Heart of Atlanta Motel (1964): Commerce Clause, Civil Rights Act 1964

• Title II of Civil Rights Ac prohibits racial discrimination in places of public accommodation affecting interstate commerce. The act covered inns, hotels, restaurants, cafeterias and movie theaters. The motel limited its clientele to white persons, and claimed the act exceeded the power of Congress

• Majority: CLARK: The hotel advertised on Interstate highways, known to have interstate travelers on it. Also, 75% of clientele were from out of state. The Court also reaffirms McCulloch stating that Congress could regulate intrastate commerce that has an effect on interstate commerce.

Katzenbach V. McClung (1964): Commerce Clause, Civil Rights Act 1964

• Another Civil Rights case, a BBQ joint in Alabama, locate near an interstate was on trial for not serving blacks. The argument was made that food was bought from other cities, as well as the effect on blacks attempting interstate travel.

• Majority: CLARK: “discrimination in restaurants had a direct and highly restrictive effect upon interstate travel by Negroes.” He said “Negroes” had a right to prepared food while traveling, or interstate travel was “obstructed”. Also, the amount of food purchased was still not significant to the meat industry (following Wickard v. Filburn), it was a substantial part of this BBQ.

• Concurring: BLACK: recognized that some isolated and remote lunchroom which sells to local people and buys supplies locally may be out of reach of the power of congress to regulate commerce.

Us V. Lopez (1995): Commerce Clause, Guns in school zone

• Lopez, a senior in high school brought a gun into a school zone, violating the Gun-Free school zone Act of 1990. The court, 5-4 rejects the Gun-Free act is authorized by commerce clause

• Majority: RHENQUIST: Commerce clause “must be considered in the light of our dual system of government and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote to embrace them…” Rehnquist set up the three broad categories of activities Congress could regulate under the commerce clause. 1) Use of channels of interstate commerce (Darby, Heart of Atlanta) 2) regulate and protect instrumentalities of interstate commerce, even though the threat is from intrastate activities (Shreveport Rate) 3) Those activities with a “substantial relation” to interstate commerce (Jones & Laughlin). "Guns in school zones" does not have this affect.

• Concurring: KENNEDY, O’CONNOR: This is a criminal statute, and the conduct of the actors is not commercial. Also, stresses the importance of Federal v. State interests as a fundamental concept to framers of Constitution.

• Concurring: THOMAS: Thomas argues for a strict definition of “commerce” as the was intended at writing. He talks of the problems of giving “commerce” a definition to accommodate modern advances. Thomas would not apply commerce to manufacturing or agriculture.

• Dissent: BREYER, STEVENS, SOUTER, GINSBURG: when determining a “significant” (“substantial” not broad enough) affect on interstate, do not consider single act, consider all similar acts. Also, Congress should determine if commerce clause is reasonably applied, and should be given lead way. The opinion claims that the majority opinion runs contrary to previous Supreme Court decisions (Perez, McClung). Also, the opinion points out the legal uncertainty of the hundreds of (criminal) statutes Congress has passed relying on the commerce clause.