Poe V. Ullman (1961): 14th a., Due Process, Individual Rights, “Ripeness”

• An old Connecticut law prohibited the use of contraceptive devices and the giving of medical advice in the use of those devices. The law also applied to married couples. The Conn. Atty. Gen. threatened to enforce the law against three individuals in this case including Jane Doe (Doe v. Pullman). Mrs. Doe, having recovered from a tough pregnancy that threatened her life and left her with several emotional and physical disabilities, was informed by her physician that any additional pregnancies could be fatal. She challenged the Connecticut law since it criminalized her use of contraceptives.

• Majority: FRANKFURTER: The court sidestepped the issue for “ripeness,” which is a term that means the case was brought too early, or because not all avenues of relief have been explored. The Court said that the record suggested that the sate was unlikely to prosecute the offenders, and the Court lacks the jurisdiction to decide hypothetical cases. Since the statute had been on the state's books for over three-quarters of a century without ever having been enforced, the Court found no sense of "immediacy which is an indispensable condition of constitutional adjudication."

• Dissent: BLACK, DOUGLAS, HARLAN, STEWART: There are two issue here, whether the Court should decide the issue of the Constitutional effect on birth control and privacy, and what the decision of the Court should be. While some justices made their point of view clear, others were not so clear.

Griswold V. Connecticut (1965): 14th, 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 9th a., Privacy

• Griswold was the Ex. Dir. of the Planned Parenthood League of Conn. Both she and the Medical Director for the League gave information, instruction, and other medical advice to married couples concerning birth control. Griswold and her colleague were convicted under a Conn. law that criminalized the provision of counseling and other medical treatment, to married persons for purposes of preventing conception. Does the Constitution protect the right of marital privacy against state restrictions on a couple's ability to be counseled in the use of contraceptives?

• Majority: DOUGLAS: The Court held that the law violated the Due Process Clause of the 14^th A.; “Emanations” and “penumbras” from the 1^st A. (including association and privacy); and other privacy values derived from the 3^rd, 4^th, 5^th, and 9^th A. Goldberg, Warren, and Brennan primarily relied on the 9^th A.

• Dissent: BLACK, STEWART: “Evil qualities of the law do not make it unconstitutional. There is no specific prohibition on Gov. not to invade privacy. It is not the Court’s job to change the Constitution.

Roe V. Wade (1973): Privacy, Abortion (9th, 14th a.)

• Roe, a Texas resident, sought to terminate her pregnancy by abortion. Texas law prohibited abortions except to save the pregnant woman's life. After granting cert., the Court heard arguments twice. The first time, Roe's attorney, Sarah Weddington, could not locate the constitutional hook of her argument for Justice Stewart. Her opponent, Jay Floyd, misfired from the start. Weddington sharpened her constitutional argument in the second round. Her new opponent, Robert Flowers, came under strong questioning from Justices Stewart and Marshall. Does the Constitution embrace a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy by abortion?

• Majority: BLACKMUN, The Court held that a woman's right to an abortion fell within the right to privacy (recognized in Griswold) protected by the 14^th A. the decision gave a woman total autonomy over the pregnancy during the first trimester and defined different levels of state interest for the second and third trimesters. As a result, the laws of 46 states were affected by the Court's ruling. [The Court's majority opinion received sharp criticism from all quarters on the ground that it was not a constitutional decision. In a 1993 interview, the Blackmun sought to convince the public, if not his critics, that he was on firm constitutional ground.]

• Dissent: REHNQUIST, WHITE: “The Court simply fashions and announces a new constitutional right for pregnant mothers… with scarcely any reason or authority for its action.” “The Court apparently values the convenience of the pregnant mother more than continued existence and development the life or potential life that she carries.

• GINSBURG, in an address in 1993, wrote that the Court should have just overturned the statute without going further. Then the debate would have been reduced, and the legislature would still be in control of the political question.