law is unconstitutional.
Examples. Thus the SCt claimed that 1st Amendment, by its explicit protection of the freedoms of speech and of the press, has “emanations” which create a “penumbra”; it is this penumbra which protects, for instance, the freedom of association, a freedom not explicitly mentioned in the USC. Similarly, the 4th Amendment’s ban on unreasonable searches has a penumbra which protects privacy interests, as do the 3rd, 5th, and 9th Amendments. Collectively, these Amendments establish a zone in which “privacy is protected from governmental instrusion.”
Why the statute was invalid. Douglas’ majority opinion did not specify exactly how the Connecticut ban on contraceptives violated this penumbra of privacy. But a good part of the rationale seemed to have to do with the privacy implications of proof in prosecutions. Thus the SCt asked: “Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?” Douglass concluded that “[t]he very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.”
Critique. Douglas’ argument is vulnerable. As Black’s dissent insists, none of these specific provisions protects a general right to privacy. The penumbras argument works only if ,as with freedom of association, the liberty in question is indispensible to the exercise of an enumerated liberty.
For example of a penumbra argument that works, consider NAACP v. Alabama, which Douglas cites at 942. This case involved an attempt by Attorney General of Alabama to force NAACP to disclose names of its members. SCt held that the NAACP did not need to disclose names, because such compelled disclosure could restrain the organization’s constitutionally protected freedoms of speech and association. SCt noted that NAACP had shown that “on past occasions, revelation of the identity of its rank-and-file members has exposed these members to economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility. NAACP v. Alabama really was a case in which an unenumerated right -- here, the right to keep one’s membership secret – was necessary to the exercise of an enumerated right. Indeed, it was clear that the real reason Alabama wanted the list was that, by disclosing the names, it could stifle unwelcome dissent.
No such argument seems available in Griswold. Douglas acknowledged at the end of his opinion that marriage “promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths.” This would seem to take it outside the protection of the first amendment. Douglas is left with the claim that the marriage relationship is specifically protected in its privacy because it is “an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.” The issue, as he has formulated it, is not, however, whether the privacy right is for a noble purpose, but whether it is necessary to the exercise of an enumerated right and therefore qualifies as an implied right.
The concern about police searches at the end is pure makeweight. As noted above, the police did not need to search any bedrooms in order to prove their case. What was at issue here was ability of Planned Parenthood to operate a birth control clinic near the center of town in New Haven.
Concurrences. There were three separate concurring opinions. None of the concurrences focus on the problem of reconciling the 14th Amendment with the New Deal to the extent that Douglas does. All agreed with the Douglas opinion’s basic conclusion that the Connecticut statute violated the 14th Amendment interest in liberty, but each reached this conclusion by different means.
Goldberg’s concurrence, which relies on the 9th Amendment, and Harlan’s concurrence, which looks to the due process clause, both envision a living, evolving constitution, and read these provisions as giving effect to values that are rooted in the traditions of our people.
Goldberg’s Ninth Amendment View. Goldberg believed that the 14th Amendment’s Due Process Clause protected all “fundamental” rights, whether or not these were explicitly listed in the Bill of Rights. He contended that the 9th Amendment (which provides that “[t]he enumeration in the USC, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people”) supported this view, because it “shows a belief of the USC’s authors that fundamental rights exist that are not expressly enumerated in the first eight Amendments.” Just as the 9th Amendment showed that certain rights not enumerated in the Bill of Rights were protected as against the federal government, so the 14th Amendment should be found to protect against state action fundamental rights, including some not enumerated in the Bill of Rights. Goldberg found the right of “marital privacy” to be among such fundamental rights, and argued that the statute unconstitutionally violated that right, because it was not necessary for the fulfilling of a “compelling” state objective.
Harlan’s “ordered liberty” approach. Harlan’s concurrence was essentially in accord with Goldberg’s. Harlan argued that the 14th Amendment Due Process Clause does not merely incorporate the specific Bill of Rights guarantees, but instead “stands . . . on its own bottom,” to protect those basic values “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” He then relied on his prior dissent in Poe v. Ullman (1961), which had contended that the same Connecticut statute violated the due process interest in marital privacy.
Harlan quoted the test of Palko, which asked whether the right in question is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” and thus appears to look more to political philosophy, a la Calder v. Bull, than to tradition.
But the rest of his opinion is tradition-based, and his Poe dissent is the classic defense of that approach.
AK: Do Harlan’s references to tradition and settled norms help alleviate concerns about judicial subjectivity? What makes the right in question here fundamental? Why should the SCt be the bulwark against departures from a well-established status quo?
No protection outside of marriage: Harlan’s Griswold/Poe opinions stopped carefully short of finding a general right to privacy for sexual relations. He explicitly rejected the idea that adultery, homosexuality, fornication and incest were protected by the same right to privacy. He distinguished these from the marital relations situation by nothing that the state allows (even encourages) the marital relation, and should therefore not be permitted to use the criminal law to regulate the intimate details of that relation. By contrast, the state completely forbids the other types of sexual relations, so that it may permissibly regulate the details of those forbidden relations as well.
White’s means-end test. White’s concurrence focused on the means-end relationship. He would apparently have upheld the statute had it been “reasonably necessary for the effectuation of a legitimate and substantial state interest.” But the Connecticut statute, which supposedly served the state’s policy against promiscuity and illicit sex, was drawn too broadly: there was no need to ban the use of birth control by married couples in order to achieve this objective. Thus White would presumably have upheld the ban as applied to the use of birth control by unmarried couples.
Dissent. Both of the dissenters think that footnote four of Carolene Products exhausts the protection from governmental intrusion that USC affords. For Black, this is just Lochner all over again. Is it?
Black. Reiterated his familiar argument that only those rights explicitly protected by a specific Bill of Rights (or other constitutional) provision were protected by the 14th Amendment; he felt that “no right of privacy,” in the broad and general way the majority used that term, was protected by any specific provision.
Stewart. Similarly failed to find a right of privacy in any specific guarantee, and also rejected the Goldberg 9th Amendment rationale (claiming that it limited only the powers of federal government).
