Mistretta V. United States (1989) “Non delegation” of Congressional Power

• Congress gave a Sentencing Commission the power to help set sentencing guidelines, which was challenged on the grounds the “nondelegation” principle (that Congress can not delegate its power to legislate. However, that argument was rejected because Congress ordered the commission to set standards based on the current codes, and clearly stated the objectives of Congress. It appears as if the Court wanted to reject the commission, but could not find a way to “give teeth” (Scalia) to the nondelegation doctrine

• Majority: BLACKMUN: The earlier cases invoking the nondelegation doctrine would be narrowly read to apply only in cases where congress made “crimes of acts never before criminalized or delegated regulatory power to private individuals.” In recent years, the application has been limited to the interpretation of statutory delegations that might otherwise be thought unconstitutional.

Ins V. Chadha (1983): Legislative Veto

• Congress authorized the Attorney General to suspend the deportation of aliens, subject to disapproval from one of the Houses of Congress. The Supreme Court held oral arguments twice, and under rare circumstance, representative from the House and Senate participated in the argument.

• Majority: BURGER: The Court held all legislative vetoes were unconstitutional because they violated the PRESENTMENT Clause. In addition, the one-House veto was unconstitutional because it violated the principle of bicameralism (which requires action by both Houses). Whenever congressional action has “the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties and relations of persons” outside the legislative branch, Congress must act through both Houses in a bill presented to the President.

Clinton V. City of New York (1998): Separation of Powers, Line Item Veto

• This case consolidates two separate challenges to the constitutionality of two cancellations, made by President Clinton, under the Line Item Veto Act. The issue is whether the President's ability to selectively cancel individual portions of bills, under the Line Item Veto Act, violates the Presentment Clause of Article I.

• Majority: STEVENS: The challengers suffered sufficiently immediate and concrete injuries to sustain their standing to challenge the President's actions. The Court then explained that under the PRESENTMENT Clause, legislation that passes both Houses of Congress must either be entirely approved or rejected by the President. The Court held that by canceling only selected portions of the bills at issue, the President in effect "amended" the laws before him. Such discretion, the Court concluded, violated the "finely wrought" legislative procedures of Article I as envisioned by the Framers. The court believes that the act violates the LITERAL text of Constitution.

• Dissent: BREYER, O’CONNOR, SCALIA: The literal interpretation is wrong because Congress, by a majority, allowed the President to reject a provision, as if Congress has placed the phrase within each and every provision. Congress can take it back with a simple majority vote. (What would happen if one house no longer wanted it?) Second, there is a difference between a “spending” provision and “tax” provision because it is no longer feasible for Congress pass each provision separately.