Hammer V. Dagenhart (1918): Commerce, 10th Amendment

• In 1916 congress passed legislation to prohibit the transportation in interstate commerce of goods made at factory where children worked to young (or worked too often for their age).

• Majority: DAY: The statute is intended to stop those manufacturers who employ children from engaging in interstate commerce. The act in its effect does not regulate transportation among states, but aims to standardize the ages at which children may be employed in manufacturing. The goods being shipped are harmless, unlike the decisions in the past (i.e. Lottery tickets). “There is no power vested in Congress to exercise their police power so as to prevent possible unfair competition.” This statute exceeds the power of commerce clause, and invades states’ responsibilities.

• Dissent: HOLMES (with 3 others): “The statute confines itself to prohibiting interstate commerce” which is allowed. “The act does not meddle with anything belonging to the States. They may regulate their internal affairs and their domestic commerce as they like. But when they seek to send their products across the state line they are no longer within their rights.” If there was no Congress and no Constitution, it would be up to the neighboring states, but under Constitution, Congress can regulate. Congress “may carry out its views of public policy whatever indirect effect they may have upon the activities of states.

Nlrb V. Jones & Laughlin (1937) Commerce Clause, New Deal legislation

• In 1935, Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act, concluding that labor disputes had a direct burden on interstate commerce, and could therefore be regulated under the commerce clause. Congress relied on the “close and substantial” relationship of act wholly with in the state to interstate commerce to control those also. In the 1936 election, Roosevelt would pack the court to pass New Deal legislation, but in this case, Hughes and Roberts supported the 3 liberals (Brandeis, Cordozo, Stone) in allowing the NLRB

• Majority: HUGHES: The court accepted Congress’s argument that labor disputes directly burdened or obstructed interstate and foreign commerce and could be regulated under the COMMERCE clause. The National Labor Relations Act gave employees in industry the fundamental right to organize and engage in collective bargaining, and any intrastate commerce with a CLOSE and SUBSTANTIAL to interstate commerce could be regulated. The Court allowed Congress to give the NLRB power to prohibit unfair labor practice “effecting commerce”

• Dissent: McREYNOLDS, VAN DEVANTER, SUTHERLAND, BUTLER: The “close and substantial” as well as the “stream” of commerce test step over he constitutional bounds of Commerce Clause. Also, people have the right to contract with whomever they want, and to freely select those who work for him, which the right to collective bargaining would take away.

Us V. Darby (1941): Commerce Clause, Child Labor, Manufacturing

• The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 provided for minimum wages and maximum hours for employees engaged in production of goods for interstate commerce. The statute forced the Court to rethink its doctrine on “manufacture”. If manufacture is not in itself interstate commerce, would the shipment of manufactured goods to other states bring it within the authority of Congress to regulate? The statute, also included Child Labor laws, so the court had to revisit Hammer v. Dagenhart. The composition of the court has drastically changed and Hammer is overturned.

• Majority: STONE: “The power over interstate commerce is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the constitution.” (Language borrowed from Gibbons v. Ogden.) “The power can neither be enlarged nor diminished by the exercise or non-exercise of state power.” This answers Hammer, which said that the product being shipped must be harmful or the any shipment of product prohibited.