City of Philadelphia V. New Jersey (1978): Dormant Commerce Clause

• A New Jersey law prohibited most “solid or liquid waste which originated or was collected outside the territorial limits of the State.” Private landfill operators challenged the statute on preemption and DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE grounds. The Dormant Commerce Clause principal states that in cases when Congress does not exercise its commerce power, and the authority is considered silent or “dormant”. In such situations, the Court may decide that a state action is forbidden by the Commerce Clause, which is the case here. However, if Congress then enacts legislation to permit the state action, the court will acquiesce to the congressional policy.

• Majority: STEWART: The Court accepted that the purpose of the statute was to deal with nearly full landfills. However, the Court said that the purpose “may not be accomplished by discriminating against articles of commerce from outside the state unless there is a reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently. The Court said that New Jersey could stop ALL waste form going into the landfills, but the “State is without power to prevent privately owned articles owned articles of trade from being shipped and sold in interstate commerce on the ground they are required to satisfy local demand, or because they are needed by the people of the state.

• Dissent: REHNQUIST, BURGER: The dissent focuses on the “danger” of waste, instead of the commerce issue. Rehnquist treats the law as a “quarantine” law, and says the Commerce clause was not intended to put the states in the no win situation of not being able to put its own waste in landfills, as the majority suggests.

Kassel V. Consolidated Freightways Corp. (1981): Safety V. Commerce

• Consolidated, a large common carrier, argues that an Iowa law restricting the length and size of Trucks on interstates is an Unconstitutional burden on INTERSTATE COMMERCE. Iowa contends that the law is valid because it is based on safety justifications. The court ruled the statue unconstitutional (6-3)

• Majority: POWELL: State regulations on SAFETY, and especially highway safety, if not “illusory” will not be second-guessed in comparison with burdens on Interstate Commerce. Those who challenge such “bona fide” safety regulations must overcome a “strong presumption of validity.” However, the incantation of a purpose to promote public health or safety does not insulate a state law from Commerce Clause Attack. There must be a “sensitive consideration of the weight and nature of the state regulatory concern in light of the burden on interstate commerce.

• Dissent: REHNQUIST, BURGER, STEWART: Again, appearing to look past the commerce clause to the specific issue: “The result in this case suggests, that the only state truck length law that is valid is one which this court has not been able to get its hands on.” The dissent is a strong support for State’s power.

West Lynn Creamery, Inc. V. Healy (1994): Interstate Commerce

• Massachusetts imposed a nondiscriminatory tax on wholesale milk, but coupled the tax with a subsidy to Mass. dairy farmers that was greater than the tax. The Court declared the tax and subsidy a burden interstate commerce.

• Majority: STEVENS: This tax and subsidy has same effect as a “tariff”, which makes out of state milk more expensive. The tax alone is constitutional, “However, when a nondiscriminatory tax is coupled with a subsidy to one of the groups hurt by the tax, a state’s political process can no longer be relied upon to prevent legislative abuse, because one of the in-state interests which would otherwise lobby against the tax has been mollified by the subsidy.”

• Dissent: REHNQUIST, BLACKMUN: did not like defense of Dormant Commerce Clause based on interest group alignment